PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2015
The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library.

NOTES:

- “CL” means the lecture is a Core Lecture for one of the Honour Schools papers.

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes past the hour, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as “M. 10” will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)

- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.

- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms are: the Ryle Room (1st floor), the Lecture Room (2nd floor), and the Seminar Room (3rd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room (ground floor) and Meeting Room 4 (3rd floor).

- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.

- “Schools” refers to the Examination Schools (75 – 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

*PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy*: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

*Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy*: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy; Turing (CSP only)

*Literae Humaniores*: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

**Plato: Euthyphro and Meno**
Prof Lindsay Judson – M. W. 11 (*week 1 only*), Christ Church (Blue Boar Lecture Room)

These lectures, intended primarily for Classics Mods students taking the Plato paper, reprise the series from Michaelmas Term 2014, which was unavoidably curtailed. Handouts are available on Weblearn.

**Early Greek Philosophy**
Dr Anna Marmodoro – T. Th. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4 – no lecture Th. week 2*), Schools

These lectures are primarily, but not exclusively, aimed at those studying Early Greek Philosophy and offering this paper for Mods. They will explore the origins and early development of philosophical thinking in Greece, in a variety of areas: cosmology, psychology ethics and theology. The lectures will be structured as follows: 1. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes; 2. Heraclitus; 3. Parmenides; 4. Zeno; 5. Xenophanes; 6. Empedocles; 7. Anaxagoras; 8. Democritus.

Please note that in week 2 there will be an office hour in lieu of lecture 4. The office hour will be on Weds 28 of January at 12pm in Corpus Christi.

**General Philosophy**
Prof Ofra Magidor – W. 12, Schools

This class will cover the topics set out in the General Philosophy Syllabus: Mind and Body, Personal Identity, Free Will, Knowledge, Scepticism, Induction, and God and Evil. The last week will be devoted to questions from students.
Moral Philosophy: Mill, *Utilitarianism*
Prof Cecile Fabre – Th. 12, Schools

These lectures will focus on the text of, and on some of the main issues raised by, J. S. Mill’s *Utilitarianism*. Topics covered will include pleasure, happiness and the good life; the forms of utilitarianism; consequentialism; Mill’s ‘proof’ of the utility principle; and rights and justice.

Elements of Deductive Logic
Dr Brian King – T. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Elements of Deductive Logic builds on last term’s Introduction to Logic lectures. It is aimed at students sitting Prelims in Maths & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy, and Computer Science & Philosophy. The only set text is Halbach’s *Logic Manual*, knowledge of which will be assumed. The course content is primarily metalogical and the focus will be heavily on truth-functional metalogic, with some discussion of quantified metalogic toward the end.

Turing: “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”
Prof Peter Millican – Th. 12, Schools

These lectures, designed for the first year course in Computer Science and Philosophy, start with the background to Alan Turing’s 1936 paper “On Computable Numbers”, including Hilbert’s programme, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and Cantor’s results concerning the countability of infinite sets. They then work in detail through the 1936 paper, using Charles Petzold’s book *The Annotated Turing* (which contains the entire paper, together with comprehensive discussion) as a basis. Finally, the last couple of lectures will turn to Turing’s 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, discussing some of the philosophical issues arising from the Turing Test and Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment.
Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are core lectures for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account.

Students should also refer to the section Other Lectures, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers. In particular, this term’s lecture series on Frege’s philosophy of language (given by Michael Price) might particularly interest students taking 108 Philosophy of Logic and Language and 117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke
Prof Anita Avramides – T. 10, Schools

These lectures are primarily intended for those studying for the History of Philosophy paper (101). Others are most welcome to attend.

Lecture 1: General introduction to Locke, the man and his work. Other issues to be discussed: the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy; the relationship between philosophy and science; Locke’s corpuscularianism; Locke and his relationship to the Scholastics; Locke’s empiricism.

Lecture 2: Locke’s understanding of knowledge and its limits; Locke and scepticism: does Locke have a satisfactory response to the sceptical issues that plagued Descartes?

Lecture 3: Locke’s reaction to innatism and his empiricist alternative.

Lecture 4: A general discussion of Locke on substance and real essence.

Lecture 5: Locke’s idea of abstraction as a way of coming by generality is presented; Berkeley’s criticism of the idea of abstraction and his alternative for achieving generality is then discussed.

Lecture 6: Locke on Personal Identity

Lectures 7 & 8 to be announced closer to the time
101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume
Prof Peter Kail – W. 10 (not on in week 5), Schools

These lectures are for paper 101, Early Modern Philosophy, and offer an overview of the set text, Book I Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*. I shall follow the major contours of the Hume’s masterpiece, introduce its main themes, discuss its coherence and Hume’s overall aims. The topics covered include naturalism and scepticism, causal inference and the so-called problem of induction, causal powers and realism, the external world, the self and Hume’s dissatisfaction with his account it. For an introduction to the work, see Peter Kail “David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature” in John Shand (ed.) *The Central Works of Philosophy* Vol. 2, Acumen Press (2005). Students should use either the Oxford Student edition (ed. Norton or Norton) or the older, but still acceptable, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (again Oxford University Press).

103 Ethics I: Metaethics
Dr Felix Pinkert – F. 10, Schools

These lectures are part of 103 Ethics and provide an introduction to metaethics. The intended audience is the undergraduates taking 103 Ethics.

Metaethics examines the semantics of ethical statements, the nature of ethical judgment, the epistemological status of (supposed) ethical beliefs, and the metaethics of (purported) ethical properties and facts. Metaethics asks questions such as "What do the words 'right' and 'good' mean?", "What is the nature of moral judgements?", "Are there moral facts? And if so, what kind of fact are they?", "Can we have justified moral beliefs?", "Can we have rational debates about moral questions?", "Can we have moral knowledge?".

The lectures introduce key metaethical theories along a spectrum of increasing "objectivity". The spectrum begins with expressivist views which deny that moral judgments even purport to be true, continues on to "subjectivist" views which deny that moral judgments refer to objective, observer-independent truths, and ends with objectivist or realist views.

Provisional schedule:
1) Introduction to metaethics; arguments for non-cognitivism, the Humean argument for non-cognitivism
2) Problems for non-cognitivism: The Frege-Geach Problem, quasi-realism, arguments for cognitivism
3) Cognitivism and moral motivation: Motivational internalism & externalism
3) Naturalist cognitivism: The Open Question Argument, semantic vs. metaphysical naturalism
4) Naturalist cognitivism: Subjectivism, cultural relativism; functionalism, and constructivism; problems for naturalism
5) Non-Naturalism cognitivism: The strangeness objection & the challenge to explain
supervenience
6) Non-Naturalism cognitivism: The problem of moral knowledge, intuitionism, experimental philosophy critiques of intuition
7) Mixed theories: Error theory, fictionalism, hybrid expressivism
8) Summary and outlook: The relation between metaethics and normative ethics

The lectures are supplemented by a smaller discussion class directly after the lectures. Places are limited to about 30 students, and are allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis, with priority given first to Finalists, then to second-year philosophy students, and then to everyone else. The discussion class requires students to prepare a short (max 5 minutes) answer to a set question and to be prepared to present and discuss this answer in class. The question for week 1 is "'Non-cognitivism cannot account for the difference between moral judgments on the one hand, and judgments of aesthetics, taste, and mere preference on the other. Therefore non-cognitivism is false.' Is this a good argument?"

If you wish to attend this class, please sign up by emailing felix.pinkert@philosophy.ox.ac.uk, stating whether you are a Finalist, second-year student, or fall into a different category.

104 Philosophy of Mind II
Prof Ian Phillips – Th. 10, Schools

These lectures are intended to complement those given by Prof Avramides in MT. They will investigate the nature of a variety of different aspects of mind and their interrelations. Time permitting we will consider debates and puzzles about the nature of perception, memory, imagination, pain and bodily sensation, emotion, action, volition and those states commonly classed as propositional attitudes: knowledge, belief, desire and intention. A helpful introductory text is Anthony Kenny's *The Metaphysics of Mind* (OUP, 1992) which follows the structure of Gilbert Ryle's classic *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, 1949).

106b Philosophy of Social Science
Dr Louise Braddock– Th. 10, Schools

Provisional lecture timetable (may be altered)

1. Explanation
2. Interpretation
3. Realism
4. Relativism
5. Values
6. Individualism and Holism
7. Functionalism
8. Rational Choice
In the philosophy of social science questions of ontology and method revolve around one another. But institutional and doctrinal considerations of different traditions have shaped social investigation.

Consonant with the success of natural science, the focus of analytic philosophy has been on method: questions of ontology, as well as of epistemology, are largely taken as answered. One challenge to this position arises from the very different tradition of social study that emanates from Continental philosophical thought and grounds the interpretive tradition. More recently there is a line of thought emerging from developments in the social sciences that offers a more complex picture of social investigation. The lecture topics, selected from a much wider field, will examine the evolution of social scientific methodology while retaining a focus, often lost in methodological debates, on ontology.

107 Philosophy of Religion
Dr Tim Mawson – Th. 4, Schools

These lectures will seek to introduce the main philosophical arguments pertaining to the Western monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Those who believe that there is a God of the sort Jews, Christians and Muslims worship believe that there is a being who is personal, incorporeal/transcendent, omnipresent/immanent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, perfectly free, perfectly good, and necessary. He has created the world; He is a source of moral obligations for us; He has revealed Himself to us; and He has offered us everlasting life. In these lectures, I shall first explore the meaning and consistency of this – the classical theistic conception of God and then move on to consider some of the traditional arguments for and against the existence of such a being; specifically, I shall consider the Design Argument; the Cosmological Argument; the Ontological Argument; the Argument from Religious Experience; the Argument from Apparent Miracles; and the Problem of Evil. Finally, I shall consider Pascals’ Wager and the relation between faith and reason.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Hegel
Prof William Mander – T. 11 (except week 5: F. 9), Schools

1. Introductory
2. *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1)
3. *Phenomenology of spirit* (2)
4. Logic (1)
5. Logic (2)
6. Ethics and politics
7. History
8. Art, religion and Philosophy
**113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Sartre, Merleau-Ponty**  
Dr Katherine Morris – W. 11, Schools

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were the two most prominent figures in French existential phenomenology. They were, moreover, friends and contemporaries, and each other’s best critics. This lecture series critically explores major themes from their best-known works (Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* and Merleau-Ponty’s *The Phenomenology of Perception*), indicating both commonalities and differences. Provisional programme:

Week I: Phenomenology and existential philosophy  
Week II: Intentionality I: consciousness and the pre-reflective cogito  
Week III: Bad faith  
Week IV: Intellectual prejudices and the return to phenomena  
Week V: The body I  
Week VI: Intentionality II/The body II: operative intentionality  
Week VII: Others, the look and intersubjectivity  
Week VIII: Freedom

**114 Theory of Politics**  
Prof Daniel McDermott and Prof Daniel Butt – T. 12, Schools

**115 /130 Plato: Republic**  
Prof Terence Irwin and Dr Damien Storey – W. Th. 2, Schools

Further details will be found on WebLearn, which you should consult before the first lecture.

These lectures are intended for anyone who is offering the Republic in any of the Honour Schools, and for others who may be interested. We do not intend to cover all the topics that might be discussed, or even all the topics that might appear in a Finals paper. But we intend (a) to discuss some of the main philosophical questions that might be raised about the dialogue; and (b) to say enough about Plato’s other dialogues to allow a well-informed reading of the Republic.

In general, Lectures 2-8 will be mostly about moral and political philosophy (including moral psychology), and Lectures 9-16 will be mostly about metaphysics and epistemology. But this division is only approximate. The Republic is interesting partly because Plato’s views on all these topics are often closely connected, and one of our aims will be to underline, but not to exaggerate, this degree of connexion between different areas of his thought.
The following is a more detailed, but still approximate, guide to the topics of the lectures.

1. What is the Republic about?
Why and when did Plato write the Republic? Its place in the Platonic Dialogues.

2. Book i. What is its place in the dialogue?
What sort of virtue is justice?
Thrasymachus’ case against justice
What is wrong with Socrates’ reply?

3. Glaucon and Adeimantus.
A second attack on justice; how does it differ from Thrasymachus’ attack?
What questions do they ask Socrates?
Are these the right questions?
Where does Socrates answer them?

4. The three parts of the soul
What is being divided? Thought and desire? Types of desire?
What is the point of the division? Conflicts of motives. The character of a part of the soul.
How reasonable is Plato’s division?

5. The virtues
The real or alleged correspondence between the virtues and the parts of the soul.
What is the connexion between the virtues? Can someone have any one of them without the others?

6. The defence of justice
How good is Plato’s defence of the virtue that he calls justice? Justice and happiness.
How good is the answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus? Is the virtue that he calls justice really justice?
The role of Books V-IX in Plato’s answer.

7. Political theory
Plato’s diagnosis of the flaws of existing societies.
Class struggle and political instability.
Why philosophers need to rule.
The family and the state.
The role of women.

8. Plato’s ideal state.
What is the aim of Plato’s state?
Does it remove the flaws identified in Plato’s diagnosis?
What is the point of Plato’s description? Is it relevant to political action?
9. Belief and knowledge 1
What is controversial about Plato’s views about belief and knowledge? How do they relate to the ethical and political views?
Overview of Plato’s argument for his division between belief and knowledge in book V.

10. Belief and Knowledge 2
A detailed look at the argument in book V and the various interpretive challenges it presents.

11. Sun, Line, and Cave 1
Plato’s theory of Forms.
The image of the Sun and the special role of the ‘Form of the Good’.

12. Sun, Line, and Cave 2
What is Plato trying to show us with the images of the Sun, Line, and Cave?
The four divisions of the Divided Line and Plato’s distinctions between two kinds of belief and two kinds of knowledge.

13. Sun, Line, and Cave 2
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.
How are the images of the Sun, Line, and Cave related? And what does this tell us about how we should interpret the Cave?

14. Psychology in books VIII–X
What do we learn about the parts of the soul from books VIII–X?
Psychic unity/disunity and the difference between vicious and virtuous souls.
What does it mean for the appetitive, spirited, or rational part to ‘rule’ the soul?

15. Poetry in Book X 1
Plato’s application of his psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics to the question ‘what is imitative art?’

16. Poetry in Book X 2
Are Plato’s views of imitation in book III and X consistent?
The ‘greatest charge’ against imitative poetry: that it is capable of corrupting even ‘decent men’.
Is the Republic itself an example of imitative art? If not, why not?
116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*
Dr Tom Ainsworth – T. 10, Schools

The lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It is suggested that attendees bring a copy of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The topics that will be covered (subject to possible future revisions) are:

1. *eudaimonia* and the function argument
2. *eudaimonia* in Books I and X
3. virtue and the doctrine of the mean
4. the voluntary
5. practical wisdom
6. akrasia
7. pleasure
8. friendship

118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein
Prof Bill Child – W. 12, Schools

Intended Audience: Undergraduates studying the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein option. Anyone else interested in Wittgenstein.

Topics to be covered include: Augustine’s conception of language; meaning and use; rules and rule following; sensation language and the private language sections; the inner and the outer. The lectures will aim to introduce students to Wittgenstein’s views, to discuss competing interpretations, and to offer some assessment of those views in the light of other philosophical treatments of the same themes. No previous familiarity with Wittgenstein will be assumed.
120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity
Prof Harvey Brown and Prof Oliver Pooley – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The course investigates the conceptual foundations of special relativity and various philosophical implications of the theory. It starts with an examination of the role of the relativity principle in Newtonian physics and its unexpected validity (absence of ether wind effects) in ether theories of electromagnetism. We will then see how Einstein, by using thermodynamics as a template, put different strands of 19th century physics together to create special relativity, and in the process illuminate the meaning of kinematics. New philosophical questions also arise, including: to what extent are space and time parts of a more fundamental unitary entity (spacetime); whether the geometry of space time explains the behaviour of matter or vice versa; and to what extent ideas such as the passage of time, and persistence through time have to be modified or abandoned in the context of relativistic physics.

The lectures are primarily aimed at second and third year undergraduates in the Physics and Philosophy course, and will from time to time presuppose the corresponding level of knowledge of physics, but they are open to anyone.

The anticipated schedule is as follows:

Week 1 (HB) The relativity principle in Newtonian mechanics
Week 2 (HB) Length contraction and time dilation in 19th century ether theories
Week 3 (HB) Deriving the Keinstein (1705), Einstein (1905) and Ignatowski (1911) transformations
Week 4 (HB) Einstein’s 1905 “principle theory” approach and his later misgivings
Week 5 (OP) Special relativity as a theory of spacetime geometry
Week 6 (OP) The conventionality of simultaneity; the geometrical perspective on length contraction and time dilation; the twins paradox
Week 7 (OP) Geometrical versus dynamical explanation and spacetime ontology
Week 8 (OP) Relativity and the metaphysics of time

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics
Prof Harvey Brown – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of classes will cover contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics, with emphasis on the significance of symmetry principles, and the role of probability in statistical mechanics and in the Everett – Many Worlds – interpretation of quantum mechanics. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper. Others (especially BPhil students with a Philosophy of Physics interest) are welcome.
The provisional schedule is

Week 1: Noether’s theorem relating symmetries with conservation principles.
Week 2: The Aharonov-Bohm effect
Week 3: Boltzmann’s H-theorem and the Reversibility and Recurrence objections
Week 4: Thermodynamics vs statistical mechanics
Week 5: The Gibbsean approach to statistical mechanics and ergodicity
Week 6: The Boltzmannian approach and the past hypothesis
Week 7: Decoherence in quantum mechanics
Week 8: Probability in the Everett interpretation

After first week, we will be working through 1-2 relevant papers in each class, and it’s an expectation of attendance (at least for MSt/APP students) that you are willing to present the contents of one of the papers in a class at some point. Advance offers welcome (email harvey.brown@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

For preparation, you might (a) brush up the relevant physics; (b) look at David Wallace’s paper “What statistical mechanics actually does” (at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert0130/papers-sm.shtml#actualstatmech);
(c) if you have time, read chapters 1-4 of D. Albert, *Time and Chance*, Harvard University Press (2000)

127 Philosophical Logic
Prof James Studd – W. 12 (all weeks) and F. 12 (weeks 1 and 2), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127, but may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions and deviations of classical logic, focusing especially on modal logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider’s *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

**Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations**
*LFP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)*
Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism.
Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics
*LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)*
Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory
*LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4*
Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory
*LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)*
Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.
*LfP 4, 5*
Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC. Free logic.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains
*LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7*
Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics
*LfP 9.6, 10*
Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

Week 8. Counterfactuals.
*LfP 8*
Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course webpage: [www.jamesstudd.net/phillogic](http://www.jamesstudd.net/phillogic).

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133 Stoicism and its Critics (suitable for Latin Philosophy)
Prof Terence Irwin – T. 2 – 4, Keble College (Seminar Room 2)

This class is intended for those who would like to look more closely at the most systematic and sophisticated philosophical outlook in Antiquity. It does not presuppose knowledge of Stoicism. It should be suitable both for graduate students and for undergraduates offering the Latin Philosophy (Cicero and Seneca) in Greats.

We shall discuss passages from the Greats set texts, together with some of the other major sources for the study of Stoic ethics. We shall also consider the context of Stoic ethics by comparing it (i) with Plato and Aristotle, and (ii) with the views of other Hellenistic philosophers, especially Epicureans and Aristotelians.
Some of the main topics:

1. Stoic epistemology: appearance, assent, and rational belief
   A pervasive theme in Stoicism is the division between what is up to us and what is not. This division appears in Stoic epistemology as the division between appearance (phantasia) and assent (sunkatathesis). These are the components of rational belief.

2. Stoics, Sceptics, and action.
3. Emotions and false judgments.
4. Causation; responsibility; the compatibility of free will and determinism.
5. Happiness, the ultimate end, and the final good (eudaimonia).
6. Value: goods, evils, and indifferent.
7. The virtues. Unity and reciprocity of the virtues.
8. Why is virtue the only good? Why is virtue sufficient for happiness?

The main text will be Cicero’s *De Finibus*, supplemented from other sources. Everyone should read the relevant sections in Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. A longer syllabus will be found in Weblearn (Philosophy).

140 Plato: *Theaetetus*
Prof Michail Peramatzis – W. 12 (weeks 1 to 6), Worcester College (Seminar Room A)

Intended audience: those offering this option for Lit Hum Finals, and graduates, especially those contemplating offering Plato for the BPhil or the MSt in Ancient Philosophy.

The six lectures held in Hilary Term will examine the main claims and arguments developed in the *Theaetetus*: knowledge is perception; being and becoming; Protagoras’ self-refutation; the final refutation of the proposed definition of knowledge as sense perception; knowledge as true belief; false belief; Socrates’ dream; knowledge as true belief plus an ‘account’ (*logos*). There will be a discussion of the main interpretative and philosophical issues, as well as a presentation of the central scholarly debates. There will be a further series of six lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* in Trinity Term.

Text

Translation, Commentaries, and Introductory Reading

Hand-outs, and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.
141 Aristotle: Physics
Dr Ada Bronowski – Th. 2 to 4 (weeks 1 to 6), The Queen’s College (Lecture Room A)

The classes will cover the main themes charted in Aristotle’s Physics, following Aristotle’s inquiry into the principles of nature. Sessions will be devoted to the notions of matter and form and the principles of change through causal explanations. The proofs for the existence of space and time on the basis of the established principles of change will also be discussed culminating in a discussion of Aristotle’s identification of a first uncaused cause.

The sessions will be split into a general presentation and a close reading of selected passages. The text should be brought along to class and a short reading list specific to the theme of the week will be distributed in advance of each class.

A reliable companion to all the themes dealt with is Judson, L. (1991) Aristotle’s Physics, OUP.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
Dr Sophie Allen – T. 12.15, Schools

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of History and Philosophy of Science, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject Philosophy of Science in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along. There may be the possibility of arranging tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term “4683”).

17
Special Lectures

2015 Wilde Lectures: Spiritual traditions and human possibilities: Learning from the past about how to live well in the present
Prof Mark Wynn (Leeds) – M. 5 (except week 6: Th. 5), Schools

In these lectures I argue that spiritual traditions constitute historically extended experiments in human possibilities. So understood, these traditions provide a body of data concerning human nature that it is hard to replicate from other sources. So if we are to know how to live well in the present, we need to consider how we might retrieve, in an appropriately disciplined way, the cumulative wisdom, and also the mistakes, of such traditions. In these lectures, I aim to develop some of the conceptual resources that are necessary for this task of retrieval, by considering: the distinctive goods that are the object of spiritual practices; the epistemic significance of tradition in the transmission of spiritual ideals; and the relationship between the various vocabularies that are used to map the different phases of the spiritual life.

Lecture 1: Philosophy as a way of life

I consider Pierre Hadot’s account of ancient philosophies as primarily spiritual practices. I compare Hadot’s account of the nature of spiritual traditions with one implied in Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of neighbour love. The two differ over what constitutes a spiritual tradition, and what it takes to compare such traditions.

Lecture 2: Religious and secular conceptions of the human good

I consider further Aquinas’s account of neighbour love, and compare it with his treatment of the virtue of infused temperance. The difference between these throws light on the relation between religious and non-religious conceptions of the human good, and the extent to which religious ones can be made intelligible from a secular perspective.

Lecture 3: Metaphysics and experience

I consider how one and the same track of spiritual development may be differently described, depending on whether its transitions are picked out in metaphysical or experiential terms. I develop this theme by examining Thomas Aquinas’s account of the relationship between the acquired and infused moral virtues, and its connection to John of the Cross’s discussion of the active and passive phases of the Dark Night of the Soul. I argue that a metaphysical account sets only very general constraints on what it would be like to inhabit a world so conceived, and that our understanding of the spiritual life depends therefore upon the use of experiential as well as more metaphysical kinds of vocabulary.
Lecture 4: Enacted example in the spiritual life

Just as metaphysical descriptions of the phases of the spiritual life do not of themselves settle the question of what it would be like to inhabit a world so conceived, so metaphysical and experiential accounts together do not of themselves determine what kinds of bodily demeanour will best exemplify the values of a given spiritual tradition. Here, I consider why this should be so, and what follows for the induction of a person into a spiritual tradition.

Lecture 5: The epistemic significance of tradition

I consider how the perspective that I have been developing supports the idea that tradition has a key epistemic role in the spiritual life. Hadot’s account of the spiritual life does not give tradition such a role. But the respects in which I have elaborated on that account all point to a larger role for tradition in the handing on of spiritual ideals.

Lecture 6 (revised day – Thursday 26 February): The nature of faith

I consider how we might understand the nature of “faith”, taking as my focus Aquinas’s account of Christian faith. Faith on this account is voluntary, and I examine the nature of the goods at which it aims, and the extent to which they can be achieved even if some key Christian creedal claims should prove to be false. I then consider the practical rationality of faith, by considering the distinctive goods that are the focus of spiritual commitments.

Lecture 7: The existential dimension of religious thought

Theists have commonly supposed that thought about God adheres at least implicitly to the principle that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Here I consider the role of another principle in shaping religious thought, namely the principle that such thought succeeds in so far as its representation of the human condition deepens our conception of the significance of a human life. I develop this proposal by considering Aquinas’s use of the category of infused moral virtue. So this discussion extends the previous lecture on the nature of faith and the kinds of good that are the object of the commitment of faith.
Lecture 8: Understanding spiritual traditions and leading the spiritual life

I return to the theme that the major spiritual traditions are, potentially, part of our common human inheritance. I propose that the careful retrieval of these traditions is a singularly powerful way of acknowledging the significance of past human lives, and at the same time required if our own spiritual commitments are to be properly informed. In this way, in making those commitments, we can contribute to a shared human enterprise that has been centuries in the making.

The conception of the nature of spiritual goods that has emerged in the course of these lectures points to an enduring role for spiritual traditions, I argue, notwithstanding the many alternative visions of human well-being that are purveyed in contemporary cultures.

**2015 Ackrill Memorial Lecture: Colocation**
Prof Gábor Betegh (Cambridge) – Th. 5 (week 8), Brasenose College (Lecture Room XI)

An abstract will follow and be widely publicized in due course.
Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

Computing for Philosophers
Prof Peter Millican – T. 2 (week 2 onwards), Schools

These lectures aim to introduce students of Philosophy-related courses to computer programming, initially by covering the basics of coding (with no previous knowledge assumed), and then going on to show how this can facilitate investigation of philosophically interesting phenomena (e.g. economic, evolutionary, political and other social scenarios) through automated thought-experiments. Some indication of the extent of the potential links between Computing and Philosophy can be gleaned from the website www.philocomp.net. The lectures are associated with a new outreach project, based in the Faculty of Philosophy and part-funded by the government’s Department for Education, whose aim is to help in making computer programming – now seen as a key intellectual skill, and of great value to future employability – more widely available. Students who attend these lectures will subsequently be invited, if they wish, to participate in such outreach to their local schools, thus extending their own relevant skills in presentation and training as well as coding.

The Modern Sublime in Art, Philosophy and Theology
Prof Paul Fiddes and Prof Pamela Anderson – Th. 5 – 6.30 (weeks 5 to 8), Regent’s Park College

The seminars continue a project on ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful’, and will each take one modernist painter and relate him to a text in philosophy or theology with which he is associated. Each seminar will review a series of visual images, and the seminar leader will introduce a discussion of texts to be read beforehand by participants. Intending participants are asked to contact either Professor Anderson (pamela.anderson@regents.ox.ac.uk) or Professor Fiddes (paul.fiddes@regents.ox.ac.uk) and they will be sent electronic versions of the specified texts.

The seminars are intended for graduate students in any related disciplines, but undergraduates are not excluded.

Week 5. Paul Cézanne Introduced by Dr Bill Prosser

Week 6. Paul Klee Introduced by Prof. Paul S. Fiddes

Week 7. Francis Bacon Introduced by Prof. Pamela Sue Anderson

Week 8. Mark Rothko Introduced by Dr Bill Prosser
These lectures will explore a selection of Frege's most distinctive views in the philosophy of
language and the controversies to which they have given rise. We shall critically examine the
following Fregean views, among others: that names are possessed of a sense, as well
(ordinarily) as a reference; that predicates are a species of referring expression, referring to
functions of a particular variety; that the referents of predicates cannot be referred to with
singular terms; that sentences are a species of referring expression, referring to truth-values
conceived as objects; that an expression only has meaning in the context of a sentence. A
provisional schedule of topics for these lectures is as follows:

Lecture 1. Names
Lecture 2. Predicates
Lecture 3. Sentences
Lecture 4. Thoughts

No prior knowledge of Frege's thought will be assumed, but those attending may wish to
familiarise themselves with some of the following of Frege's essays (all to be found in The
Frege Reader, edited by Michael Beaney):

'On Sense and Reference' (1892) (appearing as 'On Sinn and Bedeutung' in The Frege
Reader) 'On Concept and Object' (1892) 'Function and Concept' (1891) 'Thought' (1918)

The lectures may be of particular interest to students taking 117 Frege, Russell,
However, anyone with an interest in Frege or the philosophy of language is welcome.

Set Theory Reading Group
Prof Alex Paseau – F. 1 – 3 (week 1: later sessions to be confirmed in the group
through term), Radcliffe Humanities (Meeting Room 4)

We are reading Chapter IV of Ken Kunen's Set Theory (College Publications, 2011 ed. or 2013
revised ed.). This chapter introduces forcing, one of the highlights of 20th century logic. In
the first meeting we will discuss pp. 244-9 of the 2013 edition (2011 edition: from the start
of chapter IV to Notation IV.2.17). The week 1 location is Meeting Room 4; later venues will
be confirmed week by week. All are welcome (and are welcome to bring a sandwich lunch).
Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty’s BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

Stoicism and its Critics
Prof Terence Irwin – T. 2 – 4, Keble College (Seminar Room 2)

This class is intended for those who would like to look more closely at the most systematic and sophisticated philosophical outlook in Antiquity. It does not presuppose knowledge of Stoicism. It should be suitable both for graduate students and for undergraduates offering the Latin Philosophy (Cicero and Seneca) in Greats.

We shall discuss passages from the Greats set texts, together with some of the other major sources for the study of Stoic ethics. We shall also consider the context of Stoic ethics by comparing it (i) with Plato and Aristotle, and (ii) with the views of other Hellenistic philosophers, especially Epicureans and Aristotelians.

Some of the main topics:

1. Stoic epistemology: appearance, assent, and rational belief
   A pervasive theme in Stoicism is the division between what is up to us and what is not. This division appears in Stoic epistemology as the division between appearance (phantasia) and assent (sunkatathesis). These are the components of rational belief.
2. Stoics, Sceptics, and action.
3. Emotions and false judgments.
4. Causation; responsibility; the compatibility of free will and determinism.
5. Happiness, the ultimate end, and the final good (eudaimonia).
2. Value: goods, evils, and indifferents.
3. The virtues. Unity and reciprocity of the virtues.
4. Why is virtue the only good? Why is virtue sufficient for happiness?

The main text will be Cicero’s De Finibus, supplemented from other sources. Everyone should read the relevant sections in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. A longer syllabus will be found in Weblearn (Philosophy).
Ockham’s Ontology I
Prof Cecilia Trifogli – Th. 11 – 1 (even weeks), Radcliffe Humanities (Meeting Room 4)

I will present Ockham's view on the ontological status of relations. Ockham's view is reductionist: he maintains that relations are not real things distinct from their relata. For example, the relation of similarity in colour between two white things is not a third thing in addition to the two white things. I will also present the main realist position about relations that Ockham attacks, that is, that of Duns Scotus.

Feminism in/and Philosophy
Prof Pamela Anderson – W. 9 – 11 (weeks 1 to 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Feminism and/in Philosophy will ask why ‘feminism’ and ‘philosophy’ have been thought to be mutually exclusive; and the class will read contemporary feminist philosophers such as Sally Haslanger who aim to transform the field of analytic philosophy from within. BPhil contributions to the class will include presenting feminist issues in analytic philosophy and/or leading discussion of significant philosophical work by feminist philosophers; so, the material covered will depend to a certain degree on those contributing to the class. We will aim to define the term ‘feminist’ and to debate the significance of Michèle Le Doeuff’s claim that: ‘[When one is] a woman and a philosopher, it is useful to be a feminist in order to understand what is happening to you... the term feminist here in its most basic sense of someone who knows that something is still not right in the relations between a woman and everybody else, in other words men, other women, the supposedly impersonal agents of institutions, and anyone else: some hitch that is... liable to manifest itself, but which you must learn to identify in everyday situations and conversations’ (Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, p. 28). This is a BPhil class; other graduates and interested Philosophy undergraduates are welcome to attend, but it would be helpful for planning, if those interested in the class would make themselves known in Week 1.

Selected Readings
Leibniz
Prof Paul Lodge – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will be a study of a number of the major themes in Leibniz’s philosophy as expounded in his only published book, the *Theodicy*.

Topics to be studied will include Leibniz’s conceptions of:

1) the best of all possible worlds  
2) necessity and contingency  
3) freedom  
4) the causal efficacy of created things  
5) the relationship between faith and reason  
6) divine justice in the context of the problem of evil

Recommended reading for the first meeting is the Preface to the *Theodicy*. The standard English translation of text of is available electronically at: [http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17147](http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17147)

Kant and the Philosophy of Mind
Prof Anil Gomes and Dr Andrew Stephenson – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will be based around the edited collection *Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: new essays on consciousness, judgement, and the self*, forthcoming with OUP. We will be reading papers from the collection from amongst the following authors: Patricia Kitcher, Paul Snowdon, Andrew Chignell, Ralf Bader, Katherine Dunlop, Tobias Rosefeldt, Stefanie Grüne, Lucy Allais, Robert Hanna, Jill Buroker, Ralph Walker, Jessica Leech, Ken Westphal, Dina Emundts. There will be a workshop involving some of the authors on 16-17 January 2015.

Topics covered in the volume include: self-knowledge, Kant and Strawson on persons, temporal experience, the object-dependence of intuition, synthesis and binding, the role of the will in judgement, the nature of the self, and others. Draft versions of the papers will be available for participants in the class. Graduate students will be asked to present comments on one of the papers over the course of the term.
Philosophy of Science
Prof Simon Saunders – W. 3 – 5, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class is intended for those offering Philosophy of Science in the BPhil, for Philosophy of Physics MSt students, and for anyone else who might be interested. Some degree of background in philosophy of science will be assumed, such as might be acquired by having attended the core lectures for FHS in philosophy of science, given in Michaelmas term.

The class includes both historical and topical elements. We shall begin with the origins of logical empiricism and the reasons for its decline, and move on to consider debates about realism, naturalism, scientific representation, and structuralism. From week 2, each class will begin with a discussion of one or at most two pieces of reading, relating to a topic of the previous class, which everyone attending the class will be expected to have read and to have thought about. (See Weblearn for details of the proposed readings, and for some background and further readings.) A volunteer will be sought to lead each discussion.

Useful books to read for this class include Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (OUP 1980), W.V. Quine, In Pursuit of Truth (Harvard, 1990), and several papers anthologised in D. Papineau, Philosophy of Science (1996).

Provisional schedule:

Week 1: The Vienna Circle
Week 2: Logical empiricism
Week 3: Carnap’s structuralism
Week 4: van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism
Week 5: Naturalism
Week 6: Carnap and Kuhn
Week 7: Structural realism
Week 8: Scientific representation

Philosophy of Physics
Prof Harvey Brown – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of classes will cover contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics, with emphasis on the significance of symmetry principles, and the role of probability in statistical mechanics and in the Everett – Many Worlds – interpretation of quantum mechanics. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper. Others (especially BPhil students with a Philosophy of Physics interest) are welcome.
The provisional schedule is

Week 1:  Noether’s theorem relating symmetries with conservation principles.

Week 2:  The Aharonov-Bohm effect

Week 3:  Boltzmann’s H-theorem and the Reversibility and Recurrence objections

Week 4:  Thermodynamics vs statistical mechanics

Week 5:  The Gibbsean approach to statistical mechanics and ergodicity

Week 6:  The Boltzmannian approach and the past hypothesis

Week 7:  Decoherence in quantum mechanics

Week 8:  Probability in the Everett interpretation

After first week, we will be working through 1-2 relevant papers in each class, and it’s an expectation of attendance (at least for MST/APP students) that you are willing to present the contents of one of the papers in a class at some point. Advance offers welcome (email harvey.brown@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

For preparation, you might (a) brush up the relevant physics; (b) look at David Wallace’s paper “What statistical mechanics actually does” (at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert0130/papers-sm.shtml#actualstatmech);

(c) if you have time, read chapters 1-4 of D. Albert, *Time and Chance*, Harvard University Press (2000)

**Conditionals**
Prof John Hawthorne – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

**Topics in Mind and Language: Reasoning, judgment, and experiments for philosophers**
Prof Philipp Koralus and Dr Salvador Mascarenhas – F. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we will explore approaches to issues in reasoning and judgment from both philosophy and psychology, including propositional reasoning, reasoning about probabilities, and moral judgment. We will pay special attention to what psychology ought to learn from philosophical approaches, and vice versa.

The seminar will contain a practical module on basic experimental methods for philosophers. Seminar participants will form teams to develop and implement their own studies on topics discussed in class.
Logical Consequence
Dr Owen Griffiths – W. 2, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Logical consequence is the central concept of philosophical logic. This course will explore recent definitions of logical consequence as well as the closely related topics of logical form and the logical constants. The course is aimed at graduate students, those taking the Philosophy of Logic and Language finals paper, and anyone else who is interested in core issues in philosophical logic. The plan is as follows.

Week 1: The intuitive concept of logical consequence

As Tarski noted, the concept of logical consequence 'is one whose introduction into the field of strict formal investigation was not a matter of arbitrary decision on the part of this or that investigator; in defining this concept, efforts were made to adhere to the common usage of the language of everyday life'. We will consider what this 'common usage' is, and whether 'the intuitive concept of logical consequence' is a myth.

Week 2: Logical consequence and logical form

The slogan that logical consequence is in virtue of logical form is common. We will consider quite what the slogan amounts to and whether it is in any interesting sense true.

Week 3: Model-theoretic logical consequence

The now standard definition of logical consequence is model-theoretic. We will investigate this definition, the extent to which it differs from Tarski's original, and whether it succeeds in capturing our intuitions about logical consequence.

Week 4: Etchemendy on logical consequence

John Etchemendy's 'The Concept of Logical Consequence' was an influential attack on the model-theoretic definition which has to a large extent shaped the subsequent literature. We will critically consider Etchemendy's objections.

Week 5: Formal and informal consequence

Writers frequently defend or attack definitions of logical consequence by comparing them to the intuitive notion of logical consequence. However, the intuitive notion is imprecise and generally applies to natural language, whereas formal notions are precise and generally apply to formal languages, so it is not clear how the two should be compared. We will consider the methodological question of how to compare the two. This will include a detailed discussion of Georg Kreisel's influential squeezing argument and modern abuses of it.
Week 6: Proof-theoretic logical consequence

The major alternative to the model-theoretic approach is the proof-theoretic definition. We will investigate various formulations of this definition and compare it to the model-theoretic approach.

Week 7: Model-theoretic approaches to the logical constants

One crucial feature of any account of logical consequence is the selection of logical constants. We will explore one criterion for logical nature that fits naturally with the model-theoretic approach: permutation invariance. We will consider modern formulations of this approach from e.g. Gila Sher and Vann McGee, and recent criticisms from e.g. Solomon Feferman and Denis Bonnay.

Week 8: Proof-theoretic approaches to the logical constants

The proof-theoretic approach to logical consequence fits naturally with an inferentialist criterion for the logical constants. We will consider various formulations of this approach and how it fits into a global inferentialist project. We will discuss the constraint of harmony that inferentialists usually demand of the logical constants and whether it delivers a plausible extension of 'logical constant'.

The Justification and Limits of Defensive Harming

Prof Jeff McMahan – W. 2 – 4 (weeks 1, 2, 5 – 7), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

In this seminar we will consider what justifications there may be for harming some people as a means or side effect of defending others from harm. Most accounts of the permissibility of defensive harming are based on the idea that threateners make themselves morally liable to defensive harm. From most restrictive to most permissive, the main accounts hold that people become liable to harm because they (1) are culpably responsible for a threat of wrongful harm, (2) are responsible for a threat of wrongful harm, (3) threaten to violate someone’s right, (4) pose a threat of harm to another. A fifth type of view is disjunctive, claiming that a potential victim may act in self-defense when the person who threatens her satisfies either condition 1 or condition 2 or, if the threatener satisfies neither condition, the potential victim has an agent-relative permission to give priority to her own life over that of the nonresponsible threatener. After discussing these and other views, we will concentrate on certain problems concerning the limits of permissible defense, in particular the necessity and proportionality constraints. We will begin by determining the precise nature of each constraint – for example, how each differs from but is related to the other. We will then consider how each is related to the notion of liability. Are necessity and proportionality “internal” to liability, in the sense that a person cannot be liable to suffer an unnecessary or disproportionate harm?
Among the other questions we will discuss are the following. Is proportionality determined by reference to the amount of harm that a threatener would cause or by the strength of the right that he would otherwise violate? Is causation necessary for liability to defensive harm—that is, can a person be liable to be harmed only as a means of preventing a harm that he would cause, or might a person be liable to be harmed even if he does not in fact pose a threat (for example, because he is engaged in an unsuccessful attempt, or because he is bluffing)? If the justification for defensive harming is individual liability, how can the number of aggressors be relevant to proportionality? Can there be collective liability to defensive harm? Can a person who threatens to cause only a tiny harm to each of a large number of people be liable to a serious harm, such as being killed, as a means of preventing him from acting?


Intro to Probability and Decision Theory
Prof Frank Arntzenius – T. 9 - 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will be an introduction to probability theory, formal epistemology and decision theory, focusing on Bayesianism. There will probably be a continuation of this class next academic year, in a term yet to be decided, when I will mostly focus on slightly more advanced topics. There are no pre-requisites (technical or otherwise); as long as one does not have a horror of symbols one should be able to take this class.

Some possible essay questions:
- Can Adams’ probability logic give a satisfactory response to Lewis’s triviality results?
- What is the relation between (outright) beliefs and credences?
- Is ratifiability a constraint on rational decisions?
- Is expressivism about objective chances tenable?
- Can representation theorems separate utilities from credences in a satisfactory manner?
- Are accuracy arguments better than Dutch book arguments and representation theorems?
- Do sleeping beauty type examples show that the Principal Principle needs to be modified?
- Does the undermining problem show that Humeanism about chances is impossible?
Week 1: Introduction to probability theory
Required Reading. Richard Jeffrey: Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Chapter 1

Week 2: Introduction to Bayesian epistemology

Week 3: Introduction to Bayesian decision theory. Causal versus evidential decision theory

Week 4: What are objective probabilities?
Required Reading. Lawrence Sklar: Physics and Chance. Chapter 3, section II.


Week 6: Other accounts of credences.
Required Reading. Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson: Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence. (See http://fitelson.org/ace.pdf)

Week 7: Chances and credences

Week 8: Self-locating credences

Tentative plan for continuation next academic year

Week 1: Epistemic decision theory
Week 2: Jeffrey conditionalisation and commutativity
Week 3: Game theory and decision theory
Week 4: Group rationality
Week 5: Infinity in probability theory and decision theory
Week 6: Regularity
Week 7: Alternatives to Bayesian epistemology
Week 8: Alternatives to Bayesian decision theory

Other possible topics:
Diachronic versus synchronic coherence
Mushy credences
Decisions under ambiguity
Disagreement
Liarlike paradoxes for credences
This seminar is concerned with metaphysical and formal questions regarding the nature and structure of values. Drawing on metaphysical tools and formal machinery, we will investigate the structures of different value theories, identify their presuppositions and implications, as well as evaluate their plausibility, focusing in particular on the question as to what types of values there are, how values can interact and vary across contexts, how one is to understand holism in the theory of value, and how one is to individuate and aggregate values. By examining the underlying metaphysical and axiological structures, traditional ethical questions can be clarified, our understanding of competing theories and principles can be enhanced, choice-points at which theories diverge can be identified, and desiderata that should be met and constraints that have to be satisfied can be determined. All of this allows us to rule out a number of candidate theories, clarify long-standing ethical disputes and get a better understanding of what the correct final theory will look like.

1. Meta-ethics v. the metaphysics of value
2. Conditional value structures
3. Conditional intrinsic value
4. Extrinsic value
5. Additivity/separability
6. Organic unities
7. Varieties of holism
8. Modification: agent-relative value

(Readings will be posted on Weblearn on Mondays.)
Topics will probably be (in order)

Legal Philosophy
Dr Ambrose Lee – Th. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The aim of this class is to look at some of the central topics and debates in legal philosophy. In each seminar, we shall discuss in detail the arguments of three or four important contributions to the topic in question, and one or two students will be asked to lead the discussion off with a short presentation of them. Some of the issues that will be discussed in this class are also central to political philosophy, thus this class can also serve as an introduction to at least some of the topics in political philosophy. No prior knowledge of law or legal philosophy is presumed.
The provisional programme of this class is as follows:

Week 1: Legal Positivism  
Week 2: Natural Law  
Week 3: Law as Integrity and Interpretation  
Week 4: Rights  
Week 5: Authority  
Week 6: Punishment  
Week 7: Criminalization  
Week 8: Rule of Law

This programme may change depending on the interests of the participants. A proposed reading list of the provisional programme can be found on Weblearn (under ‘Hilary Term 2015’ in ‘GRADUATE Seminar Resources’).

**Evolutionary Debunking Arguments**  
Prof Hilary Greaves and Dr Andreas Mogensen – M. 2 – 4, Somerville College (Maitland 19)

Many philosophers believe that evolutionary explanations for human morality require us to revise our ethical outlook. This seminar will consider the merits of this view by exploring the growing literature on evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics, an emergent field of debate that combines elements of meta-ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.

Students attending the first class should pre-read the following papers for that class (pdfs are available on Weblearn):

Regular Faculty Seminars

Where seminar schedules are not available at the time of publication, readers are referred to seminar websites as given in the entries below. Please also note that the Faculty’s weekly events digest will publish titles for the week when these become available. The digest often provides abstracts in addition to the titles.

Moral Philosophy Seminar
Prof Jeff McMahan and Dr Richard Rowland (Conveners) – M. 4.30 – 6.30 (not on in week 3), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These seminars take place every week in term time throughout the year, on Mondays from 4.30 to 6.30 in the Lecture Room at the Philosophy Centre, Radcliffe Humanities, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6GG.

All philosophers are welcome to attend, and also to join the speaker for drinks after the talk, and later for dinner.

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<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Talk Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Helen Frowe (Stockholm)</td>
<td>Are We Required to Turn the Trolley? (provisional)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Brad Hooker (Reading)</td>
<td>De Lazari-Radek and Singer on Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Role of Moral Rules</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Derek Parfit (Oxford)</td>
<td>Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Alex Voorhoeve (LSE)</td>
<td>Priority or Equality for Possible People?</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Kim Brownlee (Warwick)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Victor Tadros (Warwick)</td>
<td>Permissibility in a World of Wrongdoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jeremy Williams (Birmingham)</td>
<td>Public Reason and Personal Identity</td>
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The timetable for term will be published in due course at http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/future_seminars.

Philosophy of Mathematics Research Seminar
Prof Volker Halbach, Prof James Studd, and Dr Dan Isaacson (Conveners) – M. 4.30 – 6.30 (weeks 1, 3, 5, 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

W1: Volker Halbach, “Three Levels of Intensionality”
W3: Peter Koepke, “What is a Mathematical Proof?”
W5: Albert Visser, TBC
W8: Matti Eklund, TBC
DPhil Seminar
Various conveners – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The DPhil Seminar provides a forum for DPhils in philosophy to present and discuss thesis chapters, and workshop papers to be submitted for publication. The Speaker Series has been organized since January 2012. In October 2014 a Publishing Workshop component was introduced, to alternate biweekly with the Speaker Series.

Speaker Series: DPhils present material from their thesis to a faculty member and peers. The format is approximately 45 minutes for presentation, 15 minutes for faculty commentary, and 30 minutes for Q&A.

Publishing Workshop: DPhils receive targeted feedback on papers they intend to submit for publication relatively soon. Thus, workshopped papers tend to be more polished than those delivered in the speaker series. Participants are expected to attend all 3-4 workshops during the term and to have read each of the other papers in advance of the relevant sessions. The format is approximately 10 minutes for author introduction and the remaining time for faculty commentary and discussion.

Admission to both the Speaker Series and Publishing Workshop is free and open to all. Other faculty members and peers are encouraged to attend the Publishing Workshop but also to read the relevant papers in advance. For updated scheduling and access to papers please visit the DPhil Seminar website at http://dphilseminar.wordpress.com.

Post-Kantian Philosophy Seminar
Prof Manuel Dries and Prof Joseph Schear – T. 5 – 7 (even weeks), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar is a seminar series devoted to the study and discussion of Post-Kantian European Philosophy, welcoming speakers from within Oxford and elsewhere to present work in a workshop format. Colleagues and graduate students with an interest in this tradition are very welcome to take part. Details of the term’s programme will be published in due course at:

http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar

Power Structuralism/Metaphysics of Entanglement group Seminar / Reading Group
Dr Anna Marmodoro – W. 4.30 – 6.30, Corpus Christi College (Fraenkel Room)

There is normally the group Seminar in the odd weeks, and the Reading Group in the even. For more details, please visit the project’s website at:

http://www.power-structuralism.ox.ac.uk
Work in Progress in Ancient Philosophy
Prof Terence Irwin, Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen, Prof Michail Peramatzis – Th. 5 – 7 (weeks 1 to 7), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please see [http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy).

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<th>Week</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Nathan Gower (Oxford)</td>
<td>The Principle of Like-Knows-Like in the Psychology and Epistemology of Plato’s <em>Timaeus</em></td>
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<td>Antony Hatzistavrou (Hull)</td>
<td>Plato and Legal Positivism</td>
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<td>Barnaby Taylor (Oxford)</td>
<td>Epicurean Naturalism About Language</td>
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<td>Sophie Grace Chappell</td>
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<td>Dominic Scott (Kent)</td>
<td>From Painting to Poetry: method in <em>Republic X</em></td>
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<td>Frisbee Sheffield (Cambridge)</td>
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To note: in week 8 the workshop will not run, giving way to the Ackrill Memorial Lecture (see Special Lectures section above).

Philosophy of Physics Research Seminar
TBC (Convener) – Th. 4.30 – 6.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please see the website at [http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ppox/general/seminar.html](http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ppox/general/seminar.html) for more details. Titles of talks will appear in due course. Interested parties are encouraged to sign up to the Seminar’s mailing list if they have not already done so (contact admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk with your details).
Theoretical Philosophy Work in Progress Seminar
Mr Martin Pickup (Convener) – Th. 12 – 2 (even weeks), New College (6 New College Lane)

Seminar website: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/.

This seminar, open to faculty and graduate students, provides a forum for faculty members (at Oxford or visiting) to discuss their current work in progress in ‘theoretical’ philosophy, broadly construed. The seminar aims to facilitate contact and cooperation within the large group of philosophers in Oxford working in these areas, and to familiarise graduate students with the range of work being done in the faculty.

Work to be discussed is linked from the TWiP website in advance (typically a week before the seminar). Each seminar begins with a short presentation of the main ideas of the work under discussion by its author. Anyone with an interest in the topic of the paper under discussion is encouraged to attend even if they haven’t managed to read the paper in advance. Discussion is fairly informal, and as befits a work in progress seminar, the focus is on constructive and useful feedback.

Current Schedule

Week 2  
Jan Westerhoff, An argument in defence of ontological nihilism

Week 4  
Robyn Kath, A Shortfall Minimising Approach to Population Ethics

Week 6  
Dani Kodaj, Contrastive Parthood

Week 8  
TBC

Philosophy of Mind Work in Progress
Dr Josh Shepherd and Prof Ian Phillips (Conveners) – F. 1.30 – 3.15 (weeks 2, 4, 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Jan. 30 TBA

Feb. 13 Anya Farennikova (Bristol) Paper title TBA

Feb. 27 Myrto Mylopoulos (Jean Nicod) Paper title TBA
The Jowett Society / Philosophical Society
Various conveners – F. 3.30 – 5.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The Jowett Society and the Philosophical Society at Oxford University provide a forum for discussion of philosophical issues for all members of the Faculty of Philosophy. The Jowett Society dates back to the 19th century and was named in honour of Benjamin Jowett, master of Balliol College. Previous speakers include Russell, Wittgenstein, and Davidson.

http://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/