

Virtue, Rules, and Compulsion

Abstract:

In this paper, I critically investigate the dynamics of van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology. In particular, I interrogate the centerpiece of his position by questioning his thesis of *reason without compulsion*. Taking counsel from an investigation of the dynamics of a view of proper ethical reasoning developed by John McDowell, I apply these insights to the epistemological domain. It is my aim to paint a picture in which van Fraassen conflates the fertile idea that there are no universal rules of right reasoning, with the mistaken notion that reason does not compel. In drawing this distinction, I offer a reevaluation of the so-called "ampliative" practices of induction and abduction not as universalizable rules, but as characterizations pertinent to particular cases of right reasoning.

1) The constructive empiricist both may *and* may not be a believer in unobservables. What distinguishes her is not a belief or lack of belief in, say, light or electrons but her view that such belief is ancillary to the role of the scientific theories that make reference to these unobservables. Van Fraassen's scientific image thrives only by presupposing an epistemological setting in which *commitment without compulsion* makes sense [re: van Fraassen 2001, p164]. The only other logical alternative which principally allows for a possibility of accepting, say, optics while withholding belief in light requires a more drastic and highly skeptical epistemology insisting on the compulsion of non-commitment. Such a scientific image may very well survive under the auspices of a skeptic's epistemology but it fails to thrive; without permission to both believe and not believe in unobservables, the tender meta-thesis of constructive empiricism devolves into a skeptic's cry of scientific agnosticism, a distinction van Fraassen is vigilant in maintaining [e.g. Ladyman *et al*, p318]

In deference to this looming threat, in the twenty-five years since *The Scientific Image*, Bas van Fraassen has slowly developed a "new" epistemology to support his image of science. This so-called "voluntarist" epistemology is characterized not by *compulsion* but by *permission*. Against a backdrop of probabilism, he has advanced this development by persistently waging war on the rules of induction and abduction, which he has classified as "ampliative" rules of reasoning. By expelling such recipes for rational compulsion, van Fraassen purports to have cleared the way for an epistemology in which one is permitted (within the bounds of probabilism and logic) to form beliefs while giving "central importance to the will and

the role of decision” [van Fraassen 2002, p77]. In the following I interrogate the centerpiece of this position by questioning his thesis of reason without compulsion. *It is my aim to paint a picture in which van Fraassen conflates the fertile idea that there are no universal rules of right reasoning, with the mistaken notion that right reason does not compel.*

2) For the voluntarist, rationality is bounded by the limits of logical consistency and probabilistic coherence. Save this minimal bridling however, there are to be no obligations of reason. Hence, it is a key element of van Fraassen’s picture that ampliative rules of reasoning such as induction and abduction be dismissed as illicit. He attempts to achieve this goal by focusing on the difficulty that faces a proper codification of such “rules of reason.” Abduction, construed as an algorithm of inferring to the best (available) explanation is embarrassed when attention is drawn to the fact that a *yet better* explanation may still be around the corner, or when someone points out that for any explanation there are presumably many other (perhaps infinite) equally satisfying yet incompatible explanations.¹ Likewise, anyone familiar with the long history of attempts to develop an adequate account of induction will recognize that similar embarrassments threaten the prospects of universal codification capturing this sort of inference.² According to van Fraassen, the failure of such so-called “ampliative rules” to *universally* ensure inferences is supposed to suggest that inferences with the shape of abductive or inductive reasoning are *never* to be taken as compelling. It is my claim that such a move is highly suspect.

A similar sort of codification dilemma arises in ethical contexts as well as epistemological. It is an embarrassment to the consequentialist when she must admit that carving up healthy patients to restore a

¹ In *Laws and Symmetry*, van Fraassen presents three arguments to draw our attention to such uncodifiability. The first two arguments referred to in the literature by the labels “argument from a bad lot” and the “argument from indifference” are characterized by such embarrassments. It is suggestive to note that responses to these two arguments usually claim that such arguments do not respect the context in which abduction is to be used [e.g. Psillos 1999, ch9 and Psillos 1996]. The third claims that abduction and indeed any “ampliative rule” is incoherent in that it is susceptible to a Dutch book strategy. Serious concerns have been raised threatening the validity of this third argument. In the interests of space, will not be able to here rehearse a discussion of the suggested fallacies of this argument but instead refer the reader to [Kvanvig 1994, Harman 1999, and Psillos 2003, p16]. It should be noted that even if van Fraassen were able correct these fallacies, the conclusion of his argument is still consistent with the general thesis I am promoting.

² Again in the interests of space, I will bypass a careful rehearsal of these threats. For particularly relevant recent surveys of the trials and tribulations of universally codifying the techniques of induction see [Norton 2003, and van Fraassen 2000].

much greater number of dying ones to health is inappropriate. The consequentialist beholden to some sort of maximization rule must struggle to warp her calculations searching vainly to make her algorithm conform to this right choice (i.e. that it is wrong to sacrifice healthy patients). Non-consequentialist views of ethics ruled by a balancing or even ranking of imperatives do no better. Even if such a moral view is able to achieve harmony among the imperatives so that no group of imperatives could possibly oblige contradictory actions, such views are still susceptible to exaggerated thought experiments. It is a comparable embarrassment to the non-consequentialists of this sort to pretend she ought to refrain from, say, preventing immeasurable suffering or saving countless lives because it would violate some obligation set in stone by these rules. In facing these embarrassments, the non-consequentialist is likewise driven to retool or defend her imperatives by means of uncomfortable gerrymanderings distinguishing between indirect and direct actions, killing and not saving, good actions and good situations etc.³

The theme to which I am now nodding (if only through coarse perfunctory generalization) is that there is a suggestive futility in attempting to carve out universal right rules of ethical behavior. This theme indeed suggests the much bolder thesis that *no such right rules exist*.⁴ In his “Virtue and Reason” [McDowell 1998a], McDowell counsels that the deceptive impetus for such rules stems from an effort to attain *explanations* of ethical behavior through a mistaken utilization of the practical syllogism. The idea is that such rules play the role of a piece of universal knowledge (the major premise) applied to an instance of particular knowledge (the minor premise) to deduce the appropriate course of action [McDowell 1998a, p57]. Why are we to reject the propriety of such attempts at attaining moral explanation through the application of universal rules? First, in accordance with the theme I have already nodded to above, he reminds us that:

³ Compare [Foot 1978 and Foot 1985].

⁴ This philosophical insight is on a par with the refusal of the claim that there exists such thing as analytic truth (a thesis correspondingly recommended by the futility of various attempts at analyzing particularly recalcitrant concepts – causation, personhood, etc.). Of course in the ethical case, there are maxims (e.g. “thou shalt not torture children”) which we are hard pressed to even conceive of violating. Such maxims play an analogous role of purported analytic truths (e.g. ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’); they are claims that we are not likely to soon abandon but, nonetheless, fail to be of an untouchable nature, free from all other considerations.

[T]o an unprejudiced eye it should seem quite implausible that any reasonably adult moral outlook admits of any such codification. As Aristotle consistently says, the best generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part. If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong – and not necessarily because one has changed one's mind; rather one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula. [McDowell 1998a, pp57-58].

The embarrassments noted above are *not* cases of the utilitarian or the imperative minded non-consequentialist loosing their nerve about their commitment to their respective ethical intuitions. Nor is it the case, he suggests, that such positions were somehow not optimally formulated (and hence simply in need of retooling). *Ethical positions are not receptive to codification as such, be it by a single overarching recipe or a multitude of individual imperatives.*

Even if virtuous behavior were easily captured by universal claims, McDowell goes on to argue that such universal claims would still fail to offer an adequate account of moral behavior. He encourages us to take note of the Wittgensteinian insight that the operation of “universal rules” as mediating psychological mechanisms is explanatorily bereft.⁵ According to this insight, we have no reason to seek out universal rules of reason, for they are not capable of offering a proper explanation of why a judgment is appropriate. The view under attack presumes that these universal rules offer grounding for our expectation that it is *correct* to move from a bit of particular knowledge to the judgment we presume. As McDowell points out however, a key insight of Wittgenstein's argument is that such putative rules are no better grounded than our expectation itself (that said move is correct):

[W]e can no more find the putative mediating state manifested in the grounds for our expectation than we can find manifested there the very future occurrences we expect. Postulating the mediating state is an idle intervening step; it does nothing to underwrite the confidence of the expectation. [McDowell 1998a, p60]

⁵ Re: [Wittgenstein 1953] among other places.

Two key features are vital to note here. First, the point is completely general. It is in no way dependent on such rules being of an ethical nature. Our expectation that a purported next step is the right one applies equally well to theoretical judgments as practical ones, to ampliative judgments as to conceptual ones.^{6,7} Second, the point is not a skeptical one. It would be a great mistake to take McDowell (or Wittgenstein) to be endorsing the claim that we have *no grounds* for our expectation. Each of these features is instructively punctuated by the note that in the above quoted passage, McDowell is referring to Wittgenstein's allegory of following a *mathematical* rule. Imagine a mathematician proceeding "2, 4, 6, 8,..." and claiming when questioned that she is "counting by twos." The *prima facie* dilemma is raised when we recognize that we can never "check" her understanding of 'counting by twos' completely because she can only provide "at most a finite fragment of the potentially infinite range of behavior that we want to say the rule ['add 2'] dictates" [McDowell 1998a, p59].⁸ She *might* (according to the allegory) follow 1000 with the number 1004. If we truly were unconfident of the claim that it is correct to expect 1002 to follow 1000 as she is counting, then we would draw no solace from her further assurance that she is following the rule 'add 2.' Nonetheless, it is inappropriate to skeptically draw from this *prima facie* dilemma that we should not be confident that 1002 follows 1000 in such counting when mathematicians assure us that they are indeed "counting by twos." We *correctly* do not expect that (modulo clerical errors) anything other than 1002 will follow. The point is that we have appropriate confidence in her understanding of 'counting by twos' in so far as we have appropriate confidence in such expectations as 1002 will follow 1000.⁹ It is our confidence in her ability as a

⁶ Consider the argument: All bachelors are unmarried males
van Fraassen is a bachelor

∴ van Fraassen is an unmarried male

Our judgment that it is correct to move from van Fraassen is a bachelor to van Fraassen is an unmarried male is as well grounded as the purported analytic claim that all bachelors are unmarried males, or put perhaps more suggestively, if we truly had reason to doubt the propriety of such a move, it would be silly to draw comfort from the purported claim of analyticity.

⁷ It might not be immediately why I have contrasted conceptual judgments with ampliative ones. Van Fraassen seems to take conceptual judgments to be part of the "minimal logical bridling" constraining even his voluntarist epistemology. On [van Fraassen 1989, p158] he remarks that a failure to observe that rain is a form of precipitation is a "logical fault" and as such can constitute instances of self-sabotage.

⁸ Compare [Kripke 1982].

⁹ It is important here not to confuse this point with the distinct point that we may very well expect mathematicians to use certain algorithms to "calculate" the next number in the series ("carrying the one" etc.). Recognition of this second

mathematician that supports this correct expectation, not some intermediary rule compelling her psychologically from one step to the next. To be skeptical of a mathematician's ability to count by twos is the wrong moral of the allegory.

According to this argument, van Fraassen is correct to reject abduction as a universal recipe for right reasoning. Mythical faith in the ability of a "rule" of abduction to generate appropriate further judgments – come what may – is mistaken. It is regrettable that the practice of abduction is so often labeled in the literature by the phrase 'inference to the best explanation.' This misleading label encourages a caricature of abduction as following an algorithm of listing and ranking all available explanations and then concluding that whatever explanation receives the primary position in such an ordering is the truth. If the Wittgenstinian insight about rule following is correct however, this caricature is indeed grossly mistaken. The "rule" of inferring to the best explanation does not ensure the truth of our most satisfying explanations any more than ethical imperatives (be they consequentialist or non-consequentialist, singular or multiple) ensure virtuous practical judgments. An attempt to codify inferences commonly referred to as abductive (as per such a caricature) unsurprisingly will be quite unsuccessful in illuminating appropriate inferences.¹⁰

3) Our confidence in abductive judgments is not to be grounded in a rule of always inferring to the best explanation. However, as with the ethical and mathematical examples of rule following, *the failure of a rule to ensure correctness of judgments does not suggest that the judgments are not correct.* Though universalized rules fail to ground our judgments, the lesson we are supposed to take from mathematical allegory is that we would be wrong to skeptically deny our confidence in such judgments. It is my suggestion that this moral holds not only for judgments of the form 'the next number will be 1002,' 'it is wrong to make that child suffer,' or 'van Fraassen is an unmarried man,' but likewise for so-called "ampliative judgments." Van Fraassen is right to reject rule following as a medium through which right

point construes the first point as pertaining to our confidence in her appropriately understanding the method of calculation.

¹⁰ Van Fraassen's arguments in [van Fraassen 1989] against abduction indeed zero in on the weaknesses of such a conception of abduction as an algorithm for inference to the best explanation (or even as an algorithm for increased trust in our best explanations). Similarly, his review given in [van Fraassen 2000] highlights the weaknesses of a conception of induction as an algorithm for universally generating appropriate judgments.

judgments are achieved, but to take such a rejection as entailing that certain judgments are not *rightly* drawn from antecedent bits of knowledge is to miss the very heart of the insight. Though van Fraassen is quite correct in his claim that rules of right reason do not compel judgment, it is a mistake to conclude that this suffices to show that reason is without right (compelling) judgments. And so, there yet remains a possibility of rational compulsion even to ampliative judgments despite the absence of compelling “rules” for judgment.

As outlined above, ethical judgments are remarkably resilient at resisting codification as well. In order to see how a properly grounded account of epistemological reasoning might be developed, I suggest that we take council from how the uncodifiability of right practical judgment is captured in the ethical domain. In particular I want to focus on a second key idea developed by McDowell which finds its original formulation in the works of Plato, namely, the thesis that virtue is a kind of *rational sensitivity* or *perceptual capacity*.

According to McDowell’s virtue ethics, virtuous person is trained to see the world in a way that the unvirtuous person does not. A child, learning appropriate ethical behavior is taught to distinguish the “right” way to behave in a given situation. If the training goes well, if the child grows to become a virtuous person, then her judgments as to the appropriate way to behave will be reliable indicators of good action. But this virtuous agent is not *merely* able to reliably indicate judgments of virtuous behavior (as a thermometer reliably indicates temperature). This agent can cite the right reason for her judgments of virtuous behavior because she possesses a special sort of rational sensitivity to the facts. For example, a courageous person in the heat of battle might cite as a reason for courageously exposing herself to harms way in order to pull a wounded companion to safety that “he was in harms way and in need of rescue.” Her judgment to courageously provide the needed rescue was supported by this very reason. This special sensitivity allowed her to recognize such knowledge as the *right* reason for behaving as she did. Her courage allowed her to, so to speak, *see* that his need was the reason why she should rescue him. Her virtue enabled her to see it as the right thing to do. To contrast, imagine an agent who lacks virtue. Even if she behaves identically to the courageous agent, this agent would not (accurately) cite as her reason for acting the fact that “he was in harms way and in need of rescue.” The uncourageous agent might see this as a *partial* reason for action, but

she cannot see it as the *right* reason for action. Other reasons factor into her determination, such as what she might gain from her providing the rescue her companion needed, what the risk of attempting such a rescue poses, etc. Without the special sensitivity of the virtue of courage, this second agent is unable to recognize her companion's need for rescue as the *right* reason for action. Even if her judgment happens to be to act as the virtuous agent acts, such ostensibly "correct" behavior is not *virtuous* behavior but an accidental simulacrum of virtuous behavior. She makes the right judgment only because her balancing of other reasons luckily weigh in on the side of attempting a rescue.

It is revealing to consider the Aristotelian distinction between the virtue and mere continence. An agent shows continence when she holds her inclinations in check. This overcoming of inclinations is not to be confused with virtue, despite the fact that it can lead to behavior that is ostensibly similar. This distinction is supposed to be intelligible because we are not to view virtuous deliberations as a process of weighing out various reasons for acting in accordance with one's motivations (which are at least partially influenced by one's inclinations). If virtuous judgments were the result of such calculations of weighing our reasons as influenced by inclinations, then a continent agent who lacked virtue could mimic the behavior of say a courageous agent by keeping her inclinations to preserve life and limb in check. McDowell defends the Aristotelian distinction as follows:

The distinction becomes intelligible if we stop assuming that the virtuous person's judgment is a result of balancing reasons for and against. The view of a situation that he arrives at by exercising his sensitivity is one in which some aspect of the situation is seen as constituting a reason for acting in some way; this reason is apprehended, not as outweighing or overriding any reasons for acting in other ways, which would otherwise be constituted by other aspects of the situation (the present danger, say) but as silencing them. [McDowell 1998a, pp55-56]

Virtuous judgments are not arrived at by the weighing of reasons in accordance with our will (even if our will happens to be a continent one). A truly courageous action is not arrived at by dwarfing our inclination to flee in comparison to our inclination to press on. Courageous judgments are arrived at by *silencing* the reasons which might otherwise motivate action contrary to the courageous path. The increased sensitivity

that is virtue not only allows the virtuous agent to arrive at the right judgments by seeing the *right* reason, it also enables the virtuous agent to see (be sensitive to) which reasons are *wrong* reasons and silence them.

4) This ethical picture is quite elegant in its ability to account for the dynamics of right reason in the domain of practical judgments, even in the wake of the uncodifiability of right action. How might we import the structure of such this picture of right practical judgment to a picture of right theoretical judgment? In referring to the special understanding possessed by a mathematician or language bearer, we may employ the terminology of virtue: that the mathematician is able to “see” that 1002 follows 1000 requires a special sort of mathematical sensitivity or perception, the possession of which we may call *mathematical virtue*. In the linguistic case, to see that ‘van Fraassen is a bachelor’ constitutes a reason for believing that ‘van Fraassen is an unmarried man’ takes a special sensitivity to the way our language works, we may call this capacity *conceptual virtue*. What about cases that are not so cut and dry, cases that do not conform nicely to universal rules? I suggest that we continue to adopt this virtuous approach in accounting for the special sensitivity to right epistemic reasons for making judgments.

To get a sense of how this works, let us consider judgments about the observable world.¹¹ Consider an agent who claims that “there is a table before me.” The reason she gives for the belief is “well, I *see* that there is a table before me.” How might the skeptic respond to her reason for that judgment? Our skeptic might tell her fantastic stories about demons and computers to raise doubts about her claim to be truly “seeing” the table.¹² If our agent possesses the relevant epistemic virtue, she will nonetheless respond “sure but there *is* a table, I see that it is there.” A merely continent agent on the other hand quells nagging doubts about demons or computers to allow her reason for believing that there is a table there *outweigh* her skeptical reasons for not believing that there is a table. In fact, in this deliberation of continence, the agent does not indeed judge that there is a table before here because she *sees* the table, but rather because she has chosen to

¹¹ We might note that in the context of voluntarism, van Fraassen even claims that observation judgments are not *rationaly compelling*. (e.g. “Only courage can take us out of skeptical despair, but who says that a life of skeptical despair is not worth living?” [van Fraassen 2000, p274])

¹² Or, the skeptic might less dramatically raise doubts about this particular case of observation, reminding her that she’s been wrong before about towers in the distance, friends wearing overcoats, and perhaps even furniture (a presumed table that turned out to be a desk).

believe that there is a table based on the *appearances* she has been privy to and her inability to stomach the alternative.¹³

In order to *see* that there is a table, an agent must have the relevant virtue, the relevant capacity to identify the appearance as *more than just a mere appearance*, as a right (compelling) reason for judgment. As in the ethical picture, her virtuous sensitivity *silences* inappropriate skeptical doubts when judging what to believe. It is not just that her observation outweighs these doubts in the calculation; instead, her observational virtue ensures that such doubts do not even play a role in the judgment.¹⁴ To allow such skeptical doubts to enter into the deliberations is to already preclude the possibility of knowledge, to already preclude the possibility of observation.

It is wrong to be a skeptic. Our sensitivity embodied by our observational virtue makes this fact apparent to us. It is of course always *possible* that the skeptic's doubts are true, nonetheless, the presumption that such doubts are properly silenced is a precondition for the entire program of observation in the same way that the presumption that the possibility of a mathematician following 1000 with 1004 is properly silenced is a precondition for mathematics.¹⁵ The virtuous observer's recognition that skeptical doubt is rightly silenced is not to be mistaken as obstinate ignorance of genuine reasons for doubt (e.g. the room is foggy, I don't have my glasses on, the tower is far off, etc.). The ability to parse through genuine reasons for doubting what one

¹³ In fact, we might imagine the continent agent betraying her reasoning by referencing the fact that "it sure looks like a table is there" when pushed for a reason.

¹⁴ To be a bit more precise, we might compare this view to the view promoted by David Lewis in his "Elusive Knowledge". Lewis develops an analysis of 'knowing that', which is sensitive to what he terms the "proper ignorance" of "uneliminated epistemic possibilities" [Lewis 1996, p554]. Which possibilities are properly ignored depends on the context in which a claim to knowledge is uttered. Lewis embraces the feature that such an analysis leaves knowledge elusive in the sense that if we properly interrogate claims of knowledge, we embark on the road of skepticism, yet can still claim that in an everyday sense we can be said to know many things. This sort of view is akin to the *mere* continence approach. A properly ignored doubt as Lewis characterizes it is not exactly a quelled doubt, for the agent gives no weight to such doubts as relevant reasons (in the proper context). Nonetheless, proper ignorance mustn't be confused with virtuous silencing. Virtuous silencing is not the sort of feature that vacillates depending on context as with proper ignorance. The virtuous observer recognizes that it is wrong to entertain skeptical hypothesis, even while under skeptical interrogation. This does not mean that the virtuous observer is not sensitive to features of the case of observation (e.g. if the room is hazy or dark etc.). However, such sensitivity is to the features of the case of observation, not a question of the psychological state of the observer. (It is illuminating to consider the peculiarity of the idea of an agent not failing to act courageously when she left her companion in danger because she just had a conversation about how unpleasant it is to be shot.)

¹⁵ Regrettably, there is not enough space to here entertain an appropriately sensitive discussion of how to deal with the ineliminable presence of such possibilities. I must instead simply refer the reader to [McDowell 1998b] for a robust account of the proper way to approach this problem.

appears to see and skeptically doubting what one does see is part and parcel of the rational sensitivity we attribute to the virtuous observer. To mistake the fact that we do not have a readily available algorithm for distinguishing these sorts of doubts is to ignore the uncodifiability thesis of the last section.¹⁶

The approach is the same for inductive and abductive reasoning. An agent properly said to have inductive or abductive virtue possesses a sensitivity that enables her to *see* when certain antecedent knowledge constitutes a right reason for the respective inductive or abductive judgment. Since this sensitivity need not be codifiable in any way in order to ensure that judgments are indeed rightly inferred, such a picture will be immune to van Fraassen's arguments against ampliative rules. In cases where a judgment's explanatory power (the fact that the judgment makes good sense of what we know) constitutes a right reason for believing, the agent in possession of abductive virtue can *see* that this is a right reason for the judgment in question. In such cases, the abductive virtue *silences* skeptical hypotheses of invisible fairies – or what have you – serendipitously making it the case that the abduced judgment seems so sensible. Similarly for inferences to judgments such as, say, “things will continue to fall towards the earth when I drop them out the window.’ Of course the possibility that a *yet better* undiscovered explanation is around the corner or that indeed the worse explanation happens to be true ever exists, just as the logical possibility that tomorrow things will fall up exists. However, to insist that such doubts principally and universally prevent any possibility of constituting a compelling reason for believe (as with observation), is capitulation to skepticism.

5) In this paper, I have not endorsed any particular abductive inference. Rather I am rejecting the idea that abductive inference can be principally denied based on uncodifiability alone. According to the picture I have painted a further insistence on always entertaining skeptical doubts is required to principally deny the compulsion of such reasons. But, as I have argued, this is just capitulation to skepticism. It may be that abductive virtue never silences such possibilities when it comes to the existence of unobserved objects.¹⁷ Even if virtue does not rightly silence such skeptical doubts though, the result would be a compulsion to

¹⁶ It is also a mistake to assume that the virtuous observer will always make a judgment. To *withhold* judgment may also be the virtuous choice.

¹⁷ To betray my sympathies, I find such a suspicion quite implausible.

suspension of judgment, not permission to believe either way. Van Fraassen has attempted to tread between a view of rationality that excludes compulsion yet does not devolve into skepticism by promoting an epistemology of permission. He attempts this by eliminating what he takes to be the source of compulsion in epistemology, namely, rules. As we have seen however, rules are not what compel in the first place. Right reasons are what compel and it is the relevant virtue of the reasoning agent that supports her sensitivity to these reasons as compelling the correct judgments, be they practical or theoretical, codifiable or uncodifiable, conceptual or ampliative.

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