

CURRICULUM VITAE

Timothy Williamson

Position: Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College Oxford

Born: Uppsala, Sweden, 6 August 1955

Nationality: British

Address: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, U.K.

E-mail: timothyDOTwilliamsonATphilosophyDOToxDOTacDOTuk

Positions held

1980-88 Lecturer in Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin.

1988-94 Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy, University College, Oxford; C.U.F. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford.

1995-2000 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh.

2000- Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College Oxford

1990, 1995 Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U.

1994 Visiting Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T.

1995 Visiting Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury.

1998-99 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.

2004 Visiting scholar, Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.

Distinctions

Fellow of the British Academy (elected 1997)
 Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 1997)
 Foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (elected 2004)
 Foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2007)
 Fellow of the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (elected 2011)

Named lectures:

Henriette Hertz Lecture, British Academy, 1996;
 Weatherhead Lecture in Philosophy of Language, Tulane University, 1998;
 Jacobsen Lecture, University of London, 2001;
 Skolem Lecture, University of Oslo, 2004;
 Blackwell Brown Lectures, Brown University, 2005;
 Jack Smart Lecture, Australian National University, 2005;
 Anders Wedberg Lectures, University of Stockholm, 2006;
 Gaos Lectures, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Mexico City, 2006;
 Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton University, 2006.
 Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, Amherst College, 2009.
 Zeno Lecture, University of Utrecht, 2009.
 Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, 2010.
 Ortlieb Lecture, Claremont Colleges, to be delivered 2012.
 Petrus Hispanus Lectures, University of Lisbon, to be delivered 2012.
 Nelson Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2003.
 Townsend Visitor, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
 José Gaos Chair, UNAM, Mexico, 2006.
 Tang Chun-I Visiting Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007.

President of the Aristotelian Society 2004-5.
 President of the Mind Association 2006-7; Vice-President 2005-6.
 Vice-President of the British Logic Colloquium 2007-.

Research Awards

AHRC Research Leave Award 2009
 Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship 2009-12
 Máxima Distinción Académa a la Trayectoria Investigativa, Instituto de Investigaciones del Pensamiento Peruano y Latinoamericano, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Perú (2009).

Education

Degrees: B.A. (Oxon.) 1976;
 M.A. (Oxon.) 1981;
 M.A. (Dubl.) *ad eundem gradum* 1986;
 D.Phil. (Oxon.) 1981.

1972-73 Computer programmer, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell.
 1973-76 Read Mathematics and Philosophy, Balliol College, Oxford.
 1974 Mathematics and Philosophy Honour Moderations, Class I.
 1976 Mathematics and Philosophy Final Honours, Class I with Henry Wilde Prize.
 1976-80 Senior Scholar, Christ Church, Oxford; research for D.Phil. thesis 'The Concept of Approximation to the Truth'.

Books by or about Timothy Williamson

By:

Identity and Discrimination. Pp. ix + 173. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Vagueness. Pp. xiii + 325. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

Knowledge and Its Limits. Pp. xi + 340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Corrected edition 2002.

The Philosophy of Philosophy. Pp. xiv + 332. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, to appear 2013..

About:

P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., *Williamson on Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. TW contributed 'Replies to Critics', pp. 279-384.

Timothy Williamson: Publications in reverse chronological order

To appear

- [a] *Modal Logic as Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013..
- [b] ‘Barcan formulas in second-order logic’, in M. Frauchiger and W.K. Essler, eds., *Themes from Barcan Marcus* (Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 3), Frankfurt, Paris: Ebikon / Lancaster, New Brunswick: ontos verlag.
- [c] ‘Laudatio: Professor Ruth Barcan Marcus’, *ibid.*
- [d] ‘Logic, metalogic, and neutrality’, *Erkenntnis*.
- [e] ‘Knowledge first’ and ‘Knowledge still first’, in M. Steup and J. Turri (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell.
- [f] ‘Knowledge and belief’, in A. Byrne, J. Cohen, G. Rosen and S. Shiffrin, eds., *The Norton Introduction to Philosophy*, New York: W.W Norton & Co.
- [g] ‘How deep is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge’, in A. Casullo (ed.), collection on the a priori.
- [h] ‘Boghossian and Casalegno on understanding and inference’, in proceedings of a memorial conference for Paolo Casalegno.
- [i] ‘Wright and Casalegno on meaning and assertibility’, *ibid.*
- [j] ‘Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen on truth as the aim of epistemic justification’, in T. Chan (ed.), proceedings of a conference on truth as the aim of belief.
- [k] ‘Very improbable knowing’, in proceedings of a workshop on epistemic applications of many-valued logic.
- [l] ‘The philosophy of philosophy’, *Felsefe Tartışmaları: A Turkish Journal of Philosophy*.

2011

- [a] ‘Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof’, *Metaphilosophy*, 42, 3 (2011): 215-29.
- [b] ‘Improbable knowing’, in T. Dougherty, ed., *Evidentialism and its Discontents*, Oxford University Press, 2011: 147-164.
- [c] ‘Metaphysics and higher-order modal logic’, in C. Kanzian, W. Löffler, and J.

- Quitterer, eds., *The Way Things Are: Studies in Ontology*, Frankfurt: ontos verlag, 2011, pp. 17-36.
- [d] ‘Logics and metalogics’, in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz, and E. Ippoliti, eds., *Logic and Knowledge*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2011: 81-100.
- [e] ‘Discussion’, in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz, and E. Ippoliti, eds., *Logic and Knowledge*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2011: 117-121.
- [f] ‘Précis of *The Philosophy of Philosophy*’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82, 2 (2011): 470-1.
Reprinted in *Analisi: Annuario/Bollettino della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica*, Mimesis, Milan, 2011: 79-80.
- [g] ‘Reply to Peacocke’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82, 2 (2011): 481-7.
- [h] ‘Reply to Boghossian’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82, 2 (2011): 498-506.
- [i] ‘Reply to Stalnaker’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82, 2 (2011): 515-23.
- [j] ‘Reply to Horwich’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82, 2 (2011): 534-42.
- [k] ‘Three Wittgensteinians and a naturalist on *The Philosophy of Philosophy*’, in *Analisi: Annuario/Bollettino della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica*, Mimesis, Milan, 2011: 127-37.
- [l] ‘Knowledge first epistemology’, in S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard, eds., *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*, London: Routledge, 2011: 208-218.
- [m] Interview by Chen Bo, *Theoria* 77, 1 (2011): 4-31.
- [n] ‘What is naturalism?’ (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), *The New York Times*, 4 September 2011 <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/>
- [o] ‘On ducking challenges to naturalism’, (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), *The New York Times*, 28 September 2011
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/>
- [p] Comment in S. Pyke (photographer), *Philosophers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011: 210.
- 2010
- [a] ‘Necessitism, contingentism and plural quantification’, *Mind*, 119, 475 (2010): 657-748.

- [b] ‘Modal logic within counterfactual logic’, in A. Hoffman and B. Hale, eds., *Modality: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 81-96.
- [c] Self-profile in J. Dancy, E. Sosa and M. Steup, eds., *A Companion to Epistemology*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010: 199-204.
- [d] Interview in V.F. Hendricks and O. Roy, eds., *Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions*, New York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2010: 249-261.
- [e] Interview on vagueness in D. Edmonds and N. Warburton, eds., *Philosophy Bites*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 142-151.
Online version at http://philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=244823
- [f] Interview by Lev Lamberov (in Russian translation), *Analytica*, 4 (2010): 122-138
<http://www.philosophy.ru/analytica/pdf/2010/11.pdf>
- [g] Interview in *Iphilo* (Geneva), (2010): 11-14.
- [h] ‘Modality & other matters’ (interview by Paal Antonsen), *Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy* (Dublin), 3 (2010): 16-29.
- [i] ‘Anti-exceptionalism’, *The Philosophers’ Magazine*, 50, 3 (2010): 116-117.
- [j] Review of *Reason in Philosophy* by Robert Brandom, *The Times Literary Supplement* 5579 (2010): 22-23.
- [k] ‘Reclaiming the Imagination’ (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), *The New York Times*, 15 August 2010 <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/>

2009

- [a] ‘Replies to critics’, in P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., *Williamson on Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 279-384.
- [b] ‘Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives’, in J. Almog and P. Leonardi, eds., *The Philosophy of David Kaplan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 137-158.
- [c] ‘Conditionals and actuality’, *Erkenntnis*, **70**, 2 (2009): 135-150.
- [d] ‘Tennant’s troubles’, in J. Salerno, ed., *New Essays on the Knowability Paradox*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 183-204 .
- [e] ‘Knowledge of counterfactuals’, in A. O’Hear, ed., *Epistemology* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 64), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 45-64.
- [f] ‘Probability and danger’ *The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy* **4** (2009): 1-35.
<http://www.amherstlecture.org/williamson2009/>
Reprinted with Chinese abstract in Yi Jiang (ed.), *Analytic Philosophy in China 2009*,

Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2010: 1-34.

- [g] ‘Abstract of *The Philosophy of Philosophy*’, *Analysis* **69**, 1 (2009): 99-100.
- [h] ‘Replies to Kornblith, Jackson and Moore’, *ibid.*: 125-135.
- [i] ‘Précis of *The Philosophy of Philosophy*’, *Philosophical Studies*, **145**, 3 (2009): 431-434.
- [j] ‘Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg’, *Philosophical Studies*, **145**, 3 (2009): 465-476.
- [k] ‘Logic and philosophy in the twenty-first century’, in F. Stoutland, ed., *Philosophical Probing: Essays on von Wright’s Later Work*, New York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2009: 199-208.
- [l] ‘The use of pejoratives’, in D. Whiting, ed., *The Later Wittgenstein on Language*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009: 45-62.
- [m] ‘Plato goes pop’ (commentary), *The Times Literary Supplement*, 5529 (2009): 15.
- [n] Interview with Julian Baggini, *The Philosophers’ Magazine*, 45, 2 (2009): 21-30.
- [o] ‘Classical investigations’, interview with Richard Marshall, *3:AM Magazine* (2009): <http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/classical-investigations-timothy-williamson/>

2008

- [a] ‘Why epistemology can’t be operationalized’, in Q. Smith, ed., *Epistemology: New Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 277-300.
- [b] ‘Logic and philosophy in the twenty-first century’, translated into Chinese by Chen Bo, *Journal of Peking University* (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), **46**, 1 (2009): 45-54.
- [c] Interview with Chen Bo, *Studies in Logic*, **1**, 3 (2008): 79-108.
Online version at <http://www.frchina.net/data/personArticle.php?id=7660>
Chinese translation in *The Academic Journal of Jinyang* (2009).
Published with a preface by Koji Nakatogawa, *Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science* 18 (2009): 57-87.
Revised and updated version 2011 [m].
- [d] Interview in V.F. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., *Epistemology: 5 Questions*, New York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2008: 323-334.
- [e] Interview, *Filosofisk Supplement* (Oslo), **4**, 2 (2008): 35-39.

2007

- [a] *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Pp. xiv + 332. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
Chinese translations of excerpts in *World Philosophy* (Beijing), 5 (2009): 29-43.
- [b] ‘On being justified in one’s head’, in M. Timmons, J. Greco and A. Mele, eds., *Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 106-122.
Reprinted in M. Arsenijević and Ž. Lazović, eds., *Explanatory Gap: Essays in Memory of Nikola Grahek*, Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2007 (appeared 2011): 163-184.
- [c] ‘How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?’, *Analysis*, **67**, 3 (2007): 173-180.
- [d] ‘Logical deviance and semantic competence’, *Rivista di Estetica*, **34**, 1 (2007): 121-142.
Reprinted as ‘Sceptical conclusions about epistemological analyticity’, in P. Frascolla, Marconi, D. and Voltolini, A., eds., *Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 188-211.
- [e] ‘Concepciones metafísicas de la analiticidad’ (translation by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas of ‘Metaphysical conceptions of analyticity’), *Dianoia*, **52**, 58 (2007): 3-26.
- [f] ‘Philosophical knowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, **74** (2007): 89-123, and in C. Beyer and A. Burri, eds., *Philosophical Knowledge — Its Possibility and Scope*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- [g] ‘Knowledge within the margin for error’, *Mind*, **116**, 463 (2007): 723-726.
- 2006
- [a] ‘Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus non-hyperintensional contexts’, in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, eds., *Philosophical Issues, Volume 16: Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 310-333.
- [b] “‘Conceptual truth’”. *The Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **80** (2006): 1-41.
- [c] ‘Absolute identity and absolute generality’, in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, eds., *Absolute Generality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 369-389.
Similar version in Z. Novak and A. Simonyi, eds., *Truth, Reference and Realism*, Budapest: CEU Press, 2011: 177-205.
- [d] ‘Stalnaker on the interaction of modality with quantification and identity’, in J. Thomson and A. Byrne, eds., *Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: 123-147.
- [e] (with Igor Douven), ‘Generalizing the Lottery Paradox’, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, **57**, 4 (2006): 755-779.
- [f] ‘Can cognition be factorised into internal and external components?’, in R. Stainton, ed., *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 291-306.

Chinese translation of the volume to appear.

- [g] ‘Must do better’, in P. Greenough and M. Lynch, eds., *Truth and Realism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 177-187.
- [h] ‘Probability and the notion of luminosity’, *Bulletin of Life and Death Studies*, **2** (2006): 103-112.
Japanese translation by A. Iwamoto in *Journal of Death and Life Studies* (Tokyo), **6** (2005): 315-330.
- [i] ‘Zaključivanje, referencija i semantika pejorativa’, in Z. Čuljak, ed., *Spoznaja i interpretacija. Radovi međunarodnog simpozija “Cognition and Interpretation”*, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, 10-11.10.2003, Zagreb: Institut za filozofiju, 2006: 1-23.
- [j] Interview, *Novi List* (Rijeka), Znanost & obrazovanje, 24 September 2006: 2-3.

2005

- [a] ‘Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking’ (Presidential Address), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **105**, 1 (2005): 1-23.
- [b] (with Michael Fara), ‘Counterparts and actuality’, *Mind* **114**, 453 (2005): 1-30.
- [c] ‘Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge’, *Philosophical Quarterly* **55**, 219 (2005): 213-235.
- [d] ‘Knowledge, context and the agent’s point of view’, in G. Preyer and G. Peter, *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005: 91-114.
- [e] (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Conditional excluded middle in systems of consequential implication’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, **34**, 4 (2005): 333-362.
- [f] ‘Knowledge and scepticism’, in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 681-700.
- [g] ‘Précis of *Knowledge and its Limits*’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, **70**, 2 (2005): 431-435.
- [h] ‘Replies to commentators’, *ibid.*: 468-491.
- [i] Interview in V. Hendricks and J. Symons, eds., *Formal Philosophy*, New York and London: Automatic Press, 2005: 209-222.

2004

- [a] ‘Philosophical “intuitions” and scepticism about judgement’, *Dialectica* **58**, 1 (2004): 109-153.

- [b] ‘Past the linguistic turn?’, in B. Leiter, ed., *The Future for Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 106-128.
To be reprinted in J. E. Ford, ed., *The Ontic Return*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Reprinted in Spanish translation as ‘¿Hemos superado el giro lingüístico?’ by G. Rodríguez Espinosa and M. Ponte Azcárate in D. Pérez Chico and M. Barroso Ramos, eds., *Pluralidad de la filosofía analítica*, Plaza y Valdes, Madrid/Mexico: CSIC Press Service, 2007: 155-188.
- [c] ‘Some computational constraints in epistemic logic’, in D. Gabbay, S. Rahman, J. M. Torres and J. P. van Bendegem, eds., *Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science* (Cognitive Science Series), Oxford and Paris: Hermes, 2004: 437-456.
- [d] ‘Computational limits and epistemic logic’, in W. Löffler and P. Weingartner, eds., *Knowledge and Belief. Wissen und Glauben* (Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium), Vienna: ÖBV-HPT, 2004: 126-140.
To be republished in H. Arló-Costa, J. van Benthem, and V.F. Hendricks (eds.), *Readings in Formal Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, to appear.
- [e] ‘Reply to McGee and McLaughlin’, *Linguistics and Philosophy* **27**, 1 (2004): 113-122.
- [f] ‘Sosa on abilities, concepts and externalism’, in J. Greco, ed., *Philosophers and Their Critics: Ernest Sosa*, Oxford: Blackwell: 2004: 263-271.
- [g] (with Agustín Rayo), ‘Formal semantics and unrestricted quantification’, in E. Assenza, D. Chiricò and P. Perconti (eds.), *Logic, Ontology and Linguistics/Logica, Ontologia, Linguistica* (Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi, **1**), Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2004: 131-147.
- [h] ‘Summary of *Knowledge and its Limits*’, *Philosophical Books* **45**, 4 (2004): 283-284.
- [i] ‘Replies to commentators’, *ibid.*, 313-323.
- [j] ‘Armchair philosophy and counterfactual thinking’, in W. Østreng (ed.), *Synergies: Interdisciplinary Communications*, Oslo: Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 2003/2004: 106-108.
- 2003
- [a] ‘Everything’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **17**, 1 (2003): 415-465.
Selected for P. Grim, K. Baynes and G. Mar (eds.), *The Philosopher’s Annual* **26** (2003).
- [b] ‘Understanding and inference’ (in symposium on ‘Blind Reasoning’), *The Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **77** (2003): 249-293.
- [c] ‘Truth and borderline cases’, in K. Korta and J.M. Larrazabal, eds., *Truth, Rationality, Cognition and Music* (Proceedings of ICCS ‘01, Seventh International Colloquium on

Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, 2001), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003: 45-67.

- [d] ‘O hrpi i apsolutno svemu’ (interview), *Prolegomena* (Zagreb), **2**, 2 (2003): 289-293.

2002

- [a] ‘Necessary existents’, in A. O’Hear, ed., *Logic, Thought and Language* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 51), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002: 233-251.
- [b] ‘Vagueness in reality’, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 690-715.
- [c] (with Agustín Rayo), ‘A completeness theorem for unrestricted first-order languages’, in J. C. Beall, ed., *Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003: 331-356.
- [d] ‘Horgan on vagueness’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **63** (2002): 273-285, and in J. Brandl and O. Markič, eds., *Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002: 273-285.
- [e] ‘Reply to Machina and Deutsch on vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error’, *Acta Analytica* **17**, 29 (2002): 47-61.
- [f] ‘Peacocke’s theory of modality’, in symposium on C.A.B. Peacocke, *Being Known*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, **64**, 3 (2002): 650-655.
- [g] ‘Soames on vagueness’, in symposium on *Understanding Truth*, S. Soames, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, **65**, 2 (2002): 422-428.
- [h] (edited with Delia Graff [now Delia Graff Fara]), *Vagueness (The International Research Library of Philosophy 27)*. Pp. xxviii + 508. Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002.
Includes (with D. Graff) ‘Introduction’, *ibid.*: xi-xxviii.
- [i] ‘On vagueness’ (interview), in J. Baggini and J. Stangroom, eds., *New British Philosophy: The Interviews*, London: Routledge, 2002: 147-162.
- [j] Untitled piece (on the occasion of the exhibition ‘24 Hours’ by David Connearn) in D. Connearn, ed., *Hours*, Edinburgh: The Talbot Rice Gallery, 2002: 14.

2001

- [a] (with Jason Stanley), ‘Knowing how’, *The Journal of Philosophy* **98**, 8 (2001): 411-444.
Reprinted in P. Grim, P. Ludlow and G. Mar, eds., *The Philosopher’s Annual* **26**, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2002: 237-271.
Chinese translation in *Thought and Culture* **10** (2011): 1-37.

- [b] ‘Vagueness, identity, and Leibniz’s Law’, in A. Bottani, M. Carrara and P. Giaretta, eds., *Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics* (Topoi Library, vol. 4), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002: 273-303.
- [c] ‘Epistemicist models: Comments on Gómez-Torrente and Graff’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **64**, 1 (2002): 143-150.
- [d] ‘Vagueness, indeterminacy and social meaning’, in C. Grant and D. McLaughlin, eds., *Language-Meaning-Social Construction: Interdisciplinary Studies* (Critical Studies, vol. 16), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001: 61-76.
Reprinted in P. Hanks, ed., *Lexicology: Critical Concepts in Linguistics*, vol. 1, London: Routledge, 2007.
- [e] ‘Possibilia’, in J. Branquinho and D. Murcho, eds., *Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos*, Lisbon: Edições Gradiva, and Brasilia: University of Brasilia Press, 2001: 546-548, and in revised edition, J. Branquinho, D. Murcho and N. G. Gomes, eds., São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006: 604-606.
- [f] ‘Some philosophical aspects of reasoning about knowledge’, in J. van Bentham, ed., *Rationality and Knowledge: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference (TARK 2001)*, San Francisco: Morgan Kaufman, 2001: 97.
- [g] ‘Ethics, supervenience and Ramsey sentences’, in symposium on F. Jackson, *From Metaphysics to Ethics*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **62**, 3 (2001): 625-630.
- 2000
- [a] *Knowledge and Its Limits*. Pp. xi + 340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Paperback (with corrections) 2002.
Chapter 1 trans. P. Egré as ‘La connaissance est-elle un état d’esprit?’, in J. Dutant and P. Engel (eds.), *Philosophie de la Connaissance*, Paris: Vrin, 2005: 259-303, and in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl and M. McGrath, eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008: 213-230.
- [b] (with Miroslava Andjelković), ‘Truth, falsity and borderline cases’, *Philosophical Topics* **28**, 1 (2000): 211-244.
- [c] ‘The necessary framework of objects’, *Topoi* **19**, 2 (2000): 201-208.
- [d] ‘Scepticism and evidence’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **60**, 3 (2000): 613-628.
- [e] ‘Tennant on knowable truth’, *Ratio* **13**, 2 (2000): 99-114.
- [f] ‘Semantic paradox and semantic change’, in A. Kanamori, ed., *Analytic Philosophy and Logic: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 6*, Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000: 113-124.
- [g] ‘Skepticism, semantic externalism and Keith’s Mom’, *Southern Journal of*

Philosophy **38** (2000, Spindel Conference supplement on ‘The Role of the Empirical (And of the A Priori) in Epistemology’): 149-158.

[h] ‘Comments on Michael Williams *Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards*’. *Philosophical Studies* **103**, 1 (2001): 25-33.

[i] ‘Margins for error: a reply’, *The Philosophical Quarterly* **50**, 198 (2000): 76-81.

1999

[a] ‘On the structure of higher-order vagueness’, *Mind* **108**, 429 (1999): 127-143.
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.

[b] ‘Existence and contingency’, *Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **73** (1999): 181-203.
With printer’s errors corrected, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **100**, 1 (2000): 117-139.

[c] ‘Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula’, *Dialectica* **53**, 3/4 (1999): 253-270.

[d] (with Nicolao Bonini, Dan Osherson and Riccardo Viale), ‘On the psychology of vague predicates’, *Mind and Language* **14**, 4 (1999): 377-393.

[e] ‘Rational failures of the KK principle’, in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, eds., *The Logic of Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 101-118.

[f] ‘A note on satisfaction, truth and the empty domain’, *Analysis* **49**, 1 (1999): 3-8.

[g] ‘Andjelković on bivalence: a reply’, *Acta Analytica* **14**, 23 (1999): 35-38.

[h] ‘Schiffer on the epistemic theory of vagueness’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **13** (1999): 505-517.

[i] Review of A.W. Moore, *Points of View*, in *Philosophical Books* **40**, 1 (1999): 43-45.

1998

[a] ‘Bare possibilia’, *Erkenntnis* **48**, 2&3 (1998): 257-273.
Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković with English summary in *Theoria* (Belgrade) **41**, 4 (1998): 83-99.

[b] ‘Conditionalizing on knowledge’, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* **49**, 1 (1998): 89-121.
To be republished in H. Arló-Costa, J. van Benthem, and V.F. Hendricks (eds.), *Readings in Formal Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, to appear.

[c] ‘Iterated operators’, in T.J. Smiley, ed., *Philosophical Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, *Proceedings of the British Academy* **95** (1998): 85-133.

- [d] ‘Indefinite extensibility’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **55** (1998): 1-24 and in J. Brandl and P. Sullivan, eds., *New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, Amsterdam and Atlanta GA Rodopi, 1999: 1-24.
- [e] ‘The broadness of the mental: some logical considerations’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **12** (1998): 389-410.
- [f] ‘Continuum many maximal consistent normal bimodal logics with inverses’, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **39**, 1 (1998): 128-134.
- [g] ‘Dwa wykłady o wiedzy i przekonaniach’ (‘Two lectures on knowledge and belief’), translated by M. Iwanicki, S. Judycki & T. Szubka, in P. Gutowski and T. Szubka, eds., *Filozofia brytyjska u schyłku XX wieku*, Lublin: TN KUL, 1998: 313-334.
- [h] ‘Identity’, in E.J. Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, vol. 4: 675-678.
Reprinted in E.J. Craig, ed., *The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London and New York: Routledge, 2005: 435-437.
‘Identity’ (excerpt from the above), in E.J. Craig, ed., *Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000: 381.
- [i] ‘Lexical competence and semantic externalism’, translated into Italian by F. Bertolucci, discussion piece on *Lexical Competence*, D. Marconi, *Iride* **11**, 24 (1998): 397-401.
- [j] Review of G. Usberti, *Significato e conoscenza: Per una critica del neoverificazionismo*, in *Dialectica* **52**, 1 (1998): 63-69.
- [k] (with Paolo Crivelli), review of G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*, in *The Philosophical Review* **107**, 3 (1998): 471-474.
- [l] Review of A. Miller, *Philosophy of Language*, in *The Times Literary Supplement* 4984 (1998): 35.
- [m] (edited) issue on vagueness, *The Monist*, **81**, 2 (1998).

1997

- [a] ‘Knowledge as evidence’, *Mind* **106**, 424 (1997): 717-741.
- [b] (with Lloyd Humberstone) ‘Inverses for normal modal operators’, *Studia Logica* **59**, 1 (1997): 33-64.
- [c] (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Strong Boethius’ Thesis and consequential implication’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **26**, 5 (1997): 569-588.
- [d] ‘Imagination, stipulation and vagueness’, in E. Villanueva, ed., *Philosophical Issues 8: Truth*, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1997: 215-228.

Russian translation by A. Veruk and N. Zubkova, *Analytica* 4 (2010): 105-121
<http://www.philosophy.ru/analytica/pdf/2010/10.pdf>

- [e] ‘Replies to commentators’, *ibid.*: 255-265.
- [f] (with Mark Sainsbury), ‘Sorites’, in R. Hale and C.J.G. Wright, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 458-484.
- [g] ‘The necessity of ignorance’.
 Extracts translated into Hungarian as ‘A tudatlanság szükségessége’, in B. Petho, ed., *poszt-posztmodern: A Kilencvenes Évek (post-postmodern: The Nineties)*, Budapest: Platon, 1997: 461-463.
 Full version translated into Spanish by E. Romerales as ‘La necesidad de la ignorancia. Lógica, indeterminación y metafísica’ in A. López Cuenca, ed., *Resistiendo al oleaje: Reflexiones tras un siglo de filosofía analítica*. Madrid: Cuaderno Gris, 1999: 189-201.
- [h] ‘Précis of *Vagueness*’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **57**, 4 (1997): 921-928.
- [i] ‘Replies to commentators’, *ibid.*: 945-953.
- [j] ‘Epistemic conception of vagueness’, ‘Higher-order vagueness’, ‘Indiscriminability’, ‘Ontological conception of vagueness’, ‘S4 principle’, ‘S5 principle’ and ‘Semantic conception of vagueness’, in ‘Glossary’, in R. Hale and C.J.G. Wright, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 661-662, 666, 667, 674-675, 682, 682 and 682 respectively.
- [k] ‘Vizi e virtù della vaghezza’ (‘What is the problem of vagueness?’), *Il Sole 24-ore (Domenica)* 265 (1997): 32 .
 Reprinted in *Rivista di Estetica* **7** (1998): 75-77.
- [l] ‘Reference’ and ‘Sense’, in D.M. Borchert, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement*, New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997: 499-502 and 531-532 respectively.
- [m] ‘Sense, validity and context’, in symposium on J.J. Campbell, *Past, Space and Self*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **57**, 3 (1997): 649-654.
- [n] Review of W.P. Alston, *A Realist Conception of Truth*, in *The Journal of Philosophy* **94**, 2 (1997): 103-106.
- 1996
- [a] ‘Knowing and asserting’, *The Philosophical Review* **105**, 4 (1996): 489-523.
 To be reprinted in A. Kasher, ed., *Pragmatics: Critical Concepts II*, London: Routledge, 2010.
- [b] ‘Cognitive homelessness’, *The Journal of Philosophy* **93**, 11 (1996): 554-573.

- [c] ‘Self-knowledge and embedded operators’, *Analysis* **56**, 4 (1996): 202-209.
- [d] (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘How much common belief is necessary for a convention?’, *Games and Economic Behavior* **13** (1996): 252-268.
 Earlier version distributed as CARESS Working Paper #92-32, University of Pennsylvania, 1992.
 Reprinted in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, eds., *The Logic of Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 119-136.
- [e] ‘Admissible rules in modal systems with the Brouwerian axiom’, *Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics* **4**, 2 (1996): 283-303.
- [f] ‘The necessity and determinacy of distinctness’, in S. Lovibond and S. Williams, eds., *Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996: 1-17.
- [g] ‘What makes it a heap?’, *Erkenntnis* **44**, 3 (1996): 327-339.
 Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.
- [h] ‘Putnam on the sorites paradox’, *Philosophical Papers* **25**, 1 (1996): 47-56.
 Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 497-506.
- [i] ‘Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness’, *Analysis* **56**, 1 (1996): 39-45.
- [j] ‘Unreflective realism’, in symposium on C.J.G. Wright, *Truth and Objectivity*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **56**, 4 (1996): 905-909.
- [k] Review of G. Boolos, *The Logic of Provability*, in *The Philosophical Quarterly* **46**, 182 (1996): 110-116.
- [l] Review of W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman and N. Asher, eds., *Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honour of Ruth Barcan Marcus*, in *Philosophy* **71**, 275 (1996): 167-172.
- [m] Review of G. Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* **47**, 2 (1996): 331-334.
- [n] Review of M. Pinkal, *Logic and Lexicon*, in *History and Philosophy of Logic* **17**, 2 (1996): 92-93.
- [o] Review of S. Shapiro, ed., *The Limits of Logic*, in *History and Philosophy of Logic* **17**, 3 (1996): 175-176.
- [p] Review of D. Stalker, ed., *Grue! The New Riddle of Induction*, in *The Times Literary Supplement* 4847 (1996): 27.
- 1995
- [a] ‘Is knowing a state of mind?’, *Mind* **104**, 415 (1995): 533-565.

- [b] ‘Definiteness and knowability’, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* **33** (1995, Spindel Conference supplement): 171-191.
- [c] (with Jason Stanley) ‘Quantifiers and context-dependence’, *Analysis* **55**, 4 (1995): 291-295.
- [d] ‘Does assertibility satisfy the S4 axiom?’, *Crítica* **27**, 81 (1995): 3-22.
- [e] ‘Realism and anti-realism’ and ‘Vague objects’, in T. Honderich, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995: 746-748 and 894 respectively.
- [f] Review of R.B. Marcus, *Modalities*, in *Philosophical Books* **36**, 2 (1995): 120-122.

1994

- [a] *Vagueness*. Pp. xiii + 325. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Paperback 1996. Pp. 185-189 and 198-215 reprinted in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, eds., *Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
- [b] ‘Non-genuine MacIntosh logics’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **23**, 1 (1994): 87-101.
- [c] (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘Representing the knowledge of Turing machines’, *Theory and Decision* **37** (1994): 125-146.
Reprinted in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin and H.S. Shin, eds., *Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997: 169-190.
- [d] ‘Never say never’, *Topoi* **13**, 2 (1994): 135-145.
- [e] ‘Vagueness’, in D. Bolinger, A. McIntosh et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1994, vol. 9: 4869-4871.
Updated version in P. Lamarque, ed., *Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1997: 204-205.
- [f] Review of C.J.G. Wright, *Truth and Objectivity*, in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* **2**, 1 (1994): 130-144.
- [g] Review of A. Gupta and N. Belnap, *The Revision Theory of Truth*, in *International Studies in The Philosophy of Science* **8**, 2 (1994): 164-168.

1993

- [a] ‘Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **71**, 1 (1993): 78-86.

- [b] 'Some admissible rules in non-normal modal systems', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **34**, 3, (1993): 378-400.
- [c] 'The early history of sorites paradoxes', *Argumento* (Lisbon) **3**, 5/6 (1993): 35-44.
- [d] Review of J. Dancy and E. Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Epistemology*, in *The Times Literary Supplement* 4698 (1993): 10.

1992

- [a] 'On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **21**, 1 (1992): 63-89.
- [b] 'An alternative rule of disjunction in modal logic', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **33**, 1 (1992): 89-100.
- [c] 'Inexact knowledge', *Mind* **101**, 402 (1992): 217-42.
 Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as 'Neegzaktno znanje', *Theoria* (Belgrade) **38**, 4 (1995): 87-114.
 Reprinted in Bulgarian translation in M. Stoicheva-Pantaleeva, ed., *A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy* (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 1996).
- [d] 'Vagueness and ignorance', *Aristotelian Society*, sup. **66** (1992): 145-162.
 Reprinted in R. Keefe and P. Smith, eds., *Vagueness: A Reader*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997: 265-280.
 Reprinted in M. Rea, ed., *Metaphysics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 2007.
 Reprinted in D. Byrne and M. Kölbel, eds., *Arguing about Language*, London: Routledge, 2010.
 Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as 'Nejasnost i neznanje', *Theoria* (Belgrade) **38**, 4 (1995): 71-86.
 To be reprinted in Italian translation in G. Ronzitti, ed., *La Vaghezza* (e-book), Italian Web Site of Philosophy, <http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/index.html>.
- [e] Review of G. Vision, *Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth*, in *The Philosophical Review* **101**, 4 (1992): 420-422.

1991

- [a] 'A relation between namesakes in modal logic', *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* (Polish Academy of Sciences) **20**, 3/4 (1991): 129-137.
- [b] 'Fregean directions', *Analysis* **51**, 4 (1991): 194-195.
- [c] 'Abstract/concrete', in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Munich: Philosophia, 1991, vol. I: 4-5.

1990

- [a] *Identity and Discrimination*. Pp. ix + 173. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- [b] ‘Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics’, *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* **55**, 1 (1990): 297-314.
- [c] ‘Verification, falsification and cancellation in KT’, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **31**, 2 (1990): 286-290.
- [d] ‘Necessary identity and necessary existence’, in R. Haller and J. Brandl, eds., *Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium*, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990, vol. I: 168-175.
- [e] Review of R. Sorensen, *Blindspots*, in *Mind* **99**, 393 (1990): 137-140.
- [f] Review of M. Tiles, *The Philosophy of Set Theory*, in *The Times Higher Education Supplement* 901 (1990): 22.
- [g] Review of A. Appiah, *For Truth in Semantics*, in *Linguistics and Philosophy* **13**, 1 (1990): 129-135.
- [h] Review of N. Cocchiarella, *Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*, in *Linguistics and Philosophy* **13**, 2 (1990): 265-271.
- [i] Review of P. Simons, *Parts*, in *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **38** (1990): 201-210.
- [j] Review of D. Armstrong, *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility*, in *The Times Literary Supplement* 4572 (1990): 1241.

1989

- [a] ‘Being and being so’, *Acta Analytica* **4** (1989): 93-114.
- [b] ‘Kriteriji identiteta: tko ih treba?’ (‘Criteria of identity: who needs them?’), translated into Croatian by M. Palmović with English summary, *Filozofska Istraživanja* **9**, 4 (1989): 1383-1393.
- [c] Review of D. Marconi, *L’eredità di Wittgenstein*, in *Philosophical Books* **30**, 1 (1989): 30-33.

1988

- [a] ‘First order logics for comparative similarity’, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **29**, 4 (1988): 457-481.
- [b] ‘Assertion, denial and some cancellation rules in modal logic’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **17**, 3 (1988): 299-318.
- [c] ‘Equivocation and existence’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **88** (1987/8):

109-127.

- [d] 'Knowability and constructivism', *The Philosophical Quarterly* **38**, 153 (1988): 422-432.
- [e] 'Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals', *Synthese* **75**, 3 (1988): 405-421.
- [f] 'The contingent *a priori*: a reply', *Analysis* **48**, 4 (1988): 218-221.
- [g] 'On rigidity and persistence', *Logique et Analyse* 121/2 (1988): 89-91.
- [h] (with David Berman) 'Locke on particles: a reply to Nuchelmans', *Logique et Analyse*, 123/4 (1988): 213-215.
- [i] 'The unknown' *Cogito* **2**, 2 (1988): 30-32.
- [j] Review of R. Hale, *Abstract Objects*, in *Mind* **97**, 387 (1988): 487-490.
- [k] Review of J. Foster and H. Robinson, eds., *Essays on Berkeley*, in *Berkeley Newsletter* **10** (1987/8): 5-7.
- [l] Review of M. Hollis, *The Cunning of Reason*, in *The Times Literary Supplement* 4489 (1988): 748.

1987

- [a] 'On the paradox of knowability', *Mind* **96**, 382 (1987): 256-261.
- [b] 'On knowledge of the unknowable', *Analysis* **47**, 3 (1987): 154-158.
- [c] 'Invertible definitions', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **28**, 2 (1987): 244-258.
- [d] 'Anthropocentrism and truth', *Philosophia* **17**, 1 (1987): 33-53.

1986

- [a] 'Criteria of identity and the Axiom of Choice', *The Journal of Philosophy* **83**, 7 (1986): 380-394.
Reprinted in H.W. Noonan, ed., *Identity*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993: 419-433.
- [b] 'The contingent *a priori*: has it anything to do with indexicals?', *Analysis* **46**, 3 (1986): 113-117.
- [c] 'Realism and the burden of proof', *Irish Philosophical Journal* **3**, 1 (1986): 42-57.
- [d] Review of T. Burke, *The Philosophy of Popper*, in *Hermathena* 140 (1986): 114-115.

1985

- [a] 'Converse relations', *The Philosophical Review* **94**, 2 (1985): 249-262.
- [b] 'Antropocentrizam i istina', translated into Serbian by D. Božin with English summary, *Filozofska Istraživanja (Zagreb)* **5**, 3 (1985): 501-515.

1984

- [a] 'The infinite commitment of finite minds', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* **14**, 2 (1984): 235-255.
- [b] 'Argument u prilog Platonizmu' ('An argument for Platonism', translated into Serbian by D. Božin), *Dometi (Rijeka)* **17**, 12 (1984): 43-58.

1982

- [a] 'Intuitionism disproved?', *Analysis* **42**, 4 (1982): 203-207.