

*Why Four-Dimensionalist Solutions to Coincidence Puzzles Don't Need Temporal Parts.*

*ABSTRACT*

It is argued that familiar four-dimensionalist resolutions to coincidence puzzles need not rely on the characteristic four-dimensionalist thesis that objects have an instantaneous temporal part at each instant of their existence. Section 1 presents a familiar coincidence puzzle, reviews the causes for concern about distinct coinciding objects, and sets out the familiar argument from Leibniz's Law that the coincident objects are distinct. Sections 2 and 3 consider resolutions of the problem, offered by four-dimensionalists. The first – the Opacity Strategy, appealed to by worm theory in cases of permanent coincidence and stage theorists in all cases – identifies the coincident objects and provides reason to reject the argument for their distinctness. The second – the Coincidence Strategy, followed by worm theorists in cases of temporary coincidence – seek to relieve the concerns about the coincidence of distinct objects by showing it to be unobjectionable. It is argued that neither strategy need make appeal to temporal parts.