


17th International Conference
Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain and Ireland
Nietzsche on Mind and Nature



Abstracts

11 – 13 September 2009



ST PETER'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

under the auspices of the
Faculty of Philosophy



GÜNTER ABEL	4
<i>Consciousness, language, and nature. Nietzsche's philosophy of mind and nature</i>	
MARK ALFANO	4
<i>Nietzsche's naturalism and the tenacity of our intentional states</i>	
BABETTE BABICH	4
<i>Nietzsche's critical philosophy of science: the limits of knowledge</i>	
TOM BAILEY	5
<i>Community and naturalism in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>	
REBECCA BAMFORD	5
<i>Nietzsche and the enactive approach</i>	
MARIO BRANDHORST	5
<i>Naturalism, genealogy and the value of morality</i>	
CONSTANZE BREUER	6
<i>Embodied mind and embodied culture</i>	
MÄRTEN BOHMAN	6
<i>Nietzsche's response to and use of experimental psychology</i>	
THOMAS BROBJER	7
<i>Nietzsche's naturalism and his view of the mind-body and conscious-unconscious dichotomies</i>	
MARK COHEN AND FRIEDRICH ULFERS	7
<i>Nietzsche's panpsychism as the equation of mind and matter</i>	
JOAO CONSTANCIO	7
<i>Nietzsche on freedom and the unchangeability of character</i>	
CHRISTINE DAIGLE	8
<i>Nietzsche's notion of embodied self: proto-phenomenology at work?</i>	
DEIRDRE DALY	8
<i>Nietzsche, Bichat, Schopenhauer: nature's forces of life and death</i>	
PAOLO D'IORIO	9
<i>Nietzsche Source. Scholarly Nietzsche editions on the web</i>	
TSARINA DOYLE	10
<i>Nietzsche's non-eliminativist account of the self</i>	
MANUEL DRIES	10
<i>Nietzsche on the efficacy of feeling free</i>	
CHRISTIAN EMDEN	10
<i>Translating humanity back into nature: naturalism and teleology in Nietzsche's later writings</i>	
MARIE FLEMING	10
<i>Art from the perspective of Nietzsche's naturalism</i>	
MARIA FORNARI	11
<i>"Shadows of God" & neuroethic</i>	
MARIANO L. RODRÍGUEZ	11
<i>Nietzsche on the function of consciousness</i>	
JUTTA GEORG-LAUER	12
<i>Consciousness, body, and truth</i>	
PIETRO GORI	12
<i>Beyond immediate certainties. Nietzsche on the cause of thinking</i>	
LAWRENCE HATAB	13
<i>Talking ourselves into selfhood: Nietzsche on consciousness and language in Gay Science 354</i>	
HELMUT HEIT	13
<i>Nietzsche—an eliminative materialist?</i>	
CHARLIE HUENEMANN	13
<i>Nietzsche's critical psychological naturalism</i>	
SCOTT JENKINS	14
<i>Nietzsche on self-observation</i>	
ANTHONY JENSEN	14
<i>Selbstverleugnung: from the pure subject of knowing to physiognomic perspectivism</i>	
PETER KAIL	15
<i>Naturalism and genealogy</i>	
BRIAN LEITER	15
<i>Who is the 'Sovereign Individual'? Nietzsche on Freedom</i>	
ROGERIO LOPES	15

<i>Is it possible to eliminate our cognitive interest in metaphysical questions? A therapeutic motivation behind Nietzsche's indecision between scepticism and naturalism.</i>	
VANESSA LEMM	16
<i>The recovery of singular truth in Nietzsche's conception of Anschauungsmetapher</i>	
HONG-BIN LIM	16
<i>Affective economy and self in Nietzsche's philosophy</i>	
PAUL S. LOEB	16
<i>The reality of our drives</i>	
TIMOTHY MCWHIRTER	17
<i>Nietzsche's naturalism out of equilibrium</i>	
ALLISON, MERRICK	17
<i>On memory, historical sense, and the art of self-knowledge</i>	
MATTHEW MEYER	17
<i>Naturalism and Nietzsche's perspectivism: reconsidering the received view</i>	
EDWARD OMAR MOAD	18
<i>The will to power as a theory of causation</i>	
ERIC S. NELSON	18
<i>Nietzsche, naturalism, and the hermeneutics of nature</i>	
GRAHAM PARKES	19
<i>Nietzsche on Soul in Nature</i>	
PETER POELLNER	19
<i>Nietzsche's ethics and the philosophy of mind</i>	
BERNARD REGINSTER	19
<i>The genealogy of guilt</i>	
MATTIA RICCARDI	20
<i>Nietzsche's situated and embodied cognition</i>	
JOHN RICHARDSON	20
<i>Nietzsche's value monism: saying yes to everything</i>	
MARCO SEGALA	20
<i>Biology, or the irrationality of the natural world: Nietzsche versus Schopenhauer</i>	
HERMAN SIEMENS	21
<i>Nietzsche and the empirical: through the eyes of the term 'Empfindung'</i>	
MANOLIS SIMOS	21
<i>Foucault's Nietzschean critique of psychology</i>	
BARRY, STOCKER	22
<i>Science, art, and nature in Nietzsche</i>	
GALEN STRAWSON	22
<i>Nietzsche's metaphysics</i>	
ALESSANDRA TANESINI AND PETER SEDGWICK	22
<i>Nietzsche on concepts</i>	
GUDRUN VON TEVENAR	23
<i>Nietzsche's naturalism and nausea-cum-disgust (Ekel)</i>	
DAVE WARD	23
<i>Can Nietzsche solve the mind-body problem?</i>	
ROBERT, WELSHON	24
<i>Nietzsche and the neurosciences of consciousness</i>	
NATHAN E. WIDDER	24
<i>A Semblance of Identity: Nietzsche on the Agency of Drives in Relation to the Ego</i>	
ROBERT ZABOROWSKI	24
<i>Nietzsche on emotions</i>	
GABRIEL, ZAMOSC	25
<i>Nietzsche's ideal of autonomy: on the connection between sovereignty and guilt</i>	
BENEDETTA ZAVATTA	25
<i>Nietzsche on rhetorical reason and embodied mind</i>	

Günter Abel

Consciousness, language, and nature. Nietzsche's philosophy of mind and nature

The talk focuses on the triangulation between consciousness, language, and nature in Nietzsche's thinking, related to some major views in current philosophy. This is done by reconstructing and developing central arguments along the following lines: (1) The riddle of consciousness. (2) The principle of the continuum. (3) A particular process model. (4) Functional organization. (5) The interpenetration of consciousness and language. (6) The relation between consciousness and body. (7) The limits of consciousness and of language. (8) Outlook: a philosophy of signs and interpretation as basis of an integrative philosophy of mind, language, and nature.

Mark Alfano

Nietzsche's naturalism and the tenacity of our intentional states

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche demands that, "psychology shall be recognized again as the queen of the sciences." While one might cast a dubious glance at the "again," many of Nietzsche's insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In *Genealogy*, he criticizes the "English psychologists" for the "inherent psychological absurdity" of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic actions would be forgotten. Tabling whether this criticism is valid, we see Nietzsche's methodological naturalism here: moral claims should be grounded in empirical psychological claims. Later in *Genealogy*, Nietzsche advances his own naturalistic account of the origins of good, bad, and evil. Methodological naturalism is great, but it was not Nietzsche's innovation, and he did not pioneer its application to morality. The list of moral naturalists who appealed to psychology arguably includes Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Bentham, and Mill, among many others. If Nietzsche's naturalism is to be worth the candle of contemporary scholarship, it must involve more than the methodological naturalism that predated him by centuries and to which he made no serious contribution. Nietzsche's key contribution to naturalism is not his adherence to its methodology, but his discovery of certain psychological facts. In particular, he realized that mental states are not ordinary dyadic relations between a subject and an intentional content. Nietzsche discovered the *tenacity of intentional states*: when an intentional state loses its object (because the subject realizes the object does not exist, because the object is forbidden, or because of something else), a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. As Nietzsche puts it *Genealogy*, "Man would rather will the void than be void of will." Nietzsche relies on the tenacity thesis in his explanation of the origin of bad conscience: "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* [...] They turn] against [their] possessors." When hostility towards others becomes impossible, hostility does not disappear; instead, its object is replaced. The tenacity thesis decomposes into the conjunction of two sub-theses: the tenacity of intentional states with propositional objects (beliefs, wishes, some emotions, some desires, some memories) and the tenacity of intentional states with non- propositional objects (loves, hatreds, some desires, some memories). I argue that each of these sub-theses can be derived from Nietzsche's theory of will to power because will to power exists antecedent to and independently of any of its intentional objects.

Babette Babich

Nietzsche's critical philosophy of science: the limits of knowledge

Nietzsche's project reviewing science "as a problem, as questionable," (BT ii) has not become less alien to philosophy, especially philosophy of science, since Nietzsche first raised this question. Thus few scholars have taken the question of Nietzsche and science seriously to date and of those few that have, still fewer of these have any inclination to follow Nietzsche by putting science itself in question. Where the question of science does come up, scholars undertake to correct Nietzsche by raising the questions of what science Nietzsche might have been said to have known (and to have been right about), locating Nietzsche in connection with the history of ideas, a history including science, or else simply underscore his admiration of science.

In place of the modern constellation that sets philosophy at best as a handmaiden of science, Nietzsche seeks to raise the question of science as a philosophical question and proposes to illuminate that question using the resources of art as a self-conscious and innocent illusion. The foundation of art is methodologically indispensable inasmuch as "the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science." (BT §ii) Nietzsche regarded his own pursuit of knowledge as thoroughly, intrinsically, if exactly joyously 'scientific'. What Nietzsche means by thinking in the critical service or 'mastery' of science can only be expressed in its contextual connections to topics in other kinds of philosophic reflection traditionally regarded as distinct. Yet the coordination of art and science also foregrounds what Nietzsche elsewhere names style. This is an aesthetic affair and Nietzsche can accordingly contend that "a 'scientific' interpretation of the world ... might ... be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning." (GS §373) Asking what is the "music" in music, the Nietzsche who raised the question of the "science of aesthetics" in his first book, can ask what science has to offer us in this regard? Like music "calculated, counted, and expressed in a formula," so too the

objective ideal articulated on the terms of science only offers us a formula in need of supplementation and hence one that is only perspectival: "the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives and only in these." (Ibid.) "We cannot look around our own corner ..." (GS §374) cannot look around our own corner ..." (GS §374)

Tom Bailey

Community and naturalism in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra

In this paper I will offer an interpretation of certain passages of *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* regarding intersubjective relations, with a view to arguing that in this period Nietzsche's ethics refers essentially to a certain 'community', rather than, as is often claimed, promoting a substantive value, doctrine, or personality type. I will focus on the treatments of love in the first and second books of *The Gay Science* and on the accounts of Zarathustra's meetings with others in the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and argue that the passages in *The Gay Science* imply a certain intersubjective determination of values, as demonstrations of agents' abilities to will, and that this ethics is further developed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in terms of a series of formal requirements. I will also illuminate these passages with reference to the radically sceptical treatment of judgement and the conclusions drawn from it about 'art' elsewhere in *The Gay Science*, which I will treat as delineating a particular brand of 'naturalism'. This naturalism, I will argue, explains Nietzsche's understanding of the determination of values as a noncognitive matter and his consequent use of certain distinctive textual strategies to stimulate value determination with and among his readers. I will thus propose that in these texts Nietzsche provides a sophisticated account of the intersubjective determination of values, and that this also offers significant insights into his naturalism and his textual strategies.

Rebecca Bamford

Nietzsche and the enactive approach

Thompson (2007: 13-14) provides a helpful gloss of five characteristic ideas united by the enactive approach introduced into cognitive science by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991). These are: (i) living beings are autonomous agents that generate and maintain themselves, thereby enacting their own cognitive domains; (ii) the nervous system is an autonomous dynamic system that generates and maintains its own patterns of activity, creating meaning, rather than processing information in the computationalist sense; (iii) cognition is the exercise of skilful know-how in situated and embodied action; (iv) a cognitive being's world is a relational domain enacted by that being's mode of coupling with the environment; (v) experience is not an epiphenomenal side issue, but is central to understanding the mind, and requires careful phenomenological investigation. In this paper, I will show that Nietzsche's *methodological approach* to mind as presented in *GS*, and as supported by selected remarks from *BGE*, *GM*, and *TI*, has much in common with the *enactive approach* developed in Thompson (2007) and Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). In particular, I will argue that we have evidence to attribute (iii), (iv) and (v) to Nietzsche, comparing claims made by Nietzsche concerning the development of consciousness in e.g. *GS* §§11, 48, & 354, the connection between mind, philosophy, and science (in e.g. *GS* §344, *TI*, "Reason"), and the relationship between Nietzsche's particular claims about the mind with the way in which these claims are performatively expressed and accessed in and through the affections of the texts (e.g. *GS* "Prelude"/§§373-374, *BGE* §3). I contend that at the same time as he offers specific *arguments* concerning the nature of mind, Nietzsche *performatively presents* key aspects of human cognition commensurate with his arguments, and in keeping with the enactivist claims (iii)-(v) mentioned above. In this respect, my project follows in the footsteps of recent work by Solomon (2003), Janaway (2007), and Hatab (2008), all of whom take Nietzsche's rhetorical strategies seriously as a part of his broad philosophical contribution. In conclusion, I suggest that my account shows how Nietzsche's methodology can lend further support to the enactivist approach to bridging the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of cognition, in light of the contemporary methodological debate between Thompson, Dennett (e.g. 2007), and van de Laar (2008).

Mario Brandhorst

Naturalism, genealogy and the value of morality

One essential element of a naturalistic account of the mind is a naturalistic account of morality. One essential element of such an account is a convincing explanation of how morality, understood as a cultural institution, came or could have come about. Call an explanation of this kind a genealogy. The question is, as it was for Nietzsche, how morality and its unbroken hold on us are best explained.

I start with a brief survey of what Nietzsche calls the "English" style of genealogy, as put forward by Paul Rée, and his criticisms of it. The hallmark of this style of genealogy is an explanation of morality on the basis of the egoistic and the altruistic dispositions found in human beings. Nietzsche rightly criticizes this approach as too simplistic. However, he does not succeed in undermining its fundamental appeal.

Yet Nietzsche thought of such hypotheses, his own included, merely as a means, not as an end of ethical enquiry. His genealogy contributes to a critique of moral values and was clearly designed with that intention. However, it is anything but obvious how that relation between means and ends is to be understood. How did Nietzsche conceive of the link between naturalism and genealogy, both of which answer, at least in the first instance, to questions of fact, and his critique of morality and his alternative ethical vision, both of which answer, at least in the first instance, to questions of value? How could Nietzsche hope to support his critique of morality by employing the genealogical method, and to what extent did he succeed?

The answers to these questions, I suggest, are found not in the inherent relation between his genealogy and moral thought, but rather in its expected effect on the minds of the audience Nietzsche addressed. Given (1) that morality is a natural phenomenon that has no right to claims of objectivity, given (2) that it primarily serves the interests of the resentful and weak, and given (3) that in doing so, it harms those who could be strong and independent, there is good reason to expect that once this has been brought to light, those who could be strong and independent will be in a position to see through the illusions spun by the resentful and weak, and realize that morality has no power to bind them.

This way of understanding Nietzsche, I believe, makes his criticism more forceful, since it shows that it does not involve genetic fallacies, and does not aim to do the impossible by trying to hit and unseat morality. At the same time, it makes his critique much more vulnerable, since it cannot hope to succeed unless those to whom it is addressed share the alternative ethical vision. I conclude by asking what prospects there are to reconcile Nietzsche with the "English" style of genealogy he so despised, once we accept that human nature and human history are both more intricate and less transparent than either Rée or Nietzsche allowed.

Constanze Breuer

Embodied mind and embodied culture

Friedrich Nietzsche is famous for his persistent criticism of the culture of his time but less known for having developed a theory of mind. From his works we can learn that he maintained a naturalized view of consciousness that seems to be in accord with epiphenomenalism. Taking into account the scientific knowledge of his time he took the notion of the nervous system as a basis for his considerations on consciousness. In my paper I aim to explore the link between Nietzsche's philosophy of mind and his philosophy of culture. One nexus between his naturalized view of the mind and his conception of culture can be found in the abundant usage of the notions of *nerves*, *nervous system*, *nervousness*, *stimulus* etc. This vocabulary allows him to describe the consciousness and the culture just as their various interrelations which I want to explore by means of an analysis of this *discourse of the nerves*. I will focus on two points investigating how Nietzsche thinks that culture influences the mind and vice versa:

(1) Nietzsche considers Christian practices, especially that of the ascetics and saints, as harmful stimuli for the nerves and the body. Health and illness of a culture are seen as dependent on how cultural methods strengthen or weaken the physical constitution of its members. Nietzsche's idea that cultural practices can influence the nervous system is correct but when he describes his culture mainly in terms of weakened nerves and nervousness he falls short of the potential of his insight.

(2) Nonetheless he is right in thinking that cultures are well advised to take the physical conditions of consciousness into account. He dwells on the circumstance that the nervous system sets boundaries to moral behaviour: "*Weiss man aber je völlig, wie weh eine Handlung einem andern tut? So weit unser Nervensystem reicht, hüten wir uns vor Schmerz: reichte es weiter, nämlich bis in die Mitmenschen hinein, so würden wir Niemandem ein Leides tun [...]*" (MA I 104). I want to correlate this thought with current neurobiological research on the genesis of violent behaviour. The insights into the neurological conditions of the comprehension and realization of social rules provide an interesting possibility to empirically evaluate Nietzsche's views. Moreover, they also allow us to reassess his theory that man is irresponsible for his actions as they specify the im/mutability of social behaviour in dependence on brain structures and capacity.

Mårten Bohman

Nietzsche's response to and use of experimental psychology

Nietzsche read *Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung* by Harald Høffding early in the year of 1887, the same year it came out in German. Høffding's *Psychologie* is an attempt to combine the new experimental psychology with the philosophical discussion related to the recent results. The book soon became a popular reference work in the German debate between philosophers and psychologists. Of all books left in Nietzsche's library it is one of the most underlined and annotated. That this reading of Høffding directly influenced his writing has been shown through the findings of ten "Lesefruchten" in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* and *Götzendämmerung*.

These ten, and others found by me, are of different kinds, ranging from direct positive influence on Nietzsche to open intellectual conflict. The findings can be used to show that in Nietzsche's intellectual "program" at this time psychology often filled the role of supporting his philosophical reasoning. This is most evident in *Zur*

Genealogie der Moral and *Götzendämmerung*, where influence has been documented so far. An until now undiscovered influence from Høffding in "Die vier großen Irrtümer" in *Götzendämmerung* shows how Nietzsche uses psychology as part of a chain of reasoning aimed at rethinking classic philosophical terms of *cause* and *effect*. Høffding's retelling of findings within experimental psychology, particularly experience and emotions, influenced Nietzsche's late thinking and constitute an important context for interpreting and understanding his philosophy.

Much of the work done on the importance of psychology relating to Nietzsche has concentrated on his concept of *will*, and particularly *Wille zu Macht*. What has been less thoroughly examined is the importance of experimental psychology for Nietzsche's thinking. I will attempt to argue that the above mentioned usage of psychology by Nietzsche is most typical for his relation to the subject – that is: as a further source of support for his philosophical and critical thinking. In 1887 and 1888, his last two productive years, psychology is part of both his argumentation on *causality* and on *morality*, the latter arguably the major subject of his "revaluation of all values" - project of the unfinished *Magnum Opus* as well as *Zur Genealogie der Moral*.

Thomas Brobjer

Nietzsche's naturalism and his view of the mind-body and conscious-unconscious dichotomies

I will begin by generally discussing Nietzsche's naturalism and its limits. This theme has recently been discussed by, among others, Christoph Cox in his *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation* (1999) on more epistemological grounds, where he claims that Nietzsche's naturalism is limited due to awareness that it is an interpretation. I will discuss this and related questions, and especially elaborate on the role of values for setting a limit on Nietzsche's naturalism. Other possible limits relate to the philosophy of mind and to psychology, in particular to the mind-body and conscious-unconscious dichotomies.

Nietzsche was throughout his life concerned with the mind-body problem, and he planned to let it constitute an important part of his late project of a revaluation of all values. His response to the dichotomy is relatively straightforward and he remained interested in and read extensively about it throughout his life. His view of it can be used as an indicator of his naturalism. His relation to the conscious-unconscious dichotomy is more complex and will also be examined and discussed.

Mark Cohen and Friedrich Ulfers

Nietzsche's panpsychism as the equation of mind and matter

This paper will demonstrate that Nietzsche's ontology of Becoming can, in its fully radical tenor, be fully appreciated only when viewed in the context of his largely overlooked and, when noted, misinterpreted stipulation: his panpsychism.

For Nietzsche, panpsychism (or panexperientialism) constitutes an attribution of psychical aspects to what Nietzsche calls the "essence of material things" ("Wesen der Dinge," KSA 7.470), specifically, the attribution of "feeling" ("Empfindung," KSA 7.469) and "memory" ("Gedächtnis," KSA 7.470). In making this postulation, Nietzsche treats matter as something not entirely distinct from psyche, mind, or experience in their most general and rudimentary sense. Put differently, Nietzsche ignores the dividing line, drawn by classical philosophy and ontology, science, and common sense, between mind and mindless matter.

Nietzsche refutes the dichotomy between materialism and mentalism (or idealism) for the sake of a "third": a psychical materialism, that is, a "materialism" that harbours a minimal but not zero degree of consciousness or awareness—an "interpretive capacity"—which is what Nietzsche indicates in asserting that "everything interprets" and that the "push, the impact of one atom upon another presupposes . . . feeling." ("Der Stoss, das Einwirken des einen Atoms auf das andre, setzt Empfindung voraus," KSA 7.469)

In alignment with this conception of a minimal but not zero degree of mind in place of material objects—in which objects are replaced by events of sentience of non-zero duration—is Nietzsche's ontology of a quantized universe, a universe in which space, time, and eventuality occur in quanta, or "atoms." It is a conception of reality as event-like, rather than stabilized into substantial objects, in which all "interim phenomena," phenomena as they arise anterior to the human misinterpretation of reality that produces the world we believe we occupy, are singular and in a state of ongoing occurrence, and their quality of feeling is an aspect and mark of the Will to Power that gives rise to them. Thus, it is an ontology of Becoming rather than Being—a processual ontology. It is, as well, a cosmology possessing distinct alignments with contemporary developments in physics, such as loop quantum gravity, that envision a universe of essential quantization, a universe in which, on the sub-micro level, even space comes in packets.

Joao Constancio

Nietzsche on freedom and the unchangeability of character

This paper's aim is to clarify Nietzsche's view on Schopenhauer's doctrine of the unchangeability of character. Brian Leiter has argued that Nietzsche's repudiation of this doctrine is only apparent, and that *Daybreak* 560 is rather a reiteration of it. I claim that this must be wrong. I think, rather, that Nietzsche elaborates on Schopenhauer's doctrine of the acquisition of character in terms that lead to the repudiation of the idea of unchangeability. Schopenhauer's concept of "acquired character" implies that, because we have no a priori knowledge of what we are, we can lead authentic or inauthentic lives, i.e. that our actions can be determined either by true or false motives, that we can act either on or out of character depending on whether we have adequate knowledge of what we are. Differences in knowledge determine differences in the way we act. Inauthenticity is a lack of knowledge that makes us act as others do. One "imitates" others in ways that do not truly express one's "intelligible character", i.e. a unique, truly individual combination of the three basic human motivations: egoism, compassion, and malice (i.e. cruelty). Thus, the idea that motives "influence the character through the medium of knowledge" leads Schopenhauer to a view that is deterministic but also makes room for the improvement of character. In this, Nietzsche's view is similar to Schopenhauer's, but their differences are equally important. Nietzsche argues that 1) there is no "pure subject of knowledge" who could ever reach an impartial, will-less knowledge of our drives: instead, knowledge is always guided by "affects"; 2) the so-called "motives" are always cultural, historic values, and so are the drives that make up our "inclinations and aversions"; 3) egoism, compassion and cruelty are cultural, historic drives: although their "degree" and their relative strength and weakness in each individual tend not to change in adult life, they are changeable (as everything historic); 4) rather than pure knowledge of platonic ideas, only genealogy (as critique of cultural, historic values) gives access to the kind of insight that makes us "gardeners" of our character, i.e. of our individuality. Freedom consists of acquiring a character that is truly individual. Objectively, it is already determined who shall and who shall not be "free", but, subjectively, each individual is always faced with the task of "creating" his own individuality.

Christine Daigle

Nietzsche's notion of embodied self: proto-phenomenology at work?

Nietzsche's existential concern with the individual *qua* individual leads him to consider (1) how the human being experiences himself, (2) how he experiences the presence of others and (3) how he encounters the world, that is, how the world and the objects therein appear to him. These interconnected concerns focus on the human being as an embodied consciousness. Nietzsche's concern with embodiment and his investigative methodology indicate that he ought to be considered as a phenomenologist *avant la lettre*, that is, as a philosopher whose inquiry anticipates traditional phenomenology.

I will present specific passages of *Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak* as evidence of an early Nietzschean formulation of the concept of intentionality that lies at the heart of any phenomenological inquiry. Indeed, Nietzsche's method in such works anticipates (for example) that of the late Husserl (minus the notion of pure consciousness, obviously). Nietzsche's focus and emphasis on the phenomenal world leads him to explore the individual consciousness' interaction with the world. Nietzsche's views present us with a genuine phenomenological intentionality at work. Furthermore, I consider Nietzsche's perspectivism to be an expression of his more fundamental view of intentionality which in turn rests upon a phenomenological understanding of embodiment.

Nietzschean perspectivism, which is tied to his notion of the self as a "subjective multiplicity," understands our experience of the world in terms of a multifaceted embodied experience. I will argue that this "subjective multiplicity" is best understood in phenomenological terms. Indeed, Nietzsche's views on the body and his dealings with the body is a paradigm case of phenomenology at work in his thought. My claim is that Nietzsche's view of the body is phenomenological. Nietzsche understands the body as our grand reason, i.e. as our tool to have a world. This comes very close to Merleau-Ponty's view of the body-subject as "our general medium for having a world."¹ Drawing from the section "Of the Despisers of the Body" from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I will explain how the embodied intentional consciousness' being-in-the-world constitutes itself in this "große Vernunft." After which, I will show that a non-metaphysical mapping of the human being, such as that which we find in Nietzsche, unveils the individual as a body-subject that is a multi-faceted conscious being that has its foundation in a worldly situated embodied consciousness, a view that aligns Nietzsche with the existential-phenomenological tradition.

Deirdre Daly

Nietzsche, Bichat, Schopenhauer: nature's forces of life and death

This paper traces the origin of the philosophy of forces that influenced Nietzsche early writings to the second volume of Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation* and to the work of the French physiologist Xavier Bichat (1771-1802). The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to examine the latter's original philosophical and scientific

¹ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962): 146.

theories on natural forces (2) to analyse Nietzsche's transformation and adoption of theories of forces in the naturalism and materialism or anti-idealism of his early works, and (3) to inquire whether or not there is a change of perspective on the philosophy of forces in Nietzsche's later works and if there is, what becomes of 'natural forces' in these later works. This inquiry is intended to contribute, in the larger context, to examining in essence the modulation of the metaphysical/anti-metaphysical in Nietzsche's oeuvre. The questions posed in the paper will also, I suggest, propose a re-appraisal of Deleuze's vitalist interpretation of Nietzsche's thought.

Part 1

The importance for Nietzsche of the *second* volume of *World as Will and Representation* has been far less documented than the significance of the first volume, which is well known, and I begin by presenting evidence concerning his reception of Volume II, which focuses on physiological and biological proofs -as opposed to philosophical arguments- for the theory of the Will. I also examine the strong influence of Bichat's *Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort* (1800) in the work.

Schopenhauer considered Bichat to be pursuing the scientific complement to the philosophy of the Will, while considering his own work as the perfect supplement to the latter's physiology and pathology, noting once 'Bichat and I embrace as in a desert'. Bichat, who performed over 600 autopsies saw nature as marked essentially by a strict distinction between organic life and animal life. Most importantly, in opposition to those who considered the moral faculty to be the thing which distinguished man from animals, Bichat nominated the brain and its appendages to be the seat of animal life and declared that *moral* character was simply one aspect of *unconscious*, organic life which has its seat in the emotions and passions. He thereby concluded that only animal life is subject to external influence, e.g. education, practice, culture, but that it was impossible to modify moral character from the outside. Schopenhauer identified his idea of the Will with Bichat's concept of organic life and took this as proof that the Will -the vital, unconscious force impelling life- is immutable and eternal. The parallels between Will and Representation and Organic and Animal life will be analysed, in this paper, in relationship to the differentiation of natural forces identified by Bichat and Schopenhauer. I demonstrate how Schopenhauer utilises an array of natural forces -his 'Platonic Ideas'-to explain differentiation in the empirical world, that is, how natural forces are necessary to the *principium individuationis*. I also investigate how Bichat employs the concept of natural forces to explain health and disease, and to radicalise the understanding of both life and death.

Part 2

In this section, I examine Nietzsche's employment of notions of natural forces in the *Free Spirit* trilogy and his development of a concept of a *chemistry* of feelings in *Human, All Too Human*. (In Schopenhauer's view, chemical elements are the manifestation of unique 'chemical' forces.) I investigate this in conjunction with Nietzsche's transformation of work by two of his friends: Paul Ree's empirical psychology on one hand and Paul Deussen's theory of forces as the elements of metaphysics. I plot the evolution of these ideas up to an analysis of the thinking of the body which is offered in *The Gay Science* and discuss how a grasp of the necessity and causality of natural forces is linked to Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics. I shall also consider the prospect that a theory of forces taken to its ultimate conclusion leads necessarily to philosophical monism, which is what occurred in Deussen's case and I assess the metaphysical implications of *Monergism* as explicated by Deussen.

Part 3

In the final part, I reconsider Bichat's key statement of the *Physiological Researches on Life and Death* that "Life is the sum total of forces that resists death". By problematising the definition of life in terms of the quantification of vital signs, Bichat introduced a far more sophisticated and uncanny *evaluation* of life which is strongly counter-intuitive in many ways, as I will explore. I argue that this new science of forces paves the way for Nietzsche's development of the concept of life as a particular value or constellation of values. I ask whether Nietzsche's later statements concerning his affirmative project of the revaluation of all values change the mode in which he thinks about nature, becoming and the body. Evaluative tools such as the concepts of 'the great health' and 'sickness' as well as inventive and confounding concerns with 'physiology' and 'hygiene' are prioritized over scientific and empirical descriptions of the natural world: the question is whether these new priorities should be considered more or less metaphysical, newly 'metaphysical-ised' or spiritualised? My conclusion will incorporate a critical consideration of Deleuze's Nietzsche of vitalism and transcendental empiricism and re-poses the question of the relationship of metaphysics and the philosophy of forces.

Paolo D'Iorio

[Nietzsche Source. Scholarly Nietzsche editions on the web](#)

Nietzsche Source is a web site with stable, citable internet addresses dedicated to the publication of scholarly content on Friedrich Nietzsche. It is not subscription-based and can be freely consulted and used for scholarly purposes. All publications are peer-reviewed and aspire to meet the highest quality standards. This paper will present the three digital editions that are currently under publication in Nietzsche Source:

- 1) The digital *critical* edition of the complete works, posthumous fragments and correspondence, based on the Colli/Montinari critical edition. The philological corrections that are scattered in the critical

apparatuses of the different commentary volumes of the print edition have been integrated directly into the electronic text.

- 2) The digital *facsimile* edition, providing for the first time a digital reproduction of the complete Nietzsche estate, including first editions of works, manuscripts, letters and biographical documents.
- 3) The digital *genetic* editions of Nietzsche's works, including a new transcription of the manuscripts and a genetic disposition of the materials.

Tsarina Doyle

Nietzsche's non-eliminativist account of the self

This paper shall examine how Nietzsche's will to power thesis emerges from his engagement with Kant, focusing on the non-idealist implications of this engagement for Nietzsche's understanding of the relationship between self and world. The paper shall begin by assessing both Nietzsche's praise and criticism of Kant's rejection of rational psychology in the Paralogism section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Although Nietzsche praises Kant's rejection of the substantial and introspective Cartesian self, he nevertheless maintains that Kant fails to bring his project to its logical conclusion, arguing that Kant oscillates between a non-empirical self that stands outside the world constituting it from without and a 'no-self' view. In contrast, Nietzsche contends that the self is an object in the world. He argues that the rejection of substantialist subjects and objects constituted by them gives rise to the view that objects are perspectival, constituted by bundles of intentionally directed powers, and that the self once properly returned to nature is also a bundle of perspectives, immersed in this evolving whole. The paper examines the implications of this proposal, concluding, contrary to initial appearances that Nietzsche avoids the charge of eliminativism with regard to the self by recognizing the manner in which the capacity for conscious reflection is a specifically human phenomenon supervening on the self as an object-bundle of drives and affects.

Manuel Dries

Nietzsche on the efficacy of feeling free

In BGE Nietzsche rejects both the idea of *causa sui* freedom and the idea of determinism. He focuses instead on freedom and unfreedom as first-person experiential states. In Nietzsche's model, the first-person experiential state of freedom acts as indicator of self-efficacy and accompanies 'successful resistance', while the first-person experiential state of un-freedom acts as indicator of 'unsuccessful resistance'. I will argue that far from regarding this as a merely epiphenomenal phenomenology that is non-efficacious, Nietzsche's theory of the mind and his suggested unity of the self relies on a first-personal awareness of freedom as self-efficacy, the latter functioning as selector for both (drive-based) unconscious as well as higher-order conscious mental states.

Christian Emden

Translating humanity back into nature: naturalism and teleology in Nietzsche's later writings

Focusing on Nietzsche's writings during the 1880s, the paper argues that the naturalist dimension of his genealogy entails a return to a "weak" teleological argument. In a first step the paper outlines Nietzsche's naturalist position: Since human beings are natural beings, any normative claims about reality that such beings make, and any norms that govern these claims themselves, are necessarily embedded in an interaction with the material world (i.e. nature), and it is only through the latter that normative claims are able to sustain any binding force. While such an argument allows Nietzsche to undercut the traditional distinctions between facts and norms, "is" and "ought," in a second step I show that Nietzsche's position entails a teleological argument. If genealogy as a philosophical project, from "The Gay Science" to "The Genealogy of Morality" and the late notebooks, wishes to provide any critical insight into the historical formation of moral norms and at the same time follow a naturalist explanatory model, it has to adopt a weak program of teleology. Influenced by contemporary evolutionary thought, Nietzsche's teleological arguments are nevertheless different from those that can be found in Kant and Hegel—but they are surprisingly close to the position of Schelling's "Naturphilosophie." In the context of the naturalist stance of the genealogical project Nietzsche, thus, rejects teleology as describing a qualitative process of perfectibility, but he does accept a weaker notion of teleology as describing the common temporality of the natural and the social worlds.

Marie Fleming

Art from the perspective of Nietzsche's naturalism

Is art the natural opponent of the ascetic ideal, as Nietzsche suggests in *On the Genealogy of Morals*? Is that view compatible with the many statements, scattered throughout his writings, on art's cultural-religious dimensions? Or

do we have to shift perspective to make sense of his naturalistic understanding of art?

Nietzsche's first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, states that art is the product of a natural drive and comes into being "to seduce us into continuing to live" in the face of life's "terrors and horrors." Art, it seems, has several tasks, but a principal one is a covering up of the truth through "powerful delusions and intensely pleasurable illusions." In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche says that we humans are in debt to art, the "cult of the untrue," for saving us from the "nausea and suicide" that would surely ensue, were we honestly to confront the "delusion and error" of our everyday knowledge. Art is "good will to appearance." In the *Genealogy*, too, he declares that, in art, "precisely the *lie* is sanctified and the *will to deception* has a good conscience." Countless other passages bear on this theme of art and lies. The harsh treatment of art as a substitute for religion in *Human, All-Too Human* strikes a different tone, but is still consonant with what he says elsewhere. Artists, no less than ethical teachers, so the message runs, promote untruths, even while these untruths serve human needs by making it possible for us to say "yes" to life.

If Nietzsche's naturalism is a basis for his reevaluation of values, can we conclude that art, like religion, allows us to cope even as it all the while makes us more sickly and dependent? And would not the healthy among us be better off without art, just as they might be better off without religion? How can art play anything more than a compensatory role in a world filled with suffering? As I show in the paper, Nietzsche tries to extricate himself from this apparent dead-end by moving more decisively to the science of aesthetics and by developing views that he had put forward as early as *The Birth*.

Maria Fornari

"Shadows of God" & neuroethic

Much contemporary research into the origins of morality in the neurosciences and in a few branch of philosophy of mind seem to attribute to human beings a moral disposition, broadly understood as the capacity to formulate moral judgments and apply them to behaviour. This disposition is increasingly considered as an evolutionary consequence of specific brain structures, combined with determining epigenetic factors. What is notable, however, is how in the work of at least some writers in these fields this disposition takes on a subtly normative form. For instance, Changeux considers altruism and compassion as nothing but an extension of a suspended genetic evolution, while Hauser claims to identify a universal moral grammar analogous to the linguistic one, and Fehr and Fischbacher a so-called 'strong reciprocity' analogous to the pure altruism of human beings. This would appear to involve a substantial amount of wishful thinking, a hope for a 'universal morality' that would allow human beings to overcome their divisions and conflicts in the name of the species.

Nietzsche, an acute critic of the naturalistic fallacy and sensitive to the 'shadows of God' remaining in scientific thought, identifies similar tendencies in the work of his contemporaries. He criticizes Herbert Spencer, for instance, for considering the basis of evolution and morality to be altruism, understood as a principle induced by nature into human being with the aim of promoting conservation and the development of life. So in this paper, I will examine Nietzsche's engagement with the debates among his contemporaries over the existence of moral faculties, in the context of the development of certain new evolutionary and biological theories, particularly those of a Darwinian and Spencerian kind. I will then consider whether the criticisms that he makes of naturalistic fallacies in his contemporaries' positions can also illuminate difficulties in some of our own contemporaries' research into the origins of morality. My claim will be that Nietzsche's criticisms can indeed reveal that such supposedly 'scientific' claims often reveal the distorting influence of certain very particular inclinations and values.

Mariano L. Rodríguez

Nietzsche on the function of consciousness

The question of consciousness is considered paramount in Nietzschean philosophy of the mind as it is in this question that all its constituents converge: the critique of language as a snare for our thoughts (or the critique of belief in grammar, which would be faith in reason), the thesis of the illusory nature of intentional action, which Nietzsche contrasts with his discovery of action as a "pretext" of the force unleashed over events, an "instinctive" force we would know nothing about; in short, the Nietzschean idea of the "body" as centred plurality of unconscious drives aspiring to control by interpreting events.

As a conclusion to his deconstruction of natural or common sense psychology – in other words, having denounced the nature of interpretation, and interpretation whose "time is up", of what would be the hard core of this mentalist psychology, the *perception/action coupling* in which the basic structure of representation takes on psychological meaning, the Subject/Object structure of Indo-European languages, "S is P": "everything that exists behaves as a predicate with respect to the subject"; "every action implies an agent" – Nietzsche ends up asserting that every conscious process of development in mind states, with respect to the functional notion of representative consciousness or awareness, as Chalmers puts it, involves an inevitable "falsification" (or interpretation, in the sense of unification and generalisation) or distancing from the original source of the chaos of sensations.

The function of consciousness and its companion, language – conscious mental states being those with a conceptually articulated content – would be that of a *means of communication* of indisputable biological usefulness to man as a “herd animal”, but definitely not that of an instrument of *knowledge*. And, in contrast to the level of conscious artefact, we would have that of the sentiments – which comprise “the most fundamental fact to which we can descend” – where what we might ironically call “truly real reality” would be found: the level of the power that provides interpretations, an unconscious level, but at the same time, paradoxically, the appropriate one for phenomenal consciousness.

Jutta Georg-Lauer

Consciousness, body, and truth

I would like to research whether Nietzsche's criticism of the traditional philosophical term of reason and consciousness succeeds in creating an amoral concept of truth, which derives from the senses and from the physical nature. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche claims that traditional philosophy ‘misunderstands the body’. He says that the knowledge of such philosophy does not harbour a secured truth but rather consists of mere assertions, originating in suppressed physiological conditions of ‘health, future, growth, power, life’. The philosophers have backed the truth in order to maintain the duration of their dream of an objective knowledge. Nietzsche destroys their demand through his thesis of the perspectival character of any knowledge. According to him the strength of knowledge lies in its age, not in its degree of truth. But in spite of his basic criticism of rational truth, he does not give up truth as the goal of knowledge. His way of thinking is in search for it, but for him truth is neither universal or abstract nor intersubjective. He demands a paradigm change from reason to body-reason. He believes that the body - as a sphere of individual formation of the will to power - is the authentic organ of knowledge, whereas consciousness is just its appendix. Therefore the body-reason is great and related to the senses and not external to the mundane organic relations. True is the physically authentic grasping of a moment, which may be wrong in the next one. “Sense” and “truth” of the body-reason become evident in their superiority of appearance, deception and lie. With the body a “truth” can be gained, which does not require a transcendental binding; from such an ankle truth must also be conceived as a revelation. Discourse-theoretically spoken Nietzsche changes the traditional hierarchy comparatively from consciousness and body, and dismisses the contradiction of body and reason, because for him they are no antipodes. Only the body-reason instead expresses the perspective knowledges. But, as we know, his concept of the fundamental perspectivism of knowledge needs a close connection with his conception of the will-to-power. The first question is, whether the will-to-power has a transcendental function in Nietzsche's truth concept of the body-reason. The second question, whether it is possible to prove, that the truth of the body is really immoral. Because Nietzsche's criticism of the reason-truth is part of his belief, that the ascetic ideal is concealed in the will to truth, which is a reactive will to exercise power. If that can't be verified his focus on the body reason represents nothing but a transformation of the traditional hierarchy between consciousness and body. Certainly these questions directly touch the exclusive status Nietzsche reserves to the becoming instead of the being.

Pietro Gori

Beyond Immediate certainties. Nietzsche on the cause of thinking

In Part One of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche writes that anyone who believes in “immediate certainties” such as “I think” encounters a series of “metaphysical questions”. The most important of these “problems of intellectual knowledge” concerns the existence of an ‘I’, as much as our believing it to be the *cause* of thinking. Therefore, any remark about our mental faculties directly follows from our defining what we could call the *basic psychical unity*, i.e. our view on higher-level psychical functions is strictly related with the properties we attribute to the notion of ‘I’. As we know, the main ideas on this subject that Nietzsche states in his book from 1886 come from the neo-Kantian views of Lange, Spir and Teichmüller, and we cannot forget the important (even if hidden) reference to Lichtenberg in § 17 of the same work. Nevertheless, Nietzsche seems to move beyond all these sources, and in many of his writings we can find a new definition of the ‘ego’, finally free from any reference to a *thing in itself*, and for this reason closer to the ideas of the Austrian scientist Ernst Mach.

In this paper I shall carry these remarks out. I'll show the main properties of the notion of ‘I’ Nietzsche concerns with in his writings and, therefore, the grounds of his view on the mind-body problem. Moreover, I will argue that, once we observe that Nietzsche looks at the ‘ego’ as a mere *regulative fiction* having no ontological value out of the chain of sensation and representation it brings together, we could find out the close similarity with the way Mach defines it in his *Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen* (1886). This reference could help us to understand in a better way some statements Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks, and, secondly, to show how strictly was his philosophy of mind related with the main outcomes of 19th century science. Indeed, Nietzsche's refusal of the belief “that there must necessarily be something that thinks” - a view that results from the anti-metaphysical intent leading his naturalism - seems to be one of the most important assumptions of the new born physiological psychology, an idea out of which many of the 20th century philosophical debates arose.

Lawrence Hatab

Talking ourselves into selfhood: Nietzsche on consciousness and language in Gay Science 354

It is well known that Nietzsche critiques the idea of atomic individualism as incompatible with the dynamism of becoming. Another angle of such critique is the subversion of consciousness and its storied role in defining individual selfhood. In *GS* 354 Nietzsche claims that consciousness is not fundamental to human experience and that it arises only out of the social network of linguistic communication. With words conceived as commonly understood signs, Nietzsche concludes that self-consciousness can never be truly individual or unique but simply an appropriation of what is "average."

In my essay I want to explore some interesting questions pertaining to this text and argument. First of all I show that Nietzsche's claims find support in developmental psychology: that self-awareness seems to be an internalization of socially formed speech. Then I pose some questions about Nietzsche's analysis on its own terms:

- 1) How far does Nietzsche take the equation between consciousness and socially based language?
- 2) Is self-awareness nothing more than a linguistic-communal phenomenon?
- 3) Is language nothing more than a communal network that averages out experience?
- 4) Given the possibility of creative language in Nietzsche's thought (and hinted at in *GS* 354), would such possibility have to be distinguishable from the consciousness-language connection?
- 5) What sense can be made of unique experience and selfhood in the light of Nietzsche's analysis?

Helmut Heit

Nietzsche—an eliminative materialist?

Eliminative materialism (E.M.), as a recent alternative to dualistic and monistic philosophies of mind, holds that "our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behaviour and the nature of cognitive activity" (Churchland 1999: 43). Traditional terms of so-called folk-psychology could not be reduced to naturalistic terms but should be eliminated and replaced by more appropriate scientific ones. When one of the most prominent defenders of E.M., Paul Churchland published his first book on the relation between human neural nature and mind, a referee made an astounding remark: "Churchland aims little less than a 'transvaluation of values'" (Fraassen 1981: 555). Though van Fraassen made no further explicit references, the reminiscence of Nietzsche is not arbitrary. Not only Churchland's ambition to overcome a traditional worldview and replace it by a new and better one resembles Nietzsche; their philosophies of mind have some features in common, too. Like Nietzsche, Churchland is a Kantian insofar both agree that our perceptual world is at least co-constituted by a man-made conceptual web. Moreover, both think that the conceptual web could significantly mislead our representations of the outer and inner world. While Churchland argues that "propositional attitudes [...] form the systematic core of folk psychology" (Churchland 1989: 3), Nietzsche advises against the "seduction of language" (*GM* I,13) and the "grammatical custom" (*BGE* § 17) to add an 'I' to a 'think'. Churchland as well as Nietzsche take contemporary science serious, be it modern research in neural networks or 19th century findings in the physiology of sense-experience (e.g. Hermann von Helmholtz, whom Nietzsche studied). Nietzsche is a philosophical naturalist as Churchland is, but both refuse to treat mental processes merely as reducible 'epiphenomena'. However, in spite of these similarities, significant differences should not be neglected: As opposed to Churchland Nietzsche does not invite us to replace folk-psychology by allegedly more appropriate scientific theories, because he rejects the realist framework of E.M. Whereas the idea of transvaluation of traditional philosophy of mind is combined with realism in Churchland's version, it goes with perspectivism in Nietzsche. By means of a comparison between Nietzsche and Churchland this paper aims to provide a better understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy of mind.

References:

- Churchland, Paul M. *A Neurocomputational Perspective. The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.* Cambridge
— (1999): *Matter and Consciousness. A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.* Cambridge.
Fraassen, Bas C. van (1981): "Critical Notice of Paul Churchland: *Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind* (1979)." In: *Candian Journal of Philosophy.* Vol. 11/3: 555-567.

Charlie Huenemann

Nietzsche's critical psychological naturalism

Many commentators now see Nietzsche as a naturalist in philosophical orientation, though they disagree about what this means. Minimally, it means that Nietzsche favoured the sort of methods or approaches a naturalist would take

toward understanding humans and nature: roughly, experiment-based inferential reasoning. Maximally, the claim is taken to mean that Nietzsche accepted many of the specific conclusions of scientific materialists of his day (including Lange, Büchner, and others) and formed his philosophical conclusions to cohere with their theories.

But I shall argue that these broad accounts of Nietzsche's naturalism have missed a crucial feature, which is that his naturalism was oriented around his *psychology*. Whereas contemporary naturalists embrace conclusions from the broad range of natural sciences with equal warmth, Nietzsche believed that psychology has a pre-eminent status. His justification for this preference is that all cognitive agents are subject to psychological forces which can distort or prejudice their inquiries, and so psychology must be applied as a corrective to any scientific theory that is proposed. A central example of this orientation is Nietzsche's critique of atomism: he thought the physicists of his day were prejudiced by the "subject/object" structure of grammar, which led them into thinking that nature must be constituted by "things" instead of more fluid "forces." Nietzsche was preceded in this brand of critical psychological naturalism by David Hume, who also tried to launch a "science of man" as a corrective to central tenets of Newtonian science.

Nietzsche's critical psychological naturalism is further distinguished (I shall argue) by the way in which he embedded psychology in social evolution. Nietzsche believed that an individual's psychology is largely shaped by the surrounding culture, so that many of the psychological pressures exerted by one culture (ancient Greece, say) are different from those exerted by another (19th-century Germany, say). So human psychology itself varies over time and place. The upshot of this approach is that, in order to understand reality (according to Nietzsche), one must first understand the way in which social evolution has shaped the psychological structure of the time, and the ways in which that structure may have warped the other natural sciences of the time. This is quite different from contemporary philosophical naturalism, which typically resists any psychologicistic approach to natural science.

Scott Jenkins

Nietzsche on self-observation

Throughout his writings Nietzsche is opposed to understanding the mind as a realm of entities that can be known completely and certainly through mere self-observation [Selbstbeobachtung] (HAH 491, MAM 223, BGE 16). Rather surprisingly, Nietzsche's opposition to this picture often seems to be grounded in the same kind of introspective awareness that he asserts to be impossible (GS 335, BGE 19). Thus his position on introspection and self-knowledge appears to be inconsistent. I show that Nietzsche's view is not inconsistent insofar as he follows his contemporaries Friedrich Lange and Wilhelm Wundt in distinguishing between self-observation and the perception of one's states. Nietzsche's 'self-observer' alleges an immediacy in the awareness of our states (which could be taken to ground the completeness and incorrigibility of self-knowledge), while Nietzsche himself maintains that all inner perception is mediated by concepts. If we fail to recognize this mediation, Nietzsche argues, we overlook both the necessary incompleteness of self-knowledge and the additional limitations on self-knowledge that arise from our present reliance on 'herd' concepts that are ill-suited to the task of articulating our inner states.

Nietzsche's explanation of our tendency to believe that introspection gives us unmediated access to ourselves constitutes the second element in his critique of self-observation. Here again he follows Lange in maintaining that the doctrine of self-observation has practical benefits insofar as it provides an epistemic foundation for our most cherished religious and moral views. The doctrine thus plays the same role in our lives as the so-called 'proof of strength'. In addition, Nietzsche regards the doctrine of self-observation as an instance of a more general tendency to overestimate our capacity for knowledge. In this particular case, we understand all instances of self-knowledge on the model of those few cases in which errors are unlikely.

I conclude by examining the case of alleged self-observation most important for Nietzsche's development – Schopenhauer's claim that our bodies are 'given' to us as will (WWR I 100). A survey of Nietzsche's earliest remarks on introspection demonstrates that Nietzsche's doctrine of mediated introspection is intended as an inversion of Schopenhauer's view. While Schopenhauer believes that we can arrive at the true, hidden character of the world around us by turning inwards and attending to our wills, for Nietzsche knowledge of the world around us is a condition of the conceptual progress necessary for acquiring self-knowledge.

Anthony Jensen

Selbstverleugnung: from the pure subject of knowing to physiognomic perspectivism

Much has been made of Nietzsche's intellectual break from Schopenhauer. In this paper, I wish to shift the focus of this complicated renunciation away from the more usual themes of pessimism or metaphysics and examine more closely Nietzsche's relationship with Schopenhauer's philosophy of mind. Specifically, I will reveal his early adoption and later rejection of his Erzieher's notion of 'Anschauung'. Through this act the so-called 'Pure Subject of Knowing' rises above the ceaseless demands of Will and comes to contemplate the beautiful, universal, and objective Idea apart from the psychological distortion of Will. Nietzsche's early dependence on that framework, I argue, would lead him to consider justified his dogmatic pronouncements in the Birth of Tragedy on the grounds that he, like the genius, has become the "clear mirror of the inner nature of the world" and therefore has privileged

insight into the real development of tragedy beyond the available philological evidence. Of course, Nietzsche does not rely on this construction of will-free intellect for very long. In my second section I show that in the notes of 1871-4—thus, earlier than is sometimes thought—Nietzsche moves toward a naturalistic rejection of the mystical aspects of this Schopenhauerian formulation. In those notes, Nietzsche re-interprets *Anschauung* as the sub-conscious but entirely naturalistic ‘inference’ which actuates conscious conceptual thinking. By the mid-1880’s, unable to formulate a satisfactory theory of subjectivity that could incorporate even this naturalized *Anschauung*, Nietzsche then viciously renounces the possibility of Schopenhauer’s ‘Pure Subject of Knowing’ altogether—and in fact, I contend, the renunciation was itself the strongest intellectual impetus driving Nietzsche toward his mature theory of physiognomic perspectivism.

Peter Kail

Naturalism and genealogy

Here I attempt to disambiguate some senses of ‘naturalism’, and then focus on what I shall call ‘explanatory naturalism’. I shall then discuss this notion and its ramifications with reference to the project of the *Genealogy*. In doing so I shall also compare and contrast this project with that of David Hume’s discussion of justice.

Brian Leiter

Who is the ‘Sovereign Individual’? Nietzsche on Freedom

Who is this “sovereign individual” of GM II:2, and what does he have to do with Nietzsche’s conceptions of free will, freedom or the self? I shall argue for what would have been, at one time, a fairly unsurprising view, namely, that (1) Nietzsche denies that people ever act freely and that they are ever morally responsible for anything they do; (2) the figure of the “sovereign individual” in no way supports a denial of the first point; and (3) Nietzsche engages in what Charles Stevenson would have called a “persuasive definition” of the language of “freedom” and “free will,” radically revising the content of those concepts, but in a way that aims to capitalize on their emotive content and authority for his readers. The image of the “sovereign individual” is of a piece with those persuasive efforts.

Rogério Lopes

Is it possible to eliminate our cognitive interest in metaphysical questions? A therapeutic motivation behind Nietzsche’s indecision between scepticism and naturalism.

In this paper I intend to identify some sceptical motivations behind the philosophical program proposed by Nietzsche in the Section One of *Human, All Too Human*. In the first part of the paper I contrast Nietzsche’s “historical philosophy” with three philosophical programs that propose innovating versions of transcendental arguments. The most revisionary of these programs was formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange. I ascribe to him a sophisticated kind of methodological naturalism that inspires Nietzsche decisively. Nietzsche still retains Schopenhauer’s project of a genetic description of the world as representation, but in quite a deflationary version. This deflationary version rejects two substantive aims Schopenhauer associated with his original project: the ascribing of an epistemic privilege to the feelings in the context of a renewing of transcendental tradition and the construction of a Post-Kantian metaphysics by vindicating such an epistemic privilege. Finally, I argue that the normative conception of epistemology that arises from the transcendental philosophy as revised by Afrikan Spir has a remarkable influence on Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation between scepticism and naturalism. Nietzsche’s uncompromising naturalism concerning the mechanisms of building and fixing beliefs is the main reason behind his refusal of transcendental arguments. In such a philosophical landscape the suspension of judgement would be the only epistemically responsible thing to do, but this reasonable alternative becomes a psychological impossibility thanks to the same uncompromising naturalism concerning beliefs. I propose to describe the view held by Nietzsche at the end of Section One as a kind of fideistic naturalism, a view quite similar to those of Pascal and Hume.

In the second part of the paper I argue for the following thesis: Nietzsche is trying to find a new strategy to convince his audience that our cognitive interest in metaphysical questions is parasitic upon our alleged practical interests in such sort of issues. The most efficient strategy to create theoretical indifference toward metaphysical propositions is neither to substitute the dogmatic metaphysics for the transcendental doctrine of categories, nor to propose a semantic or logical theory about the non-decidability of certain problems, but to deny that such propositions have an absolute practical meaning, by showing how our practical concerns about them had its origin in intellectual mistakes. That is precisely the task Nietzsche attributes to his genealogical approach.

Vanessa Lemm

The recovery of singular truth in Nietzsche's conception of Anschauungsmetapher

This paper presents a reading of *On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense* centred on the notion of *Anschauungsmetapher* (intuited metaphor). In *On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense*, Nietzsche contrasts intuition (*Anschauungsmetapher*), pictures (*Bilder*) and dreams (*Traum*) with concepts (*Begriffe*), metaphors (*Metapher*) and schemes (*Schemata*). While the former uses pictorial thinking to generate a world of first impressions (*anschauliche Welt der ersten Eindrücke*) (*Bilderdenken*), the latter uses conceptual thinking (*Begriffsdenken*) to create an abstract world of regulating and imperative (linguistic) laws (*TL 1; 2*). In this text, conceptual thinking separates the human from the animal. The abstract world of regulating and imperative (linguistic) laws constituted by conceptual thinking is a distinctly human world: "[e]verything which distinguishes (*abhebt*) human beings from animals depends on this ability (*Fähigkeit*) to displace (*verflüchtigen*) intuitive metaphors (*anschauliche Metapher*) into a scheme, in other words to dissolve a picture (*Bild*) into a concept (*Begriff*)" (*TL 1*). In contrast, I argue that thinking in terms of pictures recovers the continuity between human and animal life. Reaffirming the continuity between human and animal life is crucial because only intuited metaphors and pictures can capture "unique, utterly individualized, primary experiences (*einmalige, ganz und gar individualisierte Urerlebnis*)" (*TL 1*). Through intuited metaphors humans access "what is individual (*Individuelle*) and real (*Wirkliche*)," for each intuited metaphor is itself "individual and incomparable (*ohne ihres Gleichen*)" (*TL 1*). Intuited metaphors do not contain knowledge of "essential qualities (*wesenhaften Qualität*)," but of "numerous individualized (*individualisierten*) and hence non-equivalent (*ungleichen*) actions" (*TL 1*). As such, intuited metaphors express what I call "singular truth" insofar as each and every intuited metaphor is singular and unique in an absolute sense, a product of the human animal's irreducibly singular experience and vision of the world. The possibility of singular truth is important not only because it calls forth Nietzsche's "denial" of metaphysical truth but also because it introduces a new and positive idea of truth as well as a new way to understand the pursuit of truth. What is new about the idea of truth as singular and of philosophy as a pursuit of singular truth is that it is based on an affirmation of the continuity between animal and human life. I argue that the return of and to the form of thought of the animal (of and to *Anschauungsmetapher* and *Bilderdenken*) allows philosophy to overcome its understanding of itself as metaphysics and embrace "post-metaphysical" thinking which is life-affirming rather than ascetic, productive rather than nihilist.

Hong-Bin Lim

Affective economy and self in Nietzsche's philosophy

I would like to approach the problem of self from the perspective of affection, which is operative at the fundamental level of pre-reflexive constitution of self. A further qualification of the self is its power fluctuation, which goes decisively, for instance, Spinoza's 'conatus' principle. Nietzsche's critical reconstruction of the principle of self-preservation provides us the evaluative parameters of human life. Whatever we may think of the difference between the concept of 'Ich' and 'Selbst' in Nietzsche, it can be characterized in terms of affective economy. The affective economy of body-reason (*Leib-Vernunft*) has provided in this sense relevant reasons for the rethinking of the priority of consciousness. In addition to the well known naturalistic dimension of affects connected with semiotic-hermeneutic processes, there are also some moral theoretical implications of the affective economy, when it comprises perceptual emotions with its value-laden perspective. But an emotional response of person should not be restricted solely by the perceived objects, because some features of our affections are not translatable into the language of representational objects. Furthermore it is hard to believe that we can understand the highly contested idea of 'will to power' without any reference to the affective economy as an organizing principle of self. It means that the most problematic idea of 'will to power' should be interpreted under the perspective of affective economy, which goes certainly over the existentialistic version of the idea.

Paul S. Loeb

The reality of our drives

I will speak about Section 36 in *Beyond Good and Evil* and in particular about the question whether N's position and argumentation in that section (and closely related material) correspond to the position in philosophy of mind known as panpsychism. As background material, I will discuss David Skrbina's 2005 overview of panpsychism, Galen Strawson's 2006 argument and set of responses from other philosophers of mind, and R. Kevin Hill's discussion of this issue in his 2007 Continuum guide to Nietzsche. I will also discuss the important debate regarding the question how to interpret BGE 36 among Maudemarie Clark, Richard Schacht, John Richardson, and David Owen (published in ISP 2000).

Timothy McWhirter

Nietzsche's naturalism out of equilibrium

There has been a growing trend in Nietzsche scholarship over the past few decades to characterize him broadly as a naturalist. Brian Leiter describes Nietzsche as a "*speculative methodological naturalist*" who constructs "theories that are 'modelled' on the sciences." I have demonstrated elsewhere how the will to power is consistent with future developments in the science of non-equilibrium thermodynamics. This investigation brings this interpretation of Nietzsche as a *speculative methodological naturalist* into further relief by investigating two components of his view that distinguish it from postmodern interpretations: the fundamental role he gives the body and his criticisms of nihilism.

The privilege Nietzsche gives the body is discussed within the context of the second law of thermodynamics and the concepts of dissipation and autopoiesis developed in the science of non-equilibrium thermodynamics. These concepts correlate to the biological functions of nourishment and procreation to which Nietzsche attributes a fundamental value. Nietzsche describes the productive process as an ability to "transform energy into life" (BGE 242; WP 639) and he believed increasing its strength was fundamentally associated with the growth of life. I discuss how Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen argues that advances in energy production drive economic growth. I also discuss how Phillip Kitcher argues that taking different approaches to scientific problems increases the chances of coming up with a solution. I conclude that when scientific practice is focused on the practical problems associated with "transforming energy into life" it increases the strength of the productive process and serves as Nietzsche outlined: "a means through which the body desires to perfect itself" (WP 676).

I demonstrate that Nietzsche believed nihilism generates a "*tropical*" and "*prestissimo*" tempo in the reevaluation of values—it undermines the ability to set goals and persist until they are fulfilled—and this undermines the growth of life (BGE 262; WP 71). I describe how the tempo he implicitly advocates is consistent with the tempo of punctuated equilibria described in evolutionary biology and implicit in Kuhn's description of the evolution of scientific knowledge. I also describe how this tempo is undermined by the practice of deconstruction, which consequently thwarts the body's ability "to perfect itself."

I conclude by drawing parallels between the contemporary sustainability movement and Nietzsche's naturalistic call to "lead fly-away virtue back to the earth, back to the body and to life, so that it may provide an aim for the earth, a human aim!" (Z I: 22)

Allison Merrick

On memory, historical sense, and the art of self-knowledge

In *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche makes the rather striking claim: unmitigated self-examination does not yield self-knowledge. Rather history, he tells us, is required for "the past continues to flow within us in one hundred waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but that which at every moment we experience of this continued flowing" (AOM 223). Accordingly, the subject of this paper is how memory and historical sense, what Nietzsche terms our "sixth sense," contribute to the project of self-understanding (BGE 224).

In 1874, amidst his most sustained discussion of the topic of history, Nietzsche provides us with the following schema, which serves to sketch a relationship between our historical sense, our understanding of the past, and our self-understanding: (1) there are those powerful and tremendous natures that can incorporate all of the "it was," the totality of the past, and make it their own, or, as it were, transform their assimilation and appropriation of the past "into blood" (HL I). At no moment are such powerful natures overwhelmed by memory, by their historical sense. (2) There are those who are sufficiently strong to recognize that they cannot incorporate all that is past, and, accordingly require the past to be shaped and bounded by an imposed horizon. (3) There are those who are completely beleaguered by their historical sense such that, as Nietzsche writes, they may "perish from a single experience" (HL I). Concerning the project of self-understanding and self-knowledge I argue that Nietzsche is mistaken in contending that there are extraordinary natures of the first sort, abovementioned. More positively, I suggest that the project of self-understanding and self-knowledge requires the incorporation of a past that has been shaped, veiled, and rounded off by the imposition of a particular form. And this, I conclude, is the art of self-knowledge, the active imposition of form upon the "it was." Viewing Nietzsche's thought on memory and our historical sense in this way provides the bank within which the past flows, and as such forms the constraints through which we can begin to come to know ourselves.

Matthew Meyer

Naturalism and Nietzsche's perspectivism: reconsidering the received view

Christopher Janaway has recently credited Brian Leiter with successfully refuting the received view (RV) of Nietzsche's perspectivism. As Janaway explains, RV is the position that "there can be no human knowledge that is

not a falsification of reality, that all our beliefs are 'mere interpretations', and that no one set of beliefs enjoys epistemic privilege over others."² In my paper, I argue for a revised version of RV, one that parallels Plato's account of Protagoras' *homo mensura* doctrine in the *Theaetetus* and aims to reconcile Nietzsche's perspectivism with his naturalism and empiricism. Specifically, I begin by showing how Nietzsche's commitment to the natural sciences leads him to develop a Heraclitean-like ontology of force that renders the world radically indeterminate. The world is radically indeterminate because these forces only have determinate existence in *relation* to other forces. I argue in turn that this ontology underwrites what I call Nietzsche's paradoxical skepticism. Although he knows that the world is composed of these indeterminate forces, Nietzsche nevertheless holds that these forces are unknowable precisely because they lack any intrinsic properties. At the same time, Nietzsche overcomes the skeptical upshot of his Heracliteanism by developing a Protagorean-like perspectivism. Here, knowledge is possible, but only of mind-dependent objects that are constructed, along with a conscious "I", from brute sensations via judgments. Because each judgment creates a corresponding mind-dependent object, each is said to be a mere interpretation and therefore not to enjoy any epistemic privilege over others.

As the paper unfolds, I deal with three objections that Leiter raises against RV: (1) RV cannot be squared with Nietzsche's naturalism; (2) it entails an appearance/reality (A/R) distinction that Nietzsche rejects; (3) the account of perspectivism in GM III 12 speaks against RV. The first objection is met by showing how Nietzsche turns to the natural sciences to generate support for a Heraclitean ontology that underwrites RV. Against the second, I argue that although he rejects all A/R distinctions that posit the existence of non-empirical entities, Nietzsche nevertheless preserves the early modern distinction between the "manifest image" (Protagorean appearance) and the "scientific image" (Heraclitean reality) of the empirical world. Finally, although Leiter rightly argues that Nietzsche draws an analogy between seeing and knowing in GM III 12, he nevertheless mischaracterizes Nietzsche's understanding of visual perception and therefore misreads the account of perspectivism in the passage. Properly interpreted, GM III 12 does not conflict with a revised and naturalized version of RV.

Edward Omar Moad

The will to power as a theory of causation

If Nietzsche's doctrine of Will to Power is expressed in his statement that "all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic, or psychic force except this,"³ then the many sceptical, and even eliminativist, statements that can be found scattered throughout his corpus regarding causation stimulate interest in the question over how these all fit together. How does Nietzsche conceive 'causation,' such that he would reject the notion while simultaneously postulating a "driving force" in the will to power? The aim of this paper will be to investigate Nietzsche's position on causation, and in particular his account of the origin of the concept; or perhaps it might be better described as an exercise in building a minimally plausible and interesting 'Nietzschean' position on causation out of scattered remarks on the issue drawn from his corpus. Frankly, and at the risk of being self-indulgently ahistorical, my interest in 'what Nietzsche really thought' is secondary in this context to whether some sense might be made of him that would generate some novel ways of thinking of the problem of causation itself.

In that spirit, I will venture to claim that Nietzsche's doctrine of Will to Power can itself be understood, in a certain sense, as itself a kind of theory of causation. What Nietzsche rejects, specifically, is a concept of causation involving the idea of a distinct substantial cause, which he claims arises from a mistaken understanding of our 'inner' experience of what we might normally (though mistakenly, on Nietzsche's view) call 'intentional states.' Ultimately, Nietzsche traces the genesis of this 'fictional' idea of a substantial cause to the equally fictional idea of the subject, on the basis of which the former is projected into our interpretation of 'external' phenomena. A problem emerges, however, from the fact that Nietzsche also accounts for the genesis of the 'fiction' of the subject as arising out of the need to postulate 'a "doer" for every deed.' That is, on Nietzsche's account, it seems that, while the substantial cause arises out of the need to postulate a subject, the subject arises out of the need to postulate a substantial cause.

Eric S. Nelson

Nietzsche, naturalism, and the hermeneutics of nature

Nietzsche has been associated with naturalism because of his arguments that morality, religion, metaphysics, and consciousness itself are products of natural biological organisms and are ultimately natural phenomena. The subject and its mental life are comprehensible in relation to natural desires, drives, impulses, and instincts, and the self misconceives itself in believing otherwise. On the basis of works such as *Beyond Good and Evil* and the *Genealogy of*

² Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 203. Janaway is referring to Brian Leiter's article, "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*" in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 334-57.

³ *Will to Power* 688

Morals, I argue that these naturalizing tendencies do not exhaust Nietzsche's project insofar as it involves a critique of nature and metaphysical and scientific naturalisms.

First, Nietzsche does not only assess God, the True, and the Good as otherworldly projections of this-worldly beings. He rejects appeals to immanent worldly phenomena made into ideals, such as nature in the Stoics, natural law theory, Rousseau, and Wagner. The idea of living according to nature is an idealization of nature that involves forgetting that it is a construction, projection, and interpretation of nature. Nietzsche comments that there is nothing less natural than the nature of such philosophers, who ascetically, moralistically, and romantically read their own conditions and feeling of life into nature as such.

Second, Nietzsche from his early to later thought examines nature social-historically. Genealogy not only traces the lineages of morality and religion, it follows the social-historical disciplining and shaping, interpretation and transformation, of seemingly natural passions, instincts, drives, and desires. Appeals to nature and the natural are ideological products rather than the brute facticity or truth of nature. Nietzsche's call to return to the senses, the earth, and the body does not appeal to these as fixed ahistorical absolutes. They are part of developing, cultivating, and individuating oneself under and in response to the natural and historical conditions of life. Nietzsche is accordingly not only concerned with life but with its affirmation, intensification, and cultivation. Living is a cultivating and artistic activity, it involves *Bildung*, and nature realizes itself in and as art.

Third, Nietzsche relies on the natural sciences and scientific naturalistic strategies of explanation and demystification. Yet part of this project of disenchantment is the demystification or dereification of science, positivism, and scientific naturalism. These cannot offer absolute certainties or ideal foundations for knowledge or life. Naturalism would be anti- or un-natural if it involved the denial of multiplicity and conflict of the forces of life, the bracketing of the natural and historical conditions of human existence, and the interpretive and perspectival character of human life and knowledge.

Finally, the nexus of nature and history in Nietzsche can be better clarified through his portrayal of the feeling of life and its intensification, attenuation, and transformation in relation to the forces and conditions of life, which are not simply naturalistic insofar as they involve socialization and individuation, and are interpretive and artistic in the context of *a* life.

Graham Parkes

Nietzsche on Soul in Nature

The presentation consists of two different but related parts: first, a paper to be read (under 40 minutes), and then a digital video (15 minutes) from the area around Sils-Maria in the Upper Engadine, which presents the topic of the paper visually and amplifies some of its themes.

An important question to ask, in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy of nature, is this: Is it true, as he often suggests, that our experience of the natural world is inevitably conditioned by some kind of archetypal phantasy or 'cultural construction' process? Or can we attain an unmediated apprehension of natural phenomena, as they are 'in themselves'?

Yes, Nietzsche thinks that for most of us, most of the time, our experience of nature is conditioned, and indeed clouded, by what we bring to it. But yes, he himself occasionally enjoyed some kind of 'pure experience' of the natural world, and he developed techniques to increase the frequency of such happy events.

An examination of what's going on here in terms of Nietzsche's ecopsychology of *the drives*, also from the perspective of East-Asian insight practices, can enhance our sense of the status of the soul in nature.

Peter Poellner

Nietzsche's ethics and the philosophy of mind

tbc

Bernard Reginster

The genealogy of guilt

In the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche offers an account of the emergence of the feeling of guilt, as it operates in the Christian moral outlook. In contrast to a prominent line of interpretation, I argue that Nietzsche's objective is not (primarily) to challenge the non-naturalistic account of the feeling of guilt promoted by the Christian outlook (as a manifestation of 'the voice of God in man') but to show that the Christian representation of guilt is not so much an account of the ordinary feeling of guilt—the diminution of self-esteem we experience when we fall short of our own normative expectations—as it is a product of the exploitation of the human susceptibility to that feeling as an instrument of self-directed cruelty. Christian guilt is therefore not a moral emotion, responsive to reasons, but a rational passion, by which I mean a passion to which only rational beings are

susceptible, but which is not governed by reasons. Since my interpretation takes Nietzsche's genealogy of Christian guilt to presuppose a view of the ordinary feeling of guilt, I also examine some of the tantalizing features of such a view suggested in his essay.

Mattia Riccardi

Nietzsche's situated and embodied cognition

In the last two decades situated and embodied cognition has grown as a major area in cognitive sciences, challenging the mainstream computational view of the mind. In a paper devoted to the "philosophical antecedents of situated cognition", Shaun Gallagher has recently claimed that "before the twentieth century it is difficult, though not impossible, to find philosophers who could count as proponents of situated cognition" (Gallagher, in press). The same, of course, would hold for embodied cognition. In my paper I will argue that Nietzsche can be seen as a relevant forerunner of both situated and embodied cognition.

Nietzsche's situated cognition: The central claim of situated cognition is that we can understand the function of cognitive structures and processes only considering the environment in which the corresponding cognizing agent is embedded in. According to this view, the self-world interaction plays a key role in shaping our cognitive skills. This picture clearly challenges both the traditional Cartesian view of the mind and the more recent computational one. Similarly does Nietzsche's perspectivistic conception, arguing that our cognition responds to environmental constraints.

Nietzsche's embodied cognition: Embodied cognition can be seen as a specification of situated cognition. Both share the claim that the way our mind works is shaped by our interaction with the world. However, embodied cognition focuses primarily on the physical substratum of cognition, claiming that the particular bodily build of a system, "determining" the way it perceives and moves, also "determines" the way it thinks. In a similar fashion, Nietzsche contrasts the "narrow" concept of the "I" with the "broad" concept of the "Self" as constituted by the "great reason of the body" (Za, *The Despisers of the Body*). Moreover, in many passages he argues that to understand the mind we should take the body as *Leitfaden*.

The scope of this paper is thus to stress similarities and differences between Nietzsche's approach and that of modern situated and embodied cognitive science.

Reference: S. Gallagher (in press), *Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition*. In Robbins, P. and Aydede, M. (eds), *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John Richardson

Nietzsche's value monism: saying yes to everything

We're well familiar with Nietzsche's attack on the dualism that separates mind and nature. But far more important to him is his campaign against a dualism not about what entities are, but about values. He attacks a faith in 'opposite values' that he thinks is held not just by metaphysicians, but in the Judaeo-Christian morality of good vs. evil, as well as in the human-wide ascetic ideal. I examine the several forms of this attack on a 'value dualism', as well as the character of the view he offers in its stead. This 'value monism' also takes several forms, the most radical being expressed in his apex thoughts about eternal return, *amor fati*, the Dionysian, and (above all) 'saying Yes' to everything. I examine whether Nietzsche can sustain this value monism—the view that everything is good—given various pressures that pull him back into emphatically saying no as well as yes.

Marco Segala

Biology, or the irrationality of the natural world: Nietzsche versus Schopenhauer

The *Gay Science* offers crucial insights into Nietzsche's views on the relationship between science and philosophy. Discussions in *The Gay Science* on biology and the irrationality of the natural world are not strictly philosophical but strongly indebted to scientific interpretations of nature. Words like "evil", "conflict", "struggle" acquire new meanings after Darwin, changes of which Nietzsche was clearly aware.

In this paper I intend to analyze how Nietzsche dealt with this new post-Darwinian biology, and more generally with the science-philosophy relationship. The role of Schopenhauer, who devoted a large part of his intellectual activities to science-based philosophical arguments, will be of particular relevance here: his philosophy of nature, which is premised upon the notion of "conflict" within the Will, oriented the Darwinian reception among both scientists and philosophers.

The first part of the paper will focus in particular on four Schopenhauerian themes and examine how Nietzsche modified them in original ways, namely i) self-consciousness of the human species; ii) will to live; iii) reason and consciousness as last stage of the "chain of beings"; and iv) the redeeming role of rational knowledge

(philosophy and science). In each case I will examine especially the difference between Schopenhauer's pre-Darwinian and Nietzsche's post-Darwinian biological concepts, e.g. organism, species and natural order.

In a second part I will emphasize the arguments that are central to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: the relationship between science and metaphysics, reason and will, mind and nature, intellect and evolution — with the goal to offer a better understanding of Nietzsche's own views.

It is the comparative analysis of the science-philosophy relationship in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that will enable us to reassess in particular the substantial difference between Schopenhauer's so-called pessimistic view of reality and Nietzsche's so-called "tragic optimism".

Herman Siemens

Nietzsche and the empirical: through the eyes of the term 'Empfindung'

This paper will examine Nietzsche's attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of *Empfindung*. It is based on the forthcoming article 'Empfindung' in the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* volume II (2009). The aim is to present some of the results of this work by discussing distinctive features of Nietzsche's use of the term 'Empfindung' in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19th C. physiology.

Distinctive features of Nietzsche's use of 'Empfindung' to be discussed include:

- 1) *Empfindungen* are at once perceptual and affective: *sinnlich* in both senses
- 2) *Empfindungen* are both unconscious (processes) and conscious states: (*bewusstes*) *Empfinden von (unbewussten) Empfindungen*
- 3) *Empfindungen* are radically individual, labile and relative (idiosyncratic);
- 4) They are historical (inherited but also changeable);
- 5) They are creative, poetic, that is:
 - interpretative/intellectual (etwas als etwas empfinden);
 - evaluative (etwas als gut/schlecht, nützlich/schädlich empfinden);
 - imaginative (Phantasie, Einbildungskraft);
- 6) They are selective and limited in scope: a source of error, rather than truth.

All of these features make for an activist and constructivist understanding of *Empfindung*. As such they are bound up with Nietzsche's main philosophical concern to stake out the *limits of Empfindung*, as an aspect of human finitude.

Nietzsche's treatment of the limits of *Empfindung* illustrates a key tension governing his use of the term. On the one hand, an epistemological project of radical scepticism or nominalism, which leads him to develop a strictly internalistic perspective within a highly constructivist account of conscious experience. This line of thought culminates in an absolute 'Phänomenalismus' that is radically solipsistic. Its results are then taken up in a second, 'externalistic' line of thought, which situates the epistemological perspective in relation to external forces and conditions for existence. This line of thought reinforces the first, in shifting the 'reactive' emphasis on the influence of external reality to the creative, form-giving forces from within. Most of the time, Nietzsche is looking to *deepen* and *explain* the insights of his epistemological perspective by situating it in a life-context, and he draws freely on contemporary *Naturwissenschaft*, especially the physiology of perception and theories of the organism (Roux). But in so doing, he disregards the claims of scepticism and the internalistic perspective altogether in favour of a speculative, quasi-ontological discourse of life. This 'contradictory' practice of placing two incompatible perspectives or approaches side-by-side is, however, extremely fruitful in generating insights and drawing out their ultimate consequences; one could even say, it overcomes the solipsistic sterility intrinsic to the epistemological project in philosophy, that it *makes* epistemology fruitful.

Manolis Simos

Foucault's Nietzschean critique of psychology

Michel Foucault's work can be considered a series of genealogical investigations which challenge the hypostatization of concepts as ahistorical entities and the consideration of methodological approaches as unique devices of tracking metaphysically objective truths with the goal of exposing them as social and historical constructs. This paper analyses Foucault's interpretative reception of Nietzsche's concept and practice of genealogy, and examines Foucault's own genealogical investigation as a historical critique of fundamental psychological concepts.

In Foucault's exegesis of Nietzschean genealogy in his 1971 essay "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire", genealogy as the historical recording of different, dispersed and singular events is conceived as opposed to and critical of the metahistorical essentialist and teleological metaphysics. In his series of lectures «*Il faut défendre la société*», "Society must be defended", at the Collège de France (1975–1976), Foucault seems to elaborate further on the methodology of genealogical investigation in order to use in the context of his own historical inquiries.

This paper examines further the coherence of Foucault's reception of the concept of genealogy, the justification of the genealogical project in political terms and the extent to which genealogy can be conceived in terms of an internalist critique. Examples will be given of Foucault's own genealogy as critique of fundamental

psychological concepts, as undertaken in his *Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir* (1976). Specifically, the Foucauldian genealogy shows how certain identified ensembles of knowledge are characterised by the threefold process of the implantation of a sexual attribution, the acknowledgement of a pathological parameter, and their placement in the nexus of social relations, which takes place in a series of historical instances. The paper reconstructs and explains, with reference to the above methodological considerations, the way this genealogy functions, and gestures towards a reinterpretation of Nietzsche's conception of genealogy in the light of Foucault's reception.

Barry, Stocker

Science, art, and nature in Nietzsche

Nietzsche's view of art is always presented in relation to naturalistic-physiological explanations. This is just as true of *The Birth of Tragedy* as of *Human, All Too Human* and any of the later texts. *The Birth of Tragedy* is full of assumptions from Schopenhauer that Nietzsche later rejected. However, the basic distinction in *The Birth of Tragedy* is between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, and that is explained as a distinction between dreams and dance, as physical natural events. Schopenhauer argues for an idealistic metaphysics of universal will; Nietzsche shares this position in *The Birth of Tragedy* and sometimes expresses it in phrases close to those of Schopenhauer. However, there is also a naturalistic element in Schopenhauer in his explanations of human actions and interests, including artistic activity and perception. German Idealism itself has naturalistic moments: Schelling links art with knowledge of nature. Romantic idealist metaphysics in Friedrich Schlegel connects scientific activity with artistic activity and natural processes, particularly with reference to chemistry as a science of combinations. Schopenhauer makes a similar connection, as does Nietzsche in *Human, All Too Human*. After establishing these naturalistic elements of early Nietzsche, and his predecessors, it is possible to investigate the various ways in which Nietzsche has constant naturalistic approach to art and an aesthetic model of philosophy. The investigation of Nietzsche's texts will follow a thesis of continuity with variations, rather than a thesis of complete continuity or a thesis of developmental stages. Nietzsche always follows two claims: art is a unity of opposites, which emerges from a unity of physiological opposites; knowledge comes from the achievement of such a unity. *Human, All Too Human* does suggest the future replacement of art by science, but on the assumption that science preserves insights from art and is therefore a kind of higher form of art. It is art which is said to have taught humanity to observe nature. Texts from *The Gay Science* onward make an apparent return to the primacy of art, criticising science for subordinating itself to an idealisation of truth. Detailed examination suggests a constant variation in Nietzsche, however, between criticising art as illusion and criticising science as dogmatic. A complete examination is not possible here, but the relationship of Nietzsche to his predecessors will be established along with the relationship between *The Birth of Tragedy*, *Human, All Too Human* and *The Gay Science*.

Galen Strawson

Nietzsche's metaphysics

Consider ten claims. [1] There is no persisting and unitary self. [2] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other. [3] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between the base/categorical properties of things and the dispositional/power properties of things. [4] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and processes and events on the other. [5] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between causes and effects. [6] It is incorrect to say that objects are 'governed' by laws of nature. [7] There is no free will. [8] Determinism is true. [9] Reality is one. [10] The fundamental stuff of reality is suffused with—if it does not consist of—mentality in some form.

I'll argue that Nietzsche's mature position certainly includes [1]-[7], and also [8], properly understood, and probably or very probably [9] and [10]. I take it that [1] and [7] are clearly true, in the sense in which Nietzsche intends them, and I'll argue that [2]-[6] are also true, and that [8]-[10] are also probably or very probably true. I take the claim that [1]-[10] are either certainly true or probably true to be powerful support for the view that Nietzsche held them.

Alessandra Tanesini and Peter Sedgwick

Nietzsche on concepts

Nietzsche's views on the nature and acquisition of concepts have remained largely unexplored in the critical literature. In this paper we propose to offer an account of these views. We contrast Nietzsche's understanding of the nature of concepts in his earlier works with the ideas put forward in his mature writings. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the early essay 'On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense', where Nietzsche subscribes to a classical empiricist account of concepts as abstract ideas derived from perceptions. Like some classical empiricists

Nietzsche here thinks of concepts as being abstract in the sense of lacking detail. Hence, he writes that 'the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding [...] individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects' of individual leaves. This position bears a striking resemblance to Bishop Berkeley's discussion of the general idea of a triangle which is neither equilateral, nor isosceles nor scalene. Because of his discussion Berkeley rejects this account of the contents of concepts as a product of abstraction. The problematic empiricist account is likewise abandoned by Nietzsche, albeit for reasons different from Berkeley's. We argue that in its place Nietzsche develops a non-reductive, naturalist, teleological account of the content of concepts. We defend this claim by offering close examinations of passages from Nietzsche's mature works, such as Book 5 of the *Gay Science* (e.g. section 355, which discusses the origin of the concept of "knowledge"), the second essay of the *Genealogy of Morality* (e.g. sections 12 and 13, which discuss the concept of punishment, and the account of the concept of exchange central to the argumentation of the *Genealogy's* second essay), and various sections of *Beyond Good and Evil* (e.g. 20 and 262). In our view, a view that has some parallels with John Richardson's account of the will to power, Nietzsche develops this account out of his engagement with Darwinian ideas. We thus disagree with neo-Kantian interpretations of Nietzsche's mature views on concepts, such as the one proposed by Maudemarie Clark in *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (1990).

Gudrun von Tevenar

Nietzsche's naturalism and nausea-cum-disgust (Ekel)

This paper examines the way Nietzsche applies the concepts of nausea and disgust (*Ekel*) after first outlining some difficulties with the translation of *Ekel*, since the sudden, involuntary, vehement 'seizure' implied in *Ekel*, is not fully captured by either nausea or disgust.

Nietzsche employs *Ekel* in unusual and sometimes provocative ways. In addition to using it in its natural context, Nietzsche stretches the term to cover a certain intellectual discernment which he bases on a strong instinctual need to create and maintain distance. Thus far we are in the familiar territory of Nietzsche's naturalism.

Yet Nietzsche also creates an uncomfortable tension by insisting on both a positive normative dimension to the feeling of *Ekel*, as well as warning us of its hidden and hence insidiously erosive perils. Finally and most unexpectedly, Nietzsche gives a tantalising hint at a seemingly desirable and praiseworthy state 'beyond nausea and disgust.'

Dave Ward

Can Nietzsche solve the mind-body problem?

The bad news is that we will find no solution to the mind-body problem – the problem of accounting for the qualitative character of experience in naturalistically acceptable terms – in Nietzsche's writings. The good news is that this is because the mind-body problem depends on a Cartesian view of mental properties and their relationship to persons that Nietzsche rightly rejects. So whilst Nietzsche cannot solve the mind-body problem, he can provide us with a conceptual framework that allows us to see that we were wrong to think that there was a problem to begin with.

I will argue that Nietzsche constitutes an early example of the anti-Cartesian view of mind that would later be urged by (for example) Ryle, Wittgenstein and Strawson. Those thinkers argued that formulating the mind-body problem relies on thinking of the qualitative properties of experience as mental particulars with which we are immediately acquainted in experience. However, this conception is non-mandatory – instead, we should think of experiences as properties of persons and their perceptual relationship to the world. And, once we do this, the appearance of an unbridgeable gap between the phenomenal and the naturalistically-acceptable disappears.

Such deflationary solutions are not new, and are unlikely to move those who were convinced that there was a mind-body problem in the first place – they claim that the anti-Cartesian construal of the introspective evidence is unnatural and question-begging. However, we find materials in Nietzsche that can help move the debate forward. I argue that Nietzsche's conception of persons as bundles of shifting and competing drives, and of the world as essentially perceived through the lens of those drives can be fruitfully combined with Andy Clark's recent argument that patterns of limited access to the features in virtue of which perceptual experiences differ can yield phenomenal consciousness. Nietzsche presents us with a view of persons and their minds that can flesh out Clark's proposal, and clarify its relation to the deflationary solutions suggested by Ryle et al. I argue that when we view Clark's proposal against a Nietzschean backdrop, we are left with an understanding of experience upon which the mind-body problem does not arise and a diagnosis of why the Cartesian conception required to motivate it is natural.

Robert Welshon

Nietzsche and the neurosciences of consciousness

In this paper, I argue that whatever interest there may be in the topic of Nietzsche's relation to contemporary neuroscience of access and phenomenological consciousness, it is inherently limited.

Some of Nietzsche's philosophical views about consciousness are consonant with contemporary neuroscience of consciousness. Among these are his claims that: (i) conscious perception is cognitively penetrated; (ii) consciousness is supervenient and emergent; (iii) conscious cognition is a lattice of networked brain activity; (iv) consciousness is an evolutionary product; (v) conscious affective states are evolutionarily more basic than conscious cognitive states; and (vi) certain species of consciousness are epiphenomenal. Each of these Nietzschean claims finds a counterpart in contemporary neuroscientific research on consciousness. Moreover, the ontological, epistemological, and methodological arguments Nietzsche advances on behalf of these claims are often strikingly similar to arguments in contemporary philosophy of neuroscience for similar views. I investigate these contact sites between Nietzsche and contemporary neuroscience of consciousness in detail.

Having accomplished that task, I turn to a deflationary argument for the conclusion that even if these contact sites exist, they are not sufficiently robust to establish that Nietzsche did much to anticipate the contours of contemporary neuroscience of consciousness. A weaker conclusion, still complimentary to Nietzsche, is nevertheless warranted: he correctly recognizes and persuasively shows that most of the planks in the framework buttressing philosophical presumptions about the inherent glories and mysteries of consciousness are rotten to the core. I end the paper with a few remarks on the implications of Nietzsche's naturalism about consciousness for the so-called 'explanatory gap problem' and the 'hard problem of consciousness.'

Nathan E. Widder

A Semblance of Identity: Nietzsche on the Agency of Drives in Relation to the Ego

This paper challenges two common notions of individual and collective subjectivity: the traditional idea of the centred subject existing prior to its relations and the idea associated primarily with post-foundational thought of the subject as a product of both constitutive relations that displace it and constitutive exclusions that temporarily unify it. This paper maintains that these approaches mistakenly consider coherent agency to be impossible without a centre or identity to guide action, and that the post-foundational treatment of identity as an ephemeral construction remains parasitically attached to the understandings of spatial and temporal continuity of traditional identity-based thought, aiming only to displace and not to do away with these understandings. These approaches consequently simplify the complex conditions of concrete agency, which in turn circumscribes their understandings the nature of power, identity, politics, and ethics in a complex and ever changing world.

To develop an alternative the complexity of concrete agency, this paper examines Nietzsche's analysis, particularly in *The Will to Power* and *Daybreak*, of the agency of drives. It follows Nietzsche in holding that subjectivity is best understood as an emergent property arising from a decentred multiplicity of drives, each drive itself being a complex relationship of forces in constant struggle with all others. Nietzsche holds that when we act in a singular and coherent direction, it is due to a synthesis carried out by a dominant drive or complex of drives; but, crucially, this synthesis also generates the appearance or 'optical effect' of this agency being centred by an ego or an 'I'. Spatial and temporal continuities are impossible without the establishment of this centre, but Nietzsche holds all of these to be simplifying illusions that emerge from complexity. Conversely, this paper argues, the affirmation of this complexity is inseparable from an affirmation of Nietzsche's eternal return as the structure of time in which identity and continuity are dissolved.

Nietzsche holds that the illusory ego serves as a useful marker for understanding ourselves and others, but it grasps only the most superficial aspects of selfhood. Indeed, he holds that the apparent importance of this centre, as seen in the way responsibility is assigned to it, is a reflection of *ressentiment* and a hindrance to self-overcoming. This paper concludes by arguing that Nietzsche's ethics of self-overcoming demands first and foremost the overcoming of this illusion of the ego and that this is accomplished by the affirmation of the eternal return.

Robert Zaborowski

Nietzsche on emotions

Generally, in his attitude toward emotions Nietzsche begins with adopting Schopenhauer's approach. In his *The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism*, he takes at great length Schopenhauer's idea quoting his *The World as Will and Idea*. One of the points is that if feeling is to be considered as negative, it is by means of reason:

All possible efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will, all that goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide, negative concept of feeling, may be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies (...). On the other hand Nietzsche anticipates Bergson's approach ((...) emotion is a stimulus, because it incites the intelligence to undertake ventures and the will to persevere with them (...)) There are emotions which

beget thought), when he states in *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic*: (...) The more emotional affects we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more complete our "idea" of this thing, our "objectivity," will be. But to eliminate the will in general, to suspend all our emotions without exception – even if we were capable of that – what would that be? Wouldn't we call that castrating the intellect? From the two above introduced quotations it results that affectivity is on no account considered by Nietzsche as negative. Quite the opposite: it is primary and basic for human cognition, for the vital force and the feeling of power. Affectivity and sensibility form a starting point of cognition.

The paper will discuss some important Nietzsche's remarks related to emotions and their consideration in historical perspective. On the one hand a hypothesis that Nietzsche's admiration for the Presocratics originates, among others, from their integral perspective of man (no division into separate affectivity and separate intellect). In his lectures on Greek philosophy Nietzsche observes (e. g. in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*). On the other hand without deciding whether Nietzsche follows Th. Ribot in some respects or not, it is worthy of note that several similitudes between the German and the French philosopher can be pointed out.

Gabriel Zamosc

Nietzsche's ideal of autonomy: on the connection between sovereignty and guilt

In this paper I interpret the relation between sovereignty and guilt in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*. I show that, contrary to received opinion, Nietzsche was not opposed to the moral concept of guilt. I use two Nietzschean ideas to guide my investigation: first, that of distinguishing the origin of something from its purpose; and, second, Nietzsche's insistence that conceptual understanding becomes more symbolic as civilization develops (prehistoric man used literal – I call them – material, concepts). Next, I identify affinities between Nietzsche's sovereign and guilty consciences, pointing out that the Morality of Custom is a precondition for both, and that both seemingly rest on an understanding of oneself as author of one's own behaviour. I then analyze Nietzsche's account of the emergence of a moralized guilty conscience out of a pre-moral bad conscience. I draw attention to Nietzsche's references to different forms of conscience: not only the sovereign, guilty and bad consciences, but also those of the debtor and of the beast of prey (precursors of the other three). Analogizing to Nietzsche's account of punishment, I propose a distinction between the permanent and the fluid elements of a "Conscience", defining the permanent element (common to all forms of conscience) as the practice of forming self-conceptions. This distinction sheds light not only on the emergence of the guilty conscience, but also on many other difficult passages. For Nietzsche, the moralization of the bad conscience results from mixing it with the material concepts of guilt and duty. This mixture is effected by primitive religious institutions by way of the concept of god which, due to its origin, already contains those material concepts. The moralization of conscience furnishes a new conception of oneself as a responsible agent; a conception that holds the promise of sovereignty by giving us a freedom or autonomy unknown to other creatures, but at the price of our becoming subject to moral guilt for our wrongdoings. For Nietzsche, however, this promise has been spoiled by the same moralizing forces that made it possible. Under the pressures of the ascetic ideal, a harmful notion of responsibility understood in terms of sin now dominates our lives. Thus, to fully realize the ideal of autonomy, we must liberate ourselves from this sinful conscience.

Benedetta Zavatta

Nietzsche on rhetorical reason and embodied mind

Between 1872 and 1874 Nietzsche concentrated his lessons at Basel University on rhetorics, studying it both historically and systematically. During these years Nietzsche began to question the legitimacy of inferring the existence of a 'thing in itself' as the cause of sensations: the perceptive process is recognised as intrinsically artistic and explained by a tropic paradigm. The tropes are thus conceived not as an extrinsic enhancement to the discourse, but as key constituents of language and therefore as forms through which reality becomes perceptible to the subject. Language is therefore considered not as an instrument of communication of an already formed thought, but rather as the condition of possibility and structuring matrix. The key concepts of philosophy themselves are thus traced to the linguistic categories that make it possible to formulate them, and recognised as descending from the same. Availing himself of the re-reading of the Kantian transcendental in the physiological-sensistic key operated by Lange, Nietzsche denounces the presumed 'purity' of reason and instead shows the influence of our psycho-physical organisation on the mental process of construction of reality. The linguistic criticism operated by Nietzsche thus acts on the consolidated edifice of philosophical thought, uprooting the faith in reason and the Cartesian transparency of knowledge of self, exposing the unfathomable depth of unconscious pulsions that lie beneath. Although the considerations on the cognitive and anthropological value of rhetoric are not taken up again by Nietzsche after 1874, and in spite of the fact that the adjective "rhetorical" is used from then onwards in a mainly disparaging sense, the criticism of Nietzschean language would continue to avail itself of the important conquests of the years in Basel. The cognitive process was in fact still explained through the three mechanisms that from 1872-1874 were called respectively: metaphor, synecdoche and metonym. Metaphor consisted in the assimilation of the

unknown through the application of categories already experimented to a new field. The synecdoche consists of the reduction of complexity through the assumption of a dominant trait in representation of a whole. Finally, metonym consists of the inversion of cause and effect, or rather in the representation of an imaginary cause to explain an observed phenomenon. All these procedures have an adaptive function, i.e. they arise to facilitate human survival in a constantly changing world.

* * *

Draft

Organisation:

Manuel Dries and Peter Kail

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK

E-mail: fnsox@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Web: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/events/nietzsche_mind_conference

Cover illustration courtesy of Nietzsche Source: *K 14,33 Proof sheets for 'Ecce homo'. Corrections in Heinrich Köselitz's and partly in Nietzsche's handwriting.*

The Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain and Ireland gratefully acknowledges the support of

