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Dr Daniel Isaacson

University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Fellow of Wolfson College

daniel.isaacson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Philosophy Faculty
Oxford University
10 Merton Street
Oxford OX1 4JJ

Research Interests

Philosophy of mathematics and logic

Daniel Isaacson

Career

1975- University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University
1977- Fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford
1989 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
1974-77 Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's College, Oxford
1971-73 Research Associate in Philosophy, The Rockefeller University, New York
1969-71  Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle


Education

 

1974 Oxford University , D.Phil. in Philosophy (thesis: On Some Aspects of the Concept of Truth)
1967 Harvard University , A.B. in Mathematics (thesis: A Constructive Solution of Hilbert's 17th Problem by Use of the Fundamental Theorem of Herbrand)

 

Publications

  1. “The reality of mathematics and the case of set theory”, to appear in Zsolt Novak and Andras Simonyi (eds), Truth, Reference and Realism, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2011, pp 1-76.

  2. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for undecidabillity of the Gödel sentence and its truth", to appear in Peter Clark, David DeVidi, and Michael Hallett (eds), Vintage Enthusiasms:  Essays in Honour of John Bell, University of Western Ontario Series in the Philosopy of Science, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg and New York, 2011, pp. 135-152.

  3. “Quine and logical positivism”, Roger Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 214-269.

  4. “Mathematical intuition and objectivity”, Alexander George (ed.), Mathematics and Mind, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 118-140.

  5. “Carnap, Quine and logical truth”, David Bell and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (eds), Science and Subjectivity, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 100-130.

  6. "Some considerations on arithmetical truth and the ω-rule", Michael Detlefsen (ed.), Proof, Logic and Formalization, Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 94-138.

  7. "Arithmetical truth and hidden higher-order concepts", the Paris Logic Group (eds), Logic Colloquium '85, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987, pp. 147-169; abstract in the Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (1987), p. 299; reprinted, with revisions, in W.D. Hart (ed.), Oxford Readings in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 203-224.

  8. review of Michael Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and Limitation of Size, British Book News, March 1985, p. 159.

  9. review of Reuben Hersh, "Some proposals for reviving the philosophy of mathemtics", Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1983), pp. 871-2.

  10. Notes on the Formalization of Logic , with Dana Scott (principal author), David Bostock, Graeme Forbes, and Göran Sundholm, Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford, Study Aids Monographs Nos 2 & 3, 1981, 239 pp.

  11. review of Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations, The Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978), pp. 169-171.