John Locke Lecture 2012
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Past Lectures

Trinity Term 2013

Professor Ned Block, (NYU)

'Attention and Perception'

Abstract

How philosophical issues about perception are transformed in the light of the science of perception

Ned Block

Does conscious perception have representational content?  Or are the representations involved in perception all sub-personal underpinnings of perception rather than partly constitutive of perception itself?  Is “unconscious perception” really perception? Is seeing always seeing-as?  Is seeing-as always conceptual? Do we see things only as having colors, shapes and textures?  Or do we see things as being CD players or baseball bats?   Is perception a form of judgment? Must conscious perception be cognitively accessible to the subject?  Is attention required for object perception or knowledge of the reference of perceptual demonstratives? These lectures argue that these and other related philosophical issues are transformed by taking into account the science of perception.

John Locke Lecture TT13

The 2013 John Locke Lecture series were held at 5 p.m. on Wednesdays in weeks 2 to 7 of Trinity Term 2013. The lectures were given at the T. S. Eliot Lecture Theatre, Merton College (enter by Rose Lane).

Lecture 1 (1st May) 'Attention, representationism and direct realism'

Facts about attention and its relation to the phenomenology of perception are problematic for the major philosophical approaches to perception.

Lecture 2 (8th May) 'The grain of seeing vs attending and the de re thought condition on seeing an object'

There is a minimal resolution of object-seeing that is finer than a corresponding minimal resolution of object-attention, so object-attention is not required for object-seeing.  No reasonable version of a de re thought potential requirement on seeing conflicts with this grain difference.  These ideas solve a version of the speckled hen problem.

Lecture 3 (15th May) 'Seeing-As: How can we find out whether seeing is representational, and if so, what representations are involved?'

Some say that seeing is always seeing-as and that seeing-as involves conceptualization.  Some say that not only can we see things as having certain colors, shapes and textures; we can see things as being a table or a car. A framework is proposed for distinguishing high level perceptual representations  from recognitionally equivalent color, shape and texture representations, and for distinguishing perceptual representations from cognitive representations.

Lecture 4 (22nd May) 'Consciousness and cognition: the power of unconscious perception'

One of the most important issues concerning the foundations of conscious perception centers on the question of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The “overflow” argument uses a form of “iconic memory” to argue that perceptual consciousness is richer (i.e., has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than it is possible to report or think about.  Recently, the overflow argument has been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This lecture reviews the controversy, focusing on the power of unconscious processes and arguing that what we know about unconscious processing suggests that consciousness does overflow cognition.

Lecture 5 (29th May) 'Conscious, preconscious, unconscious'

There are reliably reproducible states that have little or no reportability but do not have many of the signature properties of unconscious states.  This lecture discusses whether these states might be phenomenally conscious in the light of the close conceptual tie between conscious perception and first person authority.

Lecture 6 (5th June) 'Does the physical basis of consciousness include anything outside the head?'

Clark and Chalmers famously argued that the cognitive mind extends beyond the brain into the body and the world.  If I can fluidly access the phone number from a suitable source outside my body, we should allow that I know it now.  Others have argued that this “vehicle externalist” point of view applies to consciousness: the minimal constitutive supervenience base of conscious experience extends outside the brain into the rest of the body and into the world.  This lecture argues that there is an established empirical framework for resolving such issues and we have overwhelming grounds to doubt the externalist point of view applied to consciousness.


Trinity Term 2012

Professor Stephen Yablo, (MIT)

'Truth and Content'

Abstract

“Aboutness” is a grand-sounding name for something basically familiar. Books are on topics; portraits are of people; the 1812 Overture concerns the Battle of Borodino. Aboutness is the relation that meaningful items bear to whatever it is that they are on, or of, or that they address or concern.

Brentano made aboutness the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists have studied the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists have sought to ground it in teleology or natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and the theory of information, to operationalize aboutness.

Stephen Yablo
Brentano made aboutness the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists have studied the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists have sought to ground it in teleology or natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and the theory of information, to operationalize aboutness.

And yet the notion plays no serious role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising — sentences have aboutness properties, if anything does. One leading theory gives the meaning of a sentence by listing the scenarios in which it is true, or false. Nothing is said about the principle of selection, about how and why the sentence would be true, or false, in those scenarios. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned.

I will be asking, first, how we might go about making subject matter a separate factor in sentence meaning/content, and second, what “directed contents” can do for us in other parts of philosophy.

The 2012 John Locke Lecture series was held at 5 p.m. on Wednesdays in weeks 2 to 6 of Trinity Term 2012. The lectures were given at the T. S. Eliot Lecture Theatre, Merton College.

Lecture 1 (2nd May) 'Semantic Excuses'

[Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 2 (9th May) 'The Truth and Something But the Truth'

[Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 3 (16th May) 'Extrapolation and its Limits'

[Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 4 (23rd May) 'Knowing About Things'

[Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 5 (30th May) 'Saying Things: Pretense and Presupposition'

[Handout] [MP3]

Poster Thumbnail

Trinity Term 2011

John Cooper, (Princeton)

'Ancient Greek Philosophies as a Way of Life' 

The 2011 John Locke Lectures

Abstract

Philosophy is a demanding intellectual discipline, with many facets: logic, epistemology, philosophy of nature and science, metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of art, rhetoric, philosophy of language and mind. But a long tradition of ancient Greek philosophers, beginning with Socrates, made their philosophies also complete ways of life. For them reason, perfected by philosophy—not religion, not cultural traditions and practices—constitutes the only legitimate authority for determining how one ought to live. They also thought philosophically informed reason should be the basis for all our practical attitudes, all our decisions, and in fact the whole of our lives. In these lectures we examine the development of this pagan tradition in philosophy, from its establishment by Socrates, through Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, and Plotinus and late ancient Platonism.

The 2011 John Locke Lecture series was held at 5 p.m. on Wednesdays in weeks 1 to 6 of Trinity Term 2011. The lectures were given at the Gulbenkian Lecture Theatre, St Cross Building, Manor Road. The classes took place at the Faculty of Philosophy, 10 Merton Street.

Lecture 1 (4th May): 'Philosophy in Antiquity as a Way of Life' [Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 2 (11th May): 'Aristotle's Philosophy as Two Ways of Life' [MP3]

Class/Seminar (18th May): 'The Epicurean and Pyrrhonian Ways of Life' (Texts and Discussion).

Lecture 3 (25th May): 'The Stoic Way of Life' [Handout] [MP3]

Lecture 4 (1st June): 'Platonism as a Way of Life' [Handout] [MP3]

Class/Seminar (8th June): 'Plotinus on the Human Person and the Virtues' (Texts and Discussion)

 

Trinity Term 2010

Professor David Chalmers (ANU)

'Constructing the World'

John Locke Lecture

Abstract

In Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, Carnap argued that all truths are definitionally entailed by a very limited class of truths. Most philosophers think that the project of the Aufbau is a failure and that nothing like it can succeed. I will investigate the prospects for an Aufbau-like project, centering around what I call the Scrutability Thesis: all truths are a priori entailed by a very limited class of truths. I will also discuss applications to Carnapian projects in epistemology, the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and metaphilosophy.

The lectures took place on Wednesdays, Weeks 2 to 7, of Trinity Term 2010. They started at 5pm, and took place at the Gulbenkian Theatre, St Cross Building, Manor Road.

Lecture Schedule:

  • Lecture 1 (5th May): A Scrutable World [Handout] [MP3] [Slides]
  • Lecture 2 (12th May): The Cosmoscope Argument [Handout] [MP3] [Slides]
  • Lecture 3 (19th May): The Case for A Priori Scrutability [Handout] [MP3] [Slides]
  • Lecture 4 (26th May): Revisability and Conceptual Change: Carnap vs. Quine [Handout] [MP3] (No slides were used)
  • Lecture 5 (2nd June): Hard Cases: Mathematics, Normativity, Ontology, Intentionality [Handout] [MP3] [Slides]
  • Lecture 6 (9th June): Whither the Aufbau? [Handout] [MP3] [Slides]

The book manuscript can be found at http://consc.net/oxford/

 

Trinity 2009

Thomas M. Scanlon (Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Harvard)

'Being Realistic about Reasons'

Abstract: The idea that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action, which we can discover by thinking carefully about reasons in the usual way, has been thought to be subject to three kinds of objections: metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational or, as I would prefer to say, practical. Metaphysical objections claim that a belief in irreducibly normative truths would commit us to facts or entities that would be metaphysically odd—incompatible, it is sometimes said, with a scientific view of the world. Epistemological objections maintain that if there were such truths we would have not way of knowing what they are: we could “get in touch with” them only through some strange kind of intuition. Practical objections maintain that if conclusions about what we have reason to do were simply beliefs in a kind of fact, they could not have the practical significance that reasons are commonly supposed to have. This is often put by saying that beliefs alone cannot motivate an agent to act, but it is better put as the claim that beliefs cannot explain action, or make acting rational or irrational in the way that accepting conclusions about reasons is normally thought to do.

I will argue that all of these objections are mistaken. The idea that there are truths about are reasons for action does face serious problems. But these are normative problems—problems internal to the normative domain, whose solutions, if there are such, must themselves be normative.

The lectures took place on Wednesdays, Weeks 1 to 5, of Trinity Term 2009. They started at 5pm, and took place at the Gulbenkian Theatre, St Cross Building, Manor Road.

 

Lecture Schedule:

 

Trinity 2008

Professor Hartry Field (NYU), ‘Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability’ - Wednesdays at 5pm, Weeks One to Six (23rd April to 28th May 2008) was held in the Gulbenkian Lecture Theatre, St Cross Building, Manor Road, Oxford
(n.b., the Lecture in Fifth Week (21 May) took place in Lecture Theatre II of the St Cross Building, not the Gulbenkian Lecture Theatre)

 

Handouts Podcasts
   
Wednesday 23rd April 2008 - Lecture 1 (PDF) Podcast Icon (MP3 - 28.8Mb)
Wednesday 30th April 2008 - Lecture 2 (PDF) Podcast Icon (MP3 - 31.9Mb)
Wednesday 7th May 2008 - Lecture 3 (PDF) Podcast Icon (MP3 - 27.7Mb)

Wednesday 14th May 2008 - Lecture 4 (PDF)

Podcast Icon (MP3 - 27.0Mb)
Wednesday 21st May 2008 - Lecture 5 (PDF) Podcast Icon (MP3 - 30.3Mb)
Wednesday 28th May 2008 - Lecture 6 (PDF) Podcast Icon (MP3 - 26.5Mb)

 

Trinity 2007

2006-2007 Professor Robert Stalnaker
(TT2007) MIT
Our knowledge of the internal world
Lecture One (Wednesday 2nd May):
Starting in the middle
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)
Lecture Two (Wednesday 9th May):
Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)
Lecture Three (Wednesday 16th May):
Locating ourselves in the world
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)
Lecture Four (Wednesday 23rd May):
Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)
Lecture Five (Wednesday 30th May):
Acquaintance and essence
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)
Lecture Six (Wednesday 6th June):
Knowing what we are thinking
abstract (PDF) handout (PDF) lecture (MP3)

 

Trinity 2006

Professor Robert Brandom Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism
Pittsburgh University

Lecture 1 - Week 2 (3 May): “Extending the Project of Analysis”

Handout (PDF)

Text (PDF)

Lecture 2 - Week 3 (10 May): “Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic”

Handout (PDF)

Text (PDF)

Lecture 3 - Week 4 (17 May): “Artificial Intelligence and Analytic Pragmatism”

Handout (PDF) Text (PDF)

Lecture 4 - Week 5 (24 May):“Modality and Normativity: From Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars”

Handout (PDF) Text (PDF)

Lecture 5 - Week 6 (31 May): “Incompatibility, Modal Semantics, and Intrinsic Logic”

Handout (PDF) Text (PDF)

Lecture 6 - Week 7 (7 June): “Intentionality as a Pragmatically Mediated Semantic Relation”

Handout (PDF) Text (PDF)
2004-05
(TT2005)
Professor Ernest Sosa
Brown University and Rutgers University

Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge

Lecture 1 Dreams and the Cogito
Lecture 2 A Virtue Epistemology
Lecture 3 Intuitions
Lecture 4 Epistemic Normativity
Lecture 5 Virtue, Luck, and Credit
Lecture 6 Circularity and Easy Knowledge

2003-04
(TT 2004)
Professor J. Barnes
Paris-Sorbonne University
Truth, etc. Some Topics in Ancient Logic

Lecture 1 Truth
Lecture 2 Predicates and Subjects
Lecture 3 What is a Connector?
Lecture 4 Forms of Argument
Lecture 5 How to Justify Deduction
Lecture 6 What is the Point of Logic?

2002-03
(TT 2003)
Professor K. Fine
New York University

Reference, Relation and Meaning

Lecture handouts:

Lecture 1 Variables
Lecture 2 Frege's Puzzle
Lecture 3 Names
Lecture 4 Kripke's Puzzle
Lecture 5 Belief
Lecture 6 Moore's Paradox of Analysis

2001-02 (TT 2002)
 
Christine Korsgaard
Harvard
Self-constitution: Action,Identity and Integrity

A copy of the lectures is held in the Philosophy Library, 10 Merton Street.

Lecture Handouts:
Lecture 1 RTF copy
Lecture 2 RTF copy
Lecture 3 RTF copy
Lecture 4 RTF copy
Lecture 5 RTF copy
Lecture 6 RTF copy
2000-01 (TT 01) Bas van Fraassen
Princeton
Structure and Perspective: An Empiricist View
 
1997-98 (TT 98) Lawrence Sklar
University of Michigan
Philosophy within Science
1996-97 (TT 97) Robert Nozick
Harvard
Invariance and Objectivity
1996-97 (MT 96) Jerry Fodor
Rutgers University
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
1994-95 (TT 95) Frank Jackson
Australian National University
Supervenience, Metaphysics, and Analysis
1992-93 (TT 93) Tyler Burge
UCLA
Sources and Resources of Reason
1991-92 (TT 92) Jonathan Bennett
Syracuse University, NY
Judging Behaviour: Analysis in Moral Theory
1990-91 (TT 91) John McDowell
University of Pittsburgh
Mind and World
1989-90 (HT 90) Thomas Nagel
New York University
Equality and Plurality
1988-89 Professor Ernst Tugendhat
University of Berlin
Withdrew due to illness
1986-87 Barry G. Stroud
University of California, Berkeley
The Quest for Reality
1983-84 David Lewis
Princeton University
On the Plurality of Worlds
1982-83 Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University, MA
The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting
1979-80 David B. Kaplan
UCLA
This and D That: A History of Demonstratives (postponed)
1978-79 Professor H.P. Grice
University of California, Berkeley
Aspects of Reason
1975-76 Hilary W. Putnam
Harvard University
Meaning and Knowledge
1974-75 Professor R.B. Brandt
University of Michigan
Psychology and the Criticism of Desires and Morality
1973-74 Saul Kripke
Rockefeller University, NY
Reference and Existence
(Lectures available in the Philosophy Library)
1971-72 Sydney S. Shoemaker
Cornell University
Mind, Body and Behaviour
1969-70 Donald Davidson
Princeton University
The Structure of Truth
1968-69 Noam Chomsky
M.I.T.
Language and the Study of Mind
1967-68 Paul Lorenzen
University of Erlangen
Non-Empirical Truths
1965-66 Wilfred S. Sellars
University of Pittsburgh
Science & Metaphysics: Some Variations on Kantian Themes
1963-64 Jaakko Hintikka
University of Helsinki
Some Main Problems in the Philosophy of Logic
1961-62 Nelson Goodman
University of Pennsylvania
Languages of Art
1959-60 Gregory Vlastos
Princeton University
Mysticism & Logic in Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato
1957-58 A.C. Jackson
University of Melbourne
Material Things
1955-56 A.N. Prior
Canterbury University College, NZ
Time and Modality
1954-55 Hao Wang
Harvard University
On Formalizing Mathematical Concepts
1950-51 Oets Kolk Bouwsma
University of Nebraska
The Flux

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