

Timothy Williamson: Publications

(in reverse chronological order, updated 23 November 2021)

In preparation

- [a] *Timothy Williamson Discusses his Philosophy*, Chinese translation of lectures and discussion with commentators given at Wuhan University in 2021, to be published in China by academic press.
- [b] Book of Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [c] ‘Is the a priori / a posteriori distinction superficial?’ and ‘Response to Boghossian’ in Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa, and John Turri (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- [d] ‘Chakrabarti and the Nyāya on knowability’.
- [e] ‘Menzel on pure logic and higher-order metaphysics’ and ‘Pickel against higher-order Primitivism’ in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.), *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [f] ‘Where did it come from? Where will it go?’ [on knowledge-first epistemology].
- [g] ‘Is logic the study of validity?’ in Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Ferrari, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, and Florian Steinberger (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To appear

- [a] *Philosophical Methods: Timothy Williamson’s Lectures at Peking University*, Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Jingxian Liu, Hongguang Wang, Zhen Zhao, and Shanshan Peng of lectures and discussion with commentators, edited by Zhaoqing Xu. Beijing: Renmin University Press.
- [b] ‘Moral anti-exceptionalism’, in Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism*, Oxford University Press.
- [c] ‘Accepting a logic, accepting a theory’, in Romina Padró and Yale Weiss (eds.), *Saul Kripke on Modal Logic*. New York: Springer.
- [d] ‘Metametaphysics and semantics’, *Metaphilosophy*.
- [e] ‘Epistemological consequences of Frege puzzles’, *Philosophical Topics*.
- [f] ‘Degrees of freedom: Is good philosophy bad science?’ (*Disputatio*’s 25th Anniversary Lecture), *Disputatio*, XIII, 61 (2021).

- [g] (with Miroslava Trajkovski) ‘Abduction, perception, emotion, feeling: body maps and pattern recognition’, *Philosophical Perspectives*.
- [h] ‘Epistemological ambivalence’, in Nicholas Hughes (ed.), *Epistemic Dilemmas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [i] ‘Knowledge, credence, and strength of belief’, in A.K. Flowerree and Baron Reed (eds.), *Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social World*, London: Routledge.
- [j] ‘Modal epistemology and the logic of counterfactuals’, in Duncan Pritchard and Matthew Jope (eds.), *New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure*, London: Routledge.
- [k] ‘E = K, but what about R?’, in Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Evidence*, London: Routledge.
- [l] ‘Disagreement in metaphysics’, in Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter and Richard Rowland (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement*, London: Routledge.
- [m] ‘Vaidya on Nyāya and knowledge-first epistemology’, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*.
- [n] ‘Boghossian, Müller-Lyer, the parrot, and the Nazi’, in Luis Oliveira (ed.), *Externalism about Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [o] ‘Justifications, excuses, and skeptical scenarios’, in J. Dutant and F. Dorsch (eds.), *The New Evil Demon*, Oxford University Press.
Chinese translation forthcoming in *Journal of Hubei University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, forthcoming.
- [p] ‘Horvath on Gettier’s thought experiments’, in Duško Prelevič and Anand Vaidya (eds.), *Routledge Anthology of Modal Epistemology and Philosophical Methodology*. London: Routledge.
- [q] ‘The counterfactual-based approach to modal epistemology’, in Otávio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Modality*, London: Routledge.
- [r] ‘More Oxonian scepticism about the a priori’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), *The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent*, Oxford University Press.
- [s] ‘Reply to Casullo’s defence of the significance of the a priori – a posteriori distinction’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), *The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent*, Oxford University Press.
- [t] ‘Dunn on inferential evidence’, *The Monist* [special issue on infallibilism, ed. Christos Kyriacou and Gregory Stoutenburg].
- [u] ‘Can non-classical logic treat mathematics as exceptional?’, in Stephan Leuenberger and Adam Rieger (eds.), *festschrift* for Alan Weir. New York: Springer.

- [v] ‘Idealized rationality in models of knowledge and probability’, in Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović, and Majda Trobok (eds.), *festschrift* for Nenad Smokrović. Rijeka.
- [w] ‘Introduction’ to Khaled Qutb, *Summary of The Philosophy of Philosophy* (in Arabic), Cairo: Academic Bookshop.

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- [c] ‘Edgington on possible knowledge of unknown truth’, in Lee Walters and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Conditionals, Probability, and Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington*, 195-211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [d] ‘Edo Pivčević and metaphysical realism’, in Stipe Kutleša (ed.), *Domovina, Zavičaj, Svijet: Zbornik radova povodom 90 godina života Ede Pivčevića*, 11-17. Zagreb: Institut za filozofiju.
- [e] Review of *Vagueness: A Global Approach*, by Kit Fine. *Mind*, <https://academic.oup.com/mind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/mind/fzaa084/6048194>
- [f] ‘In defence of realism’, *IAI News*, 94 (29 January 2021), https://iai.tv/articles/in-defence-of-realism-aid-1747?_aid=2020
- [g] ‘Politics, truth and self-reference’, *IAI News*, 94 (23 February 2021). https://iai.tv/articles/politics-truth-and-self-reference-aid-1758?_aid=2020

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- [a] *Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals*. viii + 278 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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 (with PB) Preface, ix-xi.
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 ‘Boghossian and Casalegno on understanding and inference’ (2012[a]), 108-116.
 ‘How deep is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge?’ (2013[f]), 117-136.
 ‘Reply to Boghossian on the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori’, 156-167.
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- [i] ‘What is metaphysics?’, British Academy, 14 August 2020,
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