The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library.

**NOTES:**

- “CL” means the lecture is a Core Lecture for one of the Honour Schools papers.

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes past the hour, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as “M. 10” will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)

- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.

- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms are: the Ryle Room (1st floor), the Lecture Room (2nd floor), and the Seminar Room (3rd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room (ground floor) and Meeting Room 4 (ground floor).

- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.

- “Schools” refers to the Examination Schools (75 – 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
**Lectures for the First Public Examination**

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

*PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy*

*Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy*

*Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods*

**General Philosophy**  
Prof Alexander Kaiserman – W. 12, Schools

Week 1: The Analysis of Knowledge  
Week 2: Scepticism  
Week 3: Mind and Body I  
Week 4: Mind and Body II  
Week 5: Personal Identity  
Week 6: Free Will  
Week 7: Induction  
Week 8: God and Evil

**Moral Philosophy: Mill, Utilitarianism**  
Prof William Mander – F. 12, Schools

Lecture 1  Introductory remarks  
Lecture 2  Ethics of action vs ethics of character / Consequentialism vs deontology  
Lecture 3  Subjective vs objective accounts of wellbeing / hedonism  
Lecture 4  Higher & lower pleasures  
Lecture 5  Objections to utilitarianism (i)  
Lecture 6  Objections to utilitarianism (ii)  
Lecture 7  Proof & sanctions  
Lecture 8  Justice
Elements of Deductive Logic
Prof Alex Paseau – T. 12, Maths Institute (L5; weeks 6 and 7 L1)

Elements of Deductive Logic builds on last term’s Introduction to Logic lectures. It is aimed at students sitting Prelims in Mathematics & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy, and Computer Science & Philosophy. The only set text is Halbach’s The Logic Manual, knowledge of which will be assumed. The course content is primarily metalogical. The focus will be on truth-functional metalogic, with some discussion of quantified metalogic towards the end.
Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

**101 Early Modern Philosophy: Berkeley**
Prof Peter Kail – W. 10, Schools

These lectures will consider Berkeley’s *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* Part I. I shall follow the order of that text and examine Berkeley’s key claims, and try to show that his system is more powerful than some commentators think. The key themes covered are Berkeley’s background, ideas and abstraction, immaterialism, God, reality, science and the self.

**101 Early Modern Philosophy: Leibniz**
Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – M. 3, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures will cover the main aspects of Leibniz’s metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology as they are deployed in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

**101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume (Treatise, Book 1 conclusion)**
Prof Peter Millican – Th. 11 (week 3 only), Schools

This lecture completes the series from Michaelmas Term.

**102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics**
Prof Ofra Magidor – T. 10, Schools

This lecture series will present in detail some of the main topics from the Metaphysics portion of the Knowledge and Reality paper – e.g. persistence, composition, causation, and modality.
103 Ethics I: Normative Ethics  
Prof Thomas Sinclair – M. 10, Schools

These lectures will focus on theories of morality, theories that aim to make sense of moral prohibitions, permissions, and requirements—how their content is determined and what the source of their authority is. They will discuss attempts to derive moral prescriptions from foundational ideas about impartial goodness, agential excellence, rationality, human dignity, and the value of certain kinds of relationship. Although the lectures will survey consequentialism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and contractualism—key topics on the Ethics syllabus—the emphasis will be on drawing out the similarities and differences between these theories as approaches to a single set of concerns.

104 Philosophy of Mind  
Dr Umut Baysan – Th. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will discuss the following four sets of questions:

1. Physicalism: What is physicalism about the mind? How should we formulate physicalism? How should we understand “the physical”? Are supervenience-based formulations of physicalism successful?
2. Consciousness: What are some varieties of consciousness? What is phenomenal consciousness? Can phenomenal consciousness and qualia be explained in naturalistic terms? Are there any good arguments against physicalism based on phenomenal consciousness and qualia?
3. Mental causation: Is mental causation possible? What views about the mind can/cannot accommodate mental causation? How should we understand epiphenomenalism? What is anomalous monism? Does anomalous monism imply epiphenomenalism?
4. Intentionality: What is intentionality? Is intentionality the mark of the mental? What is mental content? Can we naturalise mental content? What is externalism about mental content? Is it a plausible view? Are there intentional states which are not propositional attitudes?

Most introductory texts in philosophy of mind cover these topics, but some particularly helpful ones are Jaegwon Kim’s Philosophy of Mind: 3rd edition (Westview Press, 2011) (though the 2nd edition is equally good) and David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: 2nd edition (Blackwell, 2007).
107 Philosophy of Religion
Prof Rachel Fraser – F. 12, Schools

These lectures consider (i) four important arguments for theism, viz., the ontological, the cosmological, the design, and the fine tuning argument, (ii) key topics in religious epistemology, viz., the rationality of belief in miracles and the epistemic status of religious experience, and (iii) the relationship between theism and ethics, viz., the problem of evil and the Euthyphro dilemma.

112 The Philosophy of Kant
Dr Robert Watt – T. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will provide an introduction to Immanuel Kant’s theoretical philosophy through an examination of some of the topics arising from his *Critique of Pure Reason*. They are primarily intended for those taking the Philosophy of Kant paper (112), but anyone who is interested in the material is welcome to attend. We will cover, amongst other topics, the nature of Kant’s critical project; space and time in the first Critique; the Transcendental Deduction; the rejection of transcendent metaphysics; transcendental idealism. Our primary aim will be to try and get an overall sense of Kant’s work in theoretical philosophy, partly as a way of understanding why it has exerted such influence and why it continues to attract such fascination. Details of translations and other readings can be found on the Faculty Reading list.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Hegel
Prof Mark Wrathall – Th. 12, Schools

These lectures are designed for students taking the Post-Kantian paper (113), but anyone interested in Hegel and the history of 19th century European philosophy is welcome to attend. We will cover Hegel’s dialectical method, his account of consciousness and the transition to self-consciousness, his critique of Kant’s moral theory, his philosophy of action, and the development of ethical life. We will be studying portions of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (students are encouraged to use one of the new translations – either Inwood’s with Oxford University Press, or Pinkard’s with Cambridge University Press). We will also be reading portions of the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (recommended version is Houlgate’s revised translation published by Oxford World’s Classics).
116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*
Prof Karen Nielsen and Prof Simon Shogry – T. Th. 10, Schools

These lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in translation or in Greek, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It will be useful to bring a copy of the NE to each session. In the sixteen lectures this term, we will cover material from the entire treatise (books I-X), focusing on: Aristotle’s conception of happiness, the function argument, the doctrine of the mean and virtues of character, Aristotle’s theory of voluntary action and moral responsibility, decision and deliberation, justice, prudence, continence and incontinence, friendship, pleasure, and the role of contemplation in the happiest life.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics
Prof James Read – M. 11 (*all weeks*) and T.11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a twelve-lecture course on the philosophical foundations of special relativity. Topics to be covered include (but may not be limited to):

1. The conceptual status of Newton’s laws
2. Galilean covariance
3. The Michelson-Morley experiment and Lorentz’s programme
4. Einstein’s 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations
5. The distinction between principle and constructive theories
6. Spacetime structure: from Newton to Minkowski
7. Generally covariant formulations of physical theories
8. Relativity and conventionality of simultaneity
9. The twins paradox
10. Frame-dependent explanations and Bell’s rockets
11. Presentism and relativity
12. Dynamical and geometrical approaches to relativity theory

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics
Prof Simon Saunders – W. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Merton College (Fitzjames 2)

Please see the entry for the graduate class on *Philosophy of Physics*, below.
During the lectures we will explore foundational questions about cognitive science. We will discuss the following topics, among others: the difference between explanations in psychology and explanations in other sciences; whether psychology can (or should) be reduced to neuroscience; how the mind is organised; how to best characterize the difference between nature and nurture in cognitive development; whether the mind is a computer, and if so, what kind of computations and symbols it might use; whether it is possible to comprehend how meanings could exist in nature; and what cognitive science can tell us about how we understand each other in everyday situations.

Program:
Week 1: Psychological explanation
Week 2: The computational-representational theory of mind and the language of thought hypothesis
Week 3: Connectionism and the debate about systematicity
Week 4: Modularity of mind
Week 5: Innateness
Week 6: Naturalising mental content
Week 7: Folk psychology and mindreading
Week 8: Philosophy of neuroscience

Overview readings:
- Crane, Tim. *The mechanical mind: A philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation*. Routledge, 2015. (This is the most accessible introduction to the issues discussed during the lectures)
- Clark, Andy. *Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. (An accessible overview that focuses on approaches to the mind that go beyond the classic computational-representational theory of mind, such as connectionism)

Further readings will be given during the lectures.
127 Philosophical Logic
Prof James Studd – T. 12 (all weeks) and W. 12 (weeks 1 and 2), Radcliffe Humanities
(Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of
interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical
applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the
mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not
take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider’s Logic for
Philosophy (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of
the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations
*LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)*
Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics
*LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)*
Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory
*LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4*
Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory
*LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)*
Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.
*LfP 4, 5*
Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC. Free logic.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains
*LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7*
Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics
*LfP 9.6, 10*
Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for
@, X and F.
Week 8. Counterfactuals.

Lfp 8
Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course webpage: https://jamesstudd.net/phillogic/

128 Practical Ethics
Dr Cressida Gaukroger – T. 10, Schools

Practical ethics investigates our ethical obligations in concrete, often every-day morally significant cases. These lectures will examine a number of pressing contemporary ethical topics including: abortion; human enhancement; health and disability; effective altruism and the moral demands of affluence; and the moral status of non-human animals.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
Dr Sophie Allen – M. 12, Schools

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of History and Philosophy of Science, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject Philosophy of Science in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term “S00004W1”).
Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

**Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems**  
Dr Dan Isaacson – M. 10 and W. 11, Maths Institute

**Prerequisites:**  
This course presupposes knowledge of first-order predicate logic up to and including soundness and completeness theorems for a formal system of first-order predicate logic (as is covered in B1 Logic).

**Course Overview:**  
The starting point is Gödel's mathematical sharpening of Hilbert's insight that manipulating symbols and expressions of a formal language has the same formal character as arithmetical operations on natural numbers. This allows the construction for any consistent formal system containing basic arithmetic of a ‘diagonal’ sentence in the language of that system which is true but not provable in the system. By further study we are able to establish the intrinsic meaning of such a sentence. These techniques lead to a mathematical theory of formal provability which generalizes the earlier results. We end with results that further sharpen understanding of formal provability.

**Course Synopsis:**  
Gödel numbering of a formal language; the diagonal lemma. Expressibility of sets and relations in a formal language. The arithmetical undefinability of truth in arithmetic. Formal systems of arithmetic; arithmetical proof predicates. Σ0-completeness and Σ1-completeness. The arithmetical hierarchy; ω-consistency and 1-consistency; the first Gödel incompleteness theorem. Separability; the Rosser incompleteness theorem. Adequacy conditions for a provability predicate; the second Gödel incompleteness theorem; Löb’s theorem. Provability logic GL; fixed point theorems for GL. The Bernays arithmetized completeness theorem; undecidable Δ2-sentences of arithmetic.

**Reading List:**  
Lecture notes for the course.

**Further Reading:**  
An introduction to Critical Theory
Prof Alice Crary – Th. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This introductory set of lectures is organized historically and thematically, tracing, during its first three weeks, the idea of a “critical theory of society” to its articulation in the work of successive representatives of the Frankfurt School and then following up, during the remaining five weeks, on some of the guiding philosophical questions that continue to drive the development of the tradition and account for its persistent moral and political importance. Themes to be addressed include the critique of instrumental reason, ideology critique, immanent critique, social ontology, critique of capitalism, the logic of the social sciences, and the relation between Critical Theory and analytic social philosophy.

The following is a provisional list of lecture topics: 1. Founding moments: calls for “critical” not “traditional” social theory; 2. Early phase: instrumental reason as a critical target; 3. Middle phase: commentary on some of Habermas’ early contributions; 4. Contemporary Kantian conceptions of critique; 5. Genealogy and critique; 6. Hegelian tendencies of contemporary critical theories; 7. Ideology critique as a key task for critical theories; and 8. Critique as critique of capitalism

An introduction to Aristotle
Dr Naoya Iwata – W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course will introduce you to some major topics of Aristotle’s philosophy. It covers his life and works (week 1), the theory of scientific knowledge (week 2), empiricism and dialectic (week 3), the theory of categories (week 4), nature and explanation (week 5), the science of being (week 6), hylomorphism and soul (week 7), happiness and virtue (week 8).

In doing so, it will place its special focus on the following two questions: how Aristotle thinks a field of science is related to another; what the relation between science and ethics is. Aristotle was the first to tackle these questions by defining what scientific knowledge is. The first half will therefore be spent surveying his theory of scientific knowledge and other relevant logical works, and the second half examining the major individual fields of science (physics, metaphysics, and psychology) and their relationships to each other and ethics. The common view is that different fields of science are autonomous of each other, and that ethics is not one of the sciences. But there has been a recent trend among scholars towards reconsidering that fractionalized view of science and ethics and getting closer to such a unified view as Plato’s. By looking into relevant Aristotelian passages and some of Plato’s doctrines, we also aim to evaluate those competing views.

Anyone who is interested in Aristotle is very welcome.
Introduction to the philosophy of consciousness
Mr Raphael Milliere – W. 11 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These four lectures will cover key notions, theories and debates on consciousness in contemporary philosophy. We will consider a wide range of questions about the nature and role of consciousness, such as: How should we define consciousness? What is its place in the natural world? How does it relate to physical processes in the brain? Can we hope to give a scientific explanation of consciousness? Does it make sense to say that we are less conscious when we dream than when we are awake? Is our conscious experience of the world as rich and detailed as it seems?

These lectures are open to everyone and will not presuppose any prior study of these topics. They are particularly relevant for students taking papers 104 (Philosophy of Mind), 125 (Philosophy of Cognitive Science), and 101 (Early Modern Philosophy).

Lecture 1. What is consciousness?

The first lecture will start with the difficult question of the definition of consciousness. As David Chalmers puts it in The Conscious Mind, there seems to be nothing more familiar to us than consciousness; and yet the task of defining it presents a remarkable challenge, as common definitions seem suspiciously circular. We will discuss whether this apparent difficulty is a genuine problem for the study of consciousness.

Lecture 2. The hard problem of consciousness

This lecture will discuss the daunting challenge of explaining how a physical information-processing system such as the human brain may give rise to conscious experience – the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. The difficulty presented by the hard problem stems from the fact that there seems to be an unbridgeable “explanatory gap” between consciousness and the physical world. The prospect of reducing conscious experience to physical processes in the brain appears to be hampered by this gap. We will discuss possible ways of addressing this challenge.

Lecture 3. Towards a science of consciousness

This lecture will discuss how consciousness may be scientifically studied. We will start from the apparent discrepancy between the third-person methodology of scientific inquiry and the first-person nature of consciousness. This discrepancy raises two important questions: Can we trust people’s reports about their conscious experience, given that introspection appears to be fallible? And are conscious experiences always accessible for report in the first place? In the final part of the lecture, we will consider how the scientific study of consciousness can progress without tackling the hard problem head on, by searching for the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain.
**Lecture 4. Levels and contents of consciousness**

The final lecture will draw on insights from the first three lectures to explore two interdisciplinary hot topics in consciousness research: Are there levels of consciousness? In other words, can people be *more or less* conscious depending on their overall physiological state? Secondly, how rich are the contents of consciousness? Is the apparent complexity and exuberance of conscious experience just an illusion? This lecture will illustrate how philosophers and scientists can join forces to address such questions.

**Suggested reading**


**Key topics in normativity**

Mr Jay Jian –W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

When we say that something is normative, we usually mean to say that that it provides an evaluative standard for, or imposes a prescription on, our attitudes and actions. But sometimes we mean something stronger - we mean to say that it imposes an evaluative standard or a prescription that is genuinely justified for us and that provides some genuine normative reasons for our action. The nature of the latter, stronger form of normativity raises some puzzling questions: If a norm is to be genuinely justified and to provide genuine normative reasons for our action, then does it have to be able to get a grip on us and engage our motivation? Is the authority of this kind of norm partly grounded in the requirements of rationality? Can the stronger form of normativity be analyzed in purely psychological, non-normative terms? If not, then can we have a plausible metaphysics of this form of normativity? The lectures on these key topics in normativity will be helpful for those who plan to take FHS Ethics paper as they will cover the central issues in the metaphysics of ethics, value and normativity, and moral psychology. But anyone who is interested in normativity in general is welcome - no background knowledge is presupposed.
**Lecture 1: Motivation** Lecture 1 will first examine the leading contemporary accounts of motivation. These include Non-Psychologism, Humeanism, and anti-Humeanism, which respectively take non-psychological states of affairs, belief-desire pairs, and evaluative beliefs to be the main motivators of action. After arriving at a richer understanding of motivation, we will then consider whether there is a motivation/internalist constraint on normativity, including both the normativity of good and that of normative reason for action.

**Lecture 2: Rationality** Lecture 2 will investigate three major conceptions of practical rationality and their respective implications on what kinds of normative reason we have. These include the instrumentalist and decision-theoretic picture of rationality, the Kantian picture of rationality, and the realist-correspondence picture of rationality. We will then examine whether the strategy of deriving normativity from an account of practical rationality can really work.

**Lecture 3: Realist Accounts of Normativity** Lecture 3 will survey the naturalist and non-naturalist versions of normative realism and their respective construals of the relation between natural and normative properties. Then we will consider some central problems that realists are faced with: How can realists secure and explain the supervenience relation between normative and natural properties? What should realists say about the causal efficacy of normative properties?

**Lecture 4: Subjectivist Accounts of Normativity** Lecture 4 will consider whether the normativity of good and that of normative reason can really be reduced to desire, and to what kind of desire - actual desire? Higher-order desire? Or hypothetical desire that we would have when we are rational? Is there any other psychological state or feature that might be the subjective source of normativity? We will consider in the end whether subjectivists can secure unconditional normative reasons by tying these reasons to the constitutive features of agency.

**Causation in the Law**
Dr Sandy Steel (Law) and Prof Alexander Kaiserman – Th. 3 – 5 (weeks 2, 4, 6, 7), Wadham College (Knowles Room)

In these four classes, we will examine the relationship between causation and legal liability. Topics to be covered include the law's distinction between 'factual' and 'legal' causation, the concept of a 'break in the chain of causation', the possibility of non-causal forms of liability, and the role of moral luck in the law. This class is cross-listed with the Faculty of Law, but philosophy graduate students are warmly encouraged to attend. Suggested readings will be posted on Weblearn in advance of the first class.
Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty’s BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

Plato and Aristotle on Truth
Prof Luca Castagnoli and Prof Michail Peramatzis – Th. 10 – 12, Worcester College

This graduate class is intended primarily for MSt students in Ancient Philosophy, BPhil students pursuing the Ancient Track. Graduate students and post-docs are also welcome.

We plan to discuss the following texts and topics:

Week 1: Plato, Republic V-VII: Knowledge, Opinion, Forms, and Truth: Ontic or Semantic?
Week 2: Plato’s Theaetetus on False Belief
Week 3: Plato’s Sophist on Truth and Falsehood
Week 4: Plato’s Philebus on Truth
Week 5: Truth in Aristotle’s Organon
Week 6: Being, Truth, and Falsehood in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.7 and Δ.29
Week 7: Truth & Falsehood in Aristotle’s Metaphysics E.4
Week 8: Truth and Falsehood for Composites and Incomposites in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.10

Leibniz
Prof Paul Lodge – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

After a week considering methodological questions in the study of the history of philosophy, this class will examine the philosophy of Leibniz via a close reading of his New Essays on Human Understanding. This book takes the form of a dialogue which selectively engages with Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding chapter by chapter from beginning to end.

Topics to be discussed will include: Innateness, freedom, personal identity, materialism about the ‘mental’, and faith and reason.
Preparatory reading:
G. W. Leibniz: *New Essays On Human Understanding* ed and trans by P Remnant and J Bennett (CUP)

N. Jolley: *Leibniz* (Routledge) – probably the best overview of Leibniz’s thinking.
N. Jolley: *Leibniz and Locke* (OUP) – the only book-length work on the *New Essays*, which is dated, but still a good starting point.

**Cognition**
Prof Cecilia Trifogli – F. 11 – 1 (weeks 1 to 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These classes will focus on two main topics: (1) Intentionality; (2) The subject of thought.

(1) In medieval philosophy, intentionality is primarily viewed as a kind of existence or property that defines a kind of entity, the so-called 'species' (intentional species). Intentionality is introduced to distinguish between a 'natural' change, like becoming hot, from a cognitive change, like sensing something hot. Sensing something hot involves an 'intentional information': reception of the intentional form of heat or intentional existence of the form of heat in the sense organs. Similar account for intellectual cognition. We shall deal with two main problems about intentional species: (i) their nature (likeness of a sensible/intelligible form, representation); (ii) their role in cognition (causal/cognitive intermediaries, 'veil of species').

(2) Medieval philosophers follow Aristotle in holding that thinking is 'immaterial' in the sense that there is no bodily organ of thought. The controversial question is whether from the immateriality of thought it can be concluded that the proper subject/agent of acts of thought is the (human) soul alone rather than the composite of body and soul (a human being). A related question is that of the independence of the human soul from the body (Aristotelian version of the mind-body problem). While Aristotle seems to hold that the subject of thought is the composite of body and soul and that the soul is not separable from the body, his most influential medieval commentator – Thomas Aquinas – disagrees with him on both issues.

We will mainly consider Thomas Aquinas’s views on both topics, but also refer to other positions in the debate (e.g. Averroes, Giles of Rome).

Wittgenstein
Prof Bill Child – T. 11 – 1, University College

The class is intended primarily for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students. Others (including 4th year undergraduates reading Computer Science & Philosophy, Maths & Philosophy, and Physics & Philosophy) may also be admitted if space permits. Please e-mail me (bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk) in advance if you would like to come to these classes: if you are a Philosophy BPhil or MSt student, that will help me to get an idea of likely numbers; if you are not a BPhil or MSt student, I will get back to you before the first class to let you know if there will be space for you to attend.

(The class will be held in University College – provisionally, in a first-floor room that is reached by a spiral staircase. Please let me know if that would be likely to make access difficult for you.)

The classes will explore some central topics in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy – with a particular focus in weeks 1 to 3 on rules and rule-following. No prior acquaintance with Wittgenstein’s work is assumed. For each topic, there will be one piece of required reading from the secondary literature, some recommended reading from Wittgenstein, and a small selection of optional supplementary readings. The required readings have been chosen to represent a range of interpretative and philosophical approaches. It is intended that all should be accessible to those reading Wittgenstein for the first time.

I will introduce the first topic, in Week 1. Thereafter, each class will start with a brief presentation by one or more of those who are attending the class (you are welcome – indeed, encouraged – to collaborate in preparing and/or giving presentations). Time limit for presentations: 15 minutes. If you are interested in presenting on a particular topic, feel free to let me know before the start of term.

The required readings are listed below. The full reading list will be available on WebLearn under Teaching and Learning Material, Graduate Classes, Hilary Term 2019.

Week 1 Rules & Rule-following 1

Week 2 Rules and Rule-Following 2
Week 3  Rules and Rule-Following 3

Week 4  Meaning, Use, and Verification

Week 5  The Private Language Sections of *Philosophical Investigations*

Week 6  Criteria and Other Minds

Week 7  Knowledge and Certainty

Week 8  Wittgenstein and Ethics

**Feminism and the Future**
Prof Amia Srinivasan and Prof Sophie Smith - W. 4 – 6, St John’s College (New Seminar Room)

*Attendance*: This is a course exclusively for Philosophy BPhil students and Politics MPhil students. No auditors allowed. Please email amia.srinivasan@philosophy.ox.ac.uk if you intend to attend this seminar.

Many of our most pressing social and political problems are ones with which feminist thinkers have long been concerned: the nature of work, the role of technology, our relationship to the environment, the politics of desire, the promise and limits of the state, and the prospects for solidarity in the face of multiply intersecting identities. At the heart of this course is the thought that feminist theory, both historical and contemporary, is not only intrinsically interesting, but a useful resource for thinking through these challenges.

*Overview*
*Week 1: Work*
*Week 2: Reproduction*
Preparatory Readings:
This course is not an introduction to feminist theory or the history of feminism, and some background familiarity with both will be assumed. In the vacation beforehand we recommend that you acquaint yourself with the broader history of feminist philosophy and politics. Here are some readings with which to do so:


Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The roots of women's liberation in civil rights and the new left (New York, 1979).


Akasha (Gloria T.) Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith (eds.), But Some of us are Brave (Feminist Press, 1982).


Lorna Finlayson, An Introduction to Feminism (Cambridge, 2016).

Miriam Schneir (ed) Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings (Vintage, 1994).

Miriam Schnier (ed) Feminism in Our Time: The Essential Writings World War II to the Present (Vintage, 1994).


Accessibility: If you have any issues with accessing the seminar room, or the readings, or anything else, please let us know. If the timing of the seminar poses a problem because of childcare, please let us know.
Reading

Week 1: Work


'Work' (Chapter 2) in Juno Mac and Molly Smith, Revolting Prostitutes (Verso: 2018).

Week 2: Reproduction

Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (Verso, 2015 [1970]). Please read the following chapters: 'The Dialectic of Sex'; 'Down with Childhood'; 'Conclusion: The Ultimate Revolution'.

Merve Emre, 'All Reproduction is Assisted' in The Boston Review: http://bostonreview.net/forum/merve-emre-all-reproduction-assisted

Response to Emre’s essay from Alys Weinbaum: http://bostonreview.net/forum/all-reproduction-assisted/alyseve-weinbaum-weinbaum-emre


Week 3: Woman


**Week 4: Desire**


Molly Smith and Juno Mac, 'Chapter 1: Sex' in Revolting Prostitutes (Verso, 2018).

**Week 5: Solidarity**

Ann Snitow, 'Pages from a Gender Diary: Some Basic Divisions in Feminism', Dissent (Spring, 1989).


Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Sections 1-4 of Chapter 1. (pp. 3-22 in the 2002 Taylor and Francis edition).


Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Feminist Encounters: Locating the Politics of Experience' in M.

**Week 6: State**

[To be finalised]


**Week 7: Environment**

[To be finalised]

**Week 8: Technology**

[To be finalised]


Practical Ethics
Dr Rebecca Brown – M. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar will explore a range of debates in practical ethics, and is open to all graduate students with an interest in this topic. Two–three core readings will form the basis of the discussion for each seminar, and students will be expected to volunteer to start the seminar with a brief presentation of the week’s core readings.

A provisional list of topics to be covered are:

Week 1 (14th Jan) Disability
Week 2 (21st Jan) Nudging
Week 3 (28th Jan) Gender and Sex
Week 4 (4th Feb) Effective Altruism
Week 5 (11th Feb) Artificial Intelligence
Week 6 (18th Feb) Commodification
Week 7 (25th Feb) Privacy
Week 8 (4th March) Neurointerventions

The core readings for week 1 are:


Thinking and Being
Dr Steven Methven – Th. 2 – 4 (weeks 1 to 7), Worcester College (Le May Room, Sultan Nazrin Shah Centre)

Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being (Harvard University Press, November 2018) represents a sustained attack on the Fregean conception of logic, which, according to Kimhi, dissociates the contents of thought or judgement – propositions, let’s say – from the activity of thinking or judging. But if logic is the study of thought or judgement, it must also be the study of thinking and of judging, and the source of its authority over thought must be situated in the structure and limits of thinking itself. By seeking to understand logic and content in this non-Fregean manner, puzzles involving negation, falsehood, the principle of non-contradiction, oratio obliqua, and inference (some of which become clear only when the Fregean framework is given up) are purported to be resolved.

The aims of this seminar are twofold: (A) to conduct a careful reading of Kimhi’s book, and (B) to critique its arguments, objections and conclusions with reference to the literature
around the positions criticised. As such, participants can, at the very least, expect to come
to a better understanding of Fregeanism and its commitments, as well as of its competitors
in respect of the foundations of logic. To these ends, each week I will assign a section of the
book and at most two accompanying texts (these will be made available to participants
electronically). This will allow us, over seven weeks, to assess the book’s arguments and
emerging position by reading it in conjunction with writings concerning the foundations of
logic by, amongst others, Aristotle, Plato, Frege, Heidegger, Russell, Ramsey and
Wittgenstein. Additionally, Kimhi will be visiting Oxford for a few weeks in the second half of
term, and will attend at least one seminar.

If you’re not familiar with the book, it is dense and difficult, but very rewarding of effort. 
While I will lead the seminar, my intention is that it also provides a forum for relatively free
discussion of these issues. Participants will be expected to come armed with questions or 
comments in respect of the weekly reading, and to participate in the discussion.

Places on the seminar will be limited, so please contact me as early as possible to register
your interest.

**Logic and Philosophical Logic**

*Prof Volker Halbach and Prof Alex Paseau – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)*

Topics to be discussed will include a review of metatheoretic results, logical constants, 
logical consequence, semantic paradoxes, operator and predicate conception of modalities, 
and self-reference.

For further information see the web page of the seminar:

[http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil19.html](http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil19.html)

**Epistemology**

*Prof Bernhard Salow and Prof Tim Williamson – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)*

Each meeting will discuss a recent article, which participants will be expected to have read:

Week 1 (15th January) Jennifer Nagel, ‘Intuitions and experiments: a defense of the case method in 
epistemology’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

Week 2 (22nd January) Martin Smith, ‘The logic of epistemic justification’, *Synthese*

Week 3 (29th January) Ru Ye, ‘Misleading evidence and the dogmatism puzzle’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*

Week 4 (5th February) Maria Lasonen Aarnio, ‘Unreasonable knowledge’, *Philosophical Perspectives*

Week 5 (12th February) Amia Srinivasan and John Hawthorne, ‘Disagreement without transparency: some bleak thoughts’, in D. Christensen and J. Lackey (eds.), *The
Arguments from Illusion

Nearly sixty years ago, JL Austin launched a blistering attack on the argument from illusion in *Sense & Sensibilia*. Some twenty years later, in a British Academy lecture, ‘Conflicting Appearances’, Myles Burnyeat sought to provide a synoptic overview of the history of arguments from illusion, and the surprising persistence of this mode of debate in Western philosophy. While he agreed with Austin that arguments from illusion lack cogency, he found lacking Austin’s preparedness to explain the persisting attractions of this trope. Burnyeat offers an explanation of this in terms of what he dubs, ‘the window model’.

Does Burnyeat’s own diagnosis of the problem carry conviction, though?

Starting out from Burnyeat’s own discussions, we’ll look at examples of the arguments from conflicting appearances/argument from illusion from early Modern philosophy, to early Analytic philosophy. And we will be looking at some recent discussions in the philosophy of perception which seem to rely on the argument from illusion. With Burnyeat, we’ll be concerned with what further assumptions might be in play, and what further costs derive from these inexplicit additional commitments.

Typically, there will be one designated piece of core reading for each week (though note that in a couple of weeks, this is going to be fairly long); with further background reading provided for each topic on WebLearn.

Provisional Schedule
Week One
Myles Burnyeat,
‘Conflicting Appearances’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1979

Week Two
George Berkeley,
*Three Dialogues between Hylas & Philonous*, part. First Dialogue; *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*
Week Three
GE Moore & Bertrand Russell
Moore, ‘A Refutation of Idealism’, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, Ch. 2
Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Ch. 1

Week Four
JL Austin,

Week Five
GEM Anscombe,

Week Six
Christopher Peacocke,

Week Seven
Susanna Siegel,
*The Content of Visual Experience*, OUP NY, 2012, Ch. 2

Week Eight
Susanna Schellenberg

**Philosophy of Science**
Prof Adam Caulton and Prof Simon Saunders – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Below are the proposed topics for the classes, in the anticipated order. We will update this document with readings as we progress.

The intended audience includes MSt students in Philosophy of Physics, and BPhil and DPhil students interested philosophy of science. Those attending the class should be sure to have read in advance the target reading(s) for each session. Some background, and some further reading, is also indicated. Roughly, turn to the background readings if the target reading is proving opaque (or more opaque than you feel it should), or if the general area of discussion is unfamiliar (or, indeed, for general edification).

Classes will begin with a brief introduction to, or summary of, the target piece (or pieces), as a jumping-off point for discussion. At the first-week class, volunteers will be sought to provide these brief introductions in subsequent weeks.
Topics:

1. Non-Euclidean geometry and the emergence of conventionalism

Target readings:


Background:

- Carnap, R., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Dover, 1966), Chapters 13-18. [In other versions, titled *Philosophical Foundations of Physics.*]

Further reading:


2. Russell’s causal theory of perception, “Ramseyfication” and Newman’s objection

Target readings:


Background:


Further reading:
3. Theoretical terms and theoretical analyticity

**Target readings:**


**Background:**

- Carnap, R., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Dover, 1966), Chapters 23-28. [In other versions, titled *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*.]

**Further reading:**


4. Carnap and Kuhn

**Target readings:**

Further reading:


5. Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

*Target readings:*

Quine, W. V. ‘On what there is’, reprinted in *From a Logical Point of View*, Harvard University Press (1953).


6. Philosophical Naturalism

*Target readings:*


7. Constructive empiricism

*Target readings:*


8. Structural realism

*Target readings:*

Philosophy of Physics
Prof Simon Saunders – W. 11 – 1 (weeks 1 to 4), Merton College (Fitzjames 2)

This course of four classes continues last term’s classes on topics in contemporary philosophy of physics, and is entirely devoted to the measurement problem (or paradox) of quantum mechanics and its realist solutions. The latter break down into three: hidden variables, dynamical collapse, and many worlds. The three are compared, with particular focus on the latter, and on the concept of probability.

The intended audience includes MSt students in Philosophy of Physics, BPhil and DPhil students interested in probability, metaphysics, and quantum physics, and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates offering Advanced Philosophy of Physics. Others are welcome if there is space.

Schedule

Week 1. The measurement problem of quantum mechanics
Week 2. Everett-De Witt-Deutsch
Week 3. Decoherence theory
Week 4. Quantum probability

The following should be read in advance for weeks 1 to 2 (and are easily available on-line):


and provisionally:


Fundamentals of Decision Theory
Prof Andreas Mogensen and Dr Teru Thomas – T. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will introduce students to the philosophical foundations of decision theory. It will cover the distinction between ignorance and risk, subjective probability, utility, representation theorems, diachronic consistency, risk aversion, causal versus evidential decision theory, and social choice. The course will be of interest to students with a wide range of philosophical interests, including ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of economics, and political philosophy.
The course presupposes no prior knowledge of decision theory and aims instead to provide students with a solid foundation. The early weeks of the course are therefore organised around Resnik’s introductory textbook *Choices*. The course will also be of interest to students with prior knowledge of this area who wish to deepen their understanding of core topics.

While the material covered is often technical, we have tried to keep complex formalisms to a minimum. The readings require no mathematical expertise beyond a standard high school education. Do not feel discouraged if you find the formal material heavy going on occasion. We all do! Let us know if you are really struggling with anything in the readings, and we will try to help.

Each session will begin with a presentation of key ideas and results led by either Andreas or Teru, after which we will move on to discussion of philosophical controversies. Students who are interested in doing some preliminary reading that gives a broad overview of the key topics to be covered in the course should have a look at:


The assigned reading for the first class is as follows:

Compulsory:


Optional further reading:


Adam Elga (2010) Subjective probabilities should be sharp. *Philosophers’ Imprint*


Regular Faculty Seminars

The programmes of the Faculty seminars are no longer included in this Lecture Prospectus, since running lists are often not settled by the time this Prospectus is published. Instead, students and Faculty members are referred to the weekly events digest, sent from the Faculty in each week of term, which includes details of each of the seminars (often with a linked abstract). Interested parties may also refer to seminars’ individual webpages, where one exists.

The Faculty seminars listed here all take place in some weeks of each term of the year, at Radcliffe Humanities (either in the Ryle Room or the Lecture Room) unless otherwise indicated. The usual schedule is given as a guide, but should be checked in any term against that term’s Lecture List, or the digest for the week.

**Monday**  
**Moral Philosophy Seminar**  
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room  
Webpage: [http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/moral_philosophy](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/moral_philosophy)

**Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar**  
Usual schedule: weeks vary; 4.30 to 6.30, Ryle Room  
Webpage: [http://users.ox.ac.uk/~philmath/pomseminar.html](http://users.ox.ac.uk/~philmath/pomseminar.html)

**Tuesdays**  
**Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar**  
Usual schedule: even-numbered weeks, 5 to 7, Ryle Room  
Webpage: [http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar)

**Aesthetics Seminar (Hilary Term only – not running in HT2019)**  
Usual schedule: every other week, 4 to 6, Exeter College  
See events digest, or contact convener (James Grant) for information

**Thursdays**  
**Workshop in Ancient Philosophy**  
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6, Ryle Room  
Webpage: [http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy)

**Philosophy of Physics Seminar**  
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room  
Webpage: [http://www.philosophy-of-physics.ox.ac.uk/tag/thursday-seminars/](http://www.philosophy-of-physics.ox.ac.uk/tag/thursday-seminars/)

**Fridays**  
**Jowett Society / Philosophical Society**  
Usual schedule: weekly, 3.30 to 5.30, Lecture Room  
Webpage: [https://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/](https://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/)

In addition to these, there are usually “work in progress” groups, or WIPs: most commonly, the Theoretical Philosophy WIP ([http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/](http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/)), and in some terms a Mind WIP meets.