

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



# PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2021

## NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight ([james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)).

*Undergraduate lectures are being delivered electronically, either by means of pre-recorded lectures or through Microsoft Teams for live events. Links to the Teams events, or the pre-recorded lectures, can be found in the Philosophy Canvas site (under the sections [Mods and Prelims Classes](#) and [FHS Classes](#)).*

*Graduate classes in Hilary Term 2021 are being delivered by Microsoft Teams, unless otherwise indicated. Graduate students will receive, by the start of week 1, invitations on Microsoft Teams for all the classes available to them.*

*Times given here are UK times. Students attending remotely in other timezones should adjust their times accordingly.*

# Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

*PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy*

*Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy*

*Literae Humaniores*: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

## **Elements of Deductive Logic**

Dr Wesley Wrigley – recordings on Canvas

Elements of Deductive Logic is primarily a course in *metalogic*. Rather than using the formal system of *The Logic Manual* to prove particular things, as in last term's Introduction to Logic lectures, we'll be proving important general results *about* this formal system. Our focus will be on the metatheory of propositional logic, and we'll examine all the major results up to and including the soundness and completeness of our natural deduction system with respect to the truth table semantics. The course is primarily aimed at students studying philosophy with mathematics, computer science, or physics, but all are welcome. The only set text is *The Logic Manual*, and familiarity with it will be assumed throughout.

## **Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic**

Prof James Studd – recordings on Canvas

These are the core lectures for first-year mathematic and philosophy students. We'll consider, among other things, Frege's attack on Mill's empiricism, Frege's views on number ascriptions, the 'Julius Caesar' problem, and Frege's attempt at a logicist reduction of arithmetic to Hume's Principle, and ultimately to his ill-fated theory of extensions.

Set Text: Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic* (trans. J. L. Austin)

# Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

## **101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume**

Prof Peter Kail – recordings on Canvas

These lectures are for paper 101, Early Modern Philosophy, and offer an overview of the set text, Book I of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. I shall follow the major contours of the Hume's masterpiece, introduce its main themes, discuss its coherence and Hume's overall aims. The topics covered include naturalism and scepticism, causal inference and the so-called problem of induction, causal powers and realism, the external world, the self and Hume's dissatisfaction with his account of it. For an introduction to the work, see Peter Kail "David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature" in John Shand (ed.) *The Central Works of Philosophy* Vol. 2, Acumen Press (2005). Students should use either the Oxford Student edition (ed. Norton or Norton) or the older, but still acceptable, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (again Oxford University Press).

## **101 Early Modern Philosophy: Leibniz**

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – recordings on Canvas

The lectures will cover the main aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology as they are deployed in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

## **102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics**

Prof Ofra Magidor – recordings on Canvas

This lecture series will discuss in detail some of the main topics from the Metaphysics portion of the Knowledge and Reality paper – Leibniz's Law and its implications, persistence, composition, modality, and supervenience. NB: a live online session for students to ask questions about the contents of the lectures will be scheduled towards the end of the term – details to be circulated by e-mail.

## **102 Knowledge and Reality: Epistemology**

Prof Bernhard Salow – F. 10, live on Teams

These lectures will focus on the nature of knowledge and justification. Recurring themes include skepticism, a focus on structural features, and the connection between knowledge and probability.

Week 1: The Analysis of Knowledge

Week 2: Closure

Week 3: Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity

Week 4: Statistical Evidence and Moral Encroachment

Week 5: Scepticism I: Externalist and Contextualist Responses

Week 6: Internalism and Luminosity

Week 7: Scepticism II: Dogmatist Responses

Week 8: The A Priori

## **103 Ethics I: Normative Ethics**

Prof Thomas Sinclair – T. 10, live on Teams

These lectures will focus on theories of morality—that is, theories that aim to make sense of moral prohibitions, permissions, and requirements, and to explain how the contents of such prohibitions, permissions, and requirements are determined and what the source of their authority is. The lectures will discuss attempts to derive moral prescriptions from foundational ideas about impartial goodness, agential excellence, rationality, human dignity, and the value of certain kinds of relationship. Although the lectures will survey consequentialism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and contractualism—key topics on the Ethics syllabus—the emphasis will be on drawing out the similarities and differences between these theories as approaches to a single set of concerns.

## **103 Ethics II: Metaethics**

Dr Joseph Cunningham – recordings on Canvas

Instead of attempting to settle ethical questions like: *Is fox hunting wrong?* and *Is temperance a virtue?* Metaethics takes a step back and addresses questions *about* such questions, and about our moral thought and talk generally. These lectures will focus on the following four areas of Metaethics:

- i. **Moral Semantics.** We make moral claims – for example, we assert sentences which contain moral predicates. What is the meaning of predicates such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘wrong’, ‘permissible’ and ‘ought’? Do the sentences in which they appear *describe* the world, or do they perform some other function? Are those sentences apt to be true or false?

- ii. **Moral Psychology.** We commit ourselves to the correctness of moral claims – we *endorse* or *subscribe* to various principles and particular moral claims. Our commitment to these things plays a role in our practical lives: the principles and claims to which we’re committed figure in deliberation and move us to action. But what sort of mental state is involved in accepting a moral claim? Is it *belief*, or something else? And what is the role that such states play in the practical lives of moral agents? Can we accept a moral claim but fail to be motivated by it?
- iii. **Moral Metaphysics.** Does the world contain moral properties or facts? Are these properties and facts there independent of human thought and experience? If there are such facts and properties, how do they relate to the non-moral properties and facts in existence? Are they natural – like the properties discovered by the sciences?
- iv. **Moral Epistemology.** Does it make sense to say that we can *know* and have *justified beliefs* in moral principles and claims? If so, *how* do we come by moral knowledge and justification?

Overview readings:

- Miller, Alexander. (2013). *Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. London: Polity Press.
- Tiberius, Valerie. (2014). *Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction*. London: Routledge.

### **106b Philosophy of Social Science**

Prof Alexander Prescott-Couch – recordings on Canvas

Contemporary social science is extremely heterogeneous, with seemingly little consensus about methods and fundamental assumptions. While some social scientific projects take the form of causal analysis of large data sets, others primarily employ case studies or involve the construction of highly idealized models that bear only an indirect relation to real-world phenomena. Many anthropologists are interested less in causal questions and more in understanding the “meanings” of events or cultural practices. Some theorists believe that a deep understanding of society requires a functional analysis of key institutions, while other, more historically inclined researchers hold that understanding these institutions requires historical narratives or “genealogies.”

How should we think about this heterogeneity? Are these differences superficial, masking a single underlying set of fundamental aims and a unitary logic of scientific inference? Or do they indicate deep disagreement about the correct approach to studying society? Moreover, if such deep disagreements do exist, to what extent should we look to the natural sciences as a model in order to resolve them?

These lectures address these (and other) questions by examining classic debates in the philosophy of social science in light of contemporary social science and recent philosophy of science. Topics will include scientific explanation, the doctrine of *Verstehen*, idealization and modeling, functional explanation, historical narrative, critical theory and ideology, social metaphysics, and the role of values in science. The aim is to show how examining social science can provide a fuller picture of substantive and methodological commitments of the sciences as well as how philosophical analysis might inform methodological discussion within social science itself.

### **110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas**

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – recordings on Canvas

I will present the following topics from Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 2-11, 75-89; II.I, qq. 1-10, 90-97: (1) Existence of God (I, q. 2); (2) Nature of God (I, q. 3); (3) Soul (I, qq. 75-76); (4) Cognition (I, qq. 79, 84-86); (5) Will (I, qq. 80, 82-83; II.I, qq. 8-10); (6) Happiness (II.I, qq. 1-5); (7) Voluntary Actions (II.I, q. 6); (8) Eternal and Natural Law (II.I, qq. 90-97).

### **113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Heidegger**

Prof Stephen Mulhall – recordings on Canvas

These lectures will aim to give an introduction to Heidegger's major early work; no previous knowledge of his writings will be assumed. Although the primary audience is assumed to be those working on Heidegger for the Post-Kantian Philosophy paper, anyone interested in the material is welcome to attend. We shall work through the text in the order in which it is written, and in some detail; so it might be advisable to bring a copy along. There will be plenty of time for questions.

### **116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics***

Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen – M. 2, live on Teams

These lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in translation or in Greek, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It will be useful to bring a copy of the NE to each session. Over the series (of which this term's lectures are the second half), we will cover material from the entire treatise (books I-X), focusing on: Aristotle's conception of happiness, the function argument, the doctrine of the mean and virtues of character, Aristotle's theory of voluntary action and moral responsibility, decision and deliberation, justice, prudence, continence and incontinence, friendship, pleasure, and the role of contemplation in the happiest life. This term's lectures cover books VI to X.

### **120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity**

Prof James Read – recordings on Canvas

This is a twelve-lecture course on the philosophical foundations of special relativity. Topics to be covered include (but may not be limited to):

1. The conceptual status of Newton's laws
2. Galilean covariance
3. The Michelson-Morley experiment and Lorentz's programme
4. Einstein's 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations
5. The distinction between principle and constructive theories
6. Spacetime structure: from Newton to Minkowski
7. Generally covariant formulations of physical theories
8. Relativity and conventionality of simultaneity
9. The twins paradox
10. Frame-dependent explanations and Bell's rockets
11. Presentism and relativity
12. Dynamical and geometrical approaches to relativity theory

### **121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics**

Dr Owen Maroney – T. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), live on Teams

Please see the entry for the graduate class on [Philosophy of Physics](#), below.

### **125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science**

Prof Philipp Koralus – W. 10 (*starts week 2*), live on Teams

These lectures will provide an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. Topics will be drawn from those on the Faculty of Philosophy reading list for the FHS Finals paper Philosophy 125. We will spend comparable amounts of time on (1) foundational issues in cognitive science that in one way or another are in the background of most areas of research and (2) the question of how experimental results relate to philosophical issues like consciousness and free will. Various concepts will be illustrated with examples from the scientific literature, but no previous experience with psychology or empirical cognitive science is assumed.

## 127 Philosophical Logic

Prof James Studd – recordings on Canvas

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

### **Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations**

*LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)*

Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

### **Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics**

*LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)*

Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

### **Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory**

*LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4*

Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

### **Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory**

*LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)*

Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

### **Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.**

*LfP 4, 5*

Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC.

### **Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains**

*LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7*

Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

### **Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics**

*LfP 9.6, 10*

Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @,

X and F.

### **Week 8. Counterfactuals.**

*LfP 8*

Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course webpage:

<https://jamesstudd.net/phillogic/>

### **129 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein**

Prof Natalia Waights Hickman – Th. 10, live on Teams

This lecture series gives an overview of select topics in Wittgenstein's philosophy, where possible exploring problems and themes that are continuous between the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP) and *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). Central among these is the concern with the nature, conditions and limits of sense.

The majority of lectures will focus on Wittgenstein's later work, but the first three will reflect on key issues in TLP which aid assessment of the later work, and engage some of its central preoccupations: the relationship between meaning and metaphysics, and the aims and nature of philosophy.

## **131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist***

Prof Michael Peramatzis – Th. 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), live on Teams

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The first six lectures in MT20 focused on the *Theaetetus*, Plato's dialogue about the nature of knowledge, and will discuss the claim that knowledge is perception; being and becoming; the self-refutation of relativism; the refutation of the proposed definition of knowledge as sense perception; knowledge as true belief; false belief; Socrates' dream; knowledge as true belief plus an 'account' (*logos*).

The next six lectures (to be given in HT20) will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the method of definition by division; the view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'; the discussion of the number and nature of what there is; the view of the so-called 'Late-Learners'; the communion of kinds; the analysis of negative predication; the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference; negative properties; and the analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance.

These twelve lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

*Platonis Opera I*, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

*Theaetetus*, tr. Levett, revised by Burnyeat (Hackett, 1990).

*Sophist*, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: both of these translations are re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Hand-outs and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

## 134/136/139 Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy

Prof Luca Castagnoli – M. 2 – 4 (*weeks 1 to 6*), live on Teams

'Human beings have a natural desire for knowledge', said Aristotle. However, both before and after him the philosophical quest for knowledge led some to the view that it was a hopeless or misguided aspiration. In the Hellenistic age the debate on the possibility of knowledge took centre stage as Plato's school, the Academy, 'turned sceptical' with Arcesilaus and Carneades and argued against the epistemological optimism of the two major rival Hellenistic schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To complicate things, not long before Zeno of Citium and Epicurus founded their schools, Pyrrho embraced and embodied the anti-dogmatic ideal of a human life stripped of knowledge and belief and thereby free from anxiety as a recipe for human happiness. That ideal was revived and developed more than two centuries later by Aenesidemus, the founder of the Pyrrhonian school, a brand of Scepticism different from the Academic one and in competition with it (the late writings of Sextus Empiricus are our best source). The lectures will introduce some of the central Hellenistic epistemological views and debates as they developed between (and within) these philosophical schools. They aim to offer an understanding of

- some of the main sources for philosophical scepticism from the fourth century BC to the 3rd century AD, and for the 'empiricist' epistemologies of Stoicism and Epicureanism;
- the variety of different positions encompassed by the term 'Sceptic';
- the Sceptics' attacks on 'dogmatic' epistemology and the various strategies adopted by the 'dogmatists' to defend the possibility of knowledge;
- the 'dogmatic' counter-attacks against the Sceptical positions, and the Sceptics' attempts to defend themselves;
- how the issue of epistemology impacted on the field of ethics: do we need knowledge to live a good and happy life? Is it possible and desirable to *live* one's Scepticism in a consistent way?

This course is primarily intended for those undergraduate students who plan to sit papers 134, 136 or 139 (Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy), but anyone (including graduate students) with an interest in ancient Greek philosophy, philosophical scepticism and the history of epistemology is welcome to attend (knowledge of ancient Greek or Latin is not required).

The main topics to be introduced in the lectures are provisionally scheduled as follows:

- W1. An introduction to Hellenistic philosophy and epistemology.  
Epicurean and Stoic epistemologies.
- W2. Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy I.
- W3. Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy II.
- W4. Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism: beliefs, appearances, and the aim of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The modes of the suspension of judgement: Aenesidemus and Agrippa
- W5. The Pyrrhonian attack on logic: criteria of truth, signs and proofs. The self-refutation charge and the possibility of Pyrrhonian inquiry.

The Pyrrhonian attack on physics: causes, motion and time.

The Pyrrhonian attack on ethics and the possibility of a Pyrrhonian life.

#### W6. Early Pyrrhonism: Pyrrho and Aenesidemus

##### Main Texts

- A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge: CUP, 1987. Vol. I: esp. sections 1-3 (Pyrrho); 15-19 (Epicureans); 39-42 (Stoics); 68-70 (Academics); 71-72 (Aenesidemus).
- Cicero, *Academic Books*, transl. by C. Brittain, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
- Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, trans. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

##### Introductory readings

- K. Vogt, 'Ancient Skepticism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism-ancient/>.
- D. Sedley, 'The Protagonists', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (eds.), *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1-19.

#### Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – recordings on Canvas

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term "S00004W1").

## Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

### Higher-Order Logic and the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

Mr Marco Grossi and Mr Hans Robin Solberg – W. 11, live on Teams

Higher-order logic (HOL) extends the apparatus of classical first-order logic (FOL) by allowing quantification into predicate position. These lectures aim to give a fairly detailed introduction of HOL and its semantics, and then discuss the role of HOL in certain arguments in philosophy of logic and mathematics.

The lectures are open to anyone interested in the subject. Students taking 127 Philosophical Logic, 122 Philosophy of Mathematics and 108 Philosophy of Logic and Language might particularly benefit from the lectures. We presume familiarity with classical first-order logic and its semantics throughout.

Below is a brief outline of the topic(s) of each lecture with suggested readings:

**Lecture 1:** We introduce the standard set-based semantics for HOL, focusing on the distinction between the full and the Henkin interpretation of the higher-order quantifiers. We also discuss the increased expressive power of HOL over FOL and some interesting metalogical properties of HOL with the full semantics, such as non-compactness and incompleteness.

*Main readings:*

- Shapiro, S. *Foundations without Foundationalism: A case for second-order logic*. OUP, 1991. **Chapter 3** (“Theory”) and **Chapter 4** (“Metatheory”). **(36 pp.)**
- Button, T. and Walsh, S. *Philosophy and Model Theory*. OUP, 2018. **Sections 1.9-1.11 and 1.C. (8 pp.)**

*Further readings:*

- Shapiro, S. “Higher-order logic”. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic*. OUP, 2007.
- Enderton, H.B. *A Mathematical Introduction to Logic*. Elsevier, 2001. **Chapter 4.**

**Lecture 2:** We review Quine’s critique of the set-based semantics and Boolos’s proposal to interpret HOL using a plurality-based semantics instead. We look at the parallels between the plurality-based and set-based semantics, in particular the existence of a plural version of the Henkin semantics.

*Main readings:*

- Quine, W.V.O. *Philosophy of Logic*. 1970. **Section on “Set theory in sheep’s clothing”, part of Chapter 5. (3 pp.)**
- Boolos, G. “To be is to be the value of a variable (or to be some values of some variables).” *The Journal of Philosophy* 81(8), 1984, pp. 430-449. **(20 pp.)**
- Florio, S. and Linnebo, Ø. “On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification.” *Noûs* 50(3), 2016, pp. 565-583. **(19 pp.)**

*Further readings:*

- Boolos, G. "Nominalist Platonism." *Philosophical Review* 94, pp. 327–44.
- Jané, I. "Higher-order Logic Reconsidered." In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic*. OUP, 2007.
- Resnik, M.D. "Second-Order Logic Still Wild." *The Journal of Philosophy* 85(2), 1988, pp. 75-87.

**Lecture 3:** Some philosophers think that the standard definition of logical consequence is conceptually inadequate, and that we should spell out validity directly in higher-order logic for higher-order logic. We will discuss their proposal in detail, and critically review its scope and limits.

*Main readings:*

- Rayo, A. and Uzquiano, G. "Toward a theory of second-order consequence." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 40(3), 1999, pp. 315-325. **(11 pp.)**
- Linnebo, Ø. and Rayo, A. "Hierarchies Ontological and Ideological." *Mind* 121(482), 2012, pp. 269–308. **(40 pp.)**

*Further reading:*

- Williamson, T. "Everything." *Philosophical Perspectives* 17, 2003, pp. 415-465.

**Lecture 4:** We review what it is for a theory to be categorical. We look at why first-order theories of arithmetic and set theory fail to be categorical, and how restating these theories in HOL with the full semantics gives us categorical or quasi-categorical theories. We then critically discuss whether this ensures that our mathematical sentences are determinate in truth-value.

*Main readings:*

- Shapiro, S. *Foundations without Foundationalism: A case for second-order logic*. OUP, 1991. **Chapter 4 ("Metatheory") pp. 82-86. (5 pp.)**
- Button, T. and Walsh, S. *Philosophy and Model Theory*. OUP, 2018. **Sections 1.A, 1.B; 7.2-7.5; 8.1 and 8.3. (14 pp.)**

*Further readings:*

- Kreisel, G. "Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs." In *Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics*. North-Holland, 1967, pp. 138-157.
- Meadows, T. "What Can a Categoricity Theorem Tell Us?" *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 6(3), 2013, pp. 524-544.
- Warren, J. and Waxman, D. "A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy." *Synthese* 197(2), 2020, pp. 477-495.
- Weston, T. "Kreisel, the continuum hypothesis and second order set theory" *The Journal of Philosophical Logic* 5, 1976, pp. 281-298.

# Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

## **BPhil Pro-Seminar: Practical Philosophy**

Various class-givers – live on Teams – times to be confirmed

*Group 1:* Prof Catharine Abell

*Group 2:* Prof James Grant

*Group 3:* Prof Alison Hills

*Group 4:* Prof Roger Crisp

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Hilary Term will cover key material in practical philosophy, with groups 1 and 2 focussing on aesthetics and the philosophy of art, and groups 3 and 4 covering moral philosophy in either metaethics or normative ethics or both. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

## **Mysticism and Philosophy of Religion**

Prof Paul Lodge and Prof Mark Wynn – F. 2 – 4, live on Teams

This seminar series aims to provide a philosophical introduction to mysticism, through the work of some representative thinkers. Key readings will be provided.

### **Week 1 Introduction: What is Mysticism?** – Paul Lodge

#### **Reading**

Jerome Gellman, 'Mysticism', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/>)

### **Week 2 Pseudo-Dionysius** – Mark Wynn

#### **Reading**

Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Mystical Theology*  
Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington, 'Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/>)

**Week 3 Ibn 'Arabī** – Fitzroy Morrissey, All Souls College, Oxford.

**Reading**

Ibn 'Arabī, selections from *The Bezels of Wisdom*  
Toshihiko Izutsu, *Sufism & Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts*  
(University of California Press, 1984), Chapter XIV.

**Week 4 Julian of Norwich** – Louise Nelstrop, St Benet's Hall, Oxford.

**Reading**

Julian of Norwich, selections from *Revelations of Divine Love*

**Week 5 John of the Cross** – Mark Wynn

**Reading**

John of the Cross, *The Dark Night of the Soul*, Book Two, Chapters 4-18.  
Edith Stein, selections from *The Science of the Cross*

**Week 6 Leibniz** – Paul Lodge

**Reading**

G. W Leibniz, *On the True Mystical Theology, New Essays on Human Understanding* Book IV  
Ch. xix 'Of enthusiasm'  
Paul Lodge, 'True and False Mysticism in Leibniz', *Leibniz Review* (2015), pp. 55-90.

**Week 7 Sri Ramakrishna** – Swami Medhananda (Ayon Maharaj), The Ramakrishna Mission  
Vivekananda Educational and Research Institute, Kolkata.

**Reading**

Ayon Maharaj, 'Beyond Perennialism and Constructivism: Sri Ramakrishna's Manifestationist  
Model of Mystical Experience', in Ayon Maharaj, *Infinite Paths to Infinite Reality: Sri  
Ramakrishna and Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion* (OUP, 2018), pp. 153–195.

**Week 8 Simone Weil** – Mark Wynn

**Reading**

Simone Weil, 'The Love of God and Affliction' and 'Forms of the Implicit Love of God', in  
Simone Weil, *Waiting on God* (Routledge, 2009), pp. 38-82.  
A. Rebecca Rozelle-Stone and Benjamin P. Davis, 'Simone Weil', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia  
of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simone-weil/>)

## Logic in ancient philosophy

Prof Alexander Bown and Dr Paolo Fait – T. 10 – 12, live on Teams

The seminar will focus on the two main logical systems developed in antiquity: Aristotle's syllogistic and Stoic logic. Besides introducing the participants to some of the formal and technical aspects of these systems, we will discuss some related issues of philosophical concern. In particular, we intend to investigate some of Aristotle's and the Stoics' views on meaning, logical form, logical consequence, modality and determinism.

The plan is as follows:

- 1) Aristotle on truth-bearers: terms, propositions, quantification and truth.
- 2) Aristotle's understanding of logical consequence. The definition of *sylogismos*.
- 3) Aristotle's syllogistic.
- 4) Aristotle on future contingents and determinism in *De interpretatione* 9.
- 5) The Stoics on truth-bearers: *lekta*, propositions, and connectives.
- 6) Stoic syllogistic.
- 7) Philo, Diodorus and the Stoics on modality.
- 8) Stoics, Epicureans and Academics on future contingents and determinism.

We will begin each session by offering a short introduction on the issues to be examined. Then we will discuss some of the philosophical questions raised by the main texts on the topic, to be read in advance of the seminar. Participants will be invited to introduce this second part of the session with a brief presentation.

Intended audience: MSt in Ancient Philosophy, BPhil and DPhil in Philosophy.

Students who feel they are not sufficiently informed to decide whether they may be interested in attending can read:

Bobzien, Susanne, 'Ancient Logic', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [link](#).

## **Wittgenstein on Meaning, Intentionality and Rules**

Prof William Child – T. 2 – 4, live on Teams

The class is intended primarily for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students. 4th year undergraduates reading Computer Science & Philosophy, Maths & Philosophy, or Physics & Philosophy are also welcome to attend. Others may also be admitted if space permits.

**Please e-mail me ([bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk](mailto:bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk)) in advance if you would like to come to these classes.**

**I have created a team on Microsoft Teams, “Philosophy - Wittgenstein on Meaning, Intentionality and Rules”, which I will use to run the classes and to post handouts etc. You will need to be added to the team in order to be able to access the class.**

If you are interested in the classes but are not in one of the categories specified above (i.e. Philosophy BPhil and MSt students, and 4th year students studying CSP, MP, or PP) please feel free to get in touch anyway. I will get back to you before the first class to let you know if I can accommodate you in the class.

The classes will explore a series of central issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, focusing on the topics of meaning, intentionality, and rule-following. There will be one piece of required reading each week: for four of the classes, this will be taken from Wittgenstein’s writings; for the other four, it will be a book or paper from the secondary literature. There will be a small selection of optional supplementary readings. No prior acquaintance with Wittgenstein’s work is assumed and the required readings should be accessible to those reading Wittgenstein for the first time.

### **Reading List**

For each class, there is one piece of required reading, which participants will be expected to have read beforehand. There will also be a small amount of optional further reading that you might want to explore, either week by week or at some point in the future. Details of these optional readings are given in the Canvas page for the course.

The required readings for each week are as follows.

#### **Week 1**

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, Parts I-III (pp. 51-74)

#### **Week 2**

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* pp. 1-44

#### **Week 3**

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§143-242

#### **Week 4**

Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, chs 1-3.  
Also available in the UK edition of I. Block ed., *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

#### **Week 5**

John McDowell 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', *Synthese* March 1984. Reprinted in A. W. Moore ed., *Meaning and Reference*, Oxford: OUP, 1993; in McDowell's *Mind, Value and Reality*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998; and in A. Miller and C. Wright (eds), *Rule-Following and Meaning*, London: Acumen, 2002.

#### **Week 6**

Hannah Ginsborg, 'Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules', *Journal of Philosophy*, 108: 5, 2011, pp. 227-254

#### **Week 7**

Cora Diamond, 'How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Verification', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume*, 73, 1999, pp. 99-134.

#### **Week 8**

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§633-693

### **Subject, Index, Content: Revisiting Russellian Psychology**

Prof Michael Martin – M. 11 – 1, live on Teams

In the lectures, the *Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Russell claims that 'partiality' is central to understanding consciousness, and that this raises a fundamental problem for 'neutral monism' (a view Russell came shortly to embrace). For Russell once we recognize the fundamental role of acquaintance, we can understand demonstratives, like 'this', indexicals like 'I', our grasp of the contrast between present, past, and future, and consciousness and subjectivity themselves.

Although Russell's psychology did not become regain popularity after he abandoned it, the connection he drew between acquaintance, perspective, and consciousness remains a persistent theme in contemporary philosophy of mind.

The aim this term is to look at four such contemporary issues deriving from Russell's concerns. We'll focus on one piece of reading each week, but I add further reading for each of the issues. Participants are invited to present on one of the core pieces of reading.

(If you want to get up to speed with the original Russellian context, look at:

'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910 – 1911

*The Problems of Philosophy*, 1912

Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge the 1918 Manuscript*. London: Routledge

*The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*

And for a statement of his later self-repudiation, *The Analysis of Mind*, 1921.)

## 1. Singular Thought & Mental Files

**Week One:** Gareth Evans, 'Understanding Demonstratives'

**Week Two:** Robin Jeshion, 'Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumentalism, and Cognitivism', in R Jeshion, ed., *New Essays on Singular Thought*, 2010, Clarendon Press

### Further Reading:

Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910 – 1911

Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lecture II', *The Monist*, v 28, n. 4, Oct 1918

John McDowell, 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space', originally in P Petit & J McDowell, ed., *Subject, Thought, & Context*, Clarendon Press, 1986; reprinted in J McDowell, *Meaning, Knowledge & Reality*, Harvard University Press

Harold Noonan, 'Russellian Thoughts & Methodological Solipsism', in Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Logic*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-91 (1986)

Robert Stalnaker, 'On What's in the Head', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1989, reprinted in his *Context & Content*, Clarendon Press, 1999

Timothy Williamson, 'The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations'

Marga Reimer, 'Descriptive Names & Singular Thoughts: Reflections on the Evans/Kaplan Debate', in Goodman, Genone, & Kroll, ed., *Singular Thought & Mental Files*

RM Sainsbury, 'Varieties of Singularity', in Goodman, Genone, & Kroll, ed., *Singular Thought & Mental Files*

Francois Recanati, 'Singular Thoughts: In Defence of Acquaintance', in R Jeshion, ed., *New Essays on Singular Thought*, 2010, Clarendon Press  
James Pryor, 'Mental Graphs', *Review of Philosophy & Psychology* (2016) 7:309–341

2. *Indexicality & Acquaintance*

**Week Three:** Saul Kripke, 'The First Person'

**Week Four:** Ruth Millikan, 'The Myth of the Essential Indexical'

**Further Reading:**

Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910 – 1911

Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge the 1918 Manuscript*. London: Routledge, Ch. I - III

Gottlob Frege, 'Thoughts', in his *Collected Papers*, Wiley-Blackwell

Christopher Peacocke, 'Subjects & Consciousness', in A Coliva, *Self & Self-Knowledge*, Clarendon Press, 2012

GEM Anscombe, 'The First Person', in *Collected Papers*, v. 2

Ian Rumfitt, 'Frege's Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications', *The Philosophical Review*, 1994, 103 (4):599-637

Sydney Shoemaker, 'Introspection & the Self', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1985

3. *The Past & Memory*

**Week Five:** GEM Anscombe, 'The Reality of the Past'

**Week Six:** JJ Campbell, 'The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory', 1997  
*European Journal of Philosophy* 5 (2):105-118

**Further Reading:**

Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Chs. V & IX

Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge the 1918 Manuscript*. London: Routledge, Ch. VI

CB Martin & Max Deutscher, 'Remembering', *The Philosophical Review*, 1965

Barry Dainton, 'Temporal Consciousness', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/>>

Ian Phillips, 'Perceiving Temporal Properties', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2010

LA Paul, 'Temporal Experience', *Journal of Philosophy*, 2010

Geoff Lee, 'Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience', 2014 – *Philosophers' Imprint* 14

Michael Dummett, 'A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', 1960 - *Philosophical Review* 69 (4):497-504

Johannes Mahr & Gergely Csibra, 'Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings', *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 2020, Vol. 15(2) 428–443

Christoph Hoerl & Theresa McCormack, 'Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 42, e244: 1–69.

#### 4. *Subjective & Objective*

**Week Seven:** Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, Ch. 2

**Week Eight:** Naomi Eilan, 'Intelligible Realism about Consciousness: A Response to Nagel's Paradox', *Ratio (new series)* XXVII 1 March 2014

#### **Further Reading:**

Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge the 1918 Manuscript*. London: Routledge, Ch. III

Bernard Williams, *Descartes*, Chs. 3 & 10

AW Moore, *Points of View*, Ch. 3

Christopher Peacocke, 'No Resting Place: A Critical Notice of the View from Nowhere', *The Philosophical Review* Vol. 98, No. 1 (Jan, 1989), pp. 65-82

Gareth Evans, 'Things without the Mind', in van Straaten, ed., *Philosophical Subjects*, Clarendon Press, 1980; reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Clarendon Press, 1985.

Kit Fine, 'Tense & Reality', in his *Modality & Tense* (OUP)

David Pears, *The False Prison*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, vol. 2, Ch. 10

#### **Narrative, History and Epistemology**

Prof Rachel Fraser and Prof Alex Prescott-Couch – Th. 4 – 6, live on Teams

Historians, social scientists, and politicians all use narratives. Some philosophers are keen to vindicate their use, arguing that narratives offer important epistemic and affective resources. Others have pointed to a number of potential concerns with narrative form: it encourages us to feel that we have understood things when we have not, it focuses attention on individual action at the expense of structural factors, and it discourages rigorous analysis of evidence regarding various descriptive and explanatory claims. We will consider such concerns within a broader investigation into potential benefits of narrative form. Does emplotting events as a narrative serve some positive epistemic function? Does it help us achieve some kind of understanding of persons and events that we cannot easily achieve in other ways? Can narratives properly represent historical events? And so on.

**Students should prepare at least one and up to two questions about the reading prior to each class. Those questions should be written on the class discussion documents, available at [this link](#).**

**Week 1:** Philosophies of History (APC and REF)

- Hegel's Lectures on The History of Philosophy, Volume 1. Introduction and Section A.1 - A. 3
- Isiah Berlin, 'Historical Inevitability.' In *Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy.
- [Carl G. Hempel](#), 'The function of general laws in history', *Journal of Philosophy* 39 (2):35-48 (1942)

**Week 2:** Making Sense of Events (REF)

- Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, chapter 10.
- Hayden White, *Meta-history*. Introduction.
- Arthur Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, chapter 11.

Further Reading:

- Arthur Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, chapter 10.

**Week 3:** Narrative Explanation and *Verstehen* (APC)

- David Velleman, Narrative Explanation, *Philosophical Review* [112.1 \(Jan: 2003\)](#).
- K. Stueber, 'Understanding vs. Explanation? How to Think about the Distinction Between the Human and Natural Sciences' *Inquiry* 55 (2012), 17-32.
- Arthur Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, chapter 13.

Further Reading:

- L. Mink, 'The Autonomy of Historical Understanding' (1996)

**Week 4:** Case Study (APC)

- [Sarah Churchwell](#), American Fascism: It Has Happened Here. *New York Review of Books*.
- Samuel Moyn, The trouble with comparisons. *New York Review of Books*.
- Ernst Nolte "Between Historical Legend and Revisionism? The Third Reich in Perspective of 1980" and Jürgen Habermas, "A Kind of Settlement of Damages: The Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing" in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? The Dispute about the Germans Understanding of History*
- Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science.' *Monist* 60. 4: 1977, 453 – 472.

**Week 5:** Critics of Narrative (REF)

- Alex Rosenberg, *How History Gets Things Wrong*. Chaps 1, 2, 3, 9 and 12.
- Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, chaps 6 –10.
- Galen Strawson, 'Against Narrativity' *Ratio* 17.4: 2004.

**Week 6:** Political Importance of Narrative (REF)

- Sally Haslanger, '[Social structure, narrative and explanation](#)' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 45 (1):1-15 (2015)
- Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identities and Political Change*. Chaps 1 and 3.

- Iris Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*. Chapter 3, sections 1, 4 and 5

Further Reading:

- Francesca Polletta and John Lee, "Is Telling Stories Good for Democracy? Rhetoric in Public Deliberation after 9/11," *American Sociology Review*

**Week 7:** Case study: Eviction (APC)

- Matthew Desmond, *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City*. N.b. -- Start with (i) Prologue, (ii) Epilogue, (iii) About this Project, then read the rest of the book (or as much as you can), while thinking about how this kind of work fits into (i) the causal paradigm and (ii) the paradigm of re-enactive empathy that Stueber discusses.
- Mary Morgan, 'Narrative Ordering and Explanation' [\*Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A\*](#), 2017,

**Week 8:** Narrative Communication (APC and REF)

- Rachel Fraser, 'Narrative Testimony'. Forthcoming, *Philosophical Studies*.
- Alexander Prescott-Couch, "Narrative Understanding" (ms)

**Phenomenology: Self and Others**

Prof Joseph Schear and Prof Mark Wrathall – M. 2 – 4, live on Teams

We will begin this course by exploring Heidegger's phenomenological account of the relationship between selves and others. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that our relationship to others plays a fundamental role in the constitution of human selfhood. We'll start by reviewing his phenomenology of the inauthentic self of everyday social existence (*Being and Time*, Division One, chapter IV). We'll then work through his analysis of authentic selfhood – a result of the individualization that occurs in being-towards-death (Division Two, chapters I & III). We'll then conclude our study of Heidegger by criticizing his post-*Being-and-Time* turn to an ethno-nationalist account of the relationship between selves and others. Our critique will compare his account of historical human existence in *Being and Time* (Division Two, chapter V) to his 1930s account of the ethno-nationalist "we" (chapter 2 in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*).

In the second half of the course, we turn to Sartre's account. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre claims that to be a self is to be 'for-itself', and that this essentially involves 'being-for-the-other'. We'll first explore the link between the self and being for-itself by reviewing Sartre's difficult doctrine of the pre-reflective cogito (Introduction, section III; Part Two, chapter 1). Here we'll stress the crucial roles of freedom and negativity, and tackle Sartre's rejection of the categories of reference and knowledge for specifying the reflexive character of self-conscious human subjectivity. We will then turn to Sartre's account of the self-other relation, as it is presented in 'the look' (Part III, chapter 1) and in his descriptions of concrete relations with the other (Part III, chapter 3). Here we'll pay particular attention to Sartre's claim that the relation between self and other is fundamentally practical and fraught with distinctive possibilities of failure. We'll conclude the course by confronting one strand of Sartre's rich

legacy. In a recent exchange in the theory of intersubjectivity, David Velleman in his 'The Genesis of Shame' (PPA, 2005) takes inspiration from Sartre, whereas Lucy O'Brien in her 'Shameful Self-Consciousness' (EJP, 2020) is critical of Sartre. We'll consider the presentation of Sartre's position in this exchange, and ask more generally what Sartre's account has to teach us about the nature of intersubjectivity.

### **Philosophy of Law**

Prof Alex Kaiserman – W. 11 – 1, live on Teams

Like Dr. Tobia's course last year, this will not be a course in 'general jurisprudence'. Instead, our focus will be on specific philosophical questions that emerge from the law as actually practiced; questions like:

- In what sense, if any, do the actions of intervening agents 'break the chain of causation'?
- Should accomplices be found guilty of the crimes they help or encourage others to commit?
- What does it mean to prove someone's guilt 'beyond reasonable doubt'?
- Should judges be replaced with algorithms?
- Would there be anything wrong with punishing someone for a crime *before* they commit it?
- Why do we punish successful criminal attempts more than unsuccessful ones?

A schedule, together with links to required and further reading, will be made available [on Canvas](#) in due course.

### **Philosophy of Physics**

Dr Owen Maroney – T. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), live on Teams

This series of classes covers contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper. Others (especially BPhil students with a Philosophy of Physics interest) are welcome.

This term's four lectures will deal with the conceptual problems involved in our best accounts of thermal physics.

The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is one of the most prominent inter-theoretic reductions to be found in the literature. However, the statistical mechanical approach itself has been understood in two very different frameworks - the Gibbsian framework, emphasising the role of probability distributions, and the neo-Boltzmannian framework, focussed upon dynamical explanations of individual systems. The lectures will cover the differences between the two statistical mechanical frameworks, how they attempt to account for the time asymmetric phenomena described by thermodynamics, and how they treat phenomena that goes beyond thermodynamics, such as thermal fluctuations.

The provisional schedule, alongside recommended preliminary reading, is:

**Week 1** What is statistical mechanics? Boltzmann vs Gibbs

Uffink 'Compendium of the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics' Sections 2, 5.  
in *Handbook of the Philosophy of Physics*. (Elsevier 2007)

Goldstein 'Boltzmann's Approach to Statistical Mechanics'  
in *Chance in Physics: Foundations and Perspectives* (2001)

**Week 2** Irreversibility and the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics

Fermi *Thermodynamics* (Dover, 1956) Chapters 2 and 3

Brown et al. 'Boltzmann's H-theorem, its discontents, and the birth of statistical mechanics'  
*Studies In the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, 2009

**Week 3** Entropy, Retrodiction, and the Past Hypothesis

Albert *Time and Chance*, (Harvard, 2000), Chapters 4, 7

Price *Times Arrow and Archimedes Point* (OUP, 1996) Chapter 2

**Week 4** Thermal Fluctuations, Macroscopic Uncertainty, and Maxwell's Demon

Maroney 'Information Processing and Thermodynamic Entropy'  
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

**Philosophy of Science**

Prof Adam Caulton– Th. 11 – 1, live on Zoom

In this BPhil course, we will discuss a variety of topics from the contemporary literature. The seminars are intended primarily for students doing the BPhil in Philosophy and the MSt in Philosophy of Physics, but all interested and engaged participants are welcome.

Below are the proposed topics for the first few classes, in the anticipated order. Updates will be posted to Canvas as we progress through term.

Those attending the class should be sure to have read in advance the target reading(s) for each session. Some background reading and some further reading will be suggested for future weeks in the first session.

This year the seminar will take place over Zoom. To join, please click the following link: <<https://zoom.us/j/99876818090?pwd=SEpFYndrZGdoQTljNWVlK09nM1o0UT09>>. The meeting ID is 998 7681 8090 and the passcode is 'carnap'.

Topics:

### 1. Reference over theory-change

*Target readings:*

- Stein, H., 'Yes, but... Some skeptical remarks on realism and anti-realism', *Dialectica* **43** (1989), pp. 47–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970610>
- Myrvold, W., "'—It would be possible to do a lengthy dialectical number on this;'", Preprint (2019), available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16675/>

### 2. Varieties of reduction

*Target readings:*

- Lewis, D. K., 'How to define theoretical terms', *Journal of Philosophy* **67** (1970), pp. 427–446. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023861>
- Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R. & Hartmann, S. 'Who's afraid of Nagelian reduction?', *Erkenntnis* **73** (2010), pp. 393–412. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9239-x>

*Background:*

- Schaffner, K. F., 'Approaches to reduction', *Philosophy of science* **34** (1967), pp. 137–147. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/186101>

### 3. Theoretical equivalence

*Target readings:*

- Glymour, C., 'Theoretical realism and theoretical equivalence', *PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association*. Vol. 1970. (D. Reidel Publishing, 1970).
- Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. 'Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence.' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 45.5 (2016): 467-483.

### 4. Data vs. phenomena

*Target readings:*

- Bogen, J. & Woodward, J., 'Saving the phenomena', *The Philosophical Review* **97** (1988), pp. 303–352. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185445>

- Glymour, B. 'Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered', *Erkenntnis* **52** (2000), pp. 29–37. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012966>

## 5. Chance, credence and the Principal Principle

*Target readings:*

- Lewis, D., 'Humean supervenience debugged.' *Mind* **103** (1994), pp. 473–491. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396>
- Hall, N., 'Two mistakes about credence and chance', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **82** (2004), pp. 93–111. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713659806>

*Background:*

- Lewis, D., 'A subjectivist's guide to objective chance.' *Ifs* (Springer, Dordrecht, 1980), pp. 267–297. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers: Volume II*. (OUP, 1987). Online access: <http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/f/89vilt/oxfaleph020157456>

### Philosophy of Logic and Philosophical Logic

Prof Volker Halbach and Prof Joel David Hamkins – F. 9 – 11, live on Teams

At the beginning of each class we will introduce the topic by presenting an article or book chapter, which all participants will be expected to have read in advance, followed by a discussion.

Topics will include self-reference, Gödel incompleteness, logical consequence, semantic paradoxes, and the hierarchy of consistency strength.

The current plan is provisional and we are happy to adapt it according to the preferences of the participants, depending on suitability. Please contact us if you would like to see a specific paper or issue discussed.

For further information, including an up-to-date list of topics and the bibliography, see the web page of the seminar:

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil21.html>

## Plato, Laws X

Prof Ursula Coope and Prof Gregory Hutchinson – W. 9 – 11, live on Teams

The tenth book of Plato's late dialogue *The Laws* provides one of the most searching ancient treatments of the gods. The question of their existence is directly and extensively confronted. Much later debate on the relation between gods and the world finds a first airing here. In the imagined scenarios of the work, clever young unbelievers and others are forcefully but not fiercely persuaded. The argument sweeps through creation, the cosmos, the soul (human and divine), through motion and change, law and nature. The language, dialogue, and inset speeches are full of invention and vitality. This is a fundamental text for ancient ideas on religion, and an exciting read.

This is a joint seminar between Philosophy and Languages and Literature. Each week, we'll discuss two passages. We are very grateful to those who have volunteered to present. Presenters have been asked (i) to read out a translation (not necessarily their own), (ii) to summarize in a few sentences the main points in the passage; (iii) to raise some questions for discussion—these can be philosophical, literary, or textual, or can concern the larger cultural context.

List of passages with (provisional) presenters:

### Week 1

1 884a1-885e6 crimes against the sacred; challenge from the irreligious [Jason Webber]

2 885e7-887c4 defence of gods' existence and goodness prepared [Jenny Rallens]

### Week 2

3 887c5-889a3 be nice to young atheists [Alex Johnston]

4 889a4-890d8 nature, law; cosmos begun by art or chance? gods exist by convention? [Alberto Corrado]

### Week 3

5 890e1-892c8 soul before body in universe? [Michail Peramatzis]

6 892c9-894d5 εἴ λέγεις risky river; kinds of 'motion' (κίνησις) [Gregory Hutchinson]

### Week 4

7 894d5 ἄρ' οὖν -896b3 self-motion and soul [Ursula Coope]

8 896b4-897e7 soul, mind, cosmos; looking at sun [Peter Olive]

### Week 5

9 897e8-899d3 soul and heavenly bodies; souls as gods; gods exist [Ben Cartlidge]

10 899d4-901c7 gods drones? [Holly Hunt]

### Week 6

11 901c8-903a6 gods and small matters [Theodore Hill]

12 903a7-904c5 gods, acting for the sake of the whole, and good and evil in us [Mor Segev]

### Week 7

13 904c6-905d1 ἔχεις changes in soul; justice; gods care [Peter Thoneman]

14 905d1 ὅτι -907d3 can the gods be bought off? [Samuele Coen]

### Week 8

15 907d4-909d2 the law on impiety; moral differences among the irreligious; different punishments [Cristiana Sessini]

16 909d3-910d4 private religion bad [Jonathan Katz]

### **Population Ethics**

Prof Jeff McMahan – M. 2 – 4, live on Teams

This seminar, which will continue over Trinity term as well, will be concerned with foundational issues in population ethics and their relevance to a variety of issues in practical ethics. The issues we will discuss will be more concerned with what reasons there are than with matters of axiology. Questions in population ethics that we will attempt to answer include the following. Is there a reason to cause an individual to exist just because that individual would have a good life, or a life worth living? Is there a reason not to cause an individual to exist if that individual would have a bad life, that is, a life in which the bad elements would outweigh the good? In determining whether it is permissible to cause an individual to exist, how does the good the individual's life would contain weigh against the suffering it would contain? If there are reasons to cause individuals to exist, or not to cause individuals to exist, what is the nature of those reasons? Are they what Parfit calls wide individual-affecting reasons, impersonal reasons, or reasons of some other kind? Is there a reason to cause or allow a better-off individual to exist rather than cause or allow a less well-off individual to exist? If so, what kind of reason is it? Is it a wide individual-affecting reason, an impersonal reason, what Johann Frick calls a standard-regarding reason, or a reason of some other kind? Is it defensible to believe that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that a less well-off individual will exist instead while simultaneously denying that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that no new individual will come into existence? If an individual in one outcome and a different individual in another outcome have the same level of well-being, does it make a moral difference that being at that level of well-being is worse for one of them but not worse for the other because the only alternative for this other individual was never to exist at all? If so, why does this matter, and to what extent?

We will discuss these questions in part by exploring the ways in which they arise in relation to various problems in practical ethics, such as abortion, prenatal injury, legal claims of wrongful life, eugenics, causing animals to exist in order to kill and eat them, climate change, war, existential risk, and so on. None of these problems can, I believe, be adequately understood unless one appreciates the ways in which the questions in population ethics cited above are relevant to them – or, ultimately, without finding defensible answers to these questions.

My own work on all of these issues is still exploratory. I am in the early stages of writing a book on them and am eager to discuss them. I will begin each seminar by sketching some ideas and arguments but I hope much of each seminar will be devoted to critical discussions of the problems and my ideas about them. I want mostly to concentrate on the problems themselves but we will also, of course, discuss some of the literature. I will identify and

provide access to the writing that I think is most important as the term progresses but for those who want to do some reading in advance, I recommend the following pieces, roughly in the order in which they are listed.

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, part 4

Johann Frick, "Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry," *Philosophical Perspectives* (2020)

Jeff McMahan, "Climate Change, War, and the Non-Identity Problem," *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, <https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/aop/article-10.1163-17455243-1706A002/article-10.1163-17455243-1706A002.xml>

Michael Otsuka, "How it makes a difference that one is worse off than one could have been," *Politics, Philosophy, & Economics* (2017)

Jacob Nebel, "Asymmetries in the Value of Existence," *Philosophical Perspectives* 33 (2019)

John Broome, "Should We Value Population?," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13 (2005)

Derek Parfit, "Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 45 (2017)

### **Contemporary Political Philosophy**

Prof David Miller (*DPIR*) – M. 10 – 12

This class required prior sign-up by BPhil students (via an advertisement sent around in December 2020, together with a course description).

### **Feminism and Analytical Philosophy**

Prof Kate Greasley (*Law*), Th. 3 – 5 – for attendance method contact Achas Burin (see below)

This module aims to explore feminist approaches to philosophy and law through three topical problems in ethics, politics, and applied legal theory: abortion rights, free speech protections for pornography, and sexual crime and the nature of consent. For each of these topics, we will look at some key commentary originating from both legal and philosophical quarters, by scholars working in analytic philosophy--including those of a feminist persuasion--and by scholars whose work is rooted more firmly in critical feminist thinking.

The module will be interdisciplinary through and through. The readings for each week will feature commentary from legal and moral philosophy, political and social theory, as well as dash of primary legal material. One of the aims of the module will thus be to consider how cross-disciplinary thinking about topics which straddle law, politics, and philosophy could be fruitfully carried out.

Another overarching aim of the module is to contrast the methodological approaches of mainstream analytical philosophy with critical feminist approaches to ethics and law, to draw out their differences, and, perhaps, their respective virtues and limitations.

Please direct any questions regarding this module to [achas.burin@law.ox.ac.uk](mailto:achas.burin@law.ox.ac.uk)

### **Seminar One – The Morality of Abortion**

#### **Seminar Reading**

The Abortion Act 1967, section 1

Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (1):47-66 (1971)

John Finnis, 'The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), pp. 117-145

For Thomson's reply, see:

- Judith Thomson, 'Rights and Deaths', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), pp. 146-159

Don Marquis, 'Why Abortion Is Immoral', *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 86, No. 4 (Apr., 1989), pp. 183-202

Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion*, (1993) chapters 1-3

Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', *The Monist* Vol. 57, No. 1, (1973), pp. 43-61

Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 37-65

#### **Further Reading**

Kate Greasley and Christopher Kaczor, *Abortion Rights: For and Against* (CUP, 2017)

David Boonin, *A Defense of Abortion*, (CUP, 2003)

R. P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, *Embryo: A Defense of Human Life* (Doubleday, 2008)

Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion*, chapters 4 and 5.

B Manninen, 'Rethinking *Roe v. Wade*: Defending the Abortion Right in the Face of Contemporary Opposition', (2010) 10 *American Journal of Bioethics* 33

## Seminar Two: Abortion Through A Feminist Ethics Lens

### Seminar Reading

*Roe v. Wade* (1973) (Justice Blackmun's opinion)

Catharine MacKinnon, 'Privacy v. Equality: Beyond *Roe v. Wade*', in *Feminism Unmodified* (HUP, 1987)

Susan Sherwin, 'Abortion through a Feminist Ethics Lens', *Dialogue* 30 (3):327- (1991).

M. O. Little, 'Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 1999;2:295-312.

### On "pro-life feminism" and informed consent:

Celia Wolf-Devine, 'Abortion and the "Feminine Voice"', *Public Affairs Quarterly* Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 81-97.

Chapter 12 of Angela Davis, *Women, Race, Class* (1981), 'Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive Rights'.

*Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt* (2016):

[https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-274\\_new\\_e18f.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-274_new_e18f.pdf)

Kate Greasley, 'Abortion and Regret', *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 2012 Dec;38(12):705-11

Reva Siegel, 'The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument', 57 *DUKE L.J.* 1641 (2008).

### Further Reading

Kate Greasley, 'Abortion, Feminism, and 'Traditional' Moral Philosophy', in De Campos, Herring, and Phillips eds. *Philosophical Foundations of Medical Law* (OUP 2020).

## Seminar Three – Pornography and Free Speech #1

### Seminar Reading

*American Booksellers Inc. v. Hudnut*, 771 F. 2d 329 (7th Cir. 1985).

Catharine MacKinnon, 'Not a Moral Issue'  
'Francis Biddle's Sister'

- both in *Feminism Unmodified* (HUP, 1987), 146-198.

Rae Langton, 'Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*  
Vol. 22, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 293-330

Jennifer Hornsby, 'Subordinating, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution', *Jurisprudence*  
(2011) 2(2), 379-385.

Leslie Green, 'Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing', in Robert Post ed. *Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation*, Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 1998.

- R. Langton, 'Pornography's Authority: Response to Leslie Green', in *Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification* (2009, OUP)

Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberty and Pornography', *The New York Review of Books*, August 15, 1991.

- R. Langton, 'Dangerous Confusion? Response to Ronald Dworkin', in *Sexual Solipsism* (2009).

Nancy Bauer, *How to do Things With Pornography* (HUP, 2015), chapter 5, 'How To Do Things With Pornography'.

### Further Reading

Louise Antony, 'Against Langton's Illocutionary Treatment of Pornography', *2 Jurisprudence* 387 (2011).

Catharine MacKinnon, *Only Words* (1993, Harper Collins)

## Seminar Four - Pornography and Free Speech #2

### Seminar Reading

Mary Kate McGowan, 'On Multiple Types of Silencing', in Mikkola eds. *Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytical Feminist Philosophy*, (OUP, 2017) 39-59.

Ishani Maitra, 'Silencing Speech', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 39 (2):pp. 309-338 (2009)

Rae Langton and Caroline West, 'Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77 (3):303 – 319 (1999)

Daniel Jacobson, 'Freedom of Speech Acts?' A Response to Langton', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter, 1995), pp. 64-79

- J. Hornsby and R. Langton, 'Freedom of Illocution? A Response to Jacobson', in *Sexual Solipsism* (2009).

Catharine MacKinnon, *Foreward* to I. Maitra and M. K. McGowan eds. *Speech & Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech* (OUP, 2012).

Alon Harel, 'Is Pornography a Speech or an Act and Does it Matter?', *Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies*, Volume 3, Issue 1, August 2011, 5–14

Lorna Finlayson, 'How to Screw Things With Words', *Hypatia* 29(4), (2014), 774-789.

### Further Reading

Mari Mikkola, *Pornography: A Philosophical Introduction* (OUP, 2019)

Rae Langton, 'Is Pornography Like The Law?', In Mari Mikkola (ed.), *Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-38 (2017)

Ishani Maitra, 'Subordinating Speech', In Mary Kate McGowan Ishani Maitra (ed.), *Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 94-120 (2012)

A. W. Eaton, 'A Sensible Anti-Porn Feminism', *Ethics* 117 (4):674-715 (2007)

## **Seminar Five – The Nature of Sexual Offending**

### **Seminar Reading**

Sexual Offences Act 2003, sections 1, 74, 75, and 76

John Gardner and Stephen Shute, 'The Wrongness of Rape', in John Gardner, *Offences and Defences* (OUP 2007).

Catharine MacKinnon, 'Sex and Violence: A Perspective', in *Feminism Unmodified* (HUP, 1987), 85.

Robin West, 'Consent, Legitimation, and Dysphoria' (2020) 83(1) *Modern Law Review*, 1-34.

Helen Reece, 'Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?', (2013) 33(3) *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 445-473.

Chapter 11 of Angela Davis, *Women, Race, Class* (1981), 'Rape, Racism and the Myth of the Black Rapist'

### **Further Reading**

John Gardner, 'The Opposite of Rape', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 1, Spring 2018, Pages 48–70,

Alan Wertheimer, *Consent to Sexual Relations* (CUP, 2003) chapters 5-7.

Heidi Hurd, 'The Moral Magic of Consent', *Legal Theory* 2 (2):121-146 (1996).

Susan J Brison, 'Can we end the feminist 'sex wars' now?' (2020) 177 *Philos Stud* 303–309  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01392-z>

## Seminar Six – Sexual Consent: Coercion and Fraud

### Seminar Reading

Sexual Offences Act 2003, sections 74, 75, and 76.

### On Coercion:

*R v. Olugboja* [1982] QB 320

Catharine MacKinnon, 'Rape: On Coercion and Consent' in *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (HUP, 1989)

Lois Pineau, 'Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis', *Law and Philosophy* Vol. 8, No. 2 (Aug., 1989), pp. 217-243

Joan McGregor, 'Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean Maybe and Doesn't Mean Yes: A Critical Reconstruction of Consent, Sex, and The Law', *Legal Theory* 2 (3):175-208 (1996)

Alan Wertheimer, *Consent to Sexual Relations* (CUP, 2003) chapter 8

### On Fraud/Mistake

*R v. McNally* [2013] EWCA Crim 1051

*R (Monica) v. DPP* [2018] EWHC 3508 (QB)

Tom Dougherty, 'Sex, Lies, and Consent', *Ethics* 123 (2013): 717-744

Alex Sharpe, 'Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and the Legal Construction of Non-Consent. *Criminal Law Review*, (2014) 207-223

Alan Wertheimer, *Consent to Sexual Relations* (CUP, 2003) chapter 9

Garg, Arushi. "Consent, Conjuality and Crime: Hegemonic Constructions of Rape Laws in India." *Social & Legal Studies* 28.6 (2019): 737-54

### Further Reading

Tom Dougherty, 'Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 46 (2018): 90-112

Kimberly Ferzan and Peter Westen, 'How to Think About Rape (Like a Lawyer)' 11 *Crim. L. & Phil.* 759 (2017).

## Seminar Seven

### On Feminist Philosophy and Feminist Jurisprudence

Nancy Bauer, 'Is Feminist Philosophy a Contradiction in Terms?', chapter 1 in Bauer, *Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism* (2001)

Kristie Dotson, 'How is this paper philosophy?' *Comparative Philosophy* Volume 3, No. 1 (2012): 03-29

Catharine MacKinnon, 'Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence', in *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (HUP, 1989)

Nicola Lacey, 'Closure and Critique in Feminist Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both Camps?', in *Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory* (Hart Publishing, 1998).

Mari Mikkola, 'Analytic Feminism: A Brief Introduction', in Hovarth, J. (ed.) *Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Contemporary Reader* (2018)

#### Further Reading

Alison Wylie, 'Why Standpoint Matters' in *Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology* (edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra Harding, Routledge 2003) 26-48

Nancy Bauer, 'Getting Things Right', chapter 8 in *How To Do Things With Pornography* (2015)