

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

MICHAELMAS TERM 2021

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Much teaching is now taking place in person and live. Some teaching is given online and live. For some courses an existing recording will be made available.
- Links will be made available on Canvas for live online teaching, and to previous recordings.
- **FACE MASKS:** unless you have an exemption, you will be expected to wear a face mask at in-person Philosophy lectures, and classes of 15 or more.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Times given here are UK times. Students attending remotely in other timezones should adjust their times accordingly.

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno*

Prof Lindsay Judson – M. W. 12, Microsoft Teams

Intended audience: primarily intended for Classics Mods students who are doing the Plato special subject.

Brief description:

This is a course of 16 lectures, primarily for Classics Mods students offering these dialogues as their philosophy option. The lectures pay particular attention to introducing philosophical concepts, analysing arguments, and explaining how to read Platonic dialogues. They will begin with an introduction to philosophy in general, as well as an introduction to Socrates and Plato: in particular, I shall say something about why Plato wrote dialogues and how we should approach them. I shall then look at the *Euthyphro* in some detail, exploring the two dialogues it contains – the one between Socrates and Euthyphro and the one between Plato and his readers. In the second half of the course I shall look at the *Meno*: topics discussed will include definition and the ‘Socratic fallacy’; the view that everyone always desires what is good; the paradox of enquiry and Plato’s response to it; hypotheses; knowledge and true belief; the point of the second half of the dialogue .

Handouts and bibliography will be available in the Philosophy section of Canvas.

Early Greek Philosophy

Prof Marion Durand – W. 12, Schools (room 8)

These lectures are primarily aimed at students planning to offer the ‘Early Greek Philosophy’ paper for Lit Hum Mods. Lectures will provide an introduction to Presocratic Philosophy, covering (over the 8 lectures) early Ionian philosophers (Thales, Anaxiamander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes), Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno and the atomists.

Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura* IV

Prof Alexander Bown – M. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of lectures is primarily aimed at Classics students offering the 'Lucretius: Book IV' paper at Mods, although anyone interested in the subject is welcome to attend. The first two lectures will be devoted to a general introduction to Epicurean philosophy; the rest of the term will then be spent on discussions of the main topics that emerge from Book IV, proceeding roughly in Lucretius' order. A provisional plan is as follows:

1. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 1: background and sources; the branches of philosophy; Epicurean physics.
2. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 2: canonic and ethics.
3. Introduction to Lucretius; overview of Book IV; the mechanics of perception.
4. 'All perceptions are true' – what does this mean, and is it defensible?
5. Refutation and self-refutation; the Epicurean defence against scepticism.
6. Teleology, theology and cosmology.
7. Psychology: thinking, dreaming and moving.
8. Epicurean hedonism and Lucretius on love.

Bibliography

The *De Rerum Natura*:

- Rouse, W. H. D. and Smith, M. F., *Lucretius: On the Nature of Things*. Loeb Classical Library. 1992.
- Godwin, J., *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura IV*. Aris & Phillips, 1986.

Collections and translations of Epicurean texts:

- Long, A. A. and Sedley, D., *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge, 1987.
- Inwood, B. and Gerson, L. P., *The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia*. Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1994.

Introductory reading:

- Sedley, D., 'Lucretius'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by E. N. Zalta. Stanford, 2013 (<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/lucretius/>).
- O'Keefe, T., *Epicureanism*. Durham, 2010.

General Philosophy

Prof Rachel Fraser – W. 12, Schools (North School)

These lectures will cover the following topics: knowledge, scepticism, induction, perception, free will, mind and body, personal identity, and God and evil.

Introduction to Logic

Prof James Studd – recordings on Canvas

The lectures follow Volker Halbach's *Logic Manual* (Oxford University Press 2010). Further materials, including the Exercises Booklet, sample papers, and worked examples, are available at: <http://logicmanual.philosophy.ox.ac.uk>.

One chapter of the Logic Manual is covered in each lecture. It is recommended that you read each week's chapter before the lecture.

Moral Philosophy: Mill, Utilitarianism

Dr Jeremy Fix – F. 12, Schools (South School)

These lectures offer an introduction to ethical theory organized around objections to utilitarianism, especially as presented by John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism, and what they reveal about the theoretical and practical aims of ethical theory. We will start with an account of the explanatory structure of consequentialist ethical theory in general and the utilitarian version of consequentialism in particular. We will then discuss challenges which target one or another part of that explanatory structure. Questions will include:

- (1) Is happiness in fact the final end of our actions?
- (2) Is the greatest happiness possible in fact the end of anyone's action?
- (3) Does utilitarianism license violating the rights of individuals?
- (4) Can a utilitarian specifically or a consequentialist generally be a true friend?
- (5) Does rule-consequentialism avoid the problems with utilitarianism?; and
- (6) Do alternatives to consequentialism miss something that consequentialism captures?

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes

Prof Paul Lodge – T. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

- Week 1: Introduction to the philosophy of Descartes
- Week 2: The method of doubt
- Week 3: 'The *cogito*'
- Week 4: Cosmological arguments for God's existence
- Week 5: Knowledge and error
- Week 6: The ontological argument for God's existence
- Week 7: Mind-body dualism
- Week 8: The existence and nature of the material world

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume

Prof Peter Millican – Th. 10, Schools (South School)

These lectures are mainly designed for students taking the Early Modern Philosophy paper in Finals, though others (e.g. graduate students) are welcome to attend. The series will aim to complement the 2018-19 lectures available online (e.g. at <http://www.millican.org/hume.htm>), while also being complete in itself. Those earlier lectures mainly proceeded through Book 1 of the *Treatise* in textual sequence, whereas these will be more thematic, and will focus particularly on key questions of Hume's philosophy, both interpretation and assessment. To facilitate this focus, most of the lectures will devote some time to discussion of Early Modern examination questions from previous years, showing how a clear understanding of Hume's overall purposes and major arguments can enable students to shape essays on these themes, and also to approach the examination with confidence.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Leibniz

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – T. 5, Microsoft Teams

The lectures will cover the main aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology as they are deployed in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

102 Knowledge and Reality: Epistemology

Prof Bernhard Salow – W. 10, Schools (South School)

These lectures will focus on the nature of knowledge and justification. Recurring themes include skepticism, a focus on structural features, and the connection between knowledge and probability.

- Week 1: The Analysis of Knowledge
- Week 2: Closure
- Week 3: Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity
- Week 4: Statistical Evidence and Moral Encroachment
- Week 5: Scepticism I: Externalist and Contextualist Responses
- Week 6: Internalism and Luminosity
- Week 7: Scepticism II: Dogmatist Responses
- Week 8: Self-Doubt and Open-Mindedness

103 Ethics II: Metaethics

Prof Alison Hills – M. 10, Schools (North School)

Metaethics is the study of our moral practice. We make moral judgements of ourselves and others and respond with praise and blame to what they do. How should we understand this practice, and can we defend it given our scientific understanding of the world? The lecture plan is as follows:

Introduction to Metaethics

1. Arguments for error theory: metaphysics
2. Arguments for error theory: epistemology
3. Moral relativism
4. Expressivism
5. Quasi-realism and fictionalism
6. Naturalist moral realism
7. Non-natural moral realism

104 Philosophy of Mind I

Prof Will Davies – F. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will cover core issues in the Philosophy of Mind, with a particular focus on the mind-body problem, the nature of mental content, and perception. Topics will include some of the following:

- Behaviourism
- Type-identity theory
- Functionalism
- Physicalism
- Internalism and externalism about mental content
- Naturalising mental content
- Perception

Introductory Texts:

Braddon Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. (2006) *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction* (2nd Edition), Blackwell Publishers.

Churchland, P. M. (1988) *Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, MIT Press.

Crane, T. (2001) *Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford University Press.

Heil, J. (2000) *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction*, Routledge Press.

Kim, J. (2011) *The Philosophy of Mind*, (3rd Edition), Westview Publishers.

Survey Article:

Burge, T. (2005) 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000', in *Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Vol. 2*, pp440-464, Oxford University Press.

Collections:

Block, N., Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. (1997) *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, (Eds.), MIT Press.

Chalmers, D. (2002) *Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings*, (Ed.) Oxford University Press.

Heil, J. (2004) *Philosophy of Mind: a Guide and Anthology*, (Ed.), Oxford University Press.

McLaughlin, B., Beckermann, A. & Walter, S. (2009) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, (Eds.), Oxford University Press.

Prinz, J. & Lycan, W. (2008) *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology*, (Eds.) Blackwell Publishers.

Rosenthal, D. (1991) *The Nature of Mind*, Oxford University Press.

Stich, S. & Warfield, T. (2003) *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*, (Eds.) Blackwell Publishers.

107 Philosophy of Religion

Prof Mark Wynn – F. 10, Schools (North School *except weeks 5 to 7*: South School)

These lectures examine some central themes in the philosophy of religion, including:

- [1] the design, cosmological, and ontological arguments for the existence of God;
- [2] the relationship of theism to ethics, including the problem of evil and the Euthyphro dilemma;
- [3] assorted additional topics in the epistemology of religion, such as miracles, religious experience, and faith;
- [4] the divine attributes: for example, God's goodness and personhood; and
- [5] the philosophical questions posed by religious diversity.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Heidegger

Prof Stephen Mulhall – T. 2, New College (Lecture Room 6)

These lectures will aim to give an introduction to Heidegger's major early work, *Being and Time*; no previous knowledge of his writings will be assumed. Although the primary audience is assumed to be those working on Heidegger for the Post-Kantian Philosophy paper, anyone interested in the material is welcome to attend. We shall work through the text in the order in which it is written, and in some detail; so it might be advisable to bring a copy along. There will be plenty of time for questions.

115 / 130 Plato: Republic

Prof Simon Shogry – T.10, Schools (North School)

Plato's *Republic* is not just one of the most celebrated and influential works in the history of philosophy; it is also one of the most gripping. These 8 lectures will introduce you to the main questions raised in the first half of the dialogue (books 1-5) and emphasise their continued philosophical relevance. (Topics from books 6-10 will be covered in Hilary Term.)

More specifically, we will discuss: Socrates's refutation of traditional accounts of justice; the 'immoralism' of Thrasymachus and the alleged inconsistency in his position; Glaucon's division of goods, and the challenge he and Adeimantus put to Socrates to defend the life of justice; the city-soul analogy and the construction of the ideal city; early childhood education in music and gymnastics; the critique of poetry; civic and individual virtue; the tripartition of the soul; the role of women in the ideal city, and Plato's alleged proto-feminism; the distinction between knowledge and opinion, and the basis for rule-by-philosophers.

These lectures are intended primarily for undergraduates studying the *Republic* in translation or in Greek (papers 115/130), but any student with an interest in learning more about this fundamental text is welcome to attend. No knowledge of ancient Greek required.

116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*

Prof Ursula Coope – W. 10, Zoom

The lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It is suggested that attendees have with them a copy of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This term's lectures will focus on topics from *Nicomachean Ethics* Books 1-5. Topics from the remaining five books will be covered in lectures in Hilary Term.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics

Dr Owen Maroney – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This will be a sixteen lecture course looking in detail at the central conceptual problems of quantum theory. While the application of the mathematical structure of quantum theory has been unambiguously successful, having predictive and explanatory success across vast range of phenomena, there is little consensus on its physical interpretation.

The course will have a particular focus upon clearly distinguishing the operational content of the theory from the properties of physical models that have been proposed to account for quantum phenomena.

Topic to be covered include, but may not be limited to:

- The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including quantum uncertainty, mixed states and decoherence;
- The phenomena of quantum interference and entanglement and why these raise problems for simple attempts to physically interpret the formalism;
- The measurement problem, and the principle interpretative responses to it;
- A more detailed examination of the advantages and weaknesses of the dynamical collapse and the hidden variable programs, with use of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and de Broglie-Bohm theories as exemplars;
- The problem of quantum non-locality, including the Einstein Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Bell's theorem.

The lectures are primarily aimed at 3rd year undergraduates studying Physics & Philosophy, and at graduate students studying the MSt in Philosophy of Physics. Others are welcome, but some familiarity with quantum mechanics and its mathematical framework will be assumed.
Background Reading:

- Feynman, *Lectures on Physics* (Addison Wesley) Volume III, Chapters 1 to 3.
- Rae, *Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality* (2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2004)

Helpful books:

- Albert, *Quantum Mechanics and Experience* (Harvard, 1992)
- Home, *Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Physics* (Plenum, 1997)
- Bell, *Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics* (2nd Edition, CUP, 2004) (Also known as 'On The Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics')
- Maudlin, *Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity* (Blackwell, 1994)

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Prof Adam Caulton and Dr Carina Prunkl – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

Please see the entry for the graduate class on [Philosophy of Physics](#), below.

122 Philosophy of Mathematics

Prof Joel David Hamkins – W. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series of self-contained lectures on the philosophy of mathematics is intended for students preparing for philosophy exam paper 122. All interested parties, however, are welcome to attend, whether or not they intend to sit the exam. The lectures will be organized loosely around mathematical themes, in such a way that brings various philosophical issues naturally to light. Lectures will follow the instructor's book *Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics* (MIT Press 2021), with supplemental suggested readings each week.

Previously recorded lectures from last year are available on the lecturer's YouTube channel at

https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLg5tKDNI_a86OO6J9HulngyROBsUqcf_z.

Since those lectures are available online, the plan for the lectures this year will be to feel somewhat more free occasionally to focus on somewhat more narrow topics, and also to entertain a somewhat more discussion format. Therefore kindly bring questions and well-thought-out opinions to the lecture.

The lectures will be held in person. The lecturer requests that students be vaccinated, wear masks, and observe social distancing as practicable. If this becomes impossible, we shall unfortunately revert to online lectures on short notice.

Lecture 1. Numbers

Numbers are perhaps the essential mathematical idea, but what are numbers? There are

many kinds of numbers---natural numbers, integers, rational numbers, real numbers, complex numbers, hyperreal numbers, surreal numbers, ordinal numbers, and more---and these number systems provide a fruitful background for classical arguments on incommensurability and transcendentalism, while setting the stage for discussions of platonism, logicism, the nature of abstraction, the significance of categoricity, and structuralism.

Lecture 2. Rigour

Let us consider the problem of mathematical rigor in the development of the calculus. Informal continuity concepts and the use of infinitesimals ultimately gave way to the epsilon-delta limit concept, which secured a more rigorous foundation while also enlarging our conceptual vocabulary, enabling us to express more refined notions, such as uniform continuity, equicontinuity, and uniform convergence. Nonstandard analysis resurrected the infinitesimals on a more secure foundation, providing a parallel development of the subject. Meanwhile, increasing abstraction emerged in the function concept, which we shall illustrate with the Devil's staircase, space-filling curves, and the Conway base 13 function. Finally, does the indispensability of mathematics for science ground mathematical truth? Fictionalism puts this in question.

Lecture 3. Infinity

We shall follow the allegory of Hilbert's hotel and the paradox of Galileo to the equinumerosity relation and the notion of countability. Cantor's diagonal arguments, meanwhile, reveal uncountability and a vast hierarchy of different orders of infinity; some arguments give rise to the distinction between constructive and nonconstructive proof. Zeno's paradox highlights classical ideas on potential versus actual infinity. Furthermore, we shall count into the transfinite ordinals.

Lecture 4. Geometry

Classical Euclidean geometry is the archetype of a mathematical deductive process. Yet the impossibility of certain constructions by straightedge and compass, such as doubling the cube, trisecting the angle, or squaring the circle, hints at geometric realms beyond Euclid. The rise of non-Euclidean geometry, especially in light of scientific theories and observations suggesting that physical reality is not Euclidean, challenges previous accounts of what geometry is about. New formalizations, such as those of David Hilbert and Alfred Tarski, replace the old axiomatizations, augmenting and correcting Euclid with axioms on completeness and betweenness. Ultimately, Tarski's decision procedure points to a tantalizing possibility of automation in geometrical reasoning.

Lecture 5. Proof

What is proof? What is the relation between proof and truth? Is every mathematical truth true for a reason? After clarifying the distinction between syntax and semantics and

discussing various views on the nature of proof, including proof-as-dialogue, we shall consider the nature of formal proof. We shall highlight the importance of soundness, completeness, and verifiability in any formal proof system, outlining the central ideas used in proving the completeness theorem. The compactness property distills the finiteness of proofs into an independent, purely semantic consequence. Computer-verified proof promises increasing significance; its role is well illustrated by the history of the four-color theorem. Nonclassical logics, such as intuitionistic logic, arise naturally from formal systems by weakening the logical rules.

Lecture 6. Computability

What is computability? Kurt Gödel defined a robust class of computable functions, the primitive recursive functions, and yet he gave reasons to despair of a fully satisfactory answer. Nevertheless, Alan Turing's machine concept of computability, growing out of a careful philosophical analysis of the nature of human computability, proved robust and laid a foundation for the contemporary computer era; the widely accepted Church-Turing thesis asserts that Turing had the right notion. The distinction between computable decidability and computable enumerability, highlighted by the undecidability of the halting problem, shows that not all mathematical problems can be solved by machine, and a vast hierarchy looms in the Turing degrees, an infinitary information theory. Complexity theory refocuses the subject on the realm of feasible computation, with the still-unsolved P versus NP problem standing in the background of nearly every serious issue in theoretical computer science.

Lecture 7. Incompleteness

David Hilbert sought to secure the consistency of higher mathematics by finitary reasoning about the formalism underlying it, but his program was dashed by Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which show that no consistent formal system can prove even its own consistency, let alone the consistency of a higher system. We shall describe several proofs of the first incompleteness theorem, via the halting problem, self-reference, and definability, showing senses in which we cannot complete mathematics. After this, we shall discuss the second incompleteness theorem, the Rosser variation, and Tarski's theorem on the nondefinability of truth. Ultimately, one is led to the inherent hierarchy of consistency strength rising above every foundational mathematical theory.

Lecture 8. Set Theory

We shall discuss the emergence of set theory as a foundation of mathematics. Cantor founded the subject with key set-theoretic insights, but Frege's formal theory was naive, refuted by the Russell paradox. Zermelo's set theory, in contrast, grew ultimately into the successful contemporary theory, founded upon a cumulative conception of the set-theoretic universe. Set theory was simultaneously a new mathematical subject, with its own motivating questions and tools, but it also was a new foundational theory with a capacity to represent

essentially arbitrary abstract mathematical structure. Sophisticated technical developments, including in particular, the forcing method and discoveries in the large cardinal hierarchy, led to a necessary engagement with deep philosophical concerns, such as the criteria by which one adopts new mathematical axioms and set-theoretic pluralism.

124 / 106a Philosophy of Science

Dr Tushar Menon – M. T. 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a twelve-lecture course. Topics to be discussed will include some of the following:

- the philosophy of logical positivism, including verificationism about meaning and the distinction between theoretical and observational vocabulary;
- the prospects for a formal account of inductive confirmation, along the lines of deductive logic;
- the feasibility of a scientific methodology free from all but deductive inference;
- the problems raised by the underdetermination of theory by data and the holistic nature of empirical confirmation;
- the problem of radical theory change (“scientific revolutions”) and its possible implications for scientific progress;
- the use of probability in science and scientific inference, especially Bayesianism;
- inference to the best explanation, also known as abductive inference
- the different species of scientific realism and anti-realism and the best arguments for and against them;
- laws of nature, what they are and how (if at all) we come to know them;
- explanation, what it is and its role in science.

The lectures are particularly intended for students reading philosophy with a scientific subject, but all are welcome. Experience of Prelims-level Logic (ie Halbach) will be assumed.

Background reading: Reichenbach H., *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (1951), University of California Press.

Helpful books and articles:

- Alan Chalmers, *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, Fourth Edition (Open University Press)
- Earman, J. and Salmon, W. C., 'The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses', in M. H. Salmon et al., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 42–103.
- Ladyman, J., *Understanding Philosophy of Science* (Routledge, 2002).
- Papineau, D., 'Methodology: the Elements of the Philosophy of Science', in A. C. Grayling (ed.), *Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject* (Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (University of Chicago Press)
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131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*

Prof Michael Peramatzis – Th. 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.

The first six lectures in MT21 will focus on the *Theaetetus*, Plato's dialogue about the nature of knowledge, and will discuss the claim that knowledge is perception; being and becoming; the self-refutation of relativism; the refutation of the proposed definition of knowledge as sense perception; knowledge as true belief; false belief; Socrates' dream; knowledge as true belief plus an 'account' (*logos*).

The next six lectures (to be given in HT22) will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the method of definition by division; the view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'; the discussion of the number and nature of what there is; the view of the so-called 'Late-Learners'; the communion of kinds; the analysis of negative predication; the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference; negative properties; and the analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance.

These twelve lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

Platonis Opera I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

Theaetetus, tr. Levett, revised by Burnyeat (Hackett, 1990).

Sophist, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: both of these translations are re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Hand-outs and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind

Prof Ursula Coope – M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course of lectures is designed primarily for undergraduate students taking the paper, Aristotle on Nature Life and Mind, and for MSt students taking this as one of their options. Other graduate or undergraduate students who are interested in the topics are very welcome to attend. There will be 12 lectures. In the first 8, we shall look at Aristotle's account of living things and of the changing world they inhabit. Topics to be discussed include: causation, teleology, change, agency, place, time and infinity. These 8 lectures will focus mainly on Aristotle's *Physics*, books 2-4, though we shall look at other passages of Aristotle where appropriate. In the last 4 lectures, we shall turn more particularly to certain questions about sentient, and indeed human, nature, by asking about the nature of perception and thought and about the relation between the mind and the body. These 4 lectures will focus mainly on passages from Aristotle's *De Anima*.

134/136/139 Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy

Prof Luca Castagnoli – W. 10 – 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Oriel College (odd weeks, Harris Lecture Theatre; even weeks, Harris Seminar Room)

'Human beings have a natural desire for knowledge', said Aristotle. However, both before and after him the philosophical quest for knowledge led some to the view that it was a hopeless or misguided aspiration. In the Hellenistic age the debate on the possibility of knowledge took centre stage as Plato's school, the Academy, 'turned sceptical' with Arcesilaus and Carneades and argued against the epistemological optimism of the two major rival Hellenistic schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To complicate things, not long before Zeno of Citium and Epicurus founded their schools, Pyrrho embraced and embodied the anti-dogmatic ideal of a human life stripped of knowledge and belief and thereby free from anxiety as a recipe for human happiness. That ideal was revived and developed more than two centuries later by Aenesidemus, the founder of the Pyrrhonian school, a brand of Scepticism different from the

Academic one and in competition with it (the late writings of Sextus Empiricus are our best source).

The lectures will introduce some of the central Hellenistic epistemological views and debates as they developed between (and within) these philosophical schools. They aim to offer an understanding of

- some of the main sources for philosophical scepticism from the fourth century BC to the 3rd century AD, and for the 'empiricist' epistemologies of Stoicism and Epicureanism;
- the variety of different positions encompassed by the term 'Sceptic';
- the Sceptics' attacks on 'dogmatic' epistemology and the various strategies adopted by the 'dogmatists' to defend the possibility of knowledge;
- the 'dogmatic' counter-attacks against the Sceptical positions, and the Sceptics' attempts to defend themselves;
- how the issue of epistemology impacted on the field of ethics: do we need knowledge to live a good and happy life? Is it possible and desirable to *live* one's Scepticism in a consistent way?

This course is primarily intended for those undergraduate students who plan to sit papers 134, 136 or 139 (Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy), but anyone (including graduate students) with an interest in ancient Greek philosophy, philosophical scepticism and the history of epistemology is welcome to attend (knowledge of ancient Greek or Latin is not required).

The main topics to be introduced in the lectures are provisionally scheduled as follows:

Week 1 - Wed 13 October, 10-12 Harris Lecture Theatre (Oriel College)

- An introduction to Hellenistic philosophy and epistemology.
- Epicurean epistemology.
- Introduction to Stoic epistemology.

Week 2 - Wed 20 October, 10-12 Harris Seminar Room (Oriel College)

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy I: Academics vs. Stoics

Week 3 - Wed 27 October, 10-12 Harris Lecture Theatre (Oriel College)

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy II.

Week 4 - Wed 3 November, 10-12 Harris Seminar Room (Oriel College)

- Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism: beliefs, appearances, and the aim of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
- The modes of the suspension of judgement: Aenesidemus and Agrippa

Week 5 - Wed 10 November, 10-12 Harris Lecture Theatre (Oriel College)

- The Pyrrhonian attack on logic: criteria of truth, signs and proofs.
- The self-refutation charge and the possibility of Pyrrhonian inquiry.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on physics: causes, motion and time.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on ethics and the possibility of a Pyrrhonian life.

Week 6 - Wed 17 November, 10-12 Harris Seminar Room (Oriel College)

- Early Pyrrhonism: Pyrrho and Aenesidemus
- Conclusions

Main Texts

- A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge: CUP, 1987. Vol. I: esp. sections 1-3 (Pyrrho); 15-19 (Epicureans); 39-42 (Stoics); 68-70 (Academics); 71-72 (Aenesidemus).
- Cicero, *Academic Books*, transl. by C. Brittain, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
- Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, trans. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

Introductory readings

- K. Vogt, 'Ancient Skepticism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism-ancient/>.
- D. Sedley, 'The Protagonists', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (eds.), *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1-19.

198 Special Subject: Feminist Theory

Prof Amia Srinivasan – recordings on Canvas

These lectures are aimed at students sitting the special subject in Feminist Theory, though others are also welcome. Topics to be covered include: gender and sex; intersectionality; feminist epistemology; sex and sexuality; pornography; feminism, work and capitalism; reproduction; sex work.

198 Special Subject: The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technology

Prof Milo Phillips-Brown, Prof John Tasioulas, Prof Carissa Veliz – T. 10 – 12, Oxford Martin School (Lecture Theatre) *except week 2: Schools (room 1) and week 6: Schools (room 11)*

*Attendance at these lectures is **strictly limited** to those registered with the Faculty as taking the option for Finals 2022. The weekly readings have been sent to those registered.*

198 Special Subject: Indian Philosophy

Prof Jessica Frazier – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

Attendance at these lectures is intended for those registered with the Faculty as taking the option for Finals 2022.

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

Reproductive Ethics

Ms Tess Johnson – W. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

- Lecture 1: Reproductive Rights and Abortion

This lecture introduces students to the start of debates on reproduction in practical ethics, starting with the abortion debate. It presents core arguments for and against abortion, and differentiates between the various conceptions of reproductive rights as positive (requiring state support and thus access to abortion services) or negative (requiring merely non-interference).

- Lecture 2: Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies

This lecture extends the debate from the decision *not* to have a child, to decisions *to have a child*. I present the debates surrounding initial uses of *in vitro* fertilisation (IVF), and intersections with Luck Egalitarianism as determining the distribution of natural resources and abilities, and compare this to Disability views on access to fertility treatments.

- Lecture 3: Reproduction or Co-Creation? Genetic Selection

This lecture moves discussion from decisions *to have a child*, to decisions concerning *what type of child to have*, via the addition of genetic selection to IVF procedures. I introduce Robertson's influential views on parents' rights to choose their child, and divide discussions of genetic selection into those concerned with parents' rights, and those concerned with the welfare of the future child, or the welfare of third parties. I examine case studies of "saviour siblings", who are selected to be able to donate blood and organs to sick siblings.

- Lecture 4: The Future of Reproduction? Germline Genome Editing

This final lecture investigates whether germline genome editing—genetically modifying rather than selecting between embryos—may also constitute an aspect of parents' reproductive rights. It introduces the debate on germline genome editing for treatment vs. enhancement purposes, and discusses Dr He Jiankui's recent attempted genome editing for immunity to HIV.

Structuralism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Mr Nuno Mendes da Silva Maia – W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Lecture 1. Structuralism: Two Main Varieties

A popular slogan has it that ‘Mathematics is the science of structures’. In the first lecture we discuss how to develop this idea. Taking as our starting point Benacerraf’s seminal challenge to set-theoretic reductionism about the natural numbers, we will introduce two varieties of mathematical structuralism: Shapiro’s ante-rem structuralism and Hellman’s modal structuralism. We will pay close attention to their differences in matters of metaphysics, epistemology and semantics, and discuss in what way they constitute an answer to Benacerraf’s original challenge.

Main Reading: Shapiro, S. (1997). *Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology* (OUP): Chapter 3.

Additional Reading:

Benacerraf, P. (1965). ‘What numbers could not be’, *Philosophical Review*, 74(1): 47–73.

Hellman, G. (1989). *Mathematics without numbers* (OUP): Chapter 1.

Lecture 2: Structuralism and Epistemology

If mathematics is to be the science of structures then a plausible account of how we manage to have reliable knowledge of such structures is due. We will discuss a complex argument developed by Bob Hale to the effect that such a challenge cannot be met by either sort of structuralism. In this lecture we address, among other things, the epistemology of modality, the possibility of performing super-tasks and the existence of ω -sequences (i.e. collections of objects with the same order as the natural numbers).

Main Reading: Hale, B. (1996). ‘Structuralism’s unpaid epistemological debts’, *Philosophia Mathematica*, 4(2): 124–47.

Additional Reading:

Benacerraf, P. (1973). ‘Mathematical truth’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 70(19): 661–679.

Yablo, S. (1993). ‘Is conceivability a guide to possibility?’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 53(1): 1–42.

Lecture 3: Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Identity

In this lecture we study the important ‘identity problem’ which argues that the ante-rem structuralist completely misreads identity facts, being committed to such claims as $1 = -1$. We will pay attention to how the argument depends on particular formulations of Leibniz Law and on the problematic notion of ‘structural property’. We then discuss two possible solutions: either reject the identity criteria employed in the argument, or take identity facts

holding in mathematical structures as a primitive.

Main Reading: Keenan, J. (2001). 'The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism', *Philosophia Mathematica*, 9(3): 308–330.

Additional Reading:

Ladyman, J. (2005). 'Mathematical structuralism and the identity of indiscernibles', *Analysis* 65(3): 218–221.

Shapiro, S. (2008). 'Identity, indiscernibility, and Ante Rem structuralism: The tale of *i* and *-i*', *Philosophia Mathematica*, 16(3): 285–309.

Lecture 4: Structuralism and Semantics

We turn to ongoing discussions on the reference of arithmetical terms. One of the main motivations for adopting ante-rem structuralism is that it treats terms like '0' and '1' as singular names with a unique referent. This contrasts sharply with its modal counterpart which paraphrases arithmetic sentences as generalizations over ω -sequences. In light of simple results from model theory, we discuss if the ante-rem account can be defended or if, in the end, it is just a version of the modal structuralist's semantic account.

Main Reading: Assadian, B. (2018) 'The semantic plights of the ante-rem structuralist', *Philosophical Studies*, 175(12): 3195–3215.

Additional Reading: Walsh, S. & Button, T. (2018) *Philosophy and Model Theory* (OUP): Chapters 1 & 2.

Prerequisites

The course is designed to be self-contained, though familiarity with first-order logic is an advantage. Those interested in attending can get a general sense of the issues to be discussed by consulting: Reck, E. & Price, M. (2000). 'Structures and structuralism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics', *Synthese*, 125(3): 341–383.

Kant's Theory of Freedom

Mr Jack Wearing – F. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Immanuel Kant characterised the concept of freedom as “the keystone of the whole structure of the system of pure reason.” This lecture series will show how freedom is a central and enduring concern for Kant in both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It will also provide an accessible entry point into the work of one of the most important figures in modern philosophy for students with an interest in the free will debate or in Kantian ethics.

Lecture 1 – Freedom and Determinism I: Kant's Incompatibilism

The first two lectures will explain how Kant attempts to show, in Allen Wood's terms, the “compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism.” I will introduce Kant's incompatibilist stance on the free will debate by explaining his critique of standard forms of compatibilism (such as that of Hume), and his concern that compatibilism makes the imputation of moral praise and blame impossible. Drawing on material from the Second Analogy, I will show that Kant is nonetheless committed to determinism in the ‘phenomenal’ realm, thus introducing the need for Kant to somehow reconcile that commitment with his strongly incompatibilistic understanding of freedom (and thus to reconcile deterministic nature and morality). I will introduce the thesis and antithesis arguments of the Third Antinomy that dramatise this conflict, and discuss some problems with Kant's framing of that antinomy.

Lecture 2 – Freedom and Determinism II: Kant's 'Compatibilism'

I will present Kant's ‘compatibilist’ solution to the Third Antinomy, and show that that solution is dependent on his transcendental idealism, and the possibility of conceiving of ourselves from two radically different points of view. I will explain how Kant arrives at an agnostic position regarding our freedom, according to which we cannot *know* that we are (transcendentally) free, but the determinist can never prove that we are not; I will thus show why Kant thought of himself as having to “deny knowledge to make room for faith.” I will also discuss objections to Kant's solution, including the question of whether he attributes to us a ‘timeless’ form of agency, and what the relationship is between our empirical and intelligible character.

Lecture 3 – Freedom and Morality I: The Practical Point of View and the 'Reciprocity Thesis'

Having shown in the first two lectures how Kant takes himself to have established the *possibility* of transcendental freedom in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (its compatibility with phenomenal determinism), but not its *reality*, I turn next to his later arguments that we have a positive warrant for regarding ourselves as free, albeit only ‘from a practical point of view.’ I will explain Henry Allison's ‘Reciprocity Thesis’ – the claim that for Kant, freedom and morality are reciprocal concepts – and use this notion to frame and evaluate two of Kant's major arguments: his attempt to ‘deduce’ the moral law from freedom in *Groundwork III* and, in the opposite direction, to establish our freedom on the basis of the ‘fact of reason’ – our consciousness of the moral law – in the second *Critique*.

Lecture 4 – Freedom and Morality II: Rational Agency, Humanity, and ‘Ends in Themselves’

Finally, I will consider the relationship between freedom and the categorical imperative, focusing especially on the ‘Formula of Humanity’ and the notion of ‘ends in themselves.’ I will introduce Christine Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s argument in *Groundwork II*, according to which Kant claims that our capacity to set ourselves ends – in other words, our capacity for free, rational choice – is the only thing that “has its value completely in itself,” thus grounding his claim that we must always treat human beings as ends, never merely as means. I will then critically discuss the implications of this view, drawing on Charles Mills’ work to connect it with Kant’s racism, and considering the question of whether it implies that non-human animals can only ever be ‘means’ for Kant, not intrinsically within the scope of moral concern.

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: Theoretical Philosophy

Various class-givers – W. 11 (*groups 1 and 2*) and F. 11 (*groups 3 and 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (*Gomes, Parrott sessions: Colin Matthew Room; Magidor, Williamson: Ryle Room*)

Groups 1 and 2: Prof Anil Gomes / Prof Ofra Magidor

Groups 3 and 4: Prof Matthew Parrott / Prof Tim Williamson

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Michaelmas Term will cover key material in theoretical philosophy. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Plato on Education

Prof Dominic Scott – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we shall take a wide-ranging look at Plato's views on education across a number of different dialogues. We start with the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, both considered early works and framed as discussions of moral education, before turning to the *Republic*.

A striking feature of Plato's approach to education is the variety of contexts in which he discusses it. For instance, the political dimension of education is very clear in the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and *Republic*. But we shall also be looking at education in the context of Plato's erotic dialogues, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. Plato saw the relationship between lover and beloved as partly pedagogical, something that was already recognized in his own culture.

Towards the end of the term, we shall turn to Plato's last work, the *Laws*, which brings us back to the political dimension of education. Among other topics, we shall look at whether his views had shifted since the *Republic*. For instance, had he become more interested in educating a wider number of citizens in philosophy and related areas?

Please note: attendance at this seminar is limited to students taking the MSt in Ancient Philosophy and those taking the ancient philosophy track of the BPhil.

Early analytic philosophy

Prof Ian Rumfitt – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The aim of the seminar is to introduce BPhil students to some central texts of early analytic philosophy. It is important that attendees should read the prescribed primary text in advance of each session. The secondary readings below are introductory texts which people might find helpful, but they should feel free to come to the classes without having read these.

Week 1 (Wednesday 13 October):

Frege, *Begriffsschrift*, chapter I. Preferably to be read in the translation by T.W. Bynum in Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Writings* (OUP, 1972), pp.111-35

Anthony Kenny, *Frege* (Blackwell, 1995), chaps. 2 & 3

Michael Beaney, *Frege: Making Sense* (Duckworth 1996), chap. 2

Week 2 (Wednesday 20 October)

Frege, 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung'. Preferably to be read in the translation by Max Black in Frege, *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1984), pp.157-77

Anthony Kenny, *Frege* (Blackwell, 1995), chap. 7

Michael Beaney, *Frege: Making Sense* (Duckworth 1996), chap. 6

Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* 2nd ed. (Duckworth, 1981), chap. 5

Week 3 (Wednesday 27 October)

Frege, 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand'. Preferably to be read in the translation by Peter Geach in Frege, *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1984), pp.182-94

Anthony Kenny, *Frege* (Blackwell, 1995), chap. 6

Michael Beaney, *Frege: Making Sense* (Duckworth 1996), chap. 7

Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* 2nd ed. (Duckworth, 1981), chap.7

Week 4 (Wednesday 3 November)

Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* vol. II, appendix pp.253-65. Preferably to be read in the translation in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, 3rd ed. (Blackwell, 1980), pp.214-224

Anthony Kenny, *Frege* (Blackwell, 1995), chaps. 8 and 9

Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics* (Duckworth, 1991), chap.17

Week 5 (Wednesday 10 November)

Russell, 'Mathematical Logic as Based on a Theory of Types' (1908). Preferably to be read in the reprint in Russell ed. Marsh, *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950* (George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp.57-102

David Bostock, *Russell's Logical Atomism* (OUP, 2012), chaps. 4-6

Alistair Urquhart, 'The Theory of Types'. In Nicholas Griffin, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell* (CUP, 2003), pp.286-309

Week 6 (Wednesday 17 November)

Ramsey, 'The Foundations of Mathematics' (1925) & 'Mathematical Logic' (1926). Preferably to be read in the reprint in Ramsey ed. Mellor, *Philosophical Papers* (CUP, 1990), pp.164-224 & 225-44.

Alonzo Church, 'A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types'. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 5 (1940): 56-58

Robin Gandy, 'The Simple Theory of Types'. In Gandy and Hyland, eds., *Logic Colloquium '76* (North Holland, 1977), pp.173-81

Week 7 (Wednesday 24 November)

Ramsey, 'Facts and Propositions'. Preferably to be read in the reprint in Ramsey ed. Mellor, *Philosophical Papers* (CUP, 1990), pp.34-51

Ramsey, ed. Rescher & Majer, *On Truth* (Kluwer, 1991), chap. I ('The Nature of Truth'), pp.6-16

A.N. Prior, *Objects of Thought* (OUP, 1971), chaps. 1, 2 & 7

D. Wiggins, 'An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth'. In R. Schantz, ed., *Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Volume 1: What is Truth?* (De Gruyter, 2002), pp.316-32

Week 8 (Wednesday 1 December)

Ramsey, 'Truth and Probability' (1926). Preferably to be read (with the first two postscripts) in the reprint in Ramsey ed. Mellor, *Philosophical Papers* (CUP, 1990), pp.52-101

Ramsey, ed. Rescher & Majer, *On Truth* (Kluwer, 1991), chaps. III & IV ('Judgement' & 'Knowledge and Opinion'), pp.43-66

Simon Blackburn, 'Success Semantics'. In Lillehammer & Mellor, eds., *Ramsey's Legacy* (OUP, 2005), pp.22-36

D.H. Mellor, 'Successful Semantics'. In his *Mind, Meaning and Reality: Philosophical Essays* (OUP, 2012), pp.60-77

The Philosophy of David Lewis

Prof Nicholas Jones and Prof Alex Kaiserman – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Love him or loathe him, David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001) was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Though in several respects he remains a contemporary figure, enough time has passed for historians of philosophy to begin to study his place in twentieth century thought, aided by the recent publication of extracts of his vast correspondence with fellow philosophers over 40 years (Helen Beebee and A.R.J. Fischer (eds.), *The Philosophical Letters of David K. Lewis (Vols. 1 and 2)*, OUP). In this class, we will read a selection of classic Lewis papers in conjunction with his letters on the topic, in the hope of shedding light both on the development of Lewis's own thought and on the directions the debate has taken in the years since Lewis's death.

A full syllabus with assigned readings will be posted on Canvas in due course.

Formal Semantics

Prof Paul Elbourne – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Much work by contemporary philosophers of language uses the tools of formal semantics. This course trains students in the craft of doing formal semantics. It introduces Frege's hypothesis that functional application is the mechanism by which the meaning of a complex phrase is composed from the meanings of its constituent parts. It applies this insight to the analysis of a variety of core semantic phenomena, including argument structure, adjectival modification, definite descriptions, relative clauses, binding, and quantification. Emphasis throughout is on training students to be able to produce explicit detailed analyses of novel data.

We will be using the following textbook: Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, 1998, *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell. Students intending to follow this course should acquire a copy.

Before the first session, participants are requested to read the first three chapters of the textbook and to do Exercises 3a and 3d on pages 32-4; for Exercise 3a, please use the lambda notation as defined on pages 34-8.

We will simply be working through the textbook chapters in order. A tentative schedule is as follows:

Week One	1-3
Week Two	4
Week Three	5
Week Four	6
Week Five	7-8
Week Six	9
Week Seven	10
Week Eight	11

Realism and Indeterminacy

Dr Wesley Wrigley – M. 10 – 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we will discuss a selection of works by major figures in later analytic philosophy on realism and indeterminacy, two central themes at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Each week, we will discuss a particular reading, following an introductory presentation by one of the attendees. The seminar will be student-led, rather than following a lecture-like format, in order to give students the opportunity to develop key academic skills, like presenting, producing handouts, and confidently engaging in philosophical discussion. If you are interested in attending, please email me (wesley.wrigley@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Provisional schedule:

Week 1: Quine, 1951. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *Philosophical Review* 60, 20–43.

Week 2: Quine, 1969. "Ontological Relativity", in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (NY: Columbia University Press).

Week 3: Davidson, 1973. "Radical Interpretation", *Dialectica* 27, 313–328.

Week 4: Davidson, 1973. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 47, 5–20.

Week 5: Putnam, 1987. "Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism". *Dialectica* 41, 69–77.

Week 6: Putnam, 1980. "Models and Reality". *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 45. 464–482.

Week 7: Kripke, 1982. "The Wittgensteinian Paradox", in his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Week 8: Kripke, 1982. "The Solution and the 'Private Language' argument", in his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Agency and its Limits

Prof Natalia Waights Hickman – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The class will examine the nature and limits of rational agency, engaging with topics and literature intersecting action theory, epistemology and moral psychology. Some key questions to discuss will be: What makes an action attributable to me as its agent? Is intentional action by definition reason-guided? How if at all can reasons motivate? What other psychological factors contribute to or undermine motivation, and how? How does reflective reasoning relate to agency and self-knowledge? My attitudes and character inform my actions, but am I responsible as agent for having them? Can unconscious attitudes offer a *rational* explanation of action? How does an agent come to act (or fail to act) against her explicit “better judgement”? Is this constitutively irrational and/or vicious?

In week 1 we will begin with The Problem of Action:

- Hornsby (2004) ‘Agency and Actions’ *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*.
- Frankfurt, H.G. (1978) ‘The problem of action’, in A. Mele (ed.) *The Philosophy of Action*.
- Davidson, D. (1971) ‘Agency’ repr. in *Essays on Actions and Events*.
- Hyman, J. (2015) *Action, Knowledge, and Will*, ch. 2.

Provisional topic schedule:

Week 2: Acting intentionally

Week 3: The guise of the good

Week 4: Motivation, reason and desire

Week 5: Agency in attitudes and character

Week 6: Reflection, identification and agency

Week 7: Unconscious motivation

Week 8: Akrasia

Philosophy of Physics

Prof Adam Caulton and Dr Carina Prunkl – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

A schedule will be sent directly to MSt and BPhil students as soon as possible.

Political Philosophy

Dr Thomas Sinclair – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class is open and restricted to B.Phil students with an interest in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Numbers may be capped to ensure enjoyable, fruitful discussion.

Each week we will focus on a recently published article or chapter in a different central topic in political philosophy. Specified further readings will provide background for those unfamiliar with the relevant area.

The topics will be as follows:

1. Legitimacy
2. Equality
3. Democracy
4. Domination
5. Perfectionism and Political Liberalism
6. Capitalism and Socialism
7. Political Realism
8. Responsibility for Justice

The Ethics of Creating, Preserving and Ending Lives

Prof Jeff McMahan – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This seminar, which will begin in Michaelmas term and continue over Hilary term, will be concerned with foundational issues in population ethics and their relevance to a variety of issues in practical ethics. The issues we will discuss will be concerned more with what reasons there are than with matters of axiology. Among the questions that we will address over the two terms are these:

- Is there a reason not to cause an individual to exist, or to prevent an individual from existing, if that individual would have a miserable life – that is, a life that would be intrinsically bad for that individual?
- If there is, what is the nature of that reason and how strong is it? Is it, for example, as strong as the reason not to cause an existing person to suffer an equivalent amount of misery?

- Is there a reason to cause an individual to exist just because that individual would have a good life, or a life that is well worth living? If so, what is the nature of the reason and how strong is it? Is it, for example, much weaker than the reason not to cause a miserable person to exist? If it is, how can that difference be explained?
- Is there a general moral asymmetry between promoting happiness and preventing suffering? If so, what is the precise nature of this asymmetry and does it apply to causing individuals to exist in the same way that it applies to acts that affect existing individuals?
- Can individuals be benefited or harmed by being caused to exist?
- Is the legal notion of “wrongful life” morally coherent?
- In determining whether it is permissible to cause an individual to exist, how does the good the individual’s life would contain weigh against the suffering it would contain? Is a certain amount of suffering morally offset by an amount of well-being that is equivalent in magnitude? Or is a certain amount of suffering offset only by well-being that is significantly greater in magnitude?
- Do we have reasons to prevent the extinction of human beings? If so, what are these reasons and how strong are they?
- Is there a reason to cause or allow a better-off individual to exist rather than cause or allow a different, less well-off individual to exist? If so, what is the nature of this reason? Is it, for example, an impersonal reason, what Parfit calls a “wide person-affecting reason”, what Johann Frick calls a “standard-regarding reason”, or a reason of some other kind?
- Is the view that one ought, other things being equal, to cause a better-off person to exist rather than a different, less well-off person an objectionably eugenicist view?
- If there is a reason to cause a better-off person to exist rather than a different, less well-off person, does this imply that we have reasons to pursue the genetic enhancement of our progeny?
- Is it defensible to believe that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that a less well-off individual will exist instead while simultaneously denying that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that no new individual will come into existence?
- What Parfit calls the “Non-Identity Problem” arises when acts that affect well-being also determine which individuals exist. In these instances, an act can have a bad effect in a person’s life without being worse for that person, as the person would not have existed if the act had not been done. Is the reason not to do such an act as strong as the reason not to do an act that has an equivalent bad effect that *is* worse for the person in whose life it occurs? In short, does it matter morally whether a bad effect is worse for someone?
- The Non-Identity Problem arises in many instances in which our acts affect the well-being of animals. If it matters in the case of persons whether an act that has bad effects is worse for individuals, does it also matter in the case of animals?

- Does non-identity matter less to the extent that identity matters less? Does identity matter less in the case of animals than in the case of persons?
- Suppose that we cause animals to exist specifically in order to be able to eat them. But we ensure that they have lives that are better than those of most animals living in the wild. We then kill these animals prematurely but painlessly. Does the fact that they would never have existed with good lives if we had not intended to eat them somehow make the practice as a whole permissible?
- How should the Non-Identity Problem affect our thinking about climate change? About proportionality in war? About reparations for historical injustice?
- What is the criterion of personal identity over time?
- Is identity the basis of rational egoistic concern over time? If not, what is?
- What is the criterion of personal identity across alternative possible lives?
- Is identity the basis of egoistically rational attitudes to alternative possible lives? If not, what is?
- What are the implications of our answers to these last four questions for the morality of abortion?
- If abortion is generally permissible, is it also generally permissible to inflict prenatal injury? If not, how can the difference in permissibility be explained?

My thinking about these questions is still very much in progress – still uncertain and exploratory. I am writing a book on these issues and am eager to discuss them with others. I will begin each seminar by sketching some ideas and arguments but I hope that much of each seminar will be devoted to critical discussions of the problems and of my ideas about them. I want mostly to concentrate on the problems themselves rather than on the literature, but we will also, of course, discuss the published views of the most important writers in the area. I will identify and provide access to the writing that I think is most important as the term progresses but for those who want to do some reading in advance might start with some of the following pieces.

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, part 4

Johann Frick, "Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry," *Philosophical Perspectives* (2020)

Michael Otsuka, "How it makes a difference that one is worse off than one could have been," *Politics, Philosophy, & Economics* (2017)

David Velleman, "Persons in Prospect," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2008)

David Boonin, *The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People* (2014)

Jeff McMahan, "Climate Change, War, and the Non-Identity Problem," *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (2021)

Jacob Nebel, "Asymmetries in the Value of Existence," *Philosophical Perspectives* 33 (2019)

John Broome, "Should We Value Population?," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13 (2005)

Derek Parfit, "Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 45 (2017)

R. Jay Wallace, *The View From Here*

Ingmar Persson, *Inclusive Ethics* (relevant parts)

Richard Yetter Chappell, "Rethinking the Asymmetry," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (2017)