



# PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS: GRADUATE CLASSES

## MICHAELMAS TERM 2022

**NOTES:**

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight ([james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)).

## Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

### **BPhil Pro-Seminar: Theoretical Philosophy**

Various class-givers and times

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Michaelmas Term will cover key material in theoretical philosophy. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

### **Aristotle on Natural and Supranatural Metaphysics**

Prof Michail Peramatzis and Dr Paolo Fait – W. 9 – 11, Worcester College

We shall discuss central passages from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and other related works to address the question of whether and, if so, in what sense the study of natural substances forms an integral part of Aristotelian metaphysical inquiry or whether it is just part of his physics, in which case the parts of the *Metaphysics* that focus on natural substances might be merely aporetic, aborted projects, 'springboards', or serve some other similar subordinate function.

#### Plan

wk 1: *Metaphysics* A.1-3 (MP)

wk 2: *Metaphysics* B (MP)

wk 3: *Metaphysics* Γ.1-3 (PF)

wk 4: *Metaphysics* E.1 (MP)

wk 5: *Metaphysics* Z.17 and H.6 (MP); *De Generatione et Corruptione* II.10; *Physics* II (PF).

wk 6: Priority & Unity in Aristotle's Natural & Supranatural Metaphysics (MP)

wk 7: *Metaphysics* Λ.6-7; *Physics* VIII.6-7 (PF)

wk 8: *Metaphysics* Λ.8-10 (PF)

#### Reading for week 1

*Metaphysics* A.1-3; commentary by Ross

Frede M., 'Aristotle's Account of the Origins of Philosophy', *Rhizai* 1 (2004).

Text & Commentary:

Ross W. D., *Aristotle: Metaphysics*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1924.

Translations:

Barnes J. (ed.), *Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation*, Princeton, 1984.

Reeve C.D.C. (tr.), *Aristotle. Metaphysics*, Hackett, 2016.

Introductions:

Barnes J., 'Metaphysics' in Barnes J. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, CUP, 66-108.

Cohen, S.Marc, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>

Politis, V., *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, Routledge 2004

Commentaries/Discussion of Text:

Bostock D., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H*, OUP, 1994.

Crubellier, M. & Laks A., (eds.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta*, OUP 2009.

Frede M. & Patzig G., *Aristoteles Metaphysik Z*, 1988.

Frede M. & Charles D. (eds.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*, OUP, 2000.

Judson L., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Lambda*, OUP, 2019.

Kirwan C., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Books ΓΔΕ*, OUP, 1993.

Madigan A., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Books B and K 1-2*, OUP, 1999.

Makin S., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ*, OUP, 2006.

Steel, C. (ed.) *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha*, OUP 2012.

Monographs and articles:

Bell I., *Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science*, Sankt Augustin, 2004.

Berti E., 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', *PAS*, 101, 185-207.

Bolton R., 'Biology and Metaphysics in Aristotle' in Lennox J. G. & Bolton R. (eds.), *Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf*, CUP, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 30-55. [This is mainly on *Metaphysics Z.17*, but has important implications for our topic and our discussion in wk 1.]

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics as a Science' in Scaltas T., Charles D., & Gill M. L. (eds.), *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, OUP, 1994.

Charles D., 'Some Comments on prof Enrico Berti's *Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle*' in A. Bottani (ed.), *Individuals, Essence and Identity*, Dordrecht, 2002.

Code A., 'Aristotle's Metaphysics as a Science of Principles', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 51/3: 357-78.

Fine G., *On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms*, OUP, 1993.

M. Frede, 'Aristotle's Account of the Origins of Philosophy', *Rhizai* 1 (2004).

Halper E., 'The Origin of Aristotle's Metaphysical *Aporiai*', *Apeiron* 21/1, 1-27.

Koslicki K., 'Aristotle's Mereology and the Status of Form', *Journal of Philosophy*, 103 (2006), 715-736

Madigan A., 'Commentary on Politis', *Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 18, 2002, 175-82.

Menn S., *The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, book manuscript: <https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/antike/mitarbeiter/menn/contents>

Menn S., 'Aristotle's Theology', in C. Shields (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, OUP, 422-464.

Peramatzis M., 'Science and Metaphysics in Aristotle's Philosophy', *Metascience*, 2012, 303-315.

Politis V., 'Aristotle on *Aporia* and Searching in Metaphysics', *Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 18, 2002, 145-74.

Quarantotto, D. (2015), 'A Dynamic Ontology: On How Aristotle Arrives at the Conclusion that Eternal Change Accomplishes *Ousia*', in M. Leunissen (ed.), *Aristotle's Physics. A Critical Guide* (Cambridge), 162-85.

Sedley D., *Teleology, Aristotelian and Platonic*, in Lennox J. G. & Bolton R. (eds.), *Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf*, CUP, Cambridge, 2010, 5-29.

Shields C., 'Being *qua* Being', in Id. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, OUP, 443-471.

### **Plato, eros and education**

Prof Dominic Scott – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we shall take a wide-ranging look at Plato's views on education across a number of different dialogues. We start with the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, both considered early works and framed as discussions of moral education, before turning to the *Republic*.

A striking feature of Plato's approach to education is the variety of contexts in which he discusses it. For instance, the political dimension of education is very clear in the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and *Republic*. But we shall also be looking at education in the context of Plato's erotic dialogues, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. Plato saw the relationship between lover and beloved as partly pedagogical, something that was already recognized in his own culture.

Towards the end of the term, we shall turn to Plato's last work, the *Laws*, which brings us back to the political dimension of education. Among other topics, we shall look at whether his views had shifted since the *Republic*. For instance, had he become more interested in educating a wider number of citizens in philosophy and related areas?

Please note: attendance at this seminar is limited to students taking the MSt in Ancient Philosophy and those taking the ancient philosophy track of the BPhil.

**Simone de Beauvoir**

Prof Daniela Dover – M. 4 – 6, Merton College (Americas Room)

For more information, please consult the Canvas site for the course, around the end of week 0.

**Wittgenstein**

Prof Bill Child – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The class is intended primarily for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students. 4th year undergraduates reading Computer Science & Philosophy, Maths & Philosophy, or Physics & Philosophy are also welcome to attend. Others may also be admitted if space permits.

**Please e-mail me ([bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk](mailto:bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk)) in advance if you would like to come to these classes.** If you are in one of the categories specified above (Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4th year students studying CSP, MP, or PP) you are entitled to participate; but it will help me to know likely numbers in advance. If you are not in one of those categories, please get in touch anyway; I will get back to you before the first class to let you know if I can accommodate you.

The classes will explore a series of central issues in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, focusing on the topics of meaning, intentionality, and rule-following. There will be one piece of required reading each week: for four of the classes, this will be taken from Wittgenstein's writings; for the other four, it will be a book or paper from the secondary literature. There will be a small selection of optional supplementary readings. No prior acquaintance with Wittgenstein's work is assumed and the required readings should be accessible to those reading Wittgenstein for the first time.

Participants are encouraged to e-mail me before each class with questions about that week's material that they'd like to discuss in the week's class. All questions are welcome – no question is too simple or basic to raise. I will do my best to address all questions that I receive in good time before the class.

**Reading List**

For each class, there is one piece of required reading, which participants will be expected to have read beforehand. The required readings are listed below.

A fuller reading list, available on Canvas and on ORLO (<https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/32DA86CF-413C-E7CC-1781-F9A2012BA370.html?lang=en&login=1>) lists a small amount of optional further reading.

**Week 1** Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, Parts I-III (pp. 51-74)

**Week 2** Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* pp. 1-44

**Week 3** Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§143-242

**Week 4** Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, chs 1-3.

(If possible, try to get hold of the 1985 paperback reprint. It contains a greatly extended version of footnote 87.)

**Week 5** John McDowell 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', *Synthese* March 1984. Reprinted in A.

W. Moore ed., *Meaning and Reference*, Oxford: OUP, 1993; in McDowell's *Mind, Value and Reality*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998; and in A. Miller and C. Wright (eds), *Rule-Following and Meaning*, London: Acumen, 2002.

**Week 6** Hannah Ginsborg, 'Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules', *Journal of Philosophy*, 108: 5, 2011, pp. 227-254

**Week 7** Cora Diamond, 'How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Verification', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume*, 73, 1999, pp. 99-134.

**Week 8** Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§633-693

### **Quantification and Metaphysics**

Prof Nicholas Jones and Prof James Studd – T. 11 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class aims to introduce students to some lively recent debates at the intersection of metaphysics with the philosophy of logic. Some concern foundational questions about various types of quantification and related resources; others concern the use of type theory and other quantificational resources to express and even answer metaphysical questions. We'll introduce the necessary technical background as we go.

Examples of the kinds of question we will discuss include:

- How is quantification best understood, and how does it relate to variable-binding? Should we take quantifiers to be variable-binding operators subject to a Tarskian semantics or should we follow Frege in treating them as predicates of predicates? Alternatively, should we eschew variables altogether in favour of a predicate-functor logic or "Quine–Bourbaki" notation?

- What types of quantification are legitimate? In addition to first-order quantifiers, should we countenance the quantifiers of type-theory or plural logic? What about further extensions of these systems?
- What are the lessons of “higher-order metaphysics”? For example, what, if anything, does type theory teach us about the structure of propositions or the nature of metaphysical necessity?

Here is a list of the topics we will cover week by week:

Week 1. Qualitativism and generalism  
 Week 2. Tarskian versus Fregean approaches to quantification  
 Week 3. Plural quantification and metaphysics  
 Week 4. Introduction to higher-order metaphysics  
 Week 5. Against propositional structure  
 Week 6. Defences of propositional structure  
 Week 7. Analysing intensional notions in type theory  
 Week 8. Type-theoretic pluralism

Please see the Canvas page for the suggested readings.

### **Logicism in the Philosophy of Mathematics**

Dr Christopher Scambler – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The recent literature in philosophy of mathematics and philosophical logic is seeing what might be called a “third wave” of logicism, after both its original manifestation and the ‘neo-logicist’ variant. The movement is characterized by use of new techniques in and conceptualizations of higher order logic, and a willingness to involve modality in the formulation of mathematical principles. This course will aim to present some of these recent logicist proposals, to assess their intrinsic merits, and compare them to the earlier manifestations. Roughly the first two-thirds will treat traditional topics in (Neo)logicism through the lens of contemporary developments; the final three weeks will then look at some new proposals of forms of logicism due to Juhani Yli Vakkuri & Zach Goodsell, Sharon Berry, and myself.

The course will be aimed at students with a working knowledge of elementary mathematical logic. Primary readings will need to be read before the session; the secondary provide supplementary material that will also be discussed, and that may in addition interest those already familiar with the primary reading, but that are not necessary to read before the session.

#### **Session 1: Frege**

Primary:

Frege: *Grundlagen*, Austin’s translation, Blackwell, 1950, Sections 55-83

Secondary:



Hodes: *Logicism & Ontological Commitments of Arithmetic*, Journal of Philosophy, 81(3), 1984, pp 123-149

Session 2: Russell

Primary:

Russell: *Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types*, American Journal of Mathematics, 30(3), 1908, pp222-262

Secondary:

Hodes: *Why Ramify?* Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 56(2), 2015, pp375-415

Session 3: Quine

Primary:

Cocchiarella: *Frege's Double Correlation Thesis and Quine's Set Theories NF and ML*, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14(1), 1985, pp1-39

Secondary:

Quine: *New Foundations*: in *From a Logical Point of View*, HUP 1953  
Hossack: *Sets and Plural Comprehension*, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43(2-3), 2014, pp517-539

Session 4: The Collapse

Primary:

Goedel: the present situation in the foundations of mathematics: in *Kurt Goedel, Collected Works vol III*, OUP, 1995, pp45- 54

Secondary:

Goedel: Russell's mathematical logic: in *Philosophy of Mathematics, selected readings*, Benacerraf and Putnam (eds.)  
Linnebo: *Pluralities and Sets*, The Journal of Philosophy, 107(3), 2010, pp144-164

Session 5: Neo-logicism

Primary:

Eklund: *Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy*, Synthese, 170(3), 2009, pp393-341

Secondary Reading:

Boolos: The Standard of Equality for Numbers: in *Logic, Logic and Logic*, 1998, pp202-220  
Wright: *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects*, Aberdeen University Press, 1983

Session 6: Higher order logicism

Primary:

Sections from Yli Vakkuri & Goodsell: *The Logical Foundations of Philosophy*, manuscript to be circulated (tbc)

Secondary:

Bacon: *The Broadest Necessity*, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(5), 2018  
pp733-783

Session 7: Logicism via Logical Possibility

Primary:

Selections from Berry: *A Logical Foundation for Set-theoretic Potentialism*, CUP  
2022

Secondary:

Hellman, *Mathematics Without Numbers*, OUP 1999

Session 8: Contingentist Logicism

Primary:

Radical Contingentism and the Foundations of Mathematics, tbc

Secondary:

Hawthorne and Yli Vakkuri: *The Necessity of Mathematics*, Nous, 52, 2018

Leitgeb: *Why Pure Mathematical Truths are Metaphysically Necessary*,  
Synthese 197 (7), pp3113-3120

**Decision Theory**

Prof Jean Baccelli – Th. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This graduate class will introduce to selected technical and conceptual topics in the contemporary theory of individual decision-making.

**1. Preference**

Simon French. *Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality*. Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1986. Chapter 3 (“Preference Orders and Value Functions”).

Paul Anand. Rationality and Intransitive Preference – Foundations for the Modern View. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 156–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

John Broome. Utility. *Economics and Philosophy*, 7(1):1–12, 1991.

**2. Choice**

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique. *Revealed Preference Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Chapter 2 (“Classical Abstract Choice Theory”).

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.

Amartya Sen. *Internal Consistency of Choice*. *Econometrica*, 61(3):495–521, 1993. Sections 2 (“Choice, Correspondence and Consistency”) and 3 (“What is the Problem with Internal Consistency of Choice?”)

**3. Expected Utility under Risk**

Itzhak Gilboa. *Theory of Decision under Uncertainty*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Chapter 8 (“von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Theorem”).

Philippe Mongin. The Allais Paradox: What It Became, What It Really Was, What It Now Suggests to Us. *Economics & Philosophy*, 35(3):423–459, 2019.

#### **4. Expected Utility under Uncertainty**

Itzhak Gilboa. *Theory of Decision under Uncertainty*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Chapters 10 (“Savage’s Theorem”) and 12 (“A Critique of Savage”).

Mark Machina. Event-Separability in the Ellsberg Urn. *Economic Theory*, 48(2-3):425–436, 2011.

#### **5. Non-Expected Utility**

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1, 701–728. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

#### **6. Dynamic Consistency**

Peter Wakker. Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles. Unpublished note, accessible at <https://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/alias.pdf>, 1999.

Mark Machina. Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 27(4):1622–1668, 1989.

Paolo Ghirardato. Revisiting Savage in a Conditional World. *Economic Theory*, 20(1):83–92, 2002.

#### **7. Ignorance**

Simon French. *Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality*. Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1986. Chapter 2 (“Decision Theory under Strict Uncertainty”).

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (Second Edition). Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Salvador Barbera, Walter Bossert, and Prasanta Pattanaik. Ranking Sets of Objects. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, 893–977. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Section 3 (“Complete Uncertainty”).

## **The Ethics of Creating, Preserving and Ending Lives**

Prof Jeff McMahan – Th. 11 – 1 (*starting week 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This seminar will be concerned with foundational issues in population ethics and their relevance to a variety of issues in practical ethics. The issues we will discuss will be concerned more with what reasons there are than with matters of axiology. Representative questions in the area in which population ethics overlaps with practical ethics are:

- Is there a reason not to cause an individual to exist, or to prevent an individual from existing, if that individual would have a life that would be intrinsically bad for that individual?
- If there is, what is the nature of that reason and how strong is it? Is it, for example, as strong as the reason not to cause an existing person to suffer an equivalent amount of misery?
- Is there a reason to cause an individual to exist just because that individual would have a good life, or a life that is well worth living? If so, what is the nature of the reason and how strong is it? Is it, for example, much weaker than the reason not to cause a miserable person to exist? If it is, how can that difference be explained?
- Can individuals be benefited or harmed by being caused to exist?
- Is the legal notion of “wrongful life” morally coherent?
- In determining whether it is permissible to cause an individual to exist, how does the good the individual’s life would contain weigh against the suffering it would contain? Is a certain amount of suffering morally offset by an amount of well-being that is equivalent in magnitude? Or is a certain amount of suffering offset only by well-being that is significantly greater in magnitude?
- Do we have reasons to prevent the extinction of human beings? If so, what are these reasons and how strong are they?
- Is there a reason to cause or allow a better-off individual to exist rather than cause or allow a different, less well-off individual to exist? If so, what is the nature of this reason?
- If there is a reason to cause a better-off person to exist rather than a different, less well-off person, does this imply that we have reasons to pursue the genetic enhancement of our progeny?
- Is it defensible to believe that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that a less well-off individual will exist instead while simultaneously denying that there is a reason to cause a well-off individual to exist when the alternative is that no new individual will come into existence?
- What Parfit calls the “Non-Identity Problem” arises when acts that affect well-being also determine which individuals exist. In these instances, an act can have a bad effect in a person’s life without being worse for that person, as the person would not have existed if the act had not been done. Is the reason not to do such an act as strong as

the reason not to do an act that has an equivalent bad effect that *is* worse for the person in whose life it occurs? In short, does it matter morally whether a bad effect is worse for someone?

- The Non-Identity Problem arises in many instances in which our acts affect the well-being of animals. If it matters in the case of persons whether an act that has bad effects is worse for individuals, does it also matter in the case of animals?
- Suppose that we cause animals to exist specifically in order to be able to eat them. But we ensure that they have lives that are better than those of most animals living in the wild. We then kill these animals prematurely but painlessly. Does the fact that they would never have existed with good lives if we had not intended to eat them somehow make the practice as a whole permissible?
- If abortion is generally permissible, is it also generally permissible to inflict prenatal injury? If not, how can the difference in permissibility be explained?

My thinking about these questions is still very much in progress – still uncertain and exploratory. I am writing a book on these issues and am eager to discuss them with others. I will begin each seminar by sketching some ideas and arguments but I hope that much of each seminar will be devoted to critical discussions of the problems and of my ideas about them. I want mostly to concentrate on the problems themselves rather than on the literature, but we will also, of course, discuss the published views of the most important writers in the area. I will identify and provide access to the writing that I think is most important as the term progresses but for those who want to do some reading in advance could read some of the following:

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, part 4

Johann Frick, "Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry," *Philosophical Perspectives* (2020)

Michael Otsuka, "How it makes a difference that one is worse off than one could have been," *Politics, Philosophy, & Economics* (2017)

David Velleman, "Persons in Prospect," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2008)

David Boonin, *The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People* (2014)

Jeff McMahan, "Climate Change, War, and the Non-Identity Problem," *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (2021)

Jacob Nebel, "Asymmetries in the Value of Existence," *Philosophical Perspectives* 33 (2019)

John Broome, "Should We Value Population?," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13 (2005)

Derek Parfit, "Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 45 (2017)

### **Philosophy of Mathematics**

Prof Alex Paseau – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

We will read a selection of works focussed on the metaphysics of mathematics. These will include classic articles in the philosophy of mathematics, chosen according to the interests of the group and presented by students, as well as some of my work in progress.

Readings will be uploaded to Canvas at least a week in advance. The first reading, on mathematics and the physical world (chapter 2 of my forthcoming book *What is Mathematics About?*), will be available from mid-September.

Anyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics is welcome. Graduate students in philosophy, naturally, but also advanced undergraduates, postdocs, students in other departments, and anyone else.

### **Philosophy of Physics**

Prof Adam Caulton– W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

A schedule will be sent directly to MSt and BPhil students as soon as possible.