PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS
(GRADUATE CLASSES)

TRINITY TERM 2022
NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.

- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Much teaching is now taking place in person and live. Some teaching is given online and live. For some courses an existing recording will be made available.

- Links will be made available on Canvas for live online teaching, and to previous recordings.

- Wearing a face covering is now a personal choice. Please respect the choice of those continue to wear a face covering. Please consider wearing a face covering if you are Covid-negative but have other respiratory symptoms. For up-to-date information please see https://www.ox.ac.uk/coronavirus/students.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Times given here are UK times. Students attending remotely in other timezones should adjust their times accordingly.
Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty’s graduate students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: History of Philosophy (strictly for 1st-year BPhil students ONLY)
Various class-givers and locations – F. 11 – 1

Group 1 - Prof Alexander Bown, Balliol College
Group 2 - Prof Marion Durand, Corpus Christi College
Group 3 - Prof Paul Lodge, Mansfield College
Group 4 - Prof William Mander, Harris Manchester College

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Trinity Term will cover key material in the history of philosophy, with groups 1 and 2 focussing on ancient philosophy, and groups 3 and 4 covering philosophy from the early modern period. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Aristotle’s defence of natural slavery and its legacy
Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen - T. 9 – 11 (starting week 2), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

‘The god has left everyone free; nature has made no one a slave’ (ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν)’ (Rhet. I 13, 1373b18-19). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle quotes this line from the lost Messenian speech of the sophist Alcidamas with disapproval. He rejects the argument of those who hold that slavery is contrary to nature, a condition enforced from the outside rather than a reflection of intrinsic properties of the enslaved. Slavery is not a necessary evil, needed to secure the happiness of household and state, nor is a slave a victim of bad luck. Enslavement is just by nature, since some people are naturally suited to serve.

In this seminar, we will examine Aristotle’s attempt to defend the institution of slavery in the Politics and explore its legacy. While Aristotle’s arguments are repulsive, they were also historically influential. We will dissect the argument and the role it plays in Aristotle’s political thought.
This is a continuation of our seminar from TT21. We shall start with a summary of our take on the argument of *Metaphysics* Z.1-16 and shall go on to discuss Z.17, Book H, and (time permitting) Book Θ. We propose to read the argument of ZHΘ as relying on the requirements of priority and unity: primary substance ought to be prior to the things it is the substance of, and it ought to account for the unity of natural substance-kinds and their members. Each week we shall introduce our reading of a few chapters of Aristotle’s text and discuss it with the participants.

**Week 1**
A Summary of the argument of *Metaphysics* Z.1-16 understood in the light of the requirements of priority and unity. Introduction to Z.17 (MP & DC)

**Week 2**
Z.17 continued (MP)

**Week 3**
H.1 (DC)

**Week 4**
H.2 (DC)

**Week 5**
H.3 (part I) (MP)

**Week 6**
H.3 (part II) (MP)

**Week 7**
H.4-5 (DC)

**Week 8**
H.6 and (perhaps) Θ (MP & DC)

**Readings**
Before each meeting it would be useful to read the relevant parts of the text, translation, and commentaries. We will also recommend one or at most two articles or chapters per meeting. The readings for week 1 are

Devereux D. (2003), ‘The Relationship between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*’ OSAP 25,159-211


*Text, Translation, and Commentaries*

Burnyeat M. F. *et al.* (1979), *Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, Oxford: Philosophy Faculty

*General*


*Burnyeat M. F. (2001), A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Pittsburgh*


**Frege and the Stoics**
Prof Susanne Bobzien – M. 2.30 – 4.30 (*weeks 5 to 8*)

The subject is the extremely close relationship between a number of topics in philosophical logic and philosophy of language between Frege and the Stoics. The course is directed at graduates but should be accessible to interested undergraduates who have taken 108 philosophy of logic and language or 127 philosophical logic.

**Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant**
Prof Joseph Schear and Prof Mark Wrathall – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will focus primarily on Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as it is presented in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (KPM)* and the associated lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (PIK)*. What does Heidegger’s reading have to teach us about the first *Critique*? What does Heidegger’s reading have to teach us about his own *Being and Time* project? Interpretations of Kant offered by Heidegger in other texts and lecture courses may also be consulted. If you are not a graduate student in philosophy, please email the class instructors for permission to attend. Preliminary schedule is as follows:
Week 1 (April 25): Introduction: The Kant interpretation & Being and Time

Week 2 (May 2): KPM §§1-5 & PIK §§5-6. Finite Intuition and the Problem of Metaphysics

Week 3 (May 9): The Kantian Imagination (reading TBA). Guest discussant: Sam Matherne (Harvard)


Week 6 (May 30): ‘Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders : An Outline of Transcendental Philosophy as Object-Guided Philosophy’ Guest discussant: Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)

Week 7 (June 6): KPM §§26-35 & PIK §§24-26. Guest discussant: Matthew Shockey (Indiana)

Week 8 (June 13): KPM §§32-34. Guest discussant: Stefan Kaufer (Franklin & Marshall)

Wittgenstein on Solipsism and the First Person
Prof Bill Child – Th. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room except week 8: Seminar Room)

The class is intended primarily for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4th year undergraduates reading Computer Science & Philosophy, Maths & Philosophy, or Physics & Philosophy are also welcome to attend. Others may also be admitted if space permits.

Please e-mail me (bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk) in advance if you would like to come to these classes. If you are in one of the categories specified above (Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4th year students studying CSP, MP, or PP) you are entitled to participate; but it will help me to know likely numbers in advance. If you are not in one of those categories, please get in touch anyway; I will let you know before the first class whether I can accommodate you.

The class will deal with the development of Wittgenstein’s treatment of a series of questions about subjectivity and the self that feature prominently in his work from the Tractatus and Notebooks 1914-16 to Philosophical Investigations. We will focus on two main themes: solipsism; and the first person. And we will explore two strands in Wittgenstein’s remarks on each of those themes. In his treatment of solipsism, we will look at: (a) his discussion of solipsism as a general metaphysical view (‘the world is my world’ (Tractatus), ‘the problem discussed by realists, idealists, and solipsists’ (Blue Book); and (b) his discussion of solipsism as a view in the philosophy of mind in particular (‘Only I feel real pain, only I really see (or
‘Only my own experiences are real’ (Blue Book)). In Wittgenstein’s treatment of the first person, we will look at: (c) his discussion of the meaning or function of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’; and (d) his discussion of the first-person point of view more generally.

There is a small amount of essential reading each week, listed below. For further details of the class, including a selection of optional further readings, see Canvas.

**Week 1** Solipsism in the Tractatus: ‘The world is my world’
L. Wittgenstein Notebooks 1914-16 – 23.5.15; 1.8.16 to 12.8.16; 2.9.16; 12.10.16-17.10.16
L. Wittgenstein Tractatus 5.541-5.5421, 5.6-5.641

**Week 2 Philosophical Remarks I: ‘only the present experience has reality’**
L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks Part V, pp. 80-87; part VII, pp. 97-104

**Week 3 Philosophical Remarks II: ‘I’, the self, and immediate experience**
L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks part VI, pp. 88-96.

**Week 4 Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Feb-March 1933: ‘2 kinds of use of “I”’**

**Week 5 The Blue Book I: Solipsism and the Philosophy of Mind**
L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books pp. 44-74

**Week 6 The Blue Book II: The use of ‘I’ as subject and the use of ‘I’ as object**
L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books pp. 44-74

**Week 7 ‘Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data’**

**Week 8 ‘I’, the Self, Subjectivity, and Solipsism in Philosophical Investigations**
L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §§398-412
This brings me to what Dr Dawes Hicks says on the subject of colour and shape. He suggests that “the real colour will present a different aspect if another colour be reflected upon it” (p. 401) But surely we cannot speak of a colour “presenting an aspect”. A colour which presents a different aspect is a different colour, and there is an end of the matter.’ (Bertrand Russell, *Mind*, v22 Jan 1913, p.79) DISCUSS.

Materials will be available on Canvas. Please contact Will Davies and Mike Martin if you intend to attend the class.

**Wk 1. An Introduction to Colour and Appearance**

**Wk 2. Appearance Talk and Appearances**
- Essential Reading: M. G. F. Martin. Variation and change in appearance.

**Wk 3. Colour Constancy and Appearance Properties.**

**Wk 4. The Argument from Illusion and Diaphaneity.**
- Essential Reading: M. G. F. Martin. The Lure of Illusion.

**Wk 5. Modes of Colour Appearance**

**Wk 6. Predicating Colours**

**Wk 7. Layering Theories of Illumination Perception**

**Wk 8. On the Reality of Colour**
The topic of this class will be properties – whether they exist and, if so, what they are. It is a traditional philosophical topic, going back to Plato, which has often been at the centre of philosophical discussion and, when not precisely at the centre, it has not been far from it. We will not deal with the topic historically, but systematically, and the papers and book chapters to be discussed will all be contemporary, in a broad sense of the word in which material from the last quarter of the 20th Century onwards counts as contemporary. Sessions will happen on Thursdays from 4.30 to 6.30, in the Owen Walker room, Oriel College (ask in the lodge for directions). Students will be expected to volunteer to introduce the material to be discussed.

Week 1. Introduction to the topic.


New work on Frege's Puzzle
Prof Ofra Magidor and Prof Tim Williamson – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

After giving a general introduction to Frege’s Puzzle in week 1, we will take a fresh look at some of the classic works on the topic, as well as a discussion of some more contemporary papers. The proposed readings for each week are as follows (but might be adjusted as we go along). Most readings will be available on ORLO: https://oxford.rl.talis.com/index.html.


Week 1:

Week 2:

Week 3:
Stalnaker, R. (1984), ‘Belief and belief attribution’ and ‘The problem of deduction’, Chapters 4 and 5, of his Inquiry, MIT Press. (*chapter 5 is not ORLO, but a physical copy will be reserved in the library)

Week 4:

Week 5:

Week 6:
Week 7:

Week 8:

**Philosophy of Cognitive Science**
Prof Philipp Koralus – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The seminar will be a graduate-level introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. We will read both philosophical and scientific literature. Some of the likely topics covered will be the conceptual foundations of treating mind/brains as information processing devices, moral judgment, reasoning, cognitive architecture, and attention. We will also consider how some of these topics bear on artificial intelligence. To facilitate the logistics of having course meetings online, please sign up for the seminar by emailing me at philipp.koralus@philosophy.ox.ac.uk with the subject line “Cog Sci”.

**Philosophy and Literature**
Prof Stephen Mulhall – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will not focus primarily on what is generally called ‘the philosophy of literature’, although various topics central to that field (eg the status of fictional entities, the relationship between author and reader, the significance of authorial intention) will surface along the way. My interest lies rather in the relationship between literature and philosophy more broadly conceived, and in particular upon the ways in which literature (contrary to its fateful Platonic banishment from the just city) might claim the right to make pertinent contributions not only to specific branches of philosophy (ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind) but to revising philosophy’s conception of its own nature – its goals, its methods, and its resources.

The course will begin by examining the ways in which some philosophers have recently argued that literary texts should be seen as having a particularly important role to play in our thinking about ethics. The work of Nussbaum and Diamond will be discussed in relation to some of their most prominent philosophical critics (McMahan, O’Neill), and in relation to specific literary texts by Henry James and Iris Murdoch. These discussions quickly broaden out to encompass questions about the nature of rationality, its relation to emotion and embodiment, and the implications of these matters for our understanding of philosophy’s own presuppositions as an intellectual enterprise. The primary reference point here will be Coetzee’s Tanner Lectures, *The Lives of Animals*, which have prompted rich responses from a number of philosophers (Singer, McDowell, Diamond and Cavell), a full understanding of which will require not only an engagement with the moral standing of non-human animals but also a broader excursion into the nature of realism and modernism in the arts, particularly as interpreted by the art historian, critic and theorist Michael Fried. The final weeks of the course will then follow out some of the implications of this material,
either by looking in detail at more recent work by Coetzee (the ‘Jesus’ novels) or by David Foster Wallace (both his fiction and his non-fiction writing). The class participants will be able to choose which of these paths is taken.

The class will presuppose no prior understanding of the material to be discussed, and so will be accessible to students at any stage of the B. Phil programme (although it may of course be of particular relevance to students intending to write on topics in ethics and aesthetics). Graduate students in other programmes (in the philosophy faculty and in other faculties) will also be welcome to attend, with the class-giver’s permission (email).

A draft reading list will be made available on ORLO. As the list makes clear, we will be discussing in detail a number of novels as we go along, and the first two (which are also the longest) will be encountered relatively early on in term; so it might be a good idea to read at least some of them before the class begins, rather than trying to do so together with the other assigned reading in any given week during term. The novels, in order of appearance, are:

Henry James, *The Golden Bowl*
Iris Murdoch, *The Black Prince*
J.M. Coetzee, *Elizabeth Costello*
J.M. Coetzee, *The Childhood of Jesus*

**Art and Medium**  
Prof Catharine Abell and Prof James Grant – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

An artwork’s medium helps to determine how it is to be interpreted and evaluated. Two perceptually indistinguishable artworks can differ in both meaning and value if one is a painting and the other a photograph, or if one is a digital photograph and the other an analogue photograph. This BPhil class will investigate a variety of philosophical issues concerning artistic media. These include the nature of artistic media; their relation to other art categories including artforms and styles; their interpretative and evaluative significance; and their relations to the activities of making and appreciating art. Students who wish to get a sense of the issues to be covered are advised to read Davies’s “Medium in Art” beforehand.

Each seminar will be based on the reading for that week, which participants are expected to have read beforehand. They are also expected to have identified the philosophical issue(s) the author is addressing, their main claims and their arguments for those claims. They should also have reflected on the philosophical significance of the issues being addressed and have formulated any questions of clarification they have about the reading.
The provisional schedule is as follows:


**Idealism and the Common Good: Green’s *Prolegomena to Ethics***

Prof Roger Crisp and Prof Terence Irwin – T. 1.30 – 3.15, St Anne’s College (T H Green Room)

Thomas Hill Green (1836-82) was one of the British Idealists who introduced the philosophy of Hegel (1770-1831) into British philosophy. His main work, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, was published posthumously in 1883; it was based on lectures delivered in Oxford in the 1870s. This is the main text we will discuss in this class. We will focus primarily on Green’s moral philosophy.

Green differs from Hegel, and from his younger contemporary F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) in so far as he takes himself to be a Kantian, though his views about Kant are influenced by his study of Hegel. One aim of his moral philosophy is to show that Kant and Hegel are reconcilable.

A further influence on Green’s moral philosophy is Aristotle. In Green’s view, the contrasts that many people claim to see between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ conceptions of
ethics are misconceived. Aristotle and Kant are not basically opposed, but turn out to affirm the same essential principles in ethics.

Green develops his views in comparison and contrast with those of John Stuart Mill (1806-73) and Henry Sidgwick (1837-1900), who formulate different versions of utilitarianism in response to criticisms of the views of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Sidgwick replies to Green’s criticisms both in his Methods of Ethics (1st edn., 1874) and in his The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau (based on his lectures).

While the Prolegomena will be our main source, some of Green’s other works (also derived from lectures) are also useful. These include his Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant (for his views on Kantian ethics) and his Principles of Political Obligation (on the common good).

A recent reprint of the Prolegomena has an excellent introduction by David Brink (OUP) (see also his Perfectionism and the Common Good). Copies of the Prolegomena and Political Obligation should be easy to find in many college libraries. They can also be found in Green’s Collected Works, and on line.

Provisional Syllabus
We have divided the contents of the Prolegomena into eight parts that do not exactly correspond to the main divisions of the work. The very brief description below will give some idea of the topics that might be treated each week.
A fuller synopsis of the work can be found in the very detailed Analytical Table of Contents.

1. Introduction
Green in relation to Kant and Hegel, and to earlier moral philosophy.

Prolegomena Book i Metaphysics of Knowledge
Book i consists of the metaphysical and epistemological outlook within which Green presents his moral theory. He offers an account of Kant’s transcendental idealism, introducing an ‘eternal consciousness’, which gradually manifests itself within time. The idea of gradual unfolding and development is carried over into Green’s account of the moral ideal.

2. Book ii The will
Green’s moral theory is intended to rest on his moral psychology, and especially on his analysis of desire, will, and free will. In his view, once we understand the nature of rational will, we see that its ultimate object is also the ultimate object of morality. The antithesis between self-interest and morality, therefore, turns out to be misconceived. Green argues from the recognition of a continuing self that is distinct from particular desires to the conclusion that a rational agent aims at self-satisfaction.

3. Book iii 1 The good and moral good.
Book iii, ‘The moral ideal and moral progress’ is the central section of the Prolegomena, in which Green argues that the general aim of self-satisfaction, when properly understood, requires a specific conception of the good, which supports a specific type of moral outlook.
The first part of the argument distinguishes Green’s conception of the rational end from a psychological hedonist conception. Green attributes such a conception to Mill in *Utilitarianism*.

4. Book iii 2-3 The moral ideal
In iii 2 Green argues for some formal characteristics of the good for rational agents, which involves an essential concern for other persons as such (§190-1). At this point he compares his position with the Kantian conception of a categorical imperative (§196-8).

In iii 3, on the origin and development of the moral ideal, Green explains how the good, as he has described it, is articulated in the idea of a common good, which underlies basic principles of morality. The scope of the common good develops from the good of a small group (e.g., family, friends, acquaintances) with whom one is immediately concerned to the common good of humanity (see, e.g., §207).

5. Book iii 4 Pleasure and the common good
Having partly expounded his conception of the common good, Green returns to hedonism – not the psychological doctrine that he discussed earlier, but the evaluative doctrine that would explain the common good as maximum pleasure. This is the position that Sidgwick defends in *Methods*. Green argues that hedonistic utilitarianism gives an inadequate account of the moral good.

6. Book iii 5 The development of the moral ideal: virtue
Green argues that the moral ideal develops itself into specific virtues with their own patterns of motivation and action. The outline of these virtues is presented in Aristotle’s account of the virtues of character. Green argues that these are the virtues required by the moral ideal as he has explained it, but the content envisaged by Aristotle needs to be revised in the light of greater understanding of the scope of the common good.

7. Book iv 1-2 The practical value of the moral ideal
Book iv ‘The application of moral philosophy to the guidance of conduct’ considers an objection that may strike a reader of the *Prolegomena* so far: Doesn’t this theory of the moral ideal, even if it is plausible, remain at a level of abstraction that makes it useless in practice?

In iv 1 Green’s answer to this question is both Yes and No. Yes, because it is a mistake to suppose that the proper test for a moral theory is its capacity to give answers to specific practical questions. No, because this theory is not useless in practice. It may be practically useful, not by giving us definite advice about what to do here and now, but by forming aims and aspirations that lead to the further development of the moral consciousness (see e.g. §308).

In iv 2 Green applies these arguments to questions about perplexity of conscience, and considers how far his theory might reasonably change our attitude to these.
8. Book iv 3-4 Perfectionism and utilitarianism

Book iv 3 The practical value of a hedonistic moral philosophy
Green compares the role, as he has expounded it, of his theory in relation to practice with the role that utilitarians attribute to their theory. Utilitarianism ostensibly differs from Green’s theory in presenting clear practical consequences, on the assumption that sufficient empirical information is available. Green asks whether this claim by utilitarians is justified.

Book iv 4 The practical value of utilitarianism compared with that of the theory of the good as human perfection
Green considers whether the implications of his perfectionism are equivalent to those of the most plausible version of utilitarianism. He discusses Sidgwick’s account of ultimate good in Methods iii 14. Sidgwick replies in EGSM.

The seminars will take place in the T.H. Green Seminar room (SR6), on the ground floor of 27 Banbury Rd. The house can be approached via the St Anne’s lodge, at 56 Woodstock Rd. You will need to ask for the code to the side door. The front door on Banbury Rd. cannot be opened from the outside, but we will open it briefly a minute or two before the start of each seminar.

Pascalian Risks
Dr Christian Tarsney – W. 2 – 4, Trajan House (Room 10.38)

Please contact the class-giver to let him know if you plan to attend (so there can be some idea of numbers expected).

Is expected value maximization the correct decision rule for situations involving minuscule probabilities of astronomically good or bad outcomes? For instance, if you can save one life for sure, or alternatively do something that has a one-in-500-million chance of saving 1 billion lives, should you prefer the latter option on the grounds that it saves two lives in expectation? A bit more generally, for any sure-thing payoff and any arbitrarily small probability $p$, is there some astronomically good payoff such that you should willingly forego the sure thing in exchange for probability $p$ of the astronomical payoff?

These questions loom large for real-world agents trying to do the most good with scarce resources, since we are often (at least apparently) faced with choices between doing a moderate amount of good in the near future, with reasonably high probability, versus doing an astronomical amount of good in the far future with very small probability, and in such real-world cases, expected value reasoning tends to favour the latter sort of option (or so many have argued).

In the first four weeks of this seminar, we will read and discuss the small but growing literature focused on exactly this question of “fanaticism” about small probabilities of extreme
outcomes. In the last four weeks, we will explore various related topics, to be chosen based on the interests of participants, potentially including: Pascal's wager; the St. Petersburg and Pasadena paradoxes; arguments for/against bounded expected utility maximization; the "precautionary principle" and whether we should be especially averse to certain "catastrophic" outcomes; the psychology of low-probability risks in decision-making; fanaticism in the context of moral uncertainty; and lexical/non-Archimedean views in population ethics.

All interested graduate students are welcome to participate. Participants are expected to do the reading marked "essential" before each meeting.

**Week 1**
*Essential reading*
- Bostrom, “Pascal’s mugging”
- Beckstead & Thomas, “A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values”

*Optional reading*
- Balfour, “Pascal's mugger strikes again”

**Week 2**
*Essential reading*
- Tarsney, “Exceeding expectations”
- Wilkinson, “In defence of fanaticism”

**Week 3**
*Essential reading*
- Goodsell, “A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation”
- Russell, “On two arguments for fanaticism”

*Optional reading*
- Russell and Isaacs (2021), “Infinite prospects”

**Week 4**
*Essential reading*
- Monton, “How to avoid maximizing expected utility”
- Lundgren and Stefansson, “Against the de minimis principle”

*Optional reading*
- Smith, “Is evaluative compositionality a requirement of rationality”
- Isaacs, “Probabilities Cannot Be Rationally Neglected”
- Schwitzgebel, "How to disregard extremely remote possibilities" (from “1% Skepticism”)