

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS (GRADUATE CLASSES)

TRINITY TERM 2022

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Much teaching is now taking place in person and live. Some teaching is given online and live. For some courses an existing recording will be made available.
- Links will be made available on Canvas for live online teaching, and to previous recordings.
- Wearing a face covering is now a personal choice. Please respect the choice of those continue to wear a face covering. Please consider wearing a face covering if you are Covid-negative but have other respiratory symptoms. For up-to-date information please see <https://www.ox.ac.uk/coronavirus/students>.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Times given here are UK times. Students attending remotely in other timezones should adjust their times accordingly.

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's graduate students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: History of Philosophy (*strictly for 1st-year BPhil students ONLY*)

Various class-givers and locations – F. 11 – 1

Group 1 - Prof Alexander Bown, Balliol College

Group 2 - Prof Marion Durand, Corpus Christi College

Group 3 - Prof Paul Lodge, Mansfield College

Group 4 - Prof William Mander, Harris Manchester College

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Trinity Term will cover key material in the history of philosophy, with groups 1 and 2 focussing on ancient philosophy, and groups 3 and 4 covering philosophy from the early modern period. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Aristotle's defence of natural slavery and its legacy

Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen - T. 9 – 11 (*starting week 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

'The god has left everyone free; nature has made no one a slave' (ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἢ φύσις πεποίηκεν) (*Rhet.* I 13, 1373b18-19). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle quotes this line from the lost Messenian speech of the sophist Alcidas with disapproval. He rejects the argument of those who hold that slavery is contrary to nature, a condition enforced from the outside rather than a reflection of intrinsic properties of the enslaved. Slavery is not a necessary *evil*, needed to secure the happiness of household and state, nor is a slave a victim of bad luck. Enslavement is just by nature, since some people are naturally suited to serve.

In this seminar, we will examine Aristotle's attempt to defend the institution of slavery in the *Politics* and explore its legacy. While Aristotle's arguments are repulsive, they were also historically influential. We will dissect the argument and the role it plays in Aristotle's political thought.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z and H

Prof David Charles and Prof Michail Peramatzis – Th. 11 – 1, online

This is a continuation of our seminar from TT21. We shall start with a summary of our take on the argument of *Metaphysics* Z.1-16 and shall go on to discuss Z.17, Book H, and (time permitting) Book Θ. We propose to read the argument of ZHΘ as relying on the requirements of priority and unity: primary substance ought to be prior to the things it is the substance of, and it ought to account for the unity of natural substance-kinds and their members. Each week we shall introduce our reading of a few chapters of Aristotle's text and discuss it with the participants.

Week 1

A Summary of the argument of *Metaphysics* Z.1-16 understood in the light of the requirements of priority and unity. Introduction to Z.17 (MP & DC)

Week 2

Z.17 continued (MP)

Week 3

H.1 (DC)

Week 4

H.2 (DC)

Week 5

H.3 (part I) (MP)

Week 6

H.3 (part II) (MP)

Week 7

H.4-5 (DC)

Week 8

H.6 and (perhaps) Θ (MP & DC)

Readings

Before each meeting it would be useful to read the relevant parts of the text, translation, and commentaries. We will also recommend one or at most two articles or chapters per meeting. The readings for week 1 are

Devereux D. (2003), ['The Relationship between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*'](#) *OSAP* 25,159-211

Owen G. E. L. (1978 - 1979), 'Particular and General', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 79, 1-21

Burnyeat M. F. (2001), *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, Pittsburgh, 1-29

***Text, Translation, and Commentaries**

Bostock D. (1994), *Aristotle: Metaphysics Z and H*, Oxford: OUP

Burnyeat M. F. et al. (1979), *Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: Philosophy Faculty

Burnyeat M. F. et al. (1984), *Notes on Books Eta and Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: Philosophy Faculty

Frede M. & Patzig G. (1988), *Aristoteles Metaphysik Z*, Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck

Jaeger W. (1957), *Aristotelis, Metaphysica*, OCT, Oxford: OUP

Ross W. D. (1924), *Aristotle: Metaphysics (text & commentary)*, Oxford: OUP

General

Ainsworth T. (2016), 'Form vs. Matter' in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/#Bib>)

*Burnyeat M. F. (2001), *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, Pittsburgh

Caston, V. (2008), 'Commentary on Charles' *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 24, 31–49

*Charles D. (2021), *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the 'Mind-Body Problem'*, Oxford: OUP

*Charles D. (2011), 'Some Remarks on Substance and Essence in *Metaphysics Z.6*' in Ierodiakonou K. and Morison B. (eds.), *Episteme etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes*, OUP

*Charles, D. (2010), 'Definition and Explanation in the *Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics*' in Charles, D (ed.), *Definition in Greek Philosophy*, 286–328. Oxford: OUP

*Charles, D. (2010), 'Metaphysics $\Theta.7$ and 8: Some Issues concerning Actuality and Potentiality' in Lennox, J. G. and Bolton, R. (eds.), *Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle*, Cambridge: CUP, 168–197

Charles D. (2008), 'Aristotle's Psychological Theory' *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 24, 2008, pp. 1–30

*Charles D. (2000), *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence*, Oxford, 2000.

*Charles, D. (1994), 'Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Identity'. In: Scaltsas, Charles, and Gill (eds.)

Code, A. (2015), 'The "Matter" of Sleep' in Ebrey, D (ed.), *Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science*, Cambridge: CUP, 11–45

Code, A. (2011), 'Commentary on Devereux' *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 26 (2011), 63–76

*Code, A. (1985), 'On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication' in: J. Bogen and J. E. McGuire (eds.), *How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 101-131

*Code, A. (1983), 'Aristotle: Essence and Accident' in: *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends*, R. Grandy and R. Warner, eds. Oxford), 411-439

- Corcilius K. (2022), *'The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the "Mind-Body Problem"'*, by David Charles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021', *Mind* (<https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab091>)
- Corkum P. (2013), 'Substance and Independence in Aristotle' in Schnieder B., Steinberg A. and Miguel Hoeltje (eds), *Varieties of Dependence*, Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, Philosophia Verlag: Munich
- Corkum P. (2008), 'Aristotle on Ontological Dependence', *Phronesis*, 53: 65-92
- Dahl N. (2019), *Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta*, Palgrave Macmillan
- *Devereux D. (2003), *'The Relationship between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle's Metaphysics'* OSAP 25,159-211
- *Devereux, D. (2011), 'Aristotle on the Form and Definition of a Human Being: Definitions and their Parts in Metaphysics Z.10 & 11' *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 26, 2011
- *Ferejohn, M. (1994), 'The Definition of Generated Composites in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*' in Scaltsas, Charles, and Gill (eds.), 291–318
- *Frede, M. (1990), 'The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z' in *Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote* (pp. 113–129), edited by D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin. Paris: Éditions du CNRS
- *Frede M. (1987), *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Minnesota, essays 3-4
- *Gill, ML. (2010), 'Unity of Definition in *Metaphysics* H.6 and Z.12' in Lennox, JG and Bolton R (eds.), *Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf*, Cambridge: CUP, 97–121
- Gill, ML. (2001), 'Aristotle's Attack on Universals' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, XIX: 235–60
- Gill, ML. (1993), 'Matter against Substance', *Synthese*, 96(3): 379–97
- *Gill M. L. (1989), *Aristotle on Substance*, Princeton.
- Irwin T. (1988), *Aristotle's First Principles*, Oxford: OUP
- *Judson L. R. (2000), 'Formlessness and the Priority of Form: *Metaphysics* Zeta 7-9 and Lambda 3', in David Charles and Michael Frede (eds), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum*, OUP: Oxford
- *Lewis F. (2013), *How Aristotle Gets by in Metaphysics Zeta*, Oxford: OUP
- Lewis F. (1991), *Substance & Predication in Aristotle*, Cambridge: CUP
- *Loux M. (1991), *Primary Ousia*, Cornell
- Meister S. (2020), *'Aristotle on the Purity of Forms in Metaphysics Z.10–11'* *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy* 7 (1):1-33
- Meister S. (forthcoming), *'Aristotle on the Relation between Substance and Essence'* *Ancient Philosophy*
- *Menn S. (draft), *The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, available at <https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/antike/mitarbeiter/menn/contents>
- *Owen G. E. L. (1978 - 1979), 'Particular and General', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 79, 1-21
- *Peramatzis M. (2018), 'Aristotle's Hylomorphism: The Causal-Explanatory Model', *Metaphysics*. 1(1), pp. 12–32. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/met.2>
- *Peramatzis M. (2015), 'What is a Form in Aristotle's Hylomorphism?', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 32.3, 195-216.

*Peramatzis M. (2014), 'Sameness, Definition, and Essence', *Studia Philosophica Estonica*, 7.3, Special Aristotle Issue, 1–26.

Peramatzis M. (2013-4), 'Matter in Scientific Definitions in Aristotle' in *Oxford Handbooks Online*. New York: Oxford University Press

*Peramatzis M. (2017), 'Aristotle's "Logical" Level of Metaphysical Investigation' in Christina Thörnqvist (ed.), *The Reception of Aristotle in the Middle Ages: The Works on Logic and Metaphysics*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto

*Peramatzis M. (2011), *Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP

*Peramatzis M. (2010), 'Essence & *per se* Predication in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z.4' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 39, pp. 121-182

Pfeiffer C. (2018), *Aristotle's Theory of Bodies*, Oxford: OUP

Reeve D. (2000), *Substantial Knowledge*, Hackett, 2000.

Scaltsas, D, Charles, D and Gill, ML. (eds.) (1994), *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP

Scaltsas T. (1994), *Substances & Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Cornell

*Wedin M. (2000), *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, Oxford: OUP

*Whiting, J. (1991), 'Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth' *The Philosophical Review*, 100(4): 607–639

*Whiting, J (1986), 'Form and Individuation in Aristotle' *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 3(4): 359–377

Witt C. (1989), *Substance & Essence in Aristotle*, Cornell

Frege and the Stoics

Prof Susanne Bobzien – M. 2.30 – 4.30 (weeks 5 to 8)

The subject is the extremely close relationship between a number of topics in philosophical logic and philosophy of language between Frege and the Stoics. The course is directed at graduates but should be accessible to interested undergraduates who have taken 108 philosophy of logic and language or 127 philosophical logic.

Heidegger's interpretation of Kant

Prof Joseph Schear and Prof Mark Wrathall – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will focus primarily on Heidegger's reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as it is presented in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (KPM)* and the associated lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (PIK)*. What does Heidegger's reading have to teach us about the first *Critique*? What does Heidegger's reading have to teach us about his own *Being and Time* project? Interpretations of Kant offered by Heidegger in other texts and lecture courses may also be consulted. If you are not a graduate student in philosophy, please email the class instructors for permission to attend. Preliminary schedule is as follows:

Week 1 (April 25): Introduction: The Kant interpretation & *Being and Time*

Week 2 (May 2): KPM §§1-5 & PIK §§5-6. Finite Intuition and the Problem of Metaphysics

Week 3 (May 9): The Kantian Imagination (reading TBA). Guest discussant: Sam Matherne (Harvard)

Week 4 (May 16): KPM §§4-8. Guest discussant: Thomas Pendlebury (Pittsburgh)

Week 5 (May 23): KPM §§3-4, §14, §§18-19, §26, §31. Guest discussant: Sacha Golob (KCL)

Week 6 (May 30): 'Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders : An Outline of Transcendental Philosophy as Object-Guided Philosophy' Guest discussant: Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)

Week 7 (June 6): KPM §§26-35 & PIK §§24-26. Guest discussant: Matthew Shockey (Indiana)

Week 8 (June 13): KPM §§32-34. Guest discussant: Stefan Kaufer (Franklin & Marshall)

Wittgenstein on Solipsism and the First Person

Prof Bill Child – Th. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room *except week 8*: Seminar Room)

The class is intended primarily for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4th year undergraduates reading Computer Science & Philosophy, Maths & Philosophy, or Physics & Philosophy are also welcome to attend. Others may also be admitted if space permits.

Please e-mail me (bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk) in advance if you would like to come to these classes. If you are in one of the categories specified above (Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4th year students studying CSP, MP, or PP) you are entitled to participate; but it will help me to know likely numbers in advance. If you are not in one of those categories, please get in touch anyway; I will let you know before the first class whether I can accommodate you.

The class will deal with the development of Wittgenstein's treatment of a series of questions about subjectivity and the self that feature prominently in his work from the *Tractatus* and *Notebooks 1914-16* to *Philosophical Investigations*. We will focus on two main themes: solipsism; and the first person. And we will explore two strands in Wittgenstein's remarks on each of those themes. In his treatment of *solipsism*, we will look at: (a) his discussion of solipsism as a general metaphysical view ('the world is my world' (*Tractatus*), 'the problem discussed by realists, idealists, and solipsists' (*Blue Book*); and (b) his discussion of solipsism as a view in the philosophy of mind in particular ('Only I feel real pain, only I really see (or

hear)', 'Only my own experiences are real' (*Blue Book*)). In Wittgenstein's treatment of *the first person*, we will look at: (c) his discussion of the meaning or function of the first-person pronoun, 'I'; and (d) his discussion of the first-person point of view more generally.

There is a small amount of essential reading each week, listed below. For further details of the class, including a selection of optional further readings, see Canvas.

Week 1 Solipsism in the *Tractatus*: 'The world is my world'

L. Wittgenstein *Notebooks 1914-16* – 23.5.15; 1.8.16 to 12.8.16; 2.9.16; 12.10.16-17.10.16

L. Wittgenstein *Tractatus* 5.541-5.5421, 5.6-5.641

Peter Sullivan 'The "Truth" in Solipsism and Wittgenstein's Rejection of the A Priori', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 4:2, 1996, pp. 195-219.

Week 2 *Philosophical Remarks* I: 'only the present experience has reality'

L. Wittgenstein *Philosophical Remarks* Part V, pp. 80-87; part VII, pp. 97-104

David Stern *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*, Oxford: OUP, 1995, ch. 5.

Week 3 *Philosophical Remarks* II: 'I', the self, and immediate experience

L. Wittgenstein *Philosophical Remarks* part VI, pp. 88-96.

Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed. B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979, pp. 49-50

Week 4 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Feb-March 1933: '2 kinds of use of "I"'

L. Wittgenstein *Wittgenstein Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933, From the Notes of G. E. Moore* eds D. Stern, B. Rogers and G. Citron, Cambridge: CUP, 2016, pp. 266-304

Week 5 The Blue Book I: Solipsism and the Philosophy of Mind

L. Wittgenstein *The Blue and Brown Books* pp. 44-74

Week 6 The Blue Book II: The use of 'I' as subject and the use of 'I' as object

L. Wittgenstein *The Blue and Brown Books* pp. 44-74

Rachael Wiseman 'The Misidentification of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification', *JPhil*, 2019, pp. 663-677.

Week 7 'Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data'

L. Wittgenstein 'Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data' in *Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*, eds. J. Klagge & A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.

Week 8 'I', the Self, Subjectivity, and Solipsism in *Philosophical Investigations*

L. Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* §§398-412

Colour and Appearance

Prof Will Davies and Prof Mike Martin – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

‘This brings me to what Dr Dawes Hicks says on the subject of colour and shape. He suggests that “the real colour will present a different aspect if another colour be reflected upon it” (p. 401) But surely we cannot speak of a colour “presenting an aspect”. A colour which presents a different aspect is a different colour, and there is an end of the matter.’ (Bertrand Russell, *Mind*, v22 Jan 1913, p.79) DISCUSS.

Materials will be available on Canvas. Please contact Will Davies and Mike Martin if you intend to attend the class.

Wk 1. An Introduction to Colour and Appearance

Essential Reading: Alex Byrne & David Hilbert 1997. Introduction to *Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color*. MIT Press.

Suggested Reading: Alex Byrne & David Hilbert 2021. The Science of Colour and Colour Vision. In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*, D. Brown & F. MacPherson (Eds). Routledge.

Wk 2. Appearance Talk and Appearances

Essential Reading: M. G. F. Martin. Variation and change in appearance.

Wk 3. Colour Constancy and Appearance Properties.

Essential Reading: Keith Allen 2016. *A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour*, Chapter 2: ‘Mind Independence.’ Oxford University Press.

Wk 4. The Argument from Illusion and Diaphaneity.

Essential Reading: M. G. F. Martin. The Lure of Illusion.

Wk 5. Modes of Colour Appearance

Essential Reading: Jonathan Westphal 1986. White. *Mind* 95 (379):310-28.

Wk 6. Predicating Colours

Essential Reading: Geoffrey Lloyd 2007. *Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind*, Chapter 1: Colour Perception. Clarendon Press.

Wk 7. Layering Theories of Illumination Perception

Essential Reading: Derek Brown 2014. Colour layering and colour constancy. *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 14(15): 1-31.

Wk 8. On the Reality of Colour

Essential Reading: Barry Stroud 2002. *The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour*, Chapter 6: Perceptions of Colour and the Colours of Things. Oxford University Press.

Metaphysics

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – Th. 4.30 – 6.30, Oriel College (Owen Walker Room)

The topic of this class will be properties – whether they exist and, if so, what they are. It is a traditional philosophical topic, going back to Plato, which has often been at the centre of philosophical discussion and, when not precisely at the centre, it has not been far from it. We will not deal with the topic historically, but systematically, and the papers and book chapters to be discussed will all be contemporary, in a broad sense of the word in which material from the last quarter of the 20th Century onwards counts as contemporary. Sessions will happen on Thursdays from 4.30 to 6.30, in the Owen Walker room, Oriel College (ask in the lodge for directions). Students will be expected to volunteer to introduce the material to be discussed.

Week 1. Introduction to the topic.

Week 2. David Lewis, 'New work for a theory of universals', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61/4 (1983). Also reprinted in *Properties*, edited by D H Mellor and A Oliver, Oxford University Press, 1997.

Week 3. David Armstrong, 'Properties I', chapter 3 of his *A World of States of Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Week 4. Michael Raven. 'A problem for immanent universals in states of affairs'. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2022.

Week 5. Peter van Inwagen, 'A Theory of Properties', in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, vol. 1, 2004.

Week 6. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. 'The Coextension Difficulty', Chapter 5 of his *Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals*. Oxford University Press, 2002 and 'Resemblance Nominalism without Modal Realism', unpublished.

Week 7. Nikk Effingham, 'Mereological Nominalism', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2018.

Week 8. Robert Garcia, 'Two ways to particularize a property' in *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 2015.

New work on Frege's Puzzle

Prof Ofra Magidor and Prof Tim Williamson – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

After giving a general introduction to Frege's Puzzle in week 1, we will take a fresh look at some of the classic works on the topic, as well as a discussion of some more contemporary papers. The proposed readings for each week are as follows (but might be adjusted as we go along). Most readings will be available on ORLO: <https://oxford.rl.talis.com/index.html>.

Background reading: Nelson, M., 'Propositional Attitude Reports', in *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.

Week 1:

Frege, G., (1948/originally 1892). 'On sense and reference' *Philosophical Review*, 57 (1948): 209–230.

Crimmins, M. and J. Perry, (1989). 'The prince and the phone booth: Reporting puzzling beliefs', *Journal of Philosophy* 86: 685–711.

Week 2:

Kripke, S., (1979), 'A puzzle about belief', in A. Margalit (ed.). *Meaning and Use*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, 239–283.

Saul, J. (1997), 'Substitution and simple sentences' *Analysis* 57: 102–108.

Week 3:

Stalnaker, R. (1984), 'Belief and belief attribution' and 'The problem of deduction', Chapters 4 and 5, of his *Inquiry*, MIT Press. (*chapter 5 is not ORLO, but a physical copy will be reserved in the library)

Field, H. (1986), 'Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's *Inquiry*', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 67 :98-112.

Week 4:

Mahtani, A. (2017), 'The *Ex Ante* Pareto Principle', *Journal of Philosophy* 114 (6): 303-323.

Mahtani, A. (2021), 'Frege's Puzzle and the *Ex Ante* Pareto Principle', *Philosophical Studies* 178: 2077-2100.

Week 5:

Williamson, T. (*forthcoming*), 'Epistemological consequences of Frege's Puzzle', forthcoming in *Philosophical Topics*.

Week 6:

Lewis, D. (1979), 'Attitudes de dicto and de se', *Philosophical Review* 88: 508–543.

Magidor, O. (2015), 'The myth of the de se', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 29: 249-283.

Week 7:

Goodman, J. and Lederman, H. (2021), 'Perspectivism', *Noûs* 55: 623-48.

Week 8:

Bacon, A. and Russell, J. (2019), 'The Logic of Opacity', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 99 :81-114.

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Prof Philipp Koralus – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The seminar will be a graduate-level introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. We will read both philosophical and scientific literature. Some of the likely topics covered will be the conceptual foundations of treating mind/brains as information processing devices, moral judgment, reasoning, cognitive architecture, and attention. We will also consider how some of these topics bear on artificial intelligence. To facilitate the logistics of having course meetings online, please sign up for the seminar by emailing me at philipp.koralus@philosophy.ox.ac.uk with the subject line "Cog Sci".

Philosophy and Literature

Prof Stephen Mulhall – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will not focus primarily on what is generally called 'the philosophy of literature', although various topics central to that field (eg the status of fictional entities, the relationship between author and reader, the significance of authorial intention) will surface along the way. My interest lies rather in the relationship between literature and philosophy more broadly conceived, and in particular upon the ways in which literature (contrary to its fateful Platonic banishment from the just city) might claim the right to make pertinent contributions not only to specific branches of philosophy (ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind) but to revising philosophy's conception of its own nature – its goals, its methods, and its resources.

The course will begin by examining the ways in which some philosophers have recently argued that literary texts should be seen as having a particularly important role to play in our thinking about ethics. The work of Nussbaum and Diamond will be discussed in relation to some of their most prominent philosophical critics (McMahan, O'Neill), and in relation to specific literary texts by Henry James and Iris Murdoch. These discussions quickly broaden out to encompass questions about the nature of rationality, its relation to emotion and embodiment, and the implications of these matters for our understanding of philosophy's own presuppositions as an intellectual enterprise. The primary reference point here will be Coetzee's Tanner Lectures, *The Lives of Animals*, which have prompted rich responses from a number of philosophers (Singer, McDowell, Diamond and Cavell), a full understanding of which will require not only an engagement with the moral standing of non-human animals but also a broader excursion into the nature of realism and modernism in the arts, particularly as interpreted by the art historian, critic and theorist Michael Fried. The final weeks of the course will then follow out some of the implications of this material,

either by looking in detail at more recent work by Coetzee (the 'Jesus' novels) or by David Foster Wallace (both his fiction and his non-fiction writing). The class participants will be able to choose which of these paths is taken.

The class will presuppose no prior understanding of the material to be discussed, and so will be accessible to students at any stage of the B. Phil programme (although it may of course be of particular relevance to students intending to write on topics in ethics and aesthetics). Graduate students in other programmes (in the philosophy faculty and in other faculties) will also be welcome to attend, with the class-giver's permission ([email](#)).

A draft reading list will be made available on ORLO. As the list makes clear, we will be discussing in detail a number of novels as we go along, and the first two (which are also the longest) will be encountered relatively early on in term; so it might be a good idea to read at least some of them before the class begins, rather than trying to do so together with the other assigned reading in any given week during term. The novels, in order of appearance, are:

Henry James, *The Golden Bowl*

Iris Murdoch, *The Black Prince*

J.M.Coetzee, *Elizabeth Costello*

J.M. Coetzee, *The Childhood of Jesus*

Art and Medium

Prof Catharine Abell and Prof James Grant – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

An artwork's medium helps to determine how it is to be interpreted and evaluated. Two perceptually indistinguishable artworks can differ in both meaning and value if one is a painting and the other a photograph, or if one is a digital photograph and the other an analogue photograph. This BPhil class will investigate a variety of philosophical issues concerning artistic media. These include the nature of artistic media; their relation to other art categories including artforms and styles; their interpretative and evaluative significance; and their relations to the activities of making and appreciating art. Students who wish to get a sense of the issues to be covered are advised to read Davies's "Medium in Art" beforehand.

Each seminar will be based on the reading for that week, which participants are expected to have read beforehand. They are also expected to have identified the philosophical issue(s) the author is addressing, their main claims and their arguments for those claims. They should also have reflected on the philosophical significance of the issues being addressed and have formulated any questions of clarification they have about the reading.

The provisional schedule is as follows:

Week 1: Walton, Kendall (1970) "Categories of Art", *The Philosophical Review*, 79(3): 334-367.

Week 2: Davies, David (2005) "Medium in Art", in Jerrold Levinson (Ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 3: Binkley, Timothy (1977) "Piece: Contra Aesthetics", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 35:3, pp. 265-277.

Week 4: Wollheim, Richard (1980) *Art and Its Objects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sections 21-23 inclusive and 28-33 inclusive.

Wollheim, Richard (1990) *Painting as an Art*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1, especially sections 1-10 inclusive.

Week 5: Danto, Arthur (1981) *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chapter 6.

Week 6: Gaut, Berys (2010) *A Philosophy of Cinematic Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7.

Week 7: Lopes, Dominic (2014) *Beyond Art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapters 3 and 7.

Week 8: Thomson-Jones, Katherine (2021) *Image in the Making: Digital Innovation and the Arts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 4.

Idealism and the Common Good: Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*

Prof Roger Crisp and Prof Terence Irwin – T. 1.30 – 3.15, St Anne's College (T H Green Room)

Thomas Hill Green (1836-82) was one of the British Idealists who introduced the philosophy of Hegel (1770-1831) into British philosophy. His main work, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, was published posthumously in 1883; it was based on lectures delivered in Oxford in the 1870s. This is the main text we will discuss in this class. We will focus primarily on Green's moral philosophy.

Green differs from Hegel, and from his younger contemporary F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) in so far as he takes himself to be a Kantian, though his views about Kant are influenced by his study of Hegel. One aim of his moral philosophy is to show that Kant and Hegel are reconcilable.

A further influence on Green's moral philosophy is Aristotle. In Green's view, the contrasts that many people claim to see between 'ancient' and 'modern' conceptions of

ethics are misconceived. Aristotle and Kant are not basically opposed, but turn out to affirm the same essential principles in ethics.

Green develops his views in comparison and contrast with those of John Stuart Mill (1806-73) and Henry Sidgwick (1837-1900), who formulate different versions of utilitarianism in response to criticisms of the views of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Sidgwick replies to Green's criticisms both in his *Methods of Ethics* (1st edn., 1874) and in his *The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau* (based on his lectures).

While the *Prolegomena* will be our main source, some of Green's other works (also derived from lectures) are also useful. These include his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant* (for his views on Kantian ethics) and his *Principles of Political Obligation* (on the common good).

A recent reprint of the *Prolegomena* has an excellent introduction by David Brink (OUP) (see also his *Perfectionism and the Common Good*). Copies of the *Prolegomena* and *Political Obligation* should be easy to find in many college libraries. They can also be found in Green's *Collected Works*, and on line.

Provisional Syllabus

We have divided the contents of the *Prolegomena* into eight parts that do not exactly correspond to the main divisions of the work. The very brief description below will give some idea of the topics that might be treated each week.

A fuller synopsis of the work can be found in the very detailed Analytical Table of Contents.

1. Introduction

Green in relation to Kant and Hegel, and to earlier moral philosophy.

Prolegomena Book i Metaphysics of Knowledge

Book i consists of the metaphysical and epistemological outlook within which Green presents his moral theory. He offers an account of Kant's transcendental idealism, introducing an 'eternal consciousness', which gradually manifests itself within time. The idea of gradual unfolding and development is carried over into Green's account of the moral ideal.

2. Book ii The will

Green's moral theory is intended to rest on his moral psychology, and especially on his analysis of desire, will, and free will. In his view, once we understand the nature of rational will, we see that its ultimate object is also the ultimate object of morality. The antithesis between self-interest and morality, therefore, turns out to be misconceived. Green argues from the recognition of a continuing self that is distinct from particular desires to the conclusion that a rational agent aims at self-satisfaction.

3. Book iii 1 The good and moral good.

Book iii, 'The moral ideal and moral progress' is the central section of the *Prolegomena*, in which Green argues that the general aim of self-satisfaction, when properly understood, requires a specific conception of the good, which supports a specific type of moral outlook.

The first part of the argument distinguishes Green's conception of the rational end from a psychological hedonist conception. Green attributes such a conception to Mill in *Utilitarianism*.

4. Book iii 2-3 The moral ideal

In iii 2 Green argues for some formal characteristics of the good for rational agents, which involves an essential concern for other persons as such (§190-1). At this point he compares his position with the Kantian conception of a categorical imperative (§196-8).

In iii 3, on the origin and development of the moral ideal, Green explains how the good, as he has described it, is articulated in the idea of a common good, which underlies basic principles of morality. The scope of the common good develops from the good of a small group (e.g., family, friends, acquaintances) with whom one is immediately concerned to the common good of humanity (see, e.g., §207).

5. Book iii 4 Pleasure and the common good

Having partly expounded his conception of the common good, Green returns to hedonism – not the psychological doctrine that he discussed earlier, but the evaluative doctrine that would explain the common good as maximum pleasure. This is the position that Sidgwick defends in *Methods*. Green argues that hedonistic utilitarianism gives an inadequate account of the moral good.

6. Book iii 5 The development of the moral ideal: virtue

Green argues that the moral ideal develops itself into specific virtues with their own patterns of motivation and action. The outline of these virtues is presented in Aristotle's account of the virtues of character. Green argues that these are the virtues required by the moral ideal as he has explained it, but the content envisaged by Aristotle needs to be revised in the light of greater understanding of the scope of the common good.

7. Book iv 1-2 The practical value of the moral ideal

Book iv 'The application of moral philosophy to the guidance of conduct' considers an objection that may strike a reader of the *Prolegomena* so far: Doesn't this theory of the moral ideal, even if it is plausible, remain at a level of abstraction that makes it useless in practice?

In iv 1 Green's answer to this question is both Yes and No. Yes, because it is a mistake to suppose that the proper test for a moral theory is its capacity to give answers to specific practical questions. No, because this theory is not useless in practice. It may be practically useful, not by giving us definite advice about what to do here and now, but by forming aims and aspirations that lead to the further development of the moral consciousness (see e.g. §308).

In iv 2 Green applies these arguments to questions about perplexity of conscience, and considers how far his theory might reasonably change our attitude to these.

8. Book iv 3-4 Perfectionism and utilitarianism

Book iv 3 The practical value of a hedonistic moral philosophy

Green compares the role, as he has expounded it, of his theory in relation to practice with the role that utilitarians attribute to their theory. Utilitarianism ostensibly differs from Green's theory in presenting clear practical consequences, on the assumption that sufficient empirical information is available. Green asks whether this claim by utilitarians is justified.

Book iv 4 The practical value of utilitarianism compared with that of the theory of the good as human perfection

Green considers whether the implications of his perfectionism are equivalent to those of the most plausible version of utilitarianism. He discusses Sidgwick's account of ultimate good in Methods iii 14. Sidgwick replies in EGSM.

The seminars will take place in the T.H. Green Seminar room (SR6), on the ground floor of 27 Banbury Rd. The house can be approached via the St Anne's lodge, at 56 Woodstock Rd. You will need to ask for the code to the side door. The front door on Banbury Rd. cannot be opened from the outside, but we will open it briefly a minute or two before the start of each seminar.

Pascalian Risks

Dr Christian Tarsney – W. 2 – 4, Trajan House (Room 10.38)

Please [contact the class-giver](#) to let him know if you plan to attend (so there can be some idea of numbers expected).

Is expected value maximization the correct decision rule for situations involving minuscule probabilities of astronomically good or bad outcomes? For instance, if you can save one life for sure, or alternatively do something that has a one-in-500-million chance of saving 1 billion lives, should you prefer the latter option on the grounds that it saves two lives in expectation? A bit more generally, for any sure-thing payoff and any arbitrarily small probability p , is there some astronomically good payoff such that you should willingly forego the sure thing in exchange for probability p of the astronomical payoff?

These questions loom large for real-world agents trying to do the most good with scarce resources, since we are often (at least apparently) faced with choices between doing a moderate amount of good in the near future, with reasonably high probability, versus doing an astronomical amount of good in the far future with very small probability, and in such real-world cases, expected value reasoning tends to favour the latter sort of option (or so many have argued).

In the first four weeks of this seminar, we will read and discuss the small but growing literature focused on exactly this question of "fanaticism" about small probabilities of extreme

outcomes. In the last four weeks, we will explore various related topics, to be chosen based on the interests of participants, potentially including: Pascal's wager; the St. Petersburg and Pasadena paradoxes; arguments for/against bounded expected utility maximization; the "precautionary principle" and whether we should be especially averse to certain "catastrophic" outcomes; the psychology of low-probability risks in decision-making; fanaticism in the context of moral uncertainty; and lexical/non-Archimedean views in population ethics.

All interested graduate students are welcome to participate. Participants are expected to do the reading marked "essential" before each meeting.

Week 1

Essential reading

Bostrom, "Pascal's mugging"

Beckstead & Thomas, "A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values"

Optional reading

Balfour, "Pascal's mugger strikes again"

Week 2

Essential reading

Tarsney, "Exceeding expectations"

Wilkinson, "In defence of fanaticism"

Week 3

Essential reading

Goodsell, "A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation"

Russell, "On two arguments for fanaticism"

Optional reading

Russell and Isaacs (2021), "Infinite prospects"

Week 4

Essential reading

Monton, "How to avoid maximizing expected utility"

Lundgren and Stefansson, "Against the *de minimis* principle"

Optional reading

Smith, "Is evaluative compositionality a requirement of rationality"

Isaacs, "Probabilities Cannot Be Rationally Neglected"

Schwitzgebel, "How to disregard extremely remote possibilities" (from "1% Skepticism")