

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS  
(UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES  
AND OTHER EVENTS)

TRINITY TERM 2022

## NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Much teaching is now taking place in person and live. Some teaching is given online and live. For some courses an existing recording will be made available.
- Links will be made available on Canvas for live online teaching, and to previous recordings.
- Wearing a face covering is now a personal choice. Please respect the choice of those continue to wear a face covering. Please consider wearing a face covering if you are Covid-negative but have other respiratory symptoms. For up-to-date information please see <https://www.ox.ac.uk/coronavirus/students>.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight ([james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)).

*Times given here are UK times. Students attending remotely in other timezones should adjust their times accordingly.*

# Lectures for the First Public Examination

## **Frege: *Foundations of Arithmetic***

Prof James Studd – T. W. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

These are the core lectures for first-year mathematic and philosophy students. We'll consider, among other things, Frege's attack on Mill's empiricism, Frege's views on number ascriptions, the 'Julius Caesar' problem, and Frege's attempt at a logicist reduction of arithmetic to Hume's Principle, and ultimately to his ill-fated theory of extensions.

Set Text: Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic* (trans. J. L. Austin)

## **The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence**

Dr Henrique Gomes – W. 2 – 3.30 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course will introduce the centuries-old debate about the nature of space and time. One main question will be whether space is absolute or relative; and indeed what are the various meanings of these two words. A key text in this debate is the correspondence between Samuel Clarke---representing the ideas of Isaac Newton---and Gottfried Leibniz. We will start with the background to the debate in the works of Galileo and Descartes. We will then see how both Newton and Leibniz responded to this background; and finally, we will contrast their arguments, while investigating Leibniz's metaphysical views in more detail. The course is primarily aimed at Physics & Philosophy students, but all are welcome.

# Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

## **103 Ethics I: Normative Ethics**

Prof Tom Sinclair – F. 10 (*week 1*), Examination Schools (room 6)

This is an extra lecture continuing on last term's series. The lecture will be on contractualism.

## **106b Philosophy of Social Science**

Prof Alexander Prescott-Couch – Th.10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Contemporary social science is extremely heterogeneous, with seemingly little consensus about methods and fundamental assumptions. While some social scientific projects take the form of causal analysis of large data sets, others primarily employ case studies or involve the construction of highly idealized models that bear only an indirect relation to real-world phenomena. Many anthropologists are interested less in causal questions and more in understanding the “meanings” of events or cultural practices. Some theorists believe that a deep understanding of society requires a functional analysis of key institutions, while other, more historically inclined researchers hold that understanding these institutions requires historical narratives or “genealogies.”

How should we think about this heterogeneity? Are these differences superficial, masking a single underlying set of fundamental aims and a unitary logic of scientific inference? Or do they indicate deep disagreement about the correct approach to studying society? Moreover, if such deep disagreements do exist, to what extent should we look to the natural sciences as a model in order to resolve them?

These lectures address these (and other) questions by examining classic debates in the philosophy of social science in light of contemporary social science and recent philosophy of science. Topics will include scientific explanation, the doctrine of *Verstehen*, idealization and modeling, functional explanation, historical narrative, critical theory and ideology, social metaphysics, and the role of values in science. The aim is to show how examining social science can provide a fuller picture of substantive and methodological commitments of the sciences as well as how philosophical analysis might inform methodological discussion within social science itself.

### **108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language**

Prof Paul Elbourne – W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will concentrate on the philosophy of language and will explore the central topics of meaning (including internalism and externalism about meaning), truth, and reference (including the semantics of definite descriptions, names, and indexicals).

### **109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism**

Dr Adriana Clavel-Vazquez – M. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will cover the following topics:

- Theories of art
- Aesthetic value I
- Aesthetic value II
- Interpretation and criticism
- Aesthetic and ethical values
- Emotion and art I
- Emotion and art II
- Art and problems of authenticity

### **113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Nietzsche**

Prof Peter Kail – M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures provide a general introduction to Nietzsche's philosophy, with particular emphasis on his naturalistic critique of modern Western morality. After a brief overview of his life and works, we shall turn to his *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM) and work through that text. GM will serve as a springboard for a discussion of topics that will bring in material from other works from Nietzsche's so-called middle and late works, including *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *Twilight of the Idols*. The topics discussed include naturalism, genealogy, 'Christian' morality, self, agency and freedom. In preparation for these lectures, students are encouraged to read GM.

**Plato: *Protagoras* (for Second Classical Language at Greats)**

Sybilla Pereira – F. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These lectures are aimed at Lit. Hum. students doing the second classical language paper for Greats, in which the *Protagoras* features as one of the set texts. Anyone with an interest in Plato's philosophy is welcome to attend – a degree of familiarity with the text will be assumed, but the course could also serve as a philosophical introduction for those interested in reading the text for the first time.

Each lecture will present a philosophical issue in the text, followed by a practice run in small groups of philosophical commentary of selected excerpts (also known as 'gobbets') which will then be collectively discussed. A weekly office hour will be offered to give students preparing for the exam the opportunity for further feedback.

Lecture schedule:

Week 1: The Setting of the *Protagoras*: Is Virtue Teachable? (309-320)

Week 2: The Unity of Virtue (320-335)

Week 3: What to do with *Logoi*: Conversational Norms and Methodological Considerations (335-349)

Week 4: The Possibility of *Akrasia* (350-362)

## Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

### **The 2022 John Locke Lectures: *Reports of what we say, know, or believe***

Prof Angelika Kratzer (Massachusetts Amherst) – W. 5 – 7 (weeks 1 to 6), Keble College (H B Allen Lecture Theatre)

*The Faculty is delighted to welcome Professor Angelika Kratzer, who will give the John Locke Lectures in Trinity Term 2022. After the first lecture, there will be a drinks reception, with the generous support of Oxford University Press.*

Attitude ascriptions and speech reports are a litmus test for any semantic theory. They were at the center of discussion when philosophers and logicians became interested in natural language and began to develop the semantic frameworks we are relying on today. Mastery of attitude ascriptions and speech reports is a milestone in the cognitive development of a child and the human species as a whole.

Attitude and speech reports are built from smaller building blocks that combine and recombine to produce the interpretations those reports have. My lectures will be a search for those building blocks and for clues about how they might interact with each other. The goal – like that of any semantic theory – is a typology where the combinatorics of building blocks generates the range of possible interpretations of the constructions we are trying to understand.

### **The 2022 Nellie Wallace Lectures: *The Just Society and its Enemies, Rereading Plato's Republic in 2022***

Prof Rachel Barney (Toronto) – T. 3.30 – 5 (weeks 2 to 7), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

*The Faculty is delighted to welcome Professor Rachel Barney, who will give the Nellie Wallace Lectures in Trinity Term 2022. After the first lecture, there will be a drinks reception at Radcliffe Humanities.*

Since the publication of Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* in 1945, Plato's political ideas in the *Republic* have generally been shunned with distaste. These lectures will make a case for the permanent value of the *Republic* as a work of political theory. While it has detailed and highly pertinent arguments to make about the requirements for a just society, it is a book not so much about justice or politics itself as about the preconditions for both: about the features of human nature and society which make the problem of injustice universal, urgent, and -- just barely -- solvable.

## Topics in Modal Logic

Mr Michael Bevan – W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The aim is to give a short course in aspects of propositional modal logic and its metatheory not otherwise covered in the 127 Philosophical Logic course. In particular: proofs of completeness and canonical model construction; non-normal logics, and extensions of the Kripke semantics including non-standard worlds and neighborhood semantics. Especially with the latter topics I want to highlight philosophical applications to areas such as epistemic and doxastic logic, and where appropriate I will also aim to sketch some of the historical context to certain developments.

### Lecture 1: Completeness and Canonicity for Normal Systems

In the first lecture I present the basic definitions of the propositional language we will be working in, the definition of a modal logic, and recall the definitions of the standard systems K, D, T, B, S4 and S5 familiar from 127. I also recall the Kripke semantics, and introduce the definition of a logic's canonical model and frame, explaining how this can be used to supply to completeness results for various normal modal logics.

### Lecture 2: Neighborhoods

When presented with the standard systems mentioned above, curious students may want to ask what *other* modal logics there are. Even once we note the abundance of different normal logics besides the familiar six, we may ask (i) is there anything stronger than S5? (ii) Is there anything weaker than K? (iii) Where did S1-S3 go? The answer to (i) turns out to be yes, but these extensions are rather uninteresting and catalogued by Scrogg's theorem, which I state but don't prove. Question (ii) has a far more interesting answer, and leads us to consider non-normal modal logics, which either omit K's distribution axiom or else fail to admit the necessitation rule. The standard Kripke semantics cannot supply interpretations for non-normal modal logics, and so must be generalised for this purpose. In this lecture I introduce the Scott-Montague 'neighborhood' semantics, and consider the wider classes of 'classical', 'monotonic', and 'regular' logics which properly extend the class of normal systems. Just as K is the minimal normal logic, I introduce E, M, and C as the minimal logics of these respective classes, and sketch how completeness proofs proceed along similar lines to those in the Kripke semantics.

### Lecture 3: Strange New Worlds

Question (iii) posed in the previous lecture also has a very interesting answer, which allows us to go into some of the historical development of modal logic and modal semantics, and into an alternative extension of the Kripke semantics which is distinct from the neighborhood semantics. I outline C. I. Lewis' original motivation for introducing logics of strict implication and thus initiating modern modal logic. I briefly set out the original 'strict implication' formulation of S1-S3. Then I present Gödel's innovation of formulating modal languages with a unary necessity operator, and present in more detail E. J. Lemmon's much simpler

formulations of S1-S3 in these terms, as well as his own system S0.5. S0.5-S3 are non-normal, but also non-classical, so the neighborhood semantics will not be able to supply them with completeness results. Thankfully, an extension to the Kripke semantics presented by Kripke himself will provide us with the tools needed for this task. 'Non-standard worlds' are worlds wherein formulas of the form  $\Box\phi$  are evaluated differently to how they are in worlds of standard Kripke models; perhaps they are always true, or always false, or arbitrarily true or false. Kripke used this extended semantics to supply completeness for S2 and S3; Cresswell later used them to supply completeness for S0.5 and S1. The process of proving completeness in the extended Kripke semantics is also sketched, though only for the simpler cases of S2 and S3. To finish this discussion, I consider the very strange, but very strong systems S6 and S7, which result from the addition of the axiom  $\Diamond\Diamond p$  to S2 and S3 respectively.

#### **Lecture 4: Non-Normal Modal Logics and Philosophy**

What is a broader view on modal logic good for? Modal logics can be used by philosophers to model various important notions in pursuit of regimenting claims and evaluating arguments. For many of these notions, like knowledge, belief, obligation, and so on, the standard systems are arguably far too strong; we may need fragments of the familiar normal systems which do not prove too much in order to provide correct logics for these notions. In other cases, we may need non-normal logics which are not weaker than the standard systems but simply develop in another direction. For example, *pace* the views of some, it seems that the correct logic of the operator 'it is a propositional tautology that...' should include very strong theorems like the S6/7 theorem  $\neg\Box\Box p$ , which is only consistent in the absence of necessitation. Generally, a too-narrow conception of the variety of modal logics on offer may lead one to expect too much of the standard systems, and to use these or other normal systems to model notions for which they are inappropriate. A broader view on modal logic can correct against errors of this kind.

#### **Philosophy of Economics**

Prof Jean Baccelli – Th. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These undergraduate lectures will introduce to selected topics in the philosophy of economics. The following outline and background reading list are tentative and they may be revised along the way. Going beyond the specific topics to be discussed in class, the following general references are recommended.

##### Textbooks:

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition).

### Handbooks:

Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors. *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

### Anthology:

Daniel Hausman, editor. *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

## **1. Introduction**

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapter 1 (“The Why, What and How of Philosophy of Economics”).

Roger Backhouse and Steven Medema. Retrospectives: On the Definition of Economics. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 23(1):221–233, 2009.

Gary Becker. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Chapter 1 (“The Economic Approach to Human Behavior”).

Lionel Robbins. *An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science*. London: Macmillan, 1932 (Second Edition). Chapter 1 (“The Subject-Matter of Economics”).

### Further readings:

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Introduction (“The New Philosophy of Economics”).

Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson. The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative Economics. In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, 226–250. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

Harry Landreth and David Colander. *History of Economic Thought*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin College Division, 2002 (Fourth Edition). Chapters 14 (“The Development of Modern Microeconomic Theory”), 15 (“The Development of Modern Macroeconomic Theory”), and 16 (“The Development of Econometrics and Empirical Methods in Economics”).

## **2. Rationality**

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapters 3 (“Rational-Choice Theory”) and 4 (“Game Theory”).

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.

Wade Hands. Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory. *Erkenntnis*, 78(5):1081–1108, 2013.

### Further readings:

Erik Angner. What Preferences Really Are. *Philosophy of Science*, 85(4): 660–681, 2018.

Francesco Guala. Preferences: Neither Behavioural Nor Mental. *Economics & Philosophy*, 35(3):383–401, 2019.

Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish, and Joseph Kadane. When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. *Philosophy of Science*, 1990(1):517–524, 1990.

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1,

701–728. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

### 3. Idealization

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapter 7 (“Models, Idealization, Explanation”).

Till Grüne-Yanoff. Genuineness Resolved: A Reply to Reiss’ Purported Paradox. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 20(3):255–261, 2013.

Menno Rol. Reply to Julian Reiss. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 20 (3):244–249, 2013.

Robert Sugden. How Fictional Accounts Can Explain. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 20(3):237–243, 2013.

#### Further readings:

Mary Morgan and Tarja Knuuttila. Models and Modelling in Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, 49–87. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Robert Sugden. Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 7(1):1–31, 2000.

Michael Weisberg. Three Kinds of Idealization. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 104(12):639–659, 2007.

### 4. Methodology

Daniel Hausman. *The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Chapter 12 (“Economics as an Inexact and Separate Science”).

Milton Friedman. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Chapter 1 (“The Methodology of Positive Economics”).

Bruce Caldwell. *Beyond Positivism*. New York: Routledge, 1994 (Second Edition). Chapter 8 (“Friedman’s Methodological Instrumentalism”).

Daniel Hausman. Why Look Under the Hood? In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, 183–187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

#### Further readings:

Nancy Cartwright. The Vanity of Rigour in Economics: Theoretical Models and Galilean Experiments. In Philippe Fontaine and Robert Leonard, editors, *The Experiment in the History of Economics*, 118–134. New York: Routledge, 2005.

John Earman, John Roberts, and Sheldon Smith. Ceteris Paribus Lost. *Erkenntnis*, 57(3):281–301, 2002.

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The Case for Mindless Economics. In Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, *The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics*, 3–39. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

### 5. Welfare

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition). Chapter 8 (“Welfare”).

Amartya Sen. Capability and Well-Being. In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, editors, *The Quality of Life*, 30–53. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993.

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, 1179–1285. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Sections 4 (“Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons”) and 5 (“The Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons”).

Further readings:

Christian List. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? *Erkenntnis*, 58(2):229–260, 2003.

Anna Alexandrova. *A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Chapter 2 (“Is There a Single Theory of Well-Being?”).

Marc Fleurbaey. Equivalent Income. In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, 453–475. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

## 6. Unanimity

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017 (Second edition). Chapter 2 (“Unanimity”).

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition). Chapter 9 (“Welfare Economics”).

Amartya Sen. Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. *Economica*, 43(171):217–245, 1976.

Philippe Mongin. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle. *Economics and Philosophy*, 32(3):511–532, 2016.

Further readings:

John Chipman. Compensation Principle. In Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, volume 2, 38–48. London: Palgrave–MacMillan, 2008.

John Weymark. Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 48(2):269–294, 2017.

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018.

## 7. Justice

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (Second Edition). Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Amartya Sen. Utilitarianism and Welfarism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (9):463–489, 1979.

Bertil Tungodden. Equality and Priority. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 411–432. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Further readings:

Marc Fleurbaey. On the Informational Basis of Social Choice. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 21(2):347–384, 2003.

John Roemer. Welfarism and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory. *Recherches économiques de Louvain*, 56(3-4): 287–301, 1990.

William Thomson. Fair Allocation. In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, 193–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

## 8. Policy

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Libertarian Paternalism. *American Economic Review*, 93(2):175–179, 2003.

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapter 15 (“Behavioral Economics and Nudge”).

Till Grüne-Yanoff. Old Wine in New Casks: Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 38(4):635–645, 2012.

Luc Bovens. The Ethics of Nudge. In Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson, editors, *Preference Change*, 207–219. Heidelberg: Springer, 2009.

Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux, and Robert Sugden. Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 23(1): 1–25, 2016.

### Further readings:

Erik Angner and Georges Loewenstein. Behavioral Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, 641–689. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Pelle Hansen. The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the Hand Fit the Glove? *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 7(1):155–174, 2016.

Philippe Mongin and Mikaël Cozic. Rethinking Nudge: Not One but Three Concepts. *Behavioural Public Policy*, 2(1):107–124, 2018.

Till Grüne-Yanoff and Ralph Hertwig. Nudge versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory? *Minds and Machines*, 26(1-2):149–183, 2016.

## Kant’s Third Critique

Maya Krishnan – F. 11, All Souls College (Old Library)

This lecture series introduces the core ideas of Kant’s aesthetics (the first half of the third *Critique*). Topics explored will include beauty, sublimity, the relationship between art and knowledge, and the relationship between art and morality. Emphasis will also be placed on understanding why the third *Critique* has served as a source of inspiration to contemporary Kantian philosophers and theorists (Piper, Ngai), as well as to the Romantics and post-Kantian German Idealists (Coleridge, Fichte). Lectures will be held at 11am on Friday, Weeks 1-4, in the Old Library of All Souls College.

1. Kantian aesthetic judgments
2. Kant’s Deduction of Taste: Aesthetics and knowledge
3. The Sublime: Aesthetics and morality
4. The divine mind, imagination, and poetry

## Chinese Philosophy

Dr Rafal Banka – T. W. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The series of lectures is aimed at presenting an outline of the Chinese philosophical tradition. It is thematically composed of three parts:

- the distinctive features and intuitions of Chinese philosophy
- the discussion of the most important and influential schools of classical Chinese philosophy
- showing how Chinese philosophy is continued nowadays

Where relevant, Sino-Western comparisons and the possible contribution of Chinese thought to contemporary philosophical research will be discussed.

The lectures will cover the following topics:

1. Characteristic features of Chinese philosophy.
2. The proto-metaphysical character of the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經).
3. Metaphysics in philosophical Daoism (*Daojia* 道家) in the *Daodejing* (道德經).
4. The practical dimension of Daoism in the *Zhuangzi* (莊子).
5. Introducing Confucianism: the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語).
6. Confucian concept of human nature: the *Mencius* (*Mengzi* 孟子).
7. Beyond the Confucian mainstream: the *Xunzi* (*Xunzi* 荀子).
8. Mohist critique of Confucianism — the *Mozi* (墨子).
9. The political philosophy of the Legalists (*Fajia* 法家).
10. The relevance of Chinese philosophy to selected ethical issues I: experimental philosophy approach.
11. The relevance of Chinese philosophy to selected ethical issues I: the ethics of care.
12. Chinese philosophy and language.
13. Buddhism in Chinese philosophy.
14. Neo-Confucianism.
15. Trajectories of Chinese Philosophy in the 20th and 21st Century I: Xiong Shili (熊十力).
16. Trajectories of Chinese Philosophy in the 20th and 21st Century II: Li Zehou (李澤厚).