Alex Moran

alex moran
Area of Specialisation:
Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship (2019-2022)
Mind Studentship (2018-2019)
Jacobsen Fellowship (2017-2018)
PhD at the University of Cambridge, Queens' College (2014-2019)
BPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, University College (2012-2014)


2021 'Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28 (9/10): 163-180. 
2021 'Memory Disjunctivism: A Causal Theory', Review of Philosophy and Psychology, DOI:
2021 'Living Without Microphysical Supervenience', Philosophical Studies , DOI:
2019 'Naïve Realism, Hallucination, Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 27 (2): 368-382.
2019 'Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97 (2): 368-382.
2018 'The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts', Ratio, 31 (3): 273-284.
2018 'Kind-Dependent Grounding', Analytic Philosophy, 59 (3): 359-390.


Edited special edition

Is consciousness everywhere? Essays on panpsychism. Special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, co-edited with Philip Goff. 28 (9/10). 
Objects and Properties, co-edited with Carlo Rossi, to appear with Oxford University Press.


Review pieces

'The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau', forthcoming in Philosophy in Review.
'Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, by Philip Goff', April 2020, Times Literary Supplement. 
'Animalism: New Essays on Persons,  Animals, and Identity, by Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon (eds)',  Philosophy in Review, 37 (3): 94-96 (2017).


My current research focuses primarily on issues concerning the philosophy of perception, as well as the various traditional problems of consciousness. I also write about various topics in contemporary metaphysics. Further areas of interest include aspects of early modern philosophy, early analytic philosophy, and metaethics.