Federico Bongiorno

federico bongiorno
I am a postdoctoral researcher in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, where I am funded by an award from the Mind Association. I completed my PhD at the University of Birmingham in 2020 under the supervision of Lisa Bortolotti, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, and Craig French. In the spring of 2019, I was a visiting scholar at Yale collaborating with Phil Corlett on research into Bayesian models of psychosis. I hold a BA and MA in philosophy from the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University of Milan, and a second MA in philosophy from Durham University.
Forthcoming

"Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

2020 "Is the Capgras Delusion an Endorsement of Experience?", Mind & Language, (35:3), 293-312
2019 "The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation", in T. Chan & A. Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness (New York: Routledge), 74-97 (with Lisa Bortolotti)

 

My research lies at the interface of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and the philosophy of psychiatry. Much of my work focuses on the nature and origins of delusions, as well as their epistemic standing. I am also interested in a broad spectrum of questions about belief and perception, such as the cognitive mechanisms behind belief fixation and change, their function, the difference between beliefs and other mental states, bad cases of perception, and the nature of perceptual justification and content.