I work primarily in philosophy of mind, and related areas of epistemology and metaphysics. My dissertation addresses the question of what explains the intuition of dualism, the intuition that consciousness is nonphysical. I argue that the intuition of dualism is explained by the intuitiveness of the thesis of revelation, according to which the nature of phenomenal properties is revealed in phenomenal experience. I am also interested in philosophy of pain and philosophy of emotion.
In 2018, I was a visiting student at the Australian National University. Before my DPhil, I completed the BPhil at Oxford and an undergraduate degree (PhB Arts) in linguistics and philosophy at the Australian National University.
'Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation’ forthcoming in Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics, ed. D. Shottenkirk, M. Curado, and S. Gouveia, Routledge.
‘Pain and Spatial Inclusion: Evidence from Mandarin’ (w/ Colin Klein) forthcoming in Analysis.