|
2019 - 2022
|
Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, University of Oxford |
| 2018-2019 |
Junior Research Fellow, Durham University |
| 2016-2018 |
IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University College Dublin |
| 2015-2016 |
Stipendiary Researcher, University of Oslo |
| 2015 |
Ph.D in Philosophy, University of St Andrews & University of Oslo |
| 2009 |
MA in Philosophy, University College London |
| 2007 |
BA in Philosophy, University College London |
‘Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy’
Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
‘Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and The Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’’
Forthcoming in Utilitas
‘Dilemmic Epistemology’
Forthcoming in Synthese
‘Knowledgeable Assertion in the Image of Knowledgeable Belief’
Forthcoming in Inquiry
‘Uniqueness, Rationality, and The Norm of Belief’
Forthcoming in Erkenntnis
‘Guidance, Obligations, and Ability: A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument For Ought-Implies-Can'
Utilitas. Vol. 30 (1) pp. 73-85. (2018)
‘No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief’
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Vol 6. (3) pp. 157-166 (2017)
‘Do We Matter?’
Aeon Magazine, June 2017
‘Consistency and Evidence’
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 169 (2), pp. 333-338 (2014)
‘Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason That p?’
Episteme, Vol. 11 (4), pp. 457-462 (2014)
Epistemology, Normative Ethics
