Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Seminar

In Hilary Term 2022, we plan to meet in person in the Lecture Room, with the possibility of joining remotely.

The Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Group provides a forum for Faculty members, graduate students, and visiting scholars to discuss their current works-in-progress in philosophy of mind.

Seminars in HT22 are on Fridays 13.30 - 15.00 in weeks 1, 4 and 6. All are welcome.

The format is usually read-ahead, with the paper usually circulated on the Monday before the Friday seminar. Those intending to attend a particular session should email Nicholas Shea in advance to be put on the circulation list for that week’s paper and meeting link.

Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Convenor: Nicholas Shea

Week 2 (22nd Oct)

Nicholas Shea

Computationally Useful Processing Organisation

Week 4 (21st May)

Alex Moran 

Knowing the Qualitative 

Week 6 (4th June) 

Maya Krishnan

A Kantian criticism of modal rationalism 

Week 2 (29th Jan)    

Lucy Campbell 

'Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, and Perceptual Self-Knowledge'
Week 4 (12th Feb)      Patrick Butlin

'Model-based Reinforcement Learning and Action for Reasons'


Week 2 (23rd Oct)

Umut Baysan

'The causal argument for Russellian panpsychism'
Week 4 (6th Nov) Dominic Alford-Duguid

'Whence come properties before the mind?'

Week 6 (20th Nov) Will Davies 

'Seen the Light?'


Week 2 (7th May) Alex Moran (Oxford) 'Causative Disjunctivism'
Week 4 (21st May) Laurenz Casser(Texas) 'Pain is modular'


Week 2 (31 January)                                                Jake Quilty-Dunn (Oxford)                                Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think about Awfulness and Death
Week 4 (14 February)     Will Davies (Oxford) A Relational Theory of Colour Constancy


Week 2 (25th October) Marc Artiga (Valencia) 'Radical Liberal Representationalism'
Week 5 (15th November)             Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott (Oxford)    'On Being Internally the Same' 
Week 8 (6th December) Nicholas Shea (Oxford) 'Drawing on the Meaning of a Concept'


Week 1 (3 May): Joulia Smortchkova - First impressions and mind misreading

Week 3 (17 May): Umut Baysan - The non-mental life of some groups

Week 5 (31 May): Ben Sorgiovanni - Past-Tense Self-Knowledge

Week 7 (14 Jun): Nicholas Shea - The Role of Non-Conceptual Metacognition in Reasoning

Week 3 (1st February): Dominic Alford-Duguid - 'On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure'

Week 5 (15th February): Anne Jacobson - ‘Reading and the Clark-Chalmers extended mind’ 

Week 7 (1st March): Mike Martin - 'Embedded Information'


Week 1 (12 Oct): Jake Quilty-Dunn: 'Is iconic memory iconic?'

Week 3 (26 Oct): Sam Clarke: 'Perception is Analogue: the common format hypothesis revisited' 

Week 5 (9 Nov): Joulia Smortchkova: 'Representational Kinds'

Week 7 (23 Nov): Matthew Parrott: 'Delusional Predictions and Explanations' 

Week 1 (27 April): Zoe Jenkin: 'The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition'

Week 3 (11 May): Ben Sorgiovanni: 'Agentialism and Memory'

Week 5 (25 May): Margot Strohminger: ‘What underlies supposition and imagination?’

Week 7 (8 June): Nicholas Shea: ‘Is There Concept-Metacognition?'

Week 2 (26 Jan): Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg, 'No Representation without Misrepresentation'

Week 4 (9 Feb): Umut Baysan, 'Mad Qualia'

Week 6 (23 Feb): Casey Doyle, 'Conscious Judgment and Doxastic Self-Knowledge'

Week 8 (9 Mar): Anita Avramides, 'Disjunctivism and Other Minds'

Week 1 (13 Oct): Jake Quilty-Dunn

Week 3 (27 Oct): Cressida Gaukroger

Week 5 (10 Nov): Joulia Smortchkova

Week 7 (24 Nov): Dick Passingham

Week 2: Session with Alex Kaiserman, Oxford (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College)

Week 4: Alisa Mandrigin, Edinburgh (to be held in SR 3 in St Anne’s College)

Week 6: Anne Jacobson, Oxford (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College) 'Norms and Neuroscience: the case of Borderline Personality Disorder'

Week 8: Anna Marmodoro, George Darby & Robin Murphy (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College)

Week 2: 27th January - Cressida Gaukroger (Oxford) 'How to Individuate Concepts' in Seminar Room 1

Week 4: 10th February - Tom McClelland (Warwick) 'The Mental Affordance Hypothesis' in Seminar Room 1

Week 6: 24th February - Sophie Archer (Oxford) in Seminar Room 1

Week 8: 10th March - John Michael (Warwick) in Seminar Room 6 *this is in a different building to the usual seminar room*

Week 3: Denis Buehler (Oxford) 'Occurrent Agential Control'
** not week 2 as previously advertised **

Week 4: Lucy Campbell (Oxford) 'Self-Knowledge and the Alt-Ground Test'

Week 6: Nick Shea (Institute of Philosophy)

Week 8: Derek Brown (Brandon, soon to be at Glasgow)

Week 4: Joseph Schear (Oxford) 'Is all consciousness self-consciousness?'

Week 6: James Stazicker (Reading) 'Partial Report, Consciousness and Self-Knowledge'

Week 8: Peter Forrest (Oxford) 'Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?'

Week 2: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper (Oxford), 'What is the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness?'

Week 4: Anya Farennikova (Bristol), 'Seeing Absence' (Anya will present a paper so there is no need to read ahead, though anyone wishing to might look at her paper on 'Seeing Absence' in Phil Studies 166:3 (2013))

Week 6: Myrto Mylopoulos (Jean Nicod), 'Intentions and Agentive Awareness'

Week 2: Ian Phillips, 'Unconscious Perception Reconsidered'

Week 4: Josh Shepherd, 'Conscious experience and knowledge of action'

Week 6: Neil Levy, 'Implicit bias and moral responsibility: probing the data'

Week 1: Amit Saad, 'Achilles Last Stand- a solution to the Kripkenstein Paradox' (Commentator: Anil Gomes)

Week 3: Alex Moran, 'Naïve Realism, The Time-Lag Argument, and Eternalism' (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)

Week 5: Helen De Cruz, 'Are philosophical intuitions a natural kind? (Commentator: Joshua Shepherd) [Please note venue change - Ryle Room this week]

Week 7: Istvan Aranyosi, 'Explanatory-role functionalism' (Commentator: Bill Child)

Week 3: Alex Kaiserman, Interventions and Mental Surgery (Commentator: Joshua Shepherd)

Week 5: Paul Lodge, Leibniz’s Mill Argument Against Mechanical Materialism Revisited (Commentator: Martin Pickup)

Week 7: Jonathan Erhardt, Gods, Minds, and Other Physical Things (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)

Week 3: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper, Temporal Presence and Time Lags (Commentator: Ian Phillips)

Week 5: Joshua Shepherd, Consciousness, Control, and Zombie Action (Commentator: Alex Moran)

Week 7: Peter Forrest, Cognitive Phenomenology and the Fringe (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)

Week 3: Lee Walters, The invalidity of the argument from illusion

Week 5: Scott Sturgeon, Epistemic Attitudes

Week 7: Declan Smithies, Belief and Moore's Paradox

Week 3: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper, Individuating experiences and the unity of consciousness

Week 5: Michael Sollberger, Conscious Experience and Delusions of Inserted Thoughts

Week 7: Jeremy Goodman, Perceptual Experience: Back to Basics