

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2024

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person. You should not expect recordings to be made available on a general basis.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Litterae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

Elements of Deductive Logic

Prof Alex Paseau – T. 12, Maths Institute (L1)

Elements of Deductive Logic is primarily a course in metalogic. Our focus will be the metatheory of propositional logic. We'll examine several important results, notably the soundness and completeness of the natural deduction system from Introduction to Logic with respect to truth-table semantics. The only prerequisite is working knowledge of *The Logic Manual*. The course is primarily aimed at Mathematics & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy and Computer Science & Philosophy students, but all are welcome. In particular, more advanced students in philosophy who wish to build on a first logic course and/or those interested in taking the Philosophical Logic paper for finals are encouraged to attend. The lecturer's notes from last year are available on his webpages (www.acpaseau.com) —see the 'Teaching' section) and on Canvas. A revised version for this year's course, likely to be very similar, will be uploaded to Canvas.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account to some extent. It is therefore in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Leibniz

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – T. 11, Examination Schools (Room 9)

The lectures will cover the main aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology as they are deployed in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Spinoza

Dr Hannah Laurens – Th. 10 (*weeks 4 to 8*), Examination Schools (Room 2)

This course of lectures is designed primarily for undergraduate students taking the paper 'Early Modern Philosophy'. Other graduate or undergraduate students who are interested are welcome to attend. There will be 5 lectures in total, **starting in week 4**. We will cover main themes from Spinoza's *Ethics*, including substance monism, mind-body parallelism, the three kinds of knowledge, Spinoza's account of the emotions, and freedom or blessedness. Our primary aim is to get an overall sense of Spinoza's ethical project and understand how his metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, and ethics interconnect. Students are encouraged to familiarise themselves with the *Ethics* and consult the relevant readings on the Faculty Reading List.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke

Prof Paul Lodge – T. 10, Examination Schools (Room 6)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some of the core topics from John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* suitable for students taking the paper in Early Modern Philosophy (paper 101).

Week 1. Locke's project in the *Essay*

Week 2. Locke's attack on innate knowledge

Week 3. Locke's theory of ideas

Week 4. Locke on primary and secondary qualities
Week 5. Locke on substance and essence
Week 6. Locke on personal identity
Week 7. Locke's account of knowledge
Week 8. Roundup of the term's lectures

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Kail

Prof Peter Kail – W. 10, Examination Schools (Room 6)

These lectures will consider Berkeley's *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* Part I. I shall follow the order of that text and examine Berkeley's key claims, and try to show that his system is more powerful than some commentators think. The key themes covered are Berkeley's background, ideas and abstraction, immaterialism, God, reality, science and the self.

102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics

Prof Nicholas Jones – F. 10 (*not on in week 2*), Examination Schools (North School)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some major themes of contemporary metaphysics. Topics to be covered include modality, identity, persistence, and properties.

103 Ethics

Prof Alison Hills – Th. 10, Examination Schools (North School)

I will be lecturing on Metaethics, with the following timetable:

1. Morality: practicality and authority. The challenge from science.
2. Error theory: Metaphysical arguments
3. Error theory 2: Epistemological arguments
4. Relativism
5. Expressivism
6. Quasi-realism and fictionalism
7. Naturalist moral realism
8. Non-naturalist moral realism

104 Philosophy of Mind

Dr Alex Geddes – M. 12, Examination Schools (North School *except week 2*: Room 9)

These lectures will provide an introduction to several issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, complementing the lectures to be given by Prof. Will Davies next term. Topics to be covered include consciousness, self-consciousness, the self, memory, and imagination.

107 Philosophy of Religion

Prof Mark Wynn – T. 3, Examination Schools (South School)

The lecturer may provide information on Canvas: please check there.

108 Philosophy of Logic and Language

Prof Paul Elbourne – F. 11, Examination Schools (Room 7)

These lectures will cover selected topics in the philosophy of logic and language, concentrating largely on the philosophy of language. We will cover truth, meaning (the nature of propositions, internalism and externalism about meaning), and reference (the semantics of names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions).

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism

Prof Louise Hanson – W. 2, Examination Schools (South School)

The lecturer may provide information on Canvas: please check there.

112 The Philosophy of Kant

Prof Anil Gomes – M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some of the central ideas in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the most important and influential thinkers in the western philosophical tradition. They are primarily intended for those taking the Philosophy of Kant paper (112), but anyone who is interested in the material is welcome to attend. The main focus will be Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/ 1787), a work which aims to mark the boundaries to our knowledge and to explain the possibility of metaphysics, natural science, and mathematics. We will cover, amongst other topics, the nature of Kant's critical project; space and time in the first *Critique*; the Transcendental Deduction; the rejection of transcendent metaphysics; transcendental idealism. Our primary aim will be to try and get an overall sense of Kant's work in theoretical philosophy, partly as a way of understanding why it has exerted such influence and why it continues to attract such fascination. Details of translations and other readings can be found on the Faculty Reading list.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Nietzsche

Dr Jack Wearing – T. 11, Examination Schools (Room 6)

This course of lectures will introduce students to several themes in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Our main focus will be on Nietzsche's critique of Christian and post-Christian morality in *On the Genealogy of Morality* and related works, but we will also cover Nietzsche's first book *The Birth of Tragedy* in the final lecture.

The first lecture will give a brief overview of Nietzsche's life and works, before discussing how to approach Nietzsche's writings and his distinctive style of philosophising. In Weeks 2-7, we will cover topics from the *Genealogy*, including Nietzsche's 'immoralism' and his account of the 'slave revolt' in morality; his genealogical method and commitment to naturalism; bad conscience and the ascetic ideal; truth and perspectivism; the will to power; and freedom and self-creation. In the final week, we will turn to Nietzsche's early views on art and aesthetics, examining his accounts of tragedy and pessimism and relating them to themes in his later work.

Students are encouraged to work through the *Genealogy* alongside the first seven lectures and to read §§1-18 of *The Birth of Tragedy*, along with Nietzsche's later 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', in advance of the final lecture. I recommend using the translations published by Cambridge University Press.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Schopenhauer

Prof William Mander – T. 12, Examination Schools (Room 6)

Week 1 – Three arguments for idealism
Week 2 – Kant, and three objections to idealism
Week 3 – The argument for the world as will
Week 4 – Further exploration of the world as will
Week 5 – Pessimism and the platonic ideas
Week 6 – Aesthetic appreciation
Week 7 – Pessimism, death, and suicide
Week 8 – Character, free-will, ethics, and asceticism

115 / 130 Plato: *Republic*

Prof Dominic Scott and Prof Luca Castagnoli – T. W. 10 *except week 2*: T. 10, W. 9, Examination Schools (North and South Schools; check on entry)

The *Republic* is one of Plato's most famous, and most influential, works. The dialogue is prompted by questions concerning the nature and value of justice, and the happiest life we can live. These questions prompt wide-ranging discussions of the ideal state, the nature of knowledge, the Theory of Forms, the nature and immortality of the soul, moral psychology, education, and the nature and role of arts. The study of the *Republic* will thus introduce you to many of Plato's central ideas and arguments.

In the first 8 lectures, Prof. Scott will give an overview of the *Republic*:

1. Introduction to the *Republic*; questions about the value of justice (the challenges of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus)

2. The state-soul parallel and the evolution of the ideal state in books II–IV
3. The tripartite soul in book IV
4. Philosopher–rulers in books V–VI; introduction to the theory of Forms, including the Sun image
5. The line and the cave (books VI–VII)
6. The analysis of injustice in books VIII–IX, including reflections on the conclusion of the defence of justice at the end of book IX
7. Plato’s aesthetics I: on beauty (books II–III)
8. Plato’s aesthetics II: the corruption of poetry (book X)

In the remaining lectures, Prof. Castagnoli will pursue selected topics in more depth:

1. Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus (book I)
2. Problems with the state-soul analogy (books II, IV and VIII)
3. Problems with the tripartition of the soul and psychology (especially book IV)
4. Knowledge and opinion, Forms and sensibles (book V)
5. Problems with the Cave (book VII)
6. Education and the Good (book VII)
7. Plato’s totalitarianism?
8. The myth of Er and the ending of the *Republic* (book X)

These lectures are primarily intended for students taking papers 115/130 in any of the Honour Schools, but anyone with an interest in Plato and the history of philosophy is welcome to attend (knowledge of ancient Greek is not required).

116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – T. Th. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or in translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. Topics covered will include Aristotle’s account of the human good, the function argument, parts of the soul, habituation and the doctrine of the mean, voluntary and involuntary action, decision and deliberation, the ethical virtues, the intellectual virtues, *akrasia*, pleasure, friendship and the relationship between contemplation and *eudaimonia*.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity

Prof James Read – M. T. 11 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a twelve-lecture course on the philosophical foundations of special relativity. Topics to be covered include (but may not be limited to):

1. The conceptual status of Newton's laws
2. Galilean covariance
3. The Michelson-Morley experiment and Lorentz's programme
4. Einstein's 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations
5. The distinction between principle and constructive theories
6. Spacetime structure: from Newton to Minkowski
7. Generally covariant formulations of physical theories
8. Relativity and conventionality of simultaneity
9. The twins paradox
10. Frame-dependent explanations and Bell's rockets
11. Presentism and relativity
12. Dynamical and geometrical approaches to relativity theory

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Dr Owen Maroney – Th. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of classes covers contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper, and BPhil and DPhil students with a philosophy of physics interest. Others are welcome if there is space.

Hilary Term's series of four lectures will be introductions to advanced topics in the interpretation of quantum theory covering: whether spatially localised objects can emerge in quantum theory without presupposing extra structure to the quantum wavefunction; the compatibility of realist approaches to quantum theory with relativistic invariance; the issue of probability within Everettian quantum mechanics; and the implications of quantum no-go theorems beyond the Bell-CHSH Inequality. Familiarity with the contents of the finals course, 120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics, will be assumed.

125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Dr Theodor Nenu – W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will provide an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. Topics will be drawn from those on the Faculty of Philosophy reading list for the FHS Finals paper Philosophy 125. We will spend comparable amounts of time on (1) foundational issues in cognitive science that in one way or another are in the background of most areas of research and (2) the question of how experimental results relate to philosophical issues like consciousness and free will. Various concepts will be illustrated with examples from the scientific literature, but no previous experience with psychology or empirical cognitive science is assumed.

127 Philosophical Logic

Prof James Studd – M. 12, *plus* W. 12 (*weeks 1 and 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations

LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)

Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics

LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)

Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory

LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4

Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory

LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)

Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.

LfP 4, 5

Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains

LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7

Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics

LfP 9.6, 10

Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

Week 8. Counterfactuals.

LfP 8

Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course page on Canvas.

128 Practical Ethics / 103 Applied Ethics

Dr Umut Baysan – F.10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will cover some key debates in practical ethics. We will begin with surveying some recurring themes in these debates, such as moral status, right to life, and the distinction between doing and allowing harm, and move on to the topics of abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, moral demands of affluence, effective altruism, affirmative action, and racial profiling.

There is no set textbook for these lectures. Those intending to attend the lectures can familiarise themselves with some of these debates as they are covered in Peter Singer's book *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2011, 3rd edition, but any edition would do), some of the short essays collected in *Ethics and the Contemporary World*, edited by David Edmonds (Routledge, 2019), and William Abel, Elizabeth Kahn, Tom Parr and Andrew Walton's recent book *Introducing Political Philosophy: A Policy-Driven Approach* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

129 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein

Prof Bill Child – W. 12, University College (10 Merton Street Lecture Room *except week 4*: 90 High Street Lecture Room – **note the final paragraph below**)

Intended Audience: Undergraduates studying the Philosophy of Wittgenstein option; anyone else interested in Wittgenstein.

The syllabus for the Philosophy of Wittgenstein option is as follows:

This paper will cover the philosophical work of Wittgenstein. The paper will be in two parts, part A and part B. Part A will cover the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Part B will principally cover *Philosophical Investigations*, *The Blue and Brown Books*, and *On Certainty*. Candidates must answer at least one question from part B. They may answer from part A, but are not required to do so.

These lectures will deal exclusively with the works covered in Part B of the paper.

The provisional schedule for the term is as follows:

Week 1	Augustine's Conception of Language
Week 2	Meaning and Use
Week 3	Rules and Rule-following I: The constitutive question
Week 4	Rules and Rule-following II: Following a rule
Week 5	Sensations and Sensation Language I: The private language sections
Week 6	Sensations and Sensation Language II: Wittgenstein's positive account of sensation language; Other minds
Week 7	The Self and Self-reference
Week 8	Knowledge and Certainty

The lectures will aim to introduce students to Wittgenstein's views, to discuss competing interpretations, and to offer some assessment of those views in the light of other philosophical treatments of the same themes. No previous familiarity with Wittgenstein's work will be assumed.

Handouts will be posted on Canvas on the day of each week's lecture. For reading lists and general resources, see the Faculty reading list on ORLO here:

<https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/5BEEE7B3-79EB-DA05-9B2A-685B304CB8C7.html?lang=en&login=1>.

The lectures will take place in University College in the Merton Street Lecture Room. You will need to reach the Lecture Room from within the College; please ask for directions at the Porter's Lodge. (You cannot get to the Lecture Room from outside the College, in Merton St.)

131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*
Prof Michael Peramatzis – Th. 10 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The first six lectures in MT23 will focus on the *Theaetetus*, Plato's dialogue about the nature of knowledge, and will discuss the claim that knowledge is perception; being and becoming; the self-refutation of relativism; the refutation of the proposed definition of knowledge as sense perception; knowledge as true belief; false belief; Socrates' dream; knowledge as true belief plus an 'account' (*logos*).

The next six lectures (to be given in HT24) will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the method of definition by division; the view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'; the discussion of the number and nature of what there is; the view of the so-called 'Late-Learners'; the communion of kinds; the analysis of negative predication; the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference; negative properties; and the analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance.

These twelve lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

Platonis Opera I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

Theaetetus, tr. Levett, revised by Burnyeat (Hackett, 1990).

Sophist, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: both of these translations are re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Handouts and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind

Dr Hannah Laurens – T. 10 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Examination Schools (Room 7)

This course of lectures is designed primarily for undergraduate students taking the paper 'Aristotle on Nature, Life, and Mind' and for MSt students taking this as one of their options. Other graduate or undergraduate students who are interested are very welcome to attend. There will be 12 lectures in total. In the first 8, which took place during MT23, we looked at Aristotle's account of living things and of the changing world they inhabit. Topics discussed included: causation, teleology, change, agency, place, time, and infinity. These 8 lectures focused mainly on Aristotle's *Physics*, books 2–4. In the last 4 lectures, taking place in HT24, we shall turn more particularly to certain questions about sentient, and indeed human, nature, by asking about the nature of perception and thought and about the relation between the mind and the body. We will also briefly touch upon the relationship between the divine mind and the human mind. These 4 lectures will focus on passages from Aristotle's *De Anima*.

198 Special Subject: Indian Philosophy

Dr Jessica Frazier – Th. 2 – 4 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Mathew Room)

Details for this course will be sent directly to those registered for it.

Protagoras (for Second Classical Language in Greats)

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – M. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Examination Schools (Room 2)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates doing the second classical language paper for Greats, in which the *Protagoras* features as one of the set texts, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. Topics covered will include the Platonic dialogue form, the teachability of virtue, Protagoras' political theory and the unity of the virtues.

Supplementary Subject in the History and Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 6)

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how

does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term "S00004W1").

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

Solving, Resolving and Dissolving Philosophical Problems II

Dr Peter Hacker – W. 2 – 3.45, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lecture/seminar is open to all. It consists of a series of short talks of about 40 minutes, followed by an hour's discussion and debate. This is a second set of eight, following on from last term's set. Familiarity with the first series is not presupposed. Each talk focuses upon a salient philosophical topic in order to highlight and exemplify a form of logico-linguistic analysis, namely connective, contrastive, and contextual analysis. The first three topics complete the epistemological sequence of Michaelmas Term. The next four demonstrate the fruitful extension of the methods to axiology, morality, and happiness. The final seminar provides an overview of the methods and scrutiny of objections to conceptual analysis.

1. Imagination
2. Thinking
3. Dreaming

Those who wish to be well prepared may find it useful to read P. M. S. Hacker, *The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature* (Wiley/Blackwell, 2013), chapters 10-11

4. The place of value in a world of facts
5. Morality and the Nature of Moral Goodness
6. Badness, Wickedness, Evil, and the Death of the Soul.
7. Happiness

Those who wish to be well prepared may find it useful to read P. M. S. Hacker, *The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature* (Wiley/Blackwell, 2021), chapters 1-5, 9.

8. Connective, Contrastive, and Contextual Analysis: A Methodological overview and refutation of objections

Philosophy of Economics

Prof Jean Baccelli – W. 12, Examination Schools (Room 2)

These lectures will introduce to selected topics in the contemporary philosophy of economics. Contact information: jean.baccelli@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.

0 General Resources

0.1 Textbooks

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016.

Marcel Boumans and John Davis. *Economic Methodology: Understanding Economics as a Science*. London: Macmillan, 2015.

0.2 Handbooks

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors. *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Uskali Mäki, editor. *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

John Davis, Alain Marciano, and Jochen Runde, editors. *The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005.

0.3 Anthologies

Daniel Hausman, editor. *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2012b.

0.4 Further Background

Harry Landreth and David Colander. *History of Economic Thought*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin College Division (Fourth Edition), 2002.

Peter Godfrey-Smith. *Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Martin Curd, Jan Cover, and Christopher Pincock, editors. *Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues*. New York: Norton, 2012 (Second Edition).

Daniel Little. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder: Westview, 1991.

Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors. *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Francesco Guala and Daniel Steel, editors. *The Philosophy of Social Science Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

1 Rationality

1.1 Core Readings

Katie Steele. Choice Models. In Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors, *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*, pages 185–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapters 3 (“Rational Choice Theory”) and 4 (“Game Theory”).

Catherine Herfeld. Revisiting the Criticisms of Rational Choice Theories. *Philosophy Compass*, 17(1):e12774, 2022.

Paul Anand. Rationality and Intransitive Preference – Foundations for the Modern View. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, pages 156–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Peter Wakker. Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles. Note accessible at <https://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/alias.pdf>, 1999.

1.2 Further Readings

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1, pages 701–728. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, pages 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Amartya Sen. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 6(4):317–344, 1977.

Gary Becker. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, Chap. 1 (“The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour”).

Uskali Mäki. Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 39(3):351–380, 2009.

2 Preference

2.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.

Amartya Sen. Internal Consistency of Choice. *Econometrica*, 61(3):495– 521, 1993, Sections 2 (“Choice, Correspondence and Consistency”) and 3 (“What is the Problem with Internal Consistency of Choice?”).

Wade Hands. Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory. *Erkenntnis*, 78(5):1081–1108, 2013.

Franz Dietrich and Christian List. Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. *Economics & Philosophy*, 32(2):249–281, 2016.

Kate Vredenburg. The Economic Concept of a Preference. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 67–82. New York: Routledge, 2022.

2.2 Further Readings

Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden. The Road Not Taken: How Psychology Was Removed from Economics, and How It Might Be Brought Back. *The Economic Journal*, 117(516):146–173, 2007.

Ivan Moscati. Behavioral and Heuristic Models Are As-if Models Too— And That’s Ok. *Economics & Philosophy*, forthcoming.

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The Case for Mindless Economics. In Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, *The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics*, pages 3–39. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Johanna Thoma. In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory. *Economics & Philosophy*, 37(2):163–187, 2021.

Mikaël Cozic and Brian Hill. Representation Theorems and the Semantics of Decision-Theoretic Concepts. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 22(3): 292–311, 2015.

3 Idealization

3.1 Core Readings

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapter 7 (“Models, Idealization, Explanation”).

Nancy Cartwright. The Vanity of Rigour in Economics: Theoretical Models and Galilean Experiments. In Philippe Fontaine and Robert Leonard, editors, *The Experiment in the History of Economics*, pages 118–134. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Philippe Verreault-Julien. Explanation in Economics. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 300–315. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Mary Morgan and Tarja Knuuttila. Models and Modelling in Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 49–87. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Anna Alexandrova and Robert Northcott. Progress in Economics: Lessons from the Spectrum Auctions. In Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 306–336. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

3.2 Further Readings

Daniel Hausman. Why Look Under the Hood? In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, pages 183–187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2012a.

Bruce Caldwell. *Beyond Positivism*. New York: Routledge (Revised Edition), 1994, Chapter 8 (“Friedman’s Methodological Instrumentalism”).

Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann. Models in Science. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2020.

Alvin Roth. The Economist as Engineer. *Econometrica*, 70(4):1341–1378, 2002.

Esther Duflo. The Economist as Plumber. *American Economic Review*, 107(5):1–26, 2017.

4 Welfare

4.1 Core Readings

John Broome. Utility. *Economics & Philosophy*, 7(1):1–12, 1991a.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 8

("Welfare").

Erik Angner. Well-Being and Economics. In Guy Fletcher, editor, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*, pages 492–503. London: Routledge, 2016.

Anna Alexandrova. Well-Being. In Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors, *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*, pages 9–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Guy Fletcher. *The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2016, Chapters 1 ("Hedonism"), 2 ("Desire-Fulfilment Theory"), and 3 ("Objective List Theories").

4.2 Further Readings

Philippe Mongin and Claude d'Aspremont. Utility Theory and Ethics. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume I: Principles*, pages 371–481. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1998, Section 2 ("Some Philosophical and Historical Clarifications").

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 6(1):93–117, 2005.

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach in Practice. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(3):351–376, 2006.

Carol Graham. Subjective Well-Being in Economics. In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, pages 424–452. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Koen Decanq and Dirk Neumann. Does the Choice of Well-Being Measure Matter Empirically? In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, pages 553–587. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

5 The Limits of Efficiency, 1

5.1 Core Readings

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 9 ("Welfare Economics").

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1970, Chapters 2 ("Unanimity") and 2 ("Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons").

Matthew Adler. Value and Cost-Benefit Analysis. In Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, pages 317–337. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

John Chipman. Compensation Principle. In Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, volume 2, pages 38–48. London: Palgrave–MacMillan, 2008.

Sven Ove Hansson. Philosophical Problems in Cost–Benefit Analysis. *Economics & Philosophy*, 23(2):163–183, 2007.

5.2 Further Readings

Wade Hands. The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 219–239. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Philippe Mongin. Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics. *Economica*, 73(290):257–286, 2006.

Antoinette Baujard. Values in Welfare Economics. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 211–222. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Julian Reiss. Measurement and Value Judgments. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 223–233. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Appendix (“How Could Ethics Matter to Economics”).

6 The Limits of Efficiency, 2

6.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. *Economica*, 43(171):217–245, 1976.

Amartya Sen. Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics. *The Economic Journal*, 89(355):537–558, 1979a, Sections VI (“Limitations of Welfarism Even With Rich Utility Information”) and VII (“Limitations of Paretianism”).

John Weymark. Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 48(2):269–294, 2017.

Philippe Mongin. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle. *Economics & Philosophy*, 32(3):511–532, 2016.

Alvin Roth. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*,

21(3):37–58, 2007.

6.2 Further Readings

Itai Sher. How Perspective-Based Aggregation Undermines the Pareto Principle. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 19(2):182–205, 2020.

John Broome. *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991b, Chapters 7 (“Coherence Against the Pareto Principle”), 8 (“The Principle of Personal Good”), and 9 (“Equality”).

Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler. Pareto Efficiency with Different Beliefs. *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 43(S2): S151–S171, 2014.

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 6 (“The Ethical Limits to Markets”).

7 Public Policy

7.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Utilitarianism and Welfarism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76(9):463–489, 1979b.

Amartya Sen. The Possibility of Social Choice. *American Economic Review*, 89(3):349–378, 1999.

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Second Edition), 2009, Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, pages 1179–1285. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004, Sections 3 (“Social Choice without Interpersonal Comparisons”) and 4 (“Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons”).

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 11 (“Equality and Egalitarianism”).

7.2 Further Readings

Marc Fleurbaey. On the Informational Basis of Social Choice. *Social Choice and Welfare*,

21(2):347–384, 2003.

Marc Fleurbaey and Bertil Tungodden. The Tyranny of Non-Aggregation versus the Tyranny of Aggregation in Social Choices: A Real Dilemma. *Economic Theory*, 44(3):399–414, 2010.

Daniel Hausman. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. *Mind*, 104(415):473–490, 1995.

Christian List. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? *Erkenntnis*, 58(2):229–260, 2003.

Hilary Greaves and Harvey Lederman. Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 96(3):636–667, 2018.

8 Behavioural Public Policy

8.1 Core Readings

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapter 15 (“Behavioral Economics and Nudge”).

Andreas Schmidt and Bart Engelen. The Ethics of Nudging: An Overview. *Philosophy Compass*, 15(4):e12658, 2020.

Luc Bovens. The Ethics of Nudge. In Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson, editors, *Preference Change*, pages 207–219. Heidelberg: Springer, 2009.

Till Grüne-Yanoff. Old Wine in New Casks: Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 38(4):635–645, 2012.

Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch. Debate: To Nudge or Not To Nudge. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 18(1):123–136, 2010.

8.2 Further Readings

Pelle Hansen. The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the Hand Fit the Glove? *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 7(1):155–174, 2016.

Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux, and Robert Sugden. Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 23(1):1–25, 2016.

Till Grüne-Yanoff and Ralph Hertwig. Nudge versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory? *Minds and Machines*, 26(1-2):149–183, 2016.

Johanna Thoma. Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and ‘Debiased’ Welfare Analysis.

Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.

Cristina Bicchieri and Eugen Dimant. Nudging with Care: The Risks and Benefits of Social Information. *Public Choice*, 191(3-4):443–464, 2022.

Parts of Speech

Prof Ian Rumfitt – F. 12, Examination Schools (Room 8)

A good question to ask about any sentence of philosophical writing, Donald Davidson held, is ‘What is that word or phrase doing here?’ That is: ‘How is the word or phrase contributing to the sentence’s meaning?’ Good answers, Davidson thought, could point the way to sound philosophy while incorrect answers would almost inevitably generate philosophical mistakes.

In the second half of the twentieth century, much local effort went into finding good answers to Davidson’s question and then passing those answers on to students under the rubric of ‘Philosophical Logic’ (a term then used in a very different sense from the title of the current FHS Paper 127). While some of the claims made for Philosophical Logic may have been exaggerated, my (admittedly limited) exposure to work by today’s students suggests that the pendulum has swung too far the other way, and that genuinely useful concepts and distinctions have passed from the collective consciousness. The aim of these lectures is to set forth some of the insights attained by old-school Philosophical Logic and to show their continuing utility in diverse areas of philosophy. That is why this lecture series is not tied to any one paper in Finals. It ought to be helpful, not only in the philosophy of language, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and even in moral philosophy.

No advance reading is required for any lecture, but my handouts will contain suggestions for further reading on the various topics.

Plan for the term

Week One (Friday 19 January) The Primacy of the Sentence

The sentence as the basic unit of speech and writing. Frege’s ‘Context Principle’. What is a sentence? Types of sentence. Declarative and interrogative sentences and their relationship to the speech acts of telling and asking.

Week Two (Friday 26 January) Sentential Complements

‘That’-clauses and ‘wh’-clauses. Propositions and facts. Do so-called ‘factive’ verbs signify relations to facts? ‘Wh’-clauses and the notion of inquiry in epistemology. The disastrous consequences for the philosophy of mind of confusing interrogative and relative uses of ‘what’, ‘who’, etc.

Week Three (Friday 2 February) Proper Names

Different sorts of proper name. Are Evans's 'descriptive names' really names? The enduring importance, even after Kripke's *Naming and Necessity*, of Frege's distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*) and the consequent limitations of possible-world semantics.

Week Four (Friday 9 February) Plural and Mass Terms

The differences between singular, plural, and mass terms and their relationship to metaphysical differences between stuff and things. Lucas's distinction between quantification and quotification. Differences between the relations of identity, being one of, and material constitution. Examples of contemporary arguments which confuse these relations.

Week Five (Friday 16 February) Adjectives

Frege's conception of a *Begriffswort*. Geach's 'cancelling out' fallacy and contemporary examples of it. Frege's hierarchy of levels and how it needs to be revised to accommodate plural terms. Numerical adjectives and adjectives of quantity.

Week Six (Friday 23 February) Verbs

What is a verb? Different sorts of verb and their relation to the metaphysics of activities, processes, and completed actions and events.

Week Seven (Friday 1 March) Adverbs

Davidson's theory of adverbs. Putative counterexamples to Davidson. Adverbial modification varies depending on the character of the verb (cf. Week Six). Adverbs of time, place, and manner contrasted with adverbial operators.

Week Eight (Friday 8 March) 'Exists'

The different views of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Kripke on the meaning of 'exists'. How these views bear on the Ontological Argument for the existence of God.

Moral Agency in Humans and Non-Humans

Jen Semler and Virginie Simoneau-Gilbert– W. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Historically, most Western philosophers have thought of moral agency as a uniquely human phenomenon. However, the recent development of artificial intelligence and the ever-

growing interest in the study of animals' emotional and social lives have put pressure on this long-held view. Several philosophers now argue that some nonhuman agents should be recognized as moral agents. This lecture series aims to explore these new arguments and the debates they raise.

Lecture 1: What Is 'Moral Agency?'

This lecture will discuss the notion of moral agency, highlight how it differs from the one of moral patiency, and explore how it may or may not intersect with moral responsibility. We will also provide an overview of the three main theories of moral agency that have been proposed in the history of Western philosophy: Aristotelian, sentimentalist, and Kantian theories.

Readings

- Haksar, V. Moral Agents. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-L049-1>.
- Korsgaard, C. (2006). Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action. In *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved*, edited by Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober. Princeton University Press.

Lecture 2: An Overview of the Debate on Animal Morality

This lecture will provide an overview of the debate on animal morality, which has mainly emerged and developed in the last decade. Philosophers and scientists working on animal morality can be divided into three categories: (1) those who argue that animals cannot be moral agents, (2) those who think animals occupy a sort of middle ground between moral patients and moral agents and should be described as *proto-moral agents* or *moral subjects*, and (3) those who defend the view that animals are moral agents. This lecture will also address the question of animal moral responsibility.

Readings:

- Clement, G. (2013). Animals and Moral Agency: The Recent Debate and Its Implications. *Journal of Animal Ethics*, 3(1), 1–14.
<https://doi.org/10.5406/janimaethics.3.1.0001>.
- Fitzpatrick, S. (2017). Animal Morality: What is The Debate About? *Biology and Philosophy*, 32, 1151–1183. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9599-6>.

Lecture 3: AI and Moral Agency

This lecture will provide an overview of key debates in the artificial moral agency literature. These debates include: which capacities are necessary for moral agency (including consciousness), whether AI systems are more like agents or tools, and the relationship between artificial moral agency and responsibility.

Readings:

- Véliz, C. (2021). Moral Zombies: Why Algorithms are Not Moral Agents. *AI & Society*, 36: 487-497. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01189-x>.
- Coeckelbergh, M. (2009). Virtual Moral Agency, Virtual Moral Responsibility: On the Moral Significance of Appearance, Perception, and Performance of Artificial Moral Agents. *AI & Society*, 24: 181-189. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0208-3>.

Lecture 4: Implications for Humans and Nonhumans

This lecture will provide an overview of the implications of these debates for animal ethics and AI ethics. We will explore how recognizing morality in nonhuman animals leads us to widen our understanding of animals' moral status and the notion of animal well-being and raises new moral issues pertaining to the ethics of animal farming and animal experimentation. We will then explore how debates on artificial moral agency bear on the use of AI systems in moral decision-making, the distribution of responsibility for harms caused by AI systems, and the project of programming morality into machines. Lastly, we will discuss overarching implications for human morality—the considerations in this lecture series shed light not only on how humans should treat nonhuman agents, but also on the status of humans in the moral community.

Readings:

- Monsó, S., Benz-Schwarzburg, J. & Bremhorst, A (2018). Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters. *Journal of Ethics*, 22, 283–310. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9275-3>.
- Eggert, L. (2023). Autonomised Harming. *Philosophical Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01990-y>.

Disputing about Taste

Artur Harries – W. 11 (weeks 5 to 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

People engage in frequent and fervent disputes on matters of taste: whether an artwork is good, what colour to paint the walls, who deserves to win an Oscar, whether pineapple belongs on pizza etc. But people also often say that there is no right or wrong on such matters. This gives rise to a number of questions. What do we do when we dispute about taste? Are we right to do so? If yes, why? This lecture course provides an introduction to this

central issue in aesthetics.

This lecture course will be of particular interest to all undergraduates studying the Aesthetics paper. It provides an in-road to understanding central concerns of classic texts by Hume and Kant. It also explores some recent work on the relationship between beauty and pleasure which challenges the hedonist assumptions of such thinkers as Hume and Kant. And, finally, it addresses the question whether disputing about taste involves an objectionable sort of snobbery.

There are no required readings for this course and familiarity with the recommended readings will not be assumed. However, students will benefit more from the lectures more if they are familiar with the recommended and/or further readings.

Lecture 1: Simple subjectivism and Hume

Recommended reading: Hume, David. 1987/1757. 'Of the Standard of Taste' in his *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller, Liberty Fund, 226-249. Also available at: <https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/st>

Further reading: Kivy, Peter. 2015. *De Gustibus: Arguing About Taste and Why We Do It*, OUP. Chapter 1.

Lecture 2: Kant

Recommended reading: Kant, Immanuel. 2000/1790. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (CUP). The Analytic of the Beautiful.

Further reading: Kivy, Peter. 2015. *De Gustibus: Arguing About Taste and Why We Do It*, OUP. Chapter 2.

Lecture 3: Aesthetic hedonism

Recommended reading: Gorodeisky, Keren. 2021. On liking aesthetic value, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 102.

Lecture 4: Snobbery

Recommended reading: Pierre Bourdieu. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. First two sections of Chapter 1: The Aristocracy of Culture and The Titles of Cultural Nobility.

Data Ethics: Power and Privacy

Dr Adam Bales – M. 2 – 4, Trajan House (Seminar Room *except week 2*: room 10.38)

We live in the era of "big data", where large datasets are generated, processed, shared and used by governments, corporations and others. In the last decade, developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have provided new opportunities to make use of these datasets in decision making.

In this seminar series, we will explore two broad ethical and political issues around the use of data, AI, and ML. First, we'll explore how these technologies can impact social and political power. Second, we'll explore how these technologies pose challenges for privacy.

Part 1. Power

Week 1. What is Power?

This week we'll set aside the specific context of AI & big data and ask more generally how we should make sense of the notion of power.

Readings:

- Lukes, [*Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition*](#), ch. 1 (just sections 1–4)
- Allen, [*Rethinking Power*](#)

Week 2. AI, Big Data, and Power

Why might it be helpful to think about the impacts of AI and big data on power in particular? And is there anything special about the interplay between power and these technologies? This week, we explore these questions.

Core Readings:

- Benn & Lazar, [*What's Wrong with Automated Influence*](#)
- Campolo & Crawford, [*Enchanted Determinism: Power Without Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence.*](#)

Optional Reading:

- Zuboff, [*The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*](#), ch. 12

Week 3. Domination & the Workplace

This week we'll explore the republican view of domination, reflecting on how this can provide insight into the interaction between big data, AI and power. We'll explore what this theory can tell us about the specific case of power in the gig economy.

Core Reading:

- Pettit, [*Republicanism*](#), ch. 2
- Muldoon & Raekstad, [*Algorithmic Domination in the Gig Economy*](#)

Optional Reading:

- Hickson, [*Freedom, Domination and the Gig Economy*](#)

Week 4. Empowered AI; Disempowered Humanity

Some worry that AI systems could themselves disempower humanity, in one way or another (rather than merely being used by some humans to disempower other humans). We'll

explore how philosophical theorising about power can provide insights into these arguments.

Readings:

- Carlsmith, [Existential Risk From Power-Seeking AI](#)
- Sparrow, [Friendly AI Will Still Be Our Master](#)

Part 2. Privacy

Week 5. The Right to Privacy

Before considering the specific issues raised by big data, AI, and ML, we'll explore in more general terms how to make sense of the right to privacy.

Readings:

- Thomson, [The Right to Privacy](#)
- Marmor, [What is the Right to Privacy?](#)

Week 6. Technology, Privacy, and Surveillance

This week will explore how issues of privacy arise in the context of the internet, big tech, big data, AI and ML.

Readings:

- Véliz, [Privacy is Power](#), ch. 3 (Privacy is Power) and ch. 4 (Toxic Data)
- Van Den Hoven, Blaauw, Pieters, and Warnier, [Privacy and Information Technology](#)

Week 7. Privacy and Social Context

This week, we'll explore how social context is relevant to privacy in the domain of technology and data.

Readings:

- Nissenbaum, [Privacy as Contextual Integrity](#)
- Rumbold and Wilson, [Privacy Rights and Public Information](#)

Week 8. Surveillance and the Self

This week we'll explore how surveillance and privacy online influences the way that we do, and should, relate to ourselves and others.

Readings:

- Véliz, [Self-Presentation and Privacy Online](#)
- Vallor, [Technology and the Virtues](#), ch.8: Surveillance and the Examined Life

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's graduate students. Other students may attend Faculty graduate classes, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: Practical Philosophy (*restricted to 1st year BPhil students*)

Various class-givers and times

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Hilary Term will cover key material in practical philosophy. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Plato: *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*

Prof Dominic Scott – M. 11 – 1, Examination Schools (Room 8, except week 3: Rm 11)

Information may be uploaded to the Canvas site for the class.

Medieval Hylomorphism

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These classes focus on two major issues in the medieval debate about hylomorphism (i.e., the matter-form composition of physical objects): (1) the ontological status of prime matter; (2) the number of substantial forms in a hylomorphic compound. The discussions of these two issues are the most original and philosophically important medieval contributions to the Aristotelian theory of composite substances. We shall examine in some detail two influential views: that of Thomas Aquinas and that of John Duns Scotus. As to the first issue (1), both Aquinas and Scotus believe in the existence of prime matter as an absolutely formless substrate of change, but Aquinas maintains that prime matter, being formless, is pure potentiality, whereas Scotus rejects Aquinas's view and argues that prime matter must have some actuality, although not of a formal kind. As to the second issue (2), Aquinas maintains that in any composite substance –from the simplest, e.g., an element, to the most complex one, e.g., a human being- there is only one substantial form. Scotus rejects Aquinas's arguments for the unity of substantial form and posits that in living beings there is more than one substantial form.

Provisional Programme:

Week 1: Introduction to the medieval debate about hylomorphism

Week 2: Scotus on the existence of prime matter

Weeks 3-4: Aquinas and Scotus on the nature of prime matter

Week 5: Aquinas on the unity of substantial form

Week 6: Scotus against Aquinas on the unity of substantial form

Weeks 7-8: Special topics and presentations

German Idealism

Prof Joseph Schear – W. 2 – 4 (*not on in week 5*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Fichte says, 'No Thou, no I; No I, No Thou'. Hegel speaks of the 'I that is We, We that is I'. While appeals to mutual recognition are increasingly common in contemporary philosophy, from the foundations of moral theory to the nature of intersubjectivity in speech and communication, it was the German Idealist tradition that first put the theme of recognition (*Anerkennung*) on the map. After a brief survey of some contemporary work, followed by a week on why Kant has a seeming problem with recognition, we will turn to the classical texts by Fichte and Hegel in which the notion of recognition is invoked and theorised: Fichte's deduction of other rational beings in the opening of the *Foundations of Natural Right* and Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Week 1

Recognition in contemporary philosophy

Stephen Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint*, ch. 1, pgs. 3-26

Richard Moran, *The Exchange of Words*, ch. 1, pgs. 1-30

Week 2

Kant and the problem of recognition

Guest: Joe Saunders

Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, §7

Joe Saunders (2016). 'Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person.' *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 24(2), 164-182.

Week 3

Fichte's deduction of other rational beings

Foundations of Natural Right, §§1-3, pgs. 18-39 (CUP Translation edited by Neuhouser, 2000)

Fred Neuhouser, 'Introduction', *Foundations of Natural Right*, pgs. vii-xxviii (esp. section 1)

Jacob McNulty, 'Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self-Consciousness in Sections 1–3 of Fichte's *Foundations of Natural Right*', *European Journal of Philosophy*, v. 24, issue 4, (2016)

Week 4

Fichte on recognition, the summons, and relations of right

Foundations of Natural Right, §§3-4, pgs 39-52 (CUP Translation edited by Neuhouser, 2000)

Michelle Kosch, 'Fichte on Self-Consciousness and the Summons', *Mind*, 130 (517), (2021)

Week 5: no class

Week 6

Hegel on recognition

Guest: Bill Bristow

Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Self-Consciousness, §§166-185 (with special attention to §175), (CUP Pinkard translation)

Robert Pippin, *Hegel on Self-Consciousness* (Princeton, 2011), ch. 2, "On Hegel's claim that 'self-consciousness finds its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness'", pgs. 54-87

Week 7

Hegel on the master/slave dialectic

Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Self-Consciousness, §§186-196, (CUP Pinkard translation)

Fred Neuhouser, 'Desire, Recognition, and the Relationship between Bondsman and Lord', ch.2 of *The Blackwell Companion to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. Kenneth Westphal (2009)

Week 8

Receiving Hegel's master/slave dialectic: Sartre and Fanon

Guest: Thomas Khurana

Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, part III, pgs 325-336 (critique of Hegel), 347-366 ('the look'); (Sarah Richmond translation)

Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, ch. 7

Philosophy of Physics (thermal physics)

Dr Owen Maroney – Th. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of classes covers contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper, and BPhil and DPhil students with a philosophy of physics interest. Others are welcome if there is space.

Hilary Term's series of four lectures will be introductions to advanced topics in the interpretation of quantum theory covering: whether spatially localised objects can emerge in quantum theory without presupposing extra structure to the quantum wavefunction; the compatibility of realist approaches to quantum theory with relativistic invariance; the issue of probability within Everettian quantum mechanics; and the implications of quantum no-go theorems beyond the Bell-CHSH Inequality. Familiarity with the contents of the finals course, 120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics, will be assumed.

Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – M. 2 – 4, St Peter's College (Theberge Room)

In this BPhil seminar, we will discuss a variety of topics from the contemporary literature. The seminars are intended primarily for students doing the BPhil in Philosophy and the MSt in Philosophy of Physics, but all interested and engaged participants are welcome. Each week, the topic will be introduced with a short presentation given by one of the participants (with the convenor presenting for the first week).

Below are the proposed topics for the term in the anticipated order. Readings and topics might be adjusted to reflect the abilities and research interests of the class, but please do not skip seminars because you think that it will be on an area of science you know nothing about: specialisation is not required to come along and discuss philosophical problems. Updates will be posted to Canvas as we progress through term.

Those attending the class should be sure to have read the essential reading(s) for each session in advance as the aim is to take a critical approach to topics raised in the readings below. Some background reading and some further reading might also be suggested. These seminars will be held in person at St Peter's College but please make sure that the convenor has your email address in case we need to go online at short notice.

1. Reference over theory-change

Essential readings:

- Stein, H. 1989. Yes, but... Some skeptical remarks on realism and anti-realism. *Dialectica* 43: 47–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970610>
- Myrvold, W. 2019. “—It would be possible to do a lengthy dialectical number on this;” Preprint (2019), available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16675/>

2. Varieties of reduction

Essential readings:

- Lewis, D. K., ‘How to define theoretical terms’, *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 427–446. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023861>
- Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R. & Hartmann, S. 2010. Who’s afraid of Nagelian reduction?. *Erkenntnis* 73: 393–412. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9239-x>

Background:

- Schaffner, K. F. 1967. Approaches to reduction. *Philosophy of science* 34: 137–147. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/186101>

3. Data vs. phenomena

Essential readings:

- Bogen, J. & Woodward, J. 1988. Saving the phenomena. *The Philosophical Review* 97: 303–352. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185445>
- Glymour, B. 2000. Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. *Erkenntnis* 52: 29–37. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012966>

4. Theoretical equivalence

Essential readings:

- Glymour, C. 1970. Theoretical realism and theoretical equivalence', *PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association*. Vol. 1970. (D. Reidel Publishing, 1970). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/495769>
- Coffey, Kevin (2014). Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretative Equivalence. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 65 (4): 821-844.
<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt034>

Additional Reading

- Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. 2016. Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 45(5): 467-483.
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-015-9382-6>
- Teitel, Trevor. 2021. What Theoretical Equivalence Could Not Be. *Philosophical Studies* 178 (12): 4119-4149. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01639-8>

5. Structural Realism

Essential Reading:

- Ainsworth, P M. 2010. What is Ontic Structural Realism? *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* 41: 50–57.
<https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.11.001>
- Chakravartty, Anjan. 2004. Structuralism as a form of Scientific Realism. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 18: 151-171.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0269859042000296503>

Background:

- Worrall, J. 1989. Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? *Dialectica* 43: 99-124.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970613>
- Ladyman, James and Don Ross (with John Collier and David Spurrett). 2007. *Every Thing Must Go*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Especially chapters 2 and 3.
https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/f/1lj314/TN_cdi_proquest_ebookcentral_EBC693945

6. Natural Kinds, Interactive Kinds and Property Clusters

Essential reading:

- Boyd, R. 1991. Realism, anti-foundationalism, and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. *Philosophical Studies* 61: 127–148. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320174>
- Khalidi, M. A. 2010. Interactive kinds. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 61: 335–60. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664352>

7. Evolution

Essential reading:

- Lewens, Tim. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: what is the debate about, and what might success for the extenders look like?, *Biological Journal of the Linnean Society*, Volume 127, Issue 4, August 2019, Pages 707–721, <https://doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blz064>

8. Nancy Cartwright: Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws

Essential reading:

- Cartwright, Nancy 1999. Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws, which is chapter 1 in: *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science*. Cambridge University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545199>

Additional Reading:

- Strevens, Michael. 2017. Dappled Science in a Unified World. In *Philosophy of Science in Practice*. Springer Verlag. (PDF available at: <http://www.strevens.org/research/lawmech/dappelation.shtml>)
- McArthur, Dan. 2006. Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws. *Synthese* 151 (2): 233-255.

- Hoefer, Carl. 2003. For fundamentalism. *Philosophy of Science* 70 (5):1401–1412.

Philosophical Logic

Prof Volker Halbach and Prof Timothy Williamson – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

For a list of the topics, readings, and up-to-date information please go to the web page:

<https://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil24.html>

Property Versatility and its applications

Prof Ofra Magidor – W. 11 – 1 (*not on in week 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please check the Canvas site for information.

Formal Epistemology

Prof Bernhard Salow – Th. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please check the Canvas site for information.

Feminist Approaches to Autonomy

Dr Sebastien Bishop – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please check the Canvas site for information.

Philosophy of Action

Dr Carlos Nunez Jimenez – W. 4 – 6, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

We will cover three central themes in the philosophy of action. First, the nature of intention and its relation to beliefs and desires. Second, the requirements of rationality on intention and their normative status. Third, the kind of authority an agent might have (or lack) over her own actions.

Recommended Background Readings

- Kieran Setiya "Intention," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock and Sergio Tenenbaum, "Action" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

- Sarah Paul, *The Philosophy of Action: A Contemporary Introduction*, (Routledge 2021).

Schedule (subject to minor changes)

1. Desire, Belief, Intention

Week 1

- Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" in *Essays on Actions and Events*
- Donald Davidson, "Intending" in *Essays on Actions and Events*
- Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention" in *Faces of Intention Selected Essays on Intention and Agency*, ch. 11. pp. 209 - 224

Week 2

- Gilbert Harman, "Practical Reasoning," *Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976): 431-63
- Kieran Setiya, "Practical Knowledge," *Ethics*, Vol. 118, No. 3, Symposium on Agency (April 2008), pp. 388-409
- Sarah K. Paul, "How We Know What We Are Doing," *Philosophers' Imprint* (2009) vol. 9 no. 1.

Week 3

- Michael E. Bratman, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, §1-3.4.
- J. David Velleman, "What Good is a Will?" in Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, eds., *Rational and Social Agency* (Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 83-105.
- Michael Bratman, "Review: Cognitivism About Practical Reason. Reviewed Work(s): *Practical Reflection*, by J. David Velleman

2. Rationality and Normativity

Week 4

- Michael E. Bratman, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, ch. 8.
- Hugh McCann, "Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (1991): 25-36.

- Joshua Knobe, "Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language," *Analysis* (2003): 190-193

Week 5

- R.J. Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," *Philosophers' Imprint* vol. 1 No. 3 (December 2001) Section 4 and Postscript.
- Michael E. Bratman, "Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical," in Michael E. Bratman, *Planning, Time, and Self-Governance* (Oxford University Press, 2018): essay 2.
- Joseph Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 1 (1):28 (2005)

Week 6

- John Broome, *Rationality Through Reasoning*, Chps 5-6 & 11
- John Broome, "Rationality versus Normativity," *Australasian Philosophical Review* 4 (4):293-311 (2020)

3. Agential Authority

Week 7

- Frankfurt, H. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in *The Importance of What We Care About*.
- Watson, G. "Free Agency," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (1975): 205-220.
- Harry Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in *The Importance of What We Care About*.

Week 8

- Velleman, J. D. "What Happens When Someone Acts," *Mind* 101 (1992): 461-81.
- Shoemaker, D. (2003) "Caring, Identification, and Agency." *Ethics* 114 (1): 88-118.
- Bratman, M. E. "Three Theories of Self-Governance," *Philosophical Topics* 32 (2004).

Philosophy of Literature

Prof Stephen Mulhall – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will not focus primarily on what is generally called ‘the philosophy of literature’, although various topics central to that field (eg the status of fictional entities, the relationship between author and reader, the significance of authorial intention) will surface along the way. My interest lies rather in the relationship between literature and philosophy more broadly conceived, and in particular upon the ways in which literature (contrary to its fateful Platonic banishment from the just city) might claim the right to make pertinent contributions not only to specific branches of philosophy (ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind) but to revising philosophy’s conception of its own nature – its goals, its methods, and its resources.

The course will begin by examining the ways in which some philosophers have recently argued that literary texts should be seen as having a particularly important role to play in our thinking about ethics. The work of Nussbaum and Diamond will be discussed in relation to some of their most prominent philosophical critics (McMahan, O’Neill), and in relation to specific literary texts by Henry James and Iris Murdoch. These discussions quickly broaden out to encompass questions about the nature of rationality, its relation to emotion and embodiment, and the implications of these matters for our understanding of philosophy’s own presuppositions as an intellectual enterprise. The primary reference point here will be Coetzee’s Tanner Lectures, *The Lives of Animals*, which have prompted rich responses from a number of philosophers (Singer, McDowell, Diamond and Cavell), a full understanding of which will require not only an engagement with the moral standing of non-human animals but also a broader excursion into the nature of realism and modernism in the arts, particularly as interpreted by the art historian, critic and theorist Michael Fried. The final weeks of the course will then follow out some of the implications of this material, either by looking in detail at the work of David Foster Wallace (both his fiction and his non-fiction writing).

The class will presuppose no prior understanding of the material to be discussed, and so will be accessible to students at any stage of the B. Phil programme (although it may of course be of particular relevance to students intending to write on topics in ethics and aesthetics). Graduate students in other programmes (in the philosophy faculty and in other faculties) will also be welcome to attend, with the class-giver’s permission.

A draft reading list will be made available on ORLO. As the list makes clear, we will be discussing in detail a number of novels as we go along, and the first two (which are also the longest) will be encountered relatively early on in term; so it might be a good idea to read (at least some portions of) them both before the class begins, rather than trying to do so together with the other assigned reading in the relevant weeks during term. The novels, in order of appearance, are:

Henry James, *The Golden Bowl*

Iris Murdoch, *The Black Prince*

Reasons and Wrongs

Prof Hilary Greaves and Prof Tom Sinclair – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The aim of this seminar is to explore the relations between practical reasons, requirements, and wrongdoing in moral theorising. How are moral reasons and moral requirements to be distinguished? How do the practical reasons provided by facts about others and our relations to them interact to establish or otherwise relate to moral requirements? How do the latter relate to other practical reasons? What are the different implications of different answers to these questions for our thinking about rights, dilemmas, aggregation, and other central questions in normative moral philosophy?

The provisional schedule is as follows:

- Week 1: The nature and distinctiveness of duty
- Week 2: The paradox of deontology
- Week 3: Top-down and bottom-up theories of moral requirement
- Week 4: Values and requirements
- Week 5: Moral theorising about categoricity
- Week 6: Agency, identity, and commitment
- Week 7: Oughts beyond obligation
- Week 8: Doubts about obligation

A reading list will be circulated near the beginning of term.

Topics in Legal Epistemology

Prof David Enoch (Faculty of Law) – W. 1 – 3, Law Faculty (The Cube)

I plan to discuss in detail the texts **in bold letters**. The others are mostly for background or further reading. For information on accessing the course Canvas page or other queries, please contact the class-giver.

(The following resource is very helpful: Georgi Gardiner (2019), “Legal Epistemology”, Oxford Bibliographies Online, <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml>)

1. Week 1: Jan 17th: Introduction
 - **Hock Lai Ho (2021), “The Legal Concept of Evidence”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence-legal/>**
 - Susan Haack, “Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Problems and Projects”, chapter 1 in her *Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law* (Cambridge University Press: 2014).

2. Week 2, Jan 24th: The Proof Paradoxes

- **Lewis D. Ross (2020), "Recent Work on the Proof Paradoxes", *Philosophy Compass*.**
- **David Enoch and Talia Fisher (2015), "Sense and 'Sensitivity': Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence", *Stanford Law Review* 67; Section I.**
- **Enoch, David, Levi Spectre, and Talia Fisher. 2012. "Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 40(3): 197–224.**

3. Week 3, Jan 31st: Contd.

- **Smith, Martin. 2017. "When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?" *Mind*.**
- Marcello Di Bello (2019), "Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?", *Mind* 128, 1269-1285.
- Martin Smith (2021), "More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof", *Mind* 130, 943-960.
- Michael Blome-Tillmann (2020), "Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox", *Mind* 129, 563-577.
- Vincent Chiao (2023), "Algorithmic Decision-Making, Statistical Evidence, and the Rule of Law", forthcoming in *Episteme*.
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1986. "Liability and Individualized Evidence." *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 49(3): 199–219.
- Pardo, Michael S. 2018. "Safety vs. Sensitivity: Possible Worlds and the Law of Evidence." *Legal Theory* 24: 50–75.
- David Enoch and Levi Spectre (2019), "Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo", *Legal Theory* 25 (2019), 178-199.
- Liat Levanon (2022), *Evidence, Respect, and Truth: Knowledge and Justice in Legal Trials* (Bloomsbury), "Introduction".
- Marcello di Bello (2018) "Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?", *Mind* 128, 1045-1084.
- John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs, and Vishnu Sridharan (2021), "Statistical Evidence and Incentives in the Law", *Philosophical Issues* 31, 128-145.
- Lewis Ross (2021), "Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 102, 3-23.

4. Week 4, February 7th: Knowledge

- **Sarah Moss, "Knowledge and Legal Proof", *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 7 (2023), 176-213.**
- Littlejohn, Clayton. 2017. "Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law." *Synthese* 197, 5253-5286.
- Pardo, Michael S. 2010. "The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof." *Legal Theory* 16(1): 37–57.

- Michael Blome-Tillmann. 2017. "'More Likely Than Not' Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law." *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds). Oxford University Press, pp. 278–292.
- Pardo, Michael S. 2005. "The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge." *Law and Philosophy* 24(4): 321–392.
- David Papineau, (2020). The disvalue of knowledge. *Synthese*, 1–22.

5. Week 5, Feb 14th: The Meta-Debate

- **David Enoch, Talia Fisher, and Levi Spectre (2021), "Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake: On Fetishism, Two-Tier System Design, and Conscientious Fact-Finding", *Philosophical Issues* 31, 85-103.**
- Ronald Allen (2021), "Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited", *Quaestio Facti*.
- David Enoch (2021), "How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (And Really, about Everything Else): A Comment on Allen", *Quaestio Facti*.
- Ronald Allen (2022), "Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: A Reply to Pardo, Spellman, Muffato, and Enoch", *Quaestio Facti*.
- Marvin Backes (2020), "Epistemology and the Law: Why there is no Epistemic Mileage in Legal Cases", *Philosophical Studies* 177, 2759-2778.
- Georgi Gardiner (2024), "Legal Evidence and Knowledge", forthcoming in Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen Aarnio (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence*.
- Lewis Ross (2022), "The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology", *Ergo* 9

6. Week 6, Feb 21st: Higher-Order Evidence

- **Ofer Malcai and Ram Rivlin (2021), "Reasonable Self-doubt", *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 15, 25-45.**
- Sophie Horowitz (2022), "Higher-Order Evidence", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/higher-order-evidence/>

7. Week 7th, Feb 28th: Legal Probabilism

- **Rafal Urbaniak and Marcello di Bello (2021), "Legal Probabilism", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-probabilism/>**
- Brian Heddek and Mark Colyvan (2019), "Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defense", *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 27, 448-468.

8. Week 8th, March 6th: Beyond the Legal

- **Renee Jorgensen (2020), "The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting (Some) Racial Generalizations", *Synthese* 197, 2415-2431.**

- Marcello di Bello and Colin O'Neill (2020), "Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions", *Ethics* 130, 147-178.
- Lara Buchak (2014), "Belief, Credence, and Norms", *Philosophical Studies* 169, 285-311.
- David Enoch and Levi Spectre, "Statistical Resentment, or: What's Wrong with Acting, Blaming, and Believing on the Basis of Statistics Alone", *Synthese* 199, 5687-5718.
- David Enoch and Levi Spectre, "There is no such thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing", forthcoming in *Philosophical Perspectives*.
- Elizabeth G. Jackson (2020), "The Relationship between Belief and Credence", *Philosophy Compass*.

Ethics and risk

Dr Hayden Wilkinson – T. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please check the Canvas page for updates.