

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS  
(UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES  
AND OTHER EVENTS)

MICHAELMAS TERM 2024

**NOTES:**

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight ([james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)).

# Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

*PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, PPL: Logic, Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy*

*Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: General Philosophy*

*Literae Humaniores*: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

## **Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno***

Prof Lindsay Judson – M. Th. 11, Christ Church (Sir Michael Dummett Lecture Theatre)

This is a course of 16 lectures, primarily for Classics Mods students offering these dialogues as their philosophy option; the lectures pay particular attention to introducing philosophical concepts, analysing arguments, and explaining how to read Platonic dialogues. The lectures will begin with an introduction to philosophy in general, and I shall say something about why Plato wrote dialogues and how we should approach them. I shall then look at the *Euthyphro* in some detail, exploring the two dialogues it contains – the one between Socrates and Euthyphro and the one between Plato and his readers – and in the second half of the course I shall look at the *Meno*. Topics discussed will include the Euthyphro Dilemma, Socratic definition and the ‘Socratic fallacy’, desire and the good, the paradox of enquiry and Plato’s response to it, the method of hypothesis, the *Meno*’s account of knowledge and the distinction between knowledge and true belief, and the relationship between virtue and knowledge.

## **Early Greek Philosophy**

Prof Marion Durand – M. 11, Examination Schools (Room 8)

These lectures are primarily aimed at students planning to offer the ‘Early Greek Philosophy’ paper for Lit Hum Mods. Lectures will provide an introduction to Presocratic Philosophy, covering (over the 8 lectures) early Ionian philosophers (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes), Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno and the atomists.

### **Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura* IV**

Prof Alex Bown – M. 11, Examination Schools (Room 12)

This series of lectures is primarily aimed at Classics students offering the 'Lucretius: Book IV' paper at Mods, although anyone interested in the subject is welcome to attend. The first two lectures will be devoted to a general introduction to Epicurean philosophy; the remaining six lectures will then be spent on discussions of the main topics that emerge from Book IV, proceeding roughly in Lucretius' order. A provisional plan is as follows:

1. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 1: background and sources; the branches of philosophy; Epicurean physics.
2. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 2: canonic and ethics.
3. Introduction to Lucretius; overview of Book IV; the mechanics of perception.
4. 'All perceptions are true' – what does this mean, and is it defensible?
5. Refutation and self-refutation; the Epicurean defence against scepticism.
6. Teleology, theology and cosmology.
7. Psychology: thinking, dreaming and moving.
8. Epicurean hedonism and Lucretius on love.

### **General Philosophy**

Prof Alex Kaiserman – F. 12, Examination Schools (North School)

These lectures will cover the following topics: knowledge, scepticism, induction, perception, free will, mind and body, personal identity, and God and evil.

### **Introduction to Logic**

Prof Volker Halbach – M. 12, Examination Schools (South School)

The lectures follow Volker Halbach's *Logic Manual* (Oxford University Press 2010). Further materials, including the Exercises Booklet, sample papers, and worked examples, are available at: <http://logicmanual.philosophy.ox.ac.uk>.

One chapter of the Logic Manual is covered in each lecture. It is recommended that you read each week's chapter before the lecture.

## **Moral Philosophy: Mill, *Utilitarianism***

Dr Jeremy Fix – W. 12, Examination Schools (South School)

These lectures offer an introduction to ethical theory organized around objections to utilitarianism, especially as presented by John Stuart Mill in *Utilitarianism*, and what they reveal about the theoretical and practical aims of ethical theory. We will start with an account of the explanatory structure of consequentialist ethical theory in general and the utilitarian version of consequentialism in particular. We will then discuss challenges which target one or another part of that explanatory structure. Questions will include:

- (1) Is happiness in fact the final end of our actions?
- (2) Is the greatest happiness possible in fact the end of anyone's action?
- (3) Does utilitarianism license violating the rights of individuals?
- (4) Can a utilitarian specifically or a consequentialist generally be a true friend?
- (5) Does rule-consequentialism avoid the problems with utilitarianism?; and
- (6) Do alternatives to consequentialism miss something that consequentialism captures?

# Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

Advanced undergraduates, especially but not only those considering graduate study of philosophy, are encouraged to consider attending relevant graduate classes as well. Permission should be sought from the class-giver(s): it is usually readily given.

## **101 Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes**

Prof Paul Lodge – T. 10 – 11.30 (*not on in week 3*), Examination Schools (Room 7)

This series will provide an overview of Descartes' philosophy suitable for those who are preparing for the FHS paper in Early Modern Philosophy. The sessions will be 90 minutes long. The first hour will be a lecture and the remainder of the time will be available for discussion of the topic covered that week. Students will be free to leave after the lecture if they wish.

PLEASE NOTE: there will be no session in Week 3

In Week 1 I will provide a general overview of Descartes' philosophical projects; thereafter, the lectures will be concerned with some of the main topics that arise when studying his ideas in greater depth.

The order of the lectures will track the structure of the *Meditations On First Philosophy*. However, material from Descartes' other writings will be discussed in order to shed further light on the ideas under consideration.

Week 1:	Introduction to the philosophy of Descartes
Week 2:	The method of doubt
Week 3:	No session
Week 4:	The <i>cogito</i> and the nature of the mind
Week 5:	Cosmological arguments for God's existence
Week 6:	Knowledge and error
Week 7:	The ontological argument for God's existence
Week 8:	Substance and mind-body dualism

**101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume**

Prof Peter Millican – W. 10, Examination Schools (room 7)

Materials may appear on Canvas nearer term.

**101 Early Modern Philosophy: Berkeley**

Prof Peter Kail – F. 10, Examination Schools (room 6)

These lectures will consider Berkeley's *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* Part I. I shall follow the order of that text and examine Berkeley's key claims, and try to show that his system is more powerful than some commentators think. The key themes covered are Berkeley's background, ideas and abstraction, immaterialism, God, reality, science and the self.

**103 Ethics I**

Prof Alison Hills – M. 10, Examination Schools (South School)

Material may be added to Canvas nearer term.

## **108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language**

Dr James Ravi Kirkpatrick – W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will focus on theories of reference and meaning, from Frege to the present day. We will investigate questions such as: What are the meanings of specific expressions in English (e.g., proper names, definite descriptions, indexicals, and demonstratives)? What is the nature of meaning more generally, and how does this relate to communication? What is the relationship between natural and formal languages?

Here is the provisional schedule:

Week 1. Definite Descriptions.

Week 2. Proper Names

Week 3. Indexicals and Demonstratives

Week 4. Meaning

Week 5. Pragmatics

Week 6. Implicit Content and Quantifier Domain Restriction

Week 7. Vagueness

Week 8. Metaphor



## **120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics**

Prof James Read – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This will be a sixteen lecture course looking in detail at the central conceptual problems of quantum theory. While the application of the mathematical structure of quantum theory has been unambiguously successful, having predictive and explanatory success across vast range of phenomena, there is little consensus on its physical interpretation.

Topics to be covered include:

- The formalism of quantum mechanics
- The measurement problem
- Dynamical collapse theories
- Hidden variable theories
- The Everett interpretation
- Non-locality and contextuality
- More recent approaches to QM, e.g. relational quantum mechanics and QBism

Optional pre-reading:

1. David Albert, *Quantum Mechanics and Experience*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994.
2. Tim Maudlin, *Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.
3. Tim Maudlin, *Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity*, third edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
4. John S. Bell, "Against Measurement", in *Speakable and Unsayable in Quantum Mechanics*, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
5. David Wallace, "Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics", in D. Rickles (ed.), *The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics*, London: Routledge, 2008.

### **121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics**

Prof Adam Caulton and Prof Christopher Timpson – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The overall topics this term will be philosophy of thermal physics in weeks 1-4, and advanced philosophy of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in weeks 5-8.

A central theme of the first half of term will be the nature and origin of time asymmetry in thermal physics (thermodynamics and statistical mechanics). We will pay particular attention to the logical structure of classical (phenomenological) thermodynamics, before moving to competing interpretations of the foundations of statistical mechanics (Boltzmannian vs Gibbsian approaches), and competing conceptions of the nature of probabilities in statistical mechanics. If time allows we will discuss Maxwell's Demon and its (alleged) information-theoretic exorcism via Landauer's Principle.

In the second half of term, we will turn to quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. We will explore the role of decoherence in attempted solutions to the measurement problem, and the celebrated Deutsch-Wallace representation theorem in Everettian quantum mechanics. Then we will look at some foundational and conceptual problems specific to quantum field theory. We will end the term with a dive into the fraught matter of localisation for relativistic quantum particles.

The intended audience is 4<sup>th</sup> years reading Physics and Philosophy, MMathPhys students taking this paper as an option, MSt Physics and Philosophy students, and BPhil and DPhil students with an interest in philosophy of physics.

Useful preparatory reading for the first part of term is: David Albert *Time and Chance* (Harvard 2000) and Huw Price *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point* (OUP 1996). A reading list for the second part of term is on the Canvas site.

### **122 Philosophy of Mathematics**

Prof Beau Mount – M. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series of self-contained lectures on the philosophy of mathematics is designed for final honour school students preparing paper 122, 'The Philosophy of Mathematics', but all others (undergraduate and postgraduate) are welcome to attend. The sequence of lectures will be as follows:

Lecture 1: Frege and Neo-Fregeanism

Lecture 2: Hilbert's Program

Lecture 3: Intuitionism

Lecture 4: Empiricism and Nominalism I

Lecture 5: Empiricism and Nominalism II  
Lecture 6: Deductivism and Eliminative Structuralism  
Lecture 7: Benacerraf's Problem and Ante Rem Structuralism  
Lecture 8: Philosophy of Set Theory

Slides and handouts will be distributed in class and also made available on the web. Students are encouraged to consult the following books for preliminary reading:

Stewart Shapiro, *Thinking about Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Joel Hamkins, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2021).

For further explorations, the following collections are highly recommended:

Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds., *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Stewart Shapiro, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

### **124 / 106a Philosophy of Science**

Dr Henrique Gomes – M. T. 10 (*weeks 2 to 7*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a twelve-lecture course on the philosophy of science. The focus is on what science tells us; what does it mean to accept a scientific theory? Here is a provisional plan for the course:

1. Induction and confirmation
2. Logical empiricism
3. Popper's falsificationism
4. Kuhn
5. Varieties of reduction
6. Naturalism
7. Probability
8. Laws of nature
9. Scientific realism
10. Structural realism
11. Scientific explanation
12. Pessimistic Meta-induction vs Inference to the Best Explanation

Introductory Reading: Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (University of Chicago Press)

### **128 Practical Ethics**

Dr Umut Baysan – T. 10, Examination Schools (Room 9)

These lectures will cover some key debates in practical ethics. We will begin with surveying some recurring themes in these debates, such as moral status, right to life, and the distinction between doing and allowing harm, and move on to the topics of abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, moral demands of affluence, effective altruism, affirmative action, and racial profiling.

There is no set textbook for these lectures. Those intending to attend the lectures can familiarise themselves with some of these debates as they are covered in Peter Singer's book *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2011, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, but any edition would do), some of the short essays collected in *Ethics and the Contemporary World*, edited by David Edmonds (Routledge, 2019), and William Abel, Elizabeth Kahn, Tom Parr and Andrew Walton's recent book *Introducing Political Philosophy: A Policy-Driven Approach* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

### **131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist***

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – W. F. 12 (weeks 1 to 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates taking the finals paper 'Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*' in Greek or in translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. The first six lectures will be on the *Theaetetus*. Topics covered will include: the claim knowledge is perception and its refutation, the claim that knowledge is true judgement, the problem of false belief and the claim that knowledge is true judgement with an account. The remaining six lectures will be on the *Sophist*. Topics covered will include: definition and the method of division, the excursus on the number and nature of beings, the 'late-learners' and the communion of kinds, the analysis of negative predication and the analysis of falsehood.

### **133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind**

Dr Janine Gühler – W. 12, Examination Schools (Room 12)

This series of lectures introduces some of Aristotle's most fascinating arguments and concepts in his theoretical philosophy. The primary texts are his *Physics*, *Parts of Animals* and *De Anima*. The discussions range over what we now call metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. We will lay the foundations by investigating his concepts of nature, matter, form, potentiality, actuality, and the four causes. This will equip us to tackle with his teleology, definitions of change, the concept of the infinite and his discussion of time. We will spend the remainder of the term investigating Aristotle's views on the soul, perception, understanding and imagination.

These lectures are primarily intended for those taking tutorials on Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind (in Greek or translation) and Mst students in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write one of their essays on any of the listed topics. However, while these lectures may be especially relevant to those interested in ancient philosophy, they are open to all undergraduates and graduates, and everyone is welcome.

Week 1: Matter, form and nature  
Week 2: The four causes and teleology  
Week 3: Change, potentiality and actuality  
Week 4: The infinite  
Week 5: Time  
Week 6: Soul  
Week 7: Perception  
Week 8: Understanding and imagination

### **134 / 136 / 139 Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy**

Prof Luca Castagnoli – F. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 3 and 5 to 7*), Examination Schools (Room 12)

‘Human beings have a natural desire for knowledge’, said Aristotle. However, both before and after him the philosophical quest for knowledge led some to the view that it was a hopeless or misguided aspiration. In the Hellenistic age the debate on the possibility of knowledge took centre stage as Plato’s school, the Academy, ‘turned sceptical’ with Arcesilaus and Carneades and argued against the epistemological optimism of the two major rival Hellenistic schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To complicate things, not long before Zeno of Citium and Epicurus founded their schools, Pyrrho embraced and embodied the anti-dogmatic ideal of a human life stripped of knowledge and belief and thereby free from anxiety as a recipe for human happiness. That ideal was revived and developed more than two centuries later by Aenesidemus, the founder of the Pyrrhonian school, a brand of Scepticism different from the Academic one and in competition with it (the late writings of Sextus Empiricus are our best source).

The lectures will introduce some of the central Hellenistic epistemological views and debates as they developed between (and within) these philosophical schools. They aim to offer an understanding of

- some of the main sources for philosophical scepticism from the fourth century BC to the 3rd century AD, and for the ‘empiricist’ epistemologies of Stoicism and Epicureanism;
- the variety of different positions encompassed by the term ‘Sceptic’;
- the Sceptics’ attacks on ‘dogmatic’ epistemology and the various strategies adopted by the ‘dogmatists’ to defend the possibility of knowledge;
- the ‘dogmatic’ counter-attacks against the Sceptical positions, and the Sceptics’

attempts to defend themselves;

- how the issue of epistemology impacted on the field of ethics: do we need knowledge to live a good and happy life? Is it possible and desirable to *live* one's Scepticism in a consistent way?

This course is primarily intended for those undergraduate students who plan to sit papers 134, 136 or 139 (Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy), but anyone (including graduate students) with an interest in ancient Greek philosophy, philosophical scepticism and the history of epistemology is welcome to attend (knowledge of ancient Greek or Latin is not required).

The main topics to be introduced in the lectures are provisionally scheduled as follows:

Week 1 - Wed 12 October, 10-12

An introduction to Hellenistic philosophy and epistemology.

- Epicurean epistemology.
- Introduction to Stoic epistemology.

Week 2 - Wed 19 October, 10-12

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy I: Academics vs. Stoics

Week 3 - Wed 26 October, 10-12

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy II.

Week 4 - Wed 2 November, 10-12

- Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism: beliefs, appearances, and the aim of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
- The modes of the suspension of judgement: Aenesidemus and Agrippa

Week 5 - Wed 9 November, 10-12

- The Pyrrhonian attack on logic: criteria of truth, signs and proofs.
- The self-refutation charge and the possibility of Pyrrhonian inquiry.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on physics: causes, motion and time.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on ethics and the possibility of a Pyrrhonian life.

Week 6 - Wed 16 November, 10-12

- Early Pyrrhonism: Pyrrho and Aenesidemus
- Conclusions

### **Main Texts**

- A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge: CUP, 1987. Vol. I: esp. sections 1-3 (Pyrrho); 15-19 (Epicureans); 39-42 (Stoics); 68-70 (Academics); 71-72 (Aenesidemus).
- Cicero, *Academic Books*, transl. by C. Brittain, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
- Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, trans. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

### **Introductory readings**

- K. Vogt, 'Ancient Skepticism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism-ancient/> .
- D. Sedley, 'The Protagonists', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (eds.), *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1-19.

### **198 Special Subject in Philosophy: the Philosophy of Fiction and Literature**

Prof Catharine Abell – M. 2 (*weeks 1 to 6*) and M. 2 – 4 (*week 7*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course is restricted to those registered as taking the paper for Finals, who will be sent details.

### **198 Special Subject in Philosophy: Indian Philosophy**

Prof Monima Chadha – M. 10 – 11.30 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

This course is restricted to those registered as taking the paper for Finals, who will be sent details of what is covered.

**198 Special Subject in Philosophy: Feminist Theory**

Dr Aylon Cohen – T. 12, Examination Schools (East School)

Week 1: Power, Oppression, and Domination

Week 2: Feminism and Liberalism

Week 3: Work and Capitalism

Week 4: Reproduction and the Family

Week 5: What is a Woman?

Week 6: Sexuality and Sexual Liberation

Week 7: Sex Work

Week 8: Queer Feminism

**198 Special Subject in Philosophy: The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technology**

Prof John Tasioulas – T. 10, *first lecture* Examination Schools (*Room 6*), *remaining lectures* Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin Building

These lectures are intended only for those registered as taking the paper for Finals.



## **198 Special Subject: the Philosophy of Economics**

Prof Jean Baccelli – W. 10, Examination Schools (Room 8)

*These lectures will introduce students to selected topics in the contemporary philosophy of economics. Contact information: [jean.baccelli@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:jean.baccelli@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).*

### 0 General Resources

#### 0.1 Textbooks

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016.

Marcel Boumans and John Davis. *Economic Methodology: Understanding Economics as a Science*. London: Macmillan, 2015.

#### 0.2 Handbooks

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors. *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Uskali Mäki, editor. *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

John Davis, Alain Marciano, and Jochen Runde, editors. *The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005.

#### 0.3 Anthologies

Daniel Hausman, editor. *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2012b.

#### 0.4 Further Background

Harry Landreth and David Colander. *History of Economic Thought*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin College Division (Fourth Edition), 2002.

Peter Godfrey-Smith. *Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Martin Curd, Jan Cover, and Christopher Pincock, editors. *Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues*. New York: Norton, 2012 (Second Edition).

Daniel Little. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder: Westview, 1991.

Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors. *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Francesco Guala and Daniel Steel, editors. *The Philosophy of Social Science Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

## 1 Rationality

### 1.1 Core Readings

Katie Steele. Choice Models. In Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors, *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*, pages 185–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapters 3 (“Rational Choice Theory”) and 4 (“Game Theory”).

Catherine Herfeld. Revisiting the Criticisms of Rational Choice Theories. *Philosophy Compass*, 17(1):e12774, 2022.

Paul Anand. Rationality and Intransitive Preference – Foundations for the Modern View. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, pages 156–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Peter Wakker. Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles. Note accessible at <https://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/alias.pdf>, 1999.

### 1.2 Further Readings

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1, pages 701–728. Amsterdam: North- Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, pages 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Amartya Sen. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 6(4):317–344, 1977.

Gary Becker. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1976, Chap. 1 (“The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour”).

Uskali Mäki. Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 39(3):351–380, 2009.

## 2 Preference

### 2.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.

Amartya Sen. Internal Consistency of Choice. *Econometrica*, 61(3):495–521, 1993, Sections 2 (“Choice, Correspondence and Consistency”) and 3 (“What is the Problem with Internal Consistency of Choice?”).

Wade Hands. Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory. *Erkenntnis*, 78(5):1081–1108, 2013.

Franz Dietrich and Christian List. Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. *Economics & Philosophy*, 32(2):249–281, 2016.

Kate Vredenburg. The Economic Concept of a Preference. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 67–82. New York: Routledge, 2022.

### 2.2 Further Readings

Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden. The Road Not Taken: How Psychology Was Removed from Economics, and How It Might Be Brought Back. *The Economic Journal*, 117(516):146–173, 2007.

Ivan Moscati. Behavioral and Heuristic Models Are As-if Models Too— And That’s Ok. *Economics & Philosophy*, forthcoming.

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The Case for Mindless Economics. In Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, *The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics*, pages 3–39. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Johanna Thoma. In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory. *Economics & Philosophy*, 37(2):163–187, 2021.

Mikaël Cozic and Brian Hill. Representation Theorems and the Semantics of Decision-Theoretic Concepts. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 22(3): 292–311, 2015.

### 3 Idealization

#### 3.1 Core Readings

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapter 7 (“Models, Idealization, Explanation”).

Nancy Cartwright. The Vanity of Rigour in Economics: Theoretical Models and Galilean Experiments. In Philippe Fontaine and Robert Leonard, editors, *The Experiment in the History of Economics*, pages 118–134. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Philippe Verreault-Julien. Explanation in Economics. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 300–315. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Mary Morgan and Tarja Knuuttila. Models and Modelling in Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 49–87. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Anna Alexandrova and Robert Northcott. Progress in Economics: Lessons from the Spectrum Auctions. In Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 306–336. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

#### 3.2 Further Readings

Daniel Hausman. Why Look Under the Hood? In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, pages 183–187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2012a.

Bruce Caldwell. *Beyond Positivism*. New York: Routledge (Revised Edition), 1994, Chapter 8 (“Friedman’s Methodological Instrumentalism”).

Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann. Models in Science. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2020.

Alvin Roth. The Economist as Engineer. *Econometrica*, 70(4):1341–1378, 2002.

Esther Duflo. The Economist as Plumber. *American Economic Review*, 107(5):1–26, 2017.

### 4 Welfare

#### 4.1 Core Readings

John Broome. Utility. *Economics & Philosophy*, 7(1):1–12, 1991a.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 8

("Welfare").

Erik Angner. Well-Being and Economics. In Guy Fletcher, editor, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*, pages 492–503. London: Routledge, 2016.

Anna Alexandrova. Well-Being. In Nancy Cartwright and Eleonora Montuschi, editors, *Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction*, pages 9–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Guy Fletcher. *The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2016, Chapters 1 ("Hedonism"), 2 ("Desire-Fulfilment Theory"), and 3 ("Objective List Theories").

#### 4.2 Further Readings

Philippe Mongin and Claude d'Aspremont. Utility Theory and Ethics. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume I: Principles*, pages 371–481. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1998, Section 2 ("Some Philosophical and Historical Clarifications").

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 6(1):93–117, 2005.

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach in Practice. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(3):351–376, 2006.

Carol Graham. Subjective Well-Being in Economics. In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, pages 424–452. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Koen Decanq and Dirk Neumann. Does the Choice of Well-Being Measure Matter Empirically? In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, pages 553–587. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

### 5 The Limits of Efficiency, 1

#### 5.1 Core Readings

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 9 ("Welfare Economics").

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1970, Chapters 2 ("Unanimity") and 2 ("Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons").

Matthew Adler. Value and Cost-Benefit Analysis. In Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, pages 317–337. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

John Chipman. Compensation Principle. In Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, volume 2, pages 38–48. London: Palgrave–MacMillan, 2008.

Sven Ove Hansson. Philosophical Problems in Cost–Benefit Analysis. *Economics & Philosophy*, 23(2):163–183, 2007.

## 5.2 Further Readings

Wade Hands. The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, pages 219–239. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Philippe Mongin. Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics. *Economica*, 73(290):257–286, 2006.

Antoinette Baujard. Values in Welfare Economics. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 211–222. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Julian Reiss. Measurement and Value Judgments. In Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, pages 223–233. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Appendix (“How Could Ethics Matter to Economics”).

## 6 The Limits of Efficiency, 2

### 6.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. *Economica*, 43(171):217–245, 1976.

Amartya Sen. Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics. *The Economic Journal*, 89(355):537–558, 1979a, Sections VI (“Limitations of Welfarism Even With Rich Utility Information”) and VII (“Limitations of Paretianism”).

John Weymark. Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 48(2):269–294, 2017.

Philippe Mongin. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle. *Economics & Philosophy*, 32(3):511–532, 2016.

Alvin Roth. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*,

21(3):37–58, 2007.

## 6.2 Further Readings

Itai Sher. How Perspective-Based Aggregation Undermines the Pareto Principle. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 19(2):182–205, 2020.

John Broome. *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991b, Chapters 7 (“Coherence Against the Pareto Principle”), 8 (“The Principle of Personal Good”), and 9 (“Equality”).

Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler. Pareto Efficiency with Different Beliefs. *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 43(S2): S151–S171, 2014.

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 6 (“The Ethical Limits to Markets”).

## 7 Public Policy

### 7.1 Core Readings

Amartya Sen. Utilitarianism and Welfarism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76(9):463–489, 1979b.

Amartya Sen. The Possibility of Social Choice. *American Economic Review*, 89(3):349–378, 1999.

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Second Edition), 2009, Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, pages 1179–1285. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004, Sections 3 (“Social Choice without Interpersonal Comparisons”) and 4 (“Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons”).

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Third Edition), 2016, Chapter 11 (“Equality and Egalitarianism”).

### 7.2 Further Readings

Marc Fleurbaey. On the Informational Basis of Social Choice. *Social Choice and Welfare*,

21(2):347–384, 2003.

Marc Fleurbaey and Bertil Tungodden. The Tyranny of Non-Aggregation versus the Tyranny of Aggregation in Social Choices: A Real Dilemma. *Economic Theory*, 44(3):399–414, 2010.

Daniel Hausman. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. *Mind*, 104(415):473–490, 1995.

Christian List. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? *Erkenntnis*, 58(2):229–260, 2003.

Hilary Greaves and Harvey Lederman. Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 96(3):636–667, 2018.

## 8 Behavioural Public Policy

### 8.1 Core Readings

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013, Chapter 15 (“Behavioral Economics and Nudge”).

Andreas Schmidt and Bart Engelen. The Ethics of Nudging: An Overview. *Philosophy Compass*, 15(4):e12658, 2020.

Luc Bovens. The Ethics of Nudge. In Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson, editors, *Preference Change*, pages 207–219. Heidelberg: Springer, 2009.

Till Grüne-Yanoff. Old Wine in New Casks: Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 38(4):635–645, 2012.

Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch. Debate: To Nudge or Not To Nudge. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 18(1):123–136, 2010.

### 8.2 Further Readings

Pelle Hansen. The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the Hand Fit the Glove? *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 7(1):155–174, 2016.

Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux, and Robert Sugden. Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 23(1):1–25, 2016.

Till Grüne-Yanoff and Ralph Hertwig. Nudge versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory? *Minds and Machines*, 26(1-2):149–183, 2016.

Johanna Thoma. Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and ‘Debiased’ Welfare Analysis.



*Philosophy of Science*, forthcoming.

Cristina Bicchieri and Eugen Dimant. Nudging with Care: The Risks and Benefits of Social Information. *Public Choice*, 191(3-4):443–464, 2022.

## Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

### **The 2024 Isaiah Berlin Lectures: *Lycurgus to Moses: Thinking through Lawgivers in Legal and Political Philosophy***

Prof Melissa Lane (Princeton) – T. 5 (*weeks 3 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (*first lecture: St Luke's Chapel, remaining lectures: Lecture Room*)

Why and how have lawgivers figured in legal and political philosophy, both in history and in theory? Are lawgivers necessary for the emergence of law as a social practice, and if not, what roles have they played in the shaping and promulgating of bodies of law for particular societies? How have lawgivers deployed different means of legal transmission, such as orality and writing, been deployed to shape civic culture and values? What does it mean to debate legal questions in light of the purported intentions of a lawgiver? Why have so many political theorists and legal philosophers felt the need to appeal theoretically to the figure of a lawgiver or legislator in their own work? And is legislation in fact the core political activity? These questions can be asked in multiple registers, both historical and theoretical, and across manifold historical contexts. These lectures weave together the roles of lawgivers in archaic and early classical Greece, including both historical sources and the ways in which Greek authors themselves constructed those figures; they also extend into the early Christian era, during which Moses was explicitly compared by Jewish authors, writing in Greek, to the panoply of Greek lawgivers such as the Spartan Lycurgus (the most iconic, though not the earliest, Greek lawgiver). That arc—from Lycurgus in seventh-century Sparta, to Moses as conceived by these authors in the early Common Era—would feed into a long trajectory of invocations of lawgivers made by authors such as Rousseau and Nietzsche. Putting the history of ancient Greek lawgivers (part of a larger legacy of Greek law) in dialogue with its reception in the history of political thought, and with questions in legal theory and philosophy about promulgation, purpose, and interpretation, these six Isaiah Berlin Lectures call attention to manifold ways in which the figure of the lawgiver inflects both the history and the practice of legal and political philosophy.

<https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/isaiah-berlin-lectures>

## **Narrative and Epistemology**

Prof Rachel Fraser – M. 2 – 4 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will be a study of the epistemological behaviour of narratives. We will address questions like: do all narratives incorporate elements of subjectivity? Do narratives invariably distort their subject matter? Do we learn something from narratives that we could not learn otherwise? The main reading for this class will be my book manuscript, "Narrative Epistemology"; in some classes the manuscript will be read alongside other recent papers. Those wishing to receive the manuscript should email me by November 10th.

## **Emotions in Ancient Greek and Indian Philosophy**

Kassandra Dugi – W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This lecture series focuses on emotions in ancient Greek and Indian philosophy. While it discusses how various ancient philosophers defined and conceived of emotions, the main emphasis is on their connection to ethics. Specifically, can emotions play a positive role in ethics, when cultivated or moderated correctly, or are they inherently detrimental and must therefore be eliminated entirely?

The lectures provide a grounding in the individual theories of emotions of each philosopher or tradition, complementing the *Nicomachean Ethics* (116/132), Latin Philosophy (135) and Indian Philosophy (198) papers. At the same time, they also draw intra- and cross-cultural comparisons, in order to provide a more global understanding of emotions in the ancient world.

This lecture series does not presuppose any prior knowledge of ancient Greek or Indian philosophy and is open to anyone with an interest in ancient philosophy and/or the philosophy of emotion.

### Lecture 1 – Aristotle: Moderation

The first lecture focuses on Aristotle, who assigned emotions (*pathê*) a positive, and indeed crucial, role in ethics. Aristotle is a useful source for our understanding of ancient Greek emotions, as he provides definitions of different emotions in the *Rhetoric*. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle also argues that emotions are part of human nature and, when experienced correctly, represent an important aspect of virtue, as they reflect what we value and motivate correct ethical action.

### Lecture 2 – Stoicism: Elimination

The second lecture discusses the Stoics' conception of emotions as a kind of belief and their famous endorsement of *apatheia* (lack of/freedom from emotions). Specifically, the Stoics hold that emotions are unnatural and ought to be extirpated for the same reason that Aristotle encouraged them: they reflect what we value, specifically our false judgment of

things as good or bad that are merely 'indifferent'. Moreover, emotions not only prompt us to vicious action, but are themselves an instance thereof.

### Lecture 3 – Hinduism: Transformation

As in the case of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, one of the most thorough discussions of emotions in Hindu philosophy is found not in ethical texts, but in aesthetic ones, written by so-called *rasa* theorists, as the third lecture discusses. However, unlike Aristotle, these theorists differentiate ordinary emotions from 'higher' emotions (*rasa*) and see ethical value in the transformation, rather than moderation, of the former into the latter, as well as the transcendence of narrow egoistic concerns that results from this transformation.

### Lecture 4 – Buddhism: Elimination

The final lecture focuses on Buddhist philosophy, where emotions are considered so-called 'unwholesome mental factors' that need to be eliminated in order to achieve freedom from suffering and correct ethical action. Similarly to Aristotle and the Stoics, Buddhists see emotions not only as comprising some judgment about the external world, but also as the cause of particular (usually harmful) actions, which motivates the ethical necessity of eliminating emotions altogether.

## **Advanced Topics in the Philosophy of Logic and Language: Plurals and Higher-order languages**

Thomas Ralston – W. 11 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

English and other natural languages contain a range of expressions that cannot faithfully be translated into first-order logic. In these lectures, students will be introduced to a range of puzzles in metaphysics, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language relating to these limits. These lectures will be of particular interest to students taking the Philosophy of Logic and Language (108), Philosophical Logic (127) and Knowledge & Reality (102) finals courses.

### 1. *The Limits of First-Order Logic*

We begin by investigating the purposes of translating ordinary language arguments into formal languages and consider some problems which arise when we try to regiment sentences with collective predicates into first-order logic. Then we will survey three different methods of regimenting plural expressions in a formal language: set theory, mereology and plural reference. I introduce the Paradox of Plurality, according to which taking plural expressions to refer to a 'surrogate' or 'proxy' object generates inconsistency, and discuss how it applies to each method of regimenting natural language plurals.

Suggested reading:

- Oliver, A., & Smiley, T. (2016). *Plural Logic* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, Chapter 3 'Changing the subject'. <https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744382.003.0003>

- Florio, S., & Nicolas, D. (2021). Plurals and Mereology. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 50(3): 415–445. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-020-09570-9>

## 2. *Plural Definite Descriptions and Distributivity*

Next, we turn to the question of the meaning of plural definite descriptions and investigate how the traditional theories of Frege and Russell can be extended to cover the plural as well as the singular case. We will consider some difficult cases arising from collective descriptions and ask whether we need a new notion of *superplural* reference to explain these cases or whether these cases can be dealt with as part of a more general theory of distributive and collective predication. Finally, we discuss a puzzle known as ‘non-maximality’, where plural predications seem to have weaker than the universal truth-conditions that we would expect, given the standard semantics for plural definite descriptions.

Suggested reading:

- Sharvy, Richard. 1980. ‘A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions’. *The Philosophical Review* 89(4): 607–24. [10.2307/2184738](https://doi.org/10.2307/2184738).
- Oliver, A., & Smiley, T. (2016). *Plural Logic* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, Chapter 8 ‘Plural descriptions’. <https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744382.003.0008>

## 3. *Bare Plural Generics*

Generic sentences, like ‘Ravens are black’, have puzzled philosophers and linguists for some time, since they seem both weaker than universal generalisations – they admit exceptions – and, at the same time, stronger – they appear to be law-like. In this lecture, we will discuss the two dominant approaches to the semantics of bare plural generics, reference to kinds and covert quantification, and evaluate the arguments in favour of each approach. I will present some of the parallels between bare plural generics and plural definite descriptions, arguing that a plural reference account of bare plurals represents a viable alternative to reference to kinds and covert quantification.

Suggested reading:

- Liebesman, D. (2011) ‘Simple Generics’, *Noûs*, 45(3), pp. 409–442. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00774.x>.
- Leslie, S.-J. (2015) ‘Generics Oversimplified’, *Noûs*, 49(1), pp. 28–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12039>.

## 4. *Higher-Order Metaphysics*

In the final lecture, we move away from plurals and focus on a different departure from the traditional first-order paradigm. In contemporary metaphysics, *higher-order* languages – languages which quantify into positions other than name position – are now routinely used to formulate theories. First, we will discuss the motivations for this application of higher-order resources in metaphysics. Then we consider a long-standing Quinean objection, according to which higher-order logic is not true logic since it is not ontologically innocent and so does not provide a suitable framework for theorising in metaphysics. Whether that criticism is valid depends on the interpretation of higher-order languages, so we will discuss how they should

best be interpreted. Finally, we consider some applications of higher-order languages to questions relating to the metaphysics of properties and propositions.

Suggested reading:

- Skiba, L. (2021) 'Higher-order metaphysics', *Philosophy Compass*, 16(10), p. e12756. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12756>.
- Bacon, A. (2024) 'A Case for Higher-Order Metaphysics', in P. Fritz and N.K. Jones (eds) *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press, pp. 47–72. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0002>.