NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.

- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

*PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy*

*Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy*

*Literae Humaniores*: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

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**Alan Turing on Computability and Intelligence**
Prof Peter Millican – T. 11 – 1 (weeks 2 to 5), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures, designed for the first year course in Computer Science and Philosophy, start with the background to Alan Turing’s 1936 paper “On Computable Numbers”, including Hilbert’s programme, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and Cantor’s results concerning the countability of infinite sets. They then work in detail through the 1936 paper, using Charles Petzold’s book *The Annotated Turing* (which contains the entire paper, together with comprehensive discussion) as a basis. Finally, the last three lectures will turn to Turing’s 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, discussing some of the philosophical issues arising from the Turing Test and Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment.

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**Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic**
Prof James Studd – M. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for first-year mathematics and philosophy students. We’ll consider, among other things, Frege’s attack on Mill’s empiricism, Frege’s views on number ascriptions, the ‘Julius Caesar’ problem, and Frege’s attempt at a logicist reduction of arithmetic to Hume’s Principle, and ultimately to his ill-fated theory of extensions.


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**The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence**
Prof Christopher Timpson – F. 12 (*weeks 1 to 5 – the week 5 session will be two hours*) – Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course will introduce the centuries-old debate about the nature of space and time. One main question will be whether space is absolute or relative; and indeed what are the various meanings of these two words. A key text in this debate is the correspondence between Samuel Clarke---representing the ideas of Isaac Newton---and Gottfried Leibniz. We will start with the background to the debate in the works of Galileo and Descartes. We will then see how both Newton and Leibniz responded to this background; and finally, we will contrast
their arguments, while investigating Leibniz's metaphysical views in more detail. The course is primarily aimed at Physics & Philosophy students, but all are welcome.
Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are core lectures for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account to some extent. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section Other Lectures, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

104 Philosophy of Mind
Prof Will Davies – W. 10 (starting in week 2 – a recording will be made for week 1), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please refer to the Philosophy FHS Lectures Canvas pages.

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism
Prof Louise Hanson – W. 12 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series is cancelled.
Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

The 2024 John Locke Lectures: Seeing in Sanskrit
Prof Jonardon Ganeri – W. 5 – 7 (weeks 1 to 5), Keble College (25 Banbury Road)

The Faculty is delighted to welcome the 2024 John Locke lecturer, Prof Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto).

My plan for this series of lectures is as follows. In the first lecture I will offer a fresh reading of a key early Nyāya text. My aim will be to demonstrate a way of understanding the text which frees it from a gloss put on it by later interpreters, a conceptualist gloss that eventually binds it to a thesis incompatible with naïve realism or relationalism. In the second lecture I will examine key Nyāya arguments for Nyāya realism, the most important of which is that amodal perception of wholes is better explained with its framework than within Buddhist representationalism. I then turn to three forms of experience that enrich the picture. The first is illusion, and my argument in the third lecture will be that neither disjunctivism nor objective looks theory is more compelling than the Nyāya’s own explanation of perceptual error. This explanation draws on synaesthetic phenomena to defend the existence of anomalous relations of acquaintance with absent features. The second case is absence experience, the best noninferential theory of which concedes a role to mental imagery. Even a dogged commitment to absence realism cannot help Nyāya here. The view I defend is a non-disjunctivist version of naïve realism, one in which the relation of presentation is enriched to include both the presentation-as-present of absent features and the presentation-as-absent of absences through mismatch with mental imagery. The third case is the spectatorial experience of artworks. A sophisticated Indian analysis of such experience, as it relates to audience engagement in theatre (rasa), leads me to a threefold analysis in which the perception of an artwork incorporates elements both of virtual acquaintance and absence experience (prominent in aniconic representation). In all this my aim is to reprise Wollheim’s “two perceptual projects” hypothesis but in a different form. What replaces the distinction between seeing face-to-face and seeing-in is an orthogonal one, between what is presented-as-present and what is presented-as-absent. I will focus on the relationship between perceptual experience and attention. We have been taught by Richard Wollheim that the perceptual experience of an artwork consists in a twofold attention, and by Krishnacandra Bhattacharyya that the perceptual experience of absence consists in a negative attention (a figure-ground structure with an empty figureposition). Attention explains how we can experience wholes and why there are illusions, and I want to resist the view that what does the explanatory work is the thesis that perceptual experience is saturated by concepts and conceptualisation. So I will argue that a suite of Sanskrit ideas are better understood as matters of attention rather than conceptualisation: savikalpaka-pratyakṣa (the idea of perceptual structure), avayavi-pratyakṣa (perceptual completion in the perception of whole objects), viparyaya (the idea of perceptual error and illusion), abhāva-pratyakṣa (absence perception), and finally rasa (aesthetic experience as perceptual). The key concepts I will draw
upon from the psychology and philosophy of attention are: the distinction between selection and access, the idea of a perceptual chunk, feature-binding, the figure-ground distinction, and simultaneous divided attention. So I argue for a non-disjunctivist version of naïve realism, inspired by the work of Bimal Matilal but extending it. In an update of the empiricist project it is to Nyāya rather than Locke that we should look.

Lecture 1: Seeing Face-to-Face: Nyāya Realism

In the first lecture I reflect on Bimal Matilal’s brilliant reconstruction of Nyāya philosophy of perception as a version of naïve realism, and I offer a new interpretation of a foundational statement in the philosophy of perception in classical India: Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4.


Lecture 2: Nyāya Arguments for Nyāya Realism

I identify two central Nyāya arguments in favour of their version of naïve realism, which I call the argument from selection and the argument from (amodal) completion. Of these the first serves to diffuse a Buddhist counter-argument in support of representationalism, while the second argues that naïve realism is the best explanation of our ability to perceive wholes.


Lecture 3: Illusion as Mislocated Seeing

The two leading naïve realist accounts of illusion are disjunctivism and objective looks theory. I argue that Nyāya provides a third account of illusion, namely, that illusions result from feature-binding misfires involving relations of anomalous acquaintance with absent features. Insights about feature-binding will be drawn from the psychology of synaesthetia.


Lecture 4: Seeing Absence

What is the nature of our experience of absence? I draw on the work of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, and provide a new explication of his concept of negative attention. I reprise Wollheim’s “two perceptual projects” hypothesis, between seeing face-to-face and seeingin, but reconfigure it in terms of a distinction between what is presented-as-present and what is presented-as-absent. Aniconic representation affords an example.

Lecture 5: Seeing in the Theatre

Sanskrit aesthetics is, in the first instance, a theory of rasa: audience experience in theatre. Against the dominant view that such experience consists in noncognitive affect, I examine that of the philosopher Śrī Śaṅkuka (fl. 859 CE), who offers instead an analysis of audience engagement as the perceptual experience of characters and staged emotions.


**Ethics, Democracy and Technology**
Prof Josiah Ober and Prof John Tasioulas – T. 2 – 4, Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin Building (Phase 2 Seminar Room)

April 23: Josiah Ober (Stanford) / John Tasioulas (Oxford)
April 30: Daron Acemoglu (MIT)
May 7: Paolo Carozza (Notre Dame / MIT Oversight Board)
May 14: Jeff Howard (UCL)
May 21: Linda Eggert (Oxford)
May 28: John Ober (Stanford) / John Tasioulas (Oxford)
June 4: Josiah Cohen (Apple) **to be confirmed**
June 11: Helene Landemore (Yale)

**Meta-ethics: an introduction to reasons**
Sasha Arridge – W. 11 (weeks 5 to 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Reasons are everywhere, and you encounter them all the time. The fact that the hob is hot is a reason not to touch it; the fact that your housemate’s shoes are wet is a reason to believe that it’s raining outside; and the fact that you can expect this lecture series to be interesting is a reason to come to it. But the hotness of hobs, your housemate’s shoes, and your expectations are all very different: what makes them all *reasons*?

This lecture series, which introduces attendees to key topics in the theory of reasons, aims to engage everyone—graduate or undergraduate—with an interest in meta-ethics, and will be particularly useful for those studying the *Ethics* (103) module. No prior knowledge of the subject area is presumed; each lecture will come with a detailed handout and suggestions for further reading.
Lecture 1: Introduction—Why Reasons?

This lecture starts by arguing that reasons are the things we reach for when we try to overcome uncertainty about what to do, feel, or believe; given that such uncertainty is an unavoidable feature of our human experience, then so too are reasons. The second half of the lecture introduces attendees to contemporary work on the relation between reasons and motivation, and reasons and epistemic perspective, asking questions like: for the hotness of the hob to be a reason for you not to touch it, does it have to be possible for you to be motivated not to touch it? Do you have to know that the hob is hot? Does it have to be knowable to you?

Lecture 2: Reasons, Goodness, and Fittingness

What comes first, reasons or goodness? This lecture critically introduces attendees to value-first accounts of reasons, which attempt to analyse reasons in terms of goodness, and so-called “buck-passing” accounts of goodness, which attempt to analyse goodness in terms of reasons. The lecture then engages with the burgeoning contemporary literature on the relation between reasons and fittingness, where fittingness is the relation that obtains between, for example, desirable things and the attitude of desire.

Lecture 3: Reasons, Ought, and Obligation

This lecture introduces attendees to debates surrounding the relation between reasons and deontic normativity, including the central deontic notions of ought and obligation. It considers attempts to analyse reasons in terms of explanation and ought; analyses of ought in terms of reasons; and questions whether important deontic notions like rights are amenable to analysis in terms of reasons.

Lecture 4: Reasons and Supererogation

Sometimes it is morally permissible for you not to do what it would be morally best for you to do. For example: it would be morally best for you to give away most of your money, but it is morally permissible for you not to do so. Why? This lecture discusses extant attempts to explain the puzzling phenomenon of supererogation, focussing particularly on explanations in terms of reasons. The lecture finishes by sketching an account that brings together prerogative-based and reasons-based explanations, and which is built around the claim that, as the autonomous subjects of our wellbeing, we each have the normative power to determine how much our wellbeing matters.

The metaphysics of properties
Katherine Hong – T. 4 (weeks 5 to 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please see the Canvas page for the course.
Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty’s graduate students. (The BPhil Pro-Seminar is restricted to first-year BPhil students.) Other students may attend Faculty graduate classes, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

**BPhil Pro-Seminar: History of Philosophy**
Various class-givers and locations – F. 11 – 1

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Trinity Term will cover history of philosophy, from the ancient and early modern periods. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

**Aristotle, Movement, and the Ontology of Action**
Prof Ursula Coope – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we shall discuss Aristotle’s views about movement and activity, and ask about some of the consequences of those views for modern philosophy of action.

In the first four meetings, we’ll focus on certain key aspects of Aristotle’s view:
(i) His account of movement (*kinēsis*), and his claim that movement is distinctively incomplete.
(ii) His distinction between movement and activity (*kinēsis* and *energeia*)
(iii) His claim that nothing is moving in the now, and his response to Zeno’s moving arrow paradox.
(iv) His remarks about ‘primary time’.

In the fifth class (v), we’ll discuss Plotinus’s criticisms of Aristotle’s account of movement.

In the sixth and seventh sessions, we shall look at two modern types of account, both of which are inspired by Aristotle, but which are (I think) importantly different from Aristotle:
(vi) Crowther and Hornsby’s view that movement is constituted by activity
(vii) Remarks on the nature of process in Stout, Steward and Charles.

In the final session, (viii) we shall turn to a puzzle about contingency and the present, and ask whether Aristotle’s account of movement can help to answer it.
Hegel and Critical Theory
Dr Jack Wearing and Prof Paul Lodge – T. 11 – 1, Corpus Christi College (Seminar Room weeks 1, 4, 7; Rainolds Room other weeks)

Overview
In this course, we will pair readings from Hegel and the secondary literature on his work with readings from contemporary critical theory. The latter either take up Hegelian themes or look through a critical lens at aspects of modern society that Hegel himself sought to vindicate. The aim of the course is to familiarise students with the distinctive methods and concerns of Hegel’s social and political philosophy, while also introducing ways in which thinkers in traditions of critical theory have built on Hegelian ideas to go beyond Hegel in their critiques of the modern social world. We understand ‘critical theory’ in a capacious sense, to include the Frankfurt School tradition as well as some Marxist, feminist, and post-colonial thinkers on the margins of that tradition.

In weeks 1-4, we will explore the normative foundations and methodological commitments of Hegel’s – and Hegelian – approaches to social theory, covering the concepts of freedom, alienation, recognition, and immanent critique. In weeks 5-7 we will focus on aspects of Hegel’s account of the three central moments of modern ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) – the family, civil society, and the state – as well as Marxist and other post-Hegelian critiques of these social institutions. In week 8, we will examine Hegel’s theory of history and consider whether the notion of historical ‘progress’ has any role to play in critical social theory.

In advance of each class, please send at least one question regarding each of the core readings below to jack.wearing@philosophy.ox.ac.uk. We will anonymise these questions and use them to structure the discussion in class.

An ORLO list for this course including suggestions for introductory and further readings can be found here: [Link]

Core Readings

Week 1 – Freedom
**Week 2 – Alienation and Reconciliation**

[Note: If you have time, you may also find it useful to read chs. 1-2.]

**Week 3 – Recognition**

**Week 4 – Immanent Critique**

**Week 5 – Ethical Life I: The Family**

**Week 6 – Ethical Life II: Bourgeois Civil Society**
Week 7 – Ethical Life III: The State, the Individual, and War

Week 8 – History and Progress

Topics in Indian philosophy of perception and aesthetics
Prof Monima Chadha – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This set of lectures concerns topics in Indian philosophy that complement the 2024 John Locke lectures. These Locke lectures, titled "Seeing in Sanskrit," will be about Nyāya philosophy of perception. In Nyāya epistemology, perception is thought of as the primary source of knowledge. To orient the discussion of perception, we begin, in Week 1, thinking about the concept of knowledge and that of a knowledge source in the Nyāya tradition. We then turn our attention to the Nyāya philosophy of perception.

Nyāya philosophers defend a version of direct or naïve realism. This view has many defenders but, unsurprisingly, also detractors in contemporary philosophy. We explicate the specific version of naïve realism developed by Matilal (2002c) by paying attention to the respective arguments offered by them. Like all naïve realists, the Naiyāyikas must face up to the argument from illusion. But there are other problems too that arise for the Nyāya brand of naïve realism because of their peculiar epistemic commitments: they believe that the self, universals, and even absences, can be perceived. We discuss whether perception of such unorthodox entities is consistent with naïve realism. Lastly, we look to test the philosophical case for naïve realism by asking whether we can generalise the theory beyond seeing.

A good general introduction to classical Indian discussions of some of these questions is Bimal Krishna Matilal’s 1986 book, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (OUP).
Primary text:

Provisional Schedule and Readings:

W1. Nyāya on Knowledge and Sources of Knowledge

**Essential**

**Recommended**

W2. Nyāya on Perception

**Essential Reading**

**Recommended Readings**

W3. A Nyāya Defence of Naïve realism

**Essential Reading**

**Recommended Readings**
pp. 326–332.

W4. Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Hallucinations and Illusions

Essential Reading

Recommended Readings

W5. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Absences

Essential Reading
Bhattacharyya, K. C. 1930. The Subject as Freedom. Chapter 4, Knowledge of Absence as a Present Fact, pp. 106-123

Recommended Readings

W6. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Universals

Essential Reading

Recommended Readings

W7. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Self

Essential Reading
Recommended Readings

8. Generalising Naïve realism: Beyond Seeing

Essential Reading

Recommended Readings
Nanay, B. (2022) Amodal completion and relationalism. Philosophical Studies 179, 2537–2551

Topics in epistemology
Prof Timothy Williamson – T. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The class will meet on Tuesdays, 9-11 a.m., in the Ryle Room (Rad. Hum.)

Week 1 (23 April) Verbal disputes and Frege puzzles
(paper to be presented by Elisabetta Sassarini)

Week 2 (30 April) Is the a priori / a posteriori distinction superficial?
Paper with that title to be made available on TW’s webpage

Week 3 (7 May) Epistemic ambivalence
https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/files/dilemmaspdf

Week 4 (14 May) Inferential evidence
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475389

Week 5 (21 May) Imagination’s cognitive function
Week 6 (28 May) Is imagination too liberal for modal epistemology?
Derek Lam, ‘An imaginative person’s guide to objective modality’
https://philpapers.org/archive/LAMAIP-2.pdf

Week 7 (4 June) Imagining being
Bernard Williams, 'Imagination and the self', in Problems of the Self
Dilip Ninan, ‘Imagination and the self’ in Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination

Week 8 (11 June) Collective imagining
https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/sitefiles/collectiveimagining.pdf

A topic in philosophy of mind
Prof Mike Martin – T. 11 – 1 (weeks 1, 2, 4 to 9), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)
except week 9: TBD

Please consult the Canvas pages for graduate classes.

The philosophy of mental health and mental illness
Prof Edward Harcourt – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The main purpose of the class will be to introduce and evaluate key themes from the anti-psychiatry movement and its intellectual descendants, including contemporary champions of service user voice, mad pride and related tendencies. We will ask to what extent the practice of psychiatry is vitiated by asymmetries of power and prestige; to what extent such asymmetries are inescapable (for example if psychiatry’s mainstream self-conception as treating diseases of the brain is correct); and to what extent they float free of any particular conception of mental illness. The starting point will thus be located more in ethics and epistemology than in the metaphysics of mind, with coverage of concepts such as epistemic injustice and expertise by experience. So certain familiar topics such as ‘are delusions beliefs?’ will not be dealt with, though others – e.g. are mental disorders diseases of the brain? – will be.
This class will provide an introduction to the main philosophical questions arising from the (alleged) possibility of time travel. All are welcome, even those without any prior background in metaphysics. I will aim to begin each class at a fairly introductory level, before delving further into the details. There are only two conditions on attendance:

- You must do the compulsory reading each week. There is very little compulsory reading – sometimes only a few pages – but it is compulsory.
- You must come to the class with a question on the reading that you’ve done that week. The question can be substantive (‘How would the author respond to this objection?’), but can also be clarificatory (‘What does the author mean by this?’); indeed, clarificatory questions are especially welcome. I may call on you to ask your question, so come prepared.

Week 1: What is time travel?
Travelling through space involves being in different places at different times. By analogy, then, travelling through time should involve being at different times at different times. But if you think about it, this is either trivial or sheer nonsense. Sure, I was at 11am at 11am, at 12pm at 12pm, and so on; but that’s not normally what we have in mind by time travel. What we want to say about a time-traveller is something like this: right now they’re in the present, but they will soon be in the past; they will travel many hundreds of years in just a few minutes. But really this is no better than saying that in London I’m in London but in Oxford I’m in Lisbon, or that I’ve travelled hundreds of miles in a few centimetres.

This is known as the ‘time-discrepancy paradox’, and it has persuaded more than one philosopher that the very idea of time travel makes no sense to begin with. There are two main solutions to the time-discrepancy paradox. We’ll encounter one of them in week 5. But this week we’ll focus on David Lewis’s well-known solution, which defines time travel as a discrepancy between two different ways of assigning co-ordinates to the temporal parts of an object, what Lewis calls ‘personal time’ and ‘external time’.

Compulsory reading:

- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13(2), 145-152. Read from the beginning until “So the case of Fred and Sam is rightly disqualified as a case of personal identity and as a case of time travel”, about halfway through.

Further reading:

Week 2: The grandfather paradox
Could a time-traveller go back in time and kill their own grandfather? On the one hand, it seems like they could – what’s stopping them, exactly? – but on the other, it seems like they couldn’t – Grandfather has to survive in order for the time-traveller to be born in the first place. This is the grandfather paradox, and it goes back to the very earliest philosophical discussions of time travel, in the letter pages of pulp fiction magazines like Amazing Stories. We will once again focus on David Lewis’s proposed resolution of the paradox and subsequent critiques of it, thinking in particular about whether the same considerations apply to any attempt to change the past (or for that matter, the future).

Compulsory reading:
- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13(2), 145-152. Read from “I have argued so far...” until the end of the penultimate paragraph (“...contradictions would have been true”).

Further reading:

Week 3: Causal paradoxes
Backwards time-travel on Lewis’s model inevitably involves backwards causation – the past is the way it is in part because of my present intentions to travel back in time. But some time-travel stories also involve the existence of closed causal loops; imagine, for example, that an older person with a suspiciously familiar face hands me the blueprints to a time machine, which I build over many years, before going back in time and handing the blueprints to my past self. Stories like this raise questions – like ‘Where did the blueprints originally come from?’ – which don’t seem to have any obvious answers. We will examine what such cases can teach us about the metaphysics of causation.

Compulsory reading:
- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13(2), 145-152. Read from “We might expect that when a time traveller visits the past...” until “Then if these are possible, why not also the inexplicable causal loops that arise in the time travel?”.

Further reading:

Week 4: Self-visitation paradoxes
Time travel permits people to visit, and interact with, their former or future selves. This raises several questions: Are such people both young and old at the same time? How is that possible,
given that being young and being old are (apparently) incompatible properties? If a time machine travels continuously backwards in time, how does the traveller avoid hitting their past self going the other way? If a brick is sent back in time over and over again and used to build a wall, is the brick then a part of itself? We will examine what these questions can teach us about the metaphysics of persistence and parthood.

**Compulsory reading:**

**Further reading:**

**Week 5: Two-dimensional models**

On the model of time travel we have been assuming so far, time travellers cannot change the past – while they might cause the past to be the way that it is, they can never make the past different from how it (now) is. But many time travel stories, of course, don’t play by these rules – they have their protagonists do all kinds of things in the past which, according to those very same stories, never actually happened. Over the next three weeks we will examine alternative models of time travel that purport to make sense of such past- (and indeed future-)alteration. First up is the two-dimensional model, which postulates two dimensions of time – call them time and hypertime – such that what is true at a time can be different at different hypertimes. We’ll examine different versions of this view, according to whether the present moment travels back with the time traveller, and whether the past changes ‘all at once’ or gradually, like a video tape being overwritten.

**Compulsory reading:**

**Further reading:**

**Week 6: Branching models**

By far the most popular model of past-alteration in popular discussions of time travel is the branching model, whereby time-travellers to the past create ‘new’ timelines, branching off
from the ‘old’ timeline, in which the altered past can play out. If we’re to avoid appealing to hypertime, the adjectives ‘new’ and ‘old’ here must be understood relative to the time-traveller’s personal time – from the perspective of external time, both branches timelessly exist. We will drill down into the consequences of the model, and discuss to what extent it can really claim to be a model in which the time-traveller changes the past.

Compulsory reading:

Further reading:

Week 7: ‘Split time’ models
Past-alteration scenarios violate two important theorems of standard tense logic: *linearity in the past* – roughly, that whatever will have been the case is sometime the case – and *immutability in the future* – roughly, that whatever is the case will always have been the case. (Future-alteration, conversely, violates *linearity in the future* and *immutability in the past*.) An alternative approach to making sense of past-alteration, then, involves trying to construct tense logics which permit violations of these principles. On the resulting view, past-alteration is possible as long as it’s possible for time to be ‘backwards branching’ in structure and for precedence to ‘come apart’ from succession. We’ll look at different ways of interpreting these models, and examine how they lead to ‘explanatory gaps’, where by changing the past, time-travellers also change that which now explains why the past will soon be different.

Compulsory reading:

Further reading:

Week 8: The ethics of time travel
Time travel stories are replete with ethical dilemmas, cautionary tales, and warnings of disastrous consequences if time travellers don’t stick to the rules. In this final week we’ll ask whether time travellers do indeed face any distinctive ethical challenges, and to what extent this depends on which model of time travel one adopts.

Compulsory reading:
Further reading:


**The metaphysics of relations**
Prof Nicholas Jones and Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please see the Canvas page for the course.

**Formal Semantics**
Prof Paul Elbourne – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Much work by contemporary philosophers of language uses the tools of formal semantics. This course trains students in the craft of doing formal semantics. It introduces Frege's hypothesis that functional application is the mechanism by which the meaning of a complex phrase is composed from the meanings of its constituent parts. It applies this insight to the analysis of a variety of core semantic phenomena, including argument structure, adjectival modification, definite descriptions, relative clauses, binding, and quantification. Emphasis throughout is on training students to be able to produce explicit detailed analyses of novel data.

We will be using the following textbook: Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, 1998, *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell. Students intending to follow this course should acquire a copy.

Before the first session, participants are requested to read the first three chapters of the textbook and to do Exercises 3a and 3d on pages 32-4; for Exercise 3a, please use the lambda notation as defined on pages 34-8.

We will simply be working through the textbook chapters in order. A tentative schedule is as follows:

- Week One 1-3
- Week Two 4
- Week Three 5
- Week Four 6
- Week Five 7-8
- Week Six 9
- Week Seven 10
- Week Eight 11
This class will address questions related to indefinite extensibility and modality in the foundations of mathematics.

In the first half we will look at various proposals for roles that modality might (or might not) play in mathematical foundations, including those involving indefinite extensibility. In the second half we turn to more general foundational issues, including the question of the extent to which linguistic considerations encourage Platonism in mathematics, and the question of what foundations of mathematics is for in the first place.

The class will be divided into four ‘themes’, each guided by a main reading.

**Theme A: Indefinite Extensibility and Potentialism**
Week 1: Michael Dummett, ‘What is Mathematics About?’ (in *The Seas of Language*, OUP)
Week 2: Oystein Linnebo & Stewart Shapiro, 'Actual and Potential Infinity' (Nous 53(1), 2019)

**Theme B: Mathematics and modality**
Week 3: Hartry Field, 'Realism, Mathematics, and Modality' (Philosophical Topics, 16(1), 1988)

**Theme C: (Apparent) singular reference in maths**
Week 5: Richard Pettigrew, 'Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics' (Philosophia Mathematica, 16(3) 2008)
Week 6: Harold Hodes, 'Where Do the Natural Numbers Come From?' (Synthese, 84(3), 1990)

**Theme D: Foundations**
Week 7: Penelope Maddy, ‘What do we want a foundation to do?’ (in Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics, 2019)
Week 8: Salvatore Florio & Graham Leach-Kruse, 'What Russell Should Have Said to Burali-Forti' (RSL, 10(4), 2019)
**Philosophy, AI and Innovation**  
Prof Philipp Koralus and Brendan McCord – M. 4 – 6, St Catherine’s College (Top Floor, Porter’s Lodge)

**Description:** The seminar will explore issues at the intersection of philosophy, AI, and technological innovation, co-taught by a philosopher and a technologist. The seminar will welcome a variety of visiting discussants from the technology industry throughout term, coming to us from places including Midjourney, Imbue, Stripe, Story Protocol, and ex/ante venture capital. The focus will be on how a concern for human flourishing can be embedded in the global technology development pipeline from the ground up, and on exploring how broader bridges can be built between philosophy and technology. The seminar is primarily aimed at philosophy graduate students and computer science graduate students but participants from other areas are welcome.

**Prerequisites:** please email philipp.koralus@philosophy.ox.ac.uk no later than April 15th with a (very) brief explanation of your interest in the seminar to reserve a spot. Space limited to maintain quality of discussion.

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**Decision Theory**  
Prof Jean Baccelli – Th. 11 – 1 Radcliffe Humanities, (Ryle Room except week 2: Lecture Room)

This graduate class will introduce to selected technical and conceptual topics in the contemporary theory of individual decision-making. The short reading list below is accessible online at [https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/66C53D4F-D529-7E74-61C1-93B972E4FA70.html?lang=en&login=1](https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/66C53D4F-D529-7E74-61C1-93B972E4FA70.html?lang=en&login=1)

1. **Preference**  


2. **Choice**  


3. **Expected Utility under Risk**  
Non-realism in metanormativity and moral psychology
Dr Carlos Nunez Jimenez – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Course Description
Non-realist theories in metanormativity— theories like expressivism, contextualism or relativism— portray (or, in any case, seem committed to portraying) normative judgments as being either constituted or in central respects determined by certain non-cognitive states. In this course, we will explore the question of what such non-cognitive states should look like in order to play the role that such theories would need them to play. One central theme we will explore is whether, and how, non-cognitive states can account for relations of
agreement and disagreement, and how different non-realist theories might make use of such accounts to explain normative disagreement.

**Helpful Background Readings** (some chapters included as core readings)
- Allan Gibbard (1990), *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (esp. chs. 1-4, 8-10), OUP.
- Allan Gibbard (2003), *Thinking How To Live*, (esp. chs. 1-4), OUP.
- Simon Blackburn (1998), *Ruling passions*, (esp. ch. 3), OUP.

**Schedule (subject to minor changes)**

Week 1 Gibbard on norm-acceptance and planning states
- Gibbard, A. *Thinking How To Live*, ch. 3.

Week 2 Gibbard’s plan expressivism
- Gibbard, A. *Thinking How To Live*, pp. 60-82
  Optional:

Week 3 Negation problem

Week 4 Agent-centered judgments

Week 5 Agent-centered judgments and disagreement

Week 6 Meta-linguistic negotiation and disagreement

Week 7 Contextualism and Relativism

Week 8 Contextualism and Relativism
- Broome, J. A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?, *Analytic Philosophy*, 57 (2016), pp. 1-14
Metaethics
Dr Umut Baysan – Th. 11 – 1, St Anne’s College (Seminar Room 6 except week 3: Seminar Room 1)

In these classes, we will explore topics in metaethics, with a focus on non-naturalist realism. This is the metaethical view that moral properties (such as being right, being wrong, being good, being bad) exist objectively/mind-independently, and they are sui generis properties, irreducible to natural properties. While our focus will be on non-naturalist realism, through various arguments for and against this view, we will explore wider issues and debates in contemporary metaethics.

See below for a week-by-week breakdown of topics and readings. Please read the assigned material to attend that week’s session.

Week 1: Introducing metaethics through non-naturalist realism

Week 2: Moore’s non-naturalism

Week 3: The “just-too-different” intuition
Hille Paakkunainen, The “just too different” objection to normative naturalism, Philosophy Compass, 2017.

Week 4: Non-naturalism and moral explanation


(I have an unpublished manuscript on this topic. Contact me if you are interested.)

**Week 5: The reduction argument against non-naturalism**

**Week 6: The bruteness argument against non-naturalism**

**Week 7: Non-naturalism without supervenience**

(I have an unpublished manuscript on this topic. Contact me if you are interested.)

**Week 8: Moral arguments against moral non-naturalism**
David Enoch, “Thanks, we’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable”, *Philosophical Studies*, 2021.

**Current developments in Ethics**
Prof Daniela Dover – M. 11 – 1, Merton College

Please see the Canvas page for the class.