

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

TRINITY TERM 2017

The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library.

NOTES:

- “CL” before a paper number means the lecture is a Core Lecture for the Honour Schools paper with that number.
- The normal timeslot of an event is one hour. That is, for “W. 11”, the event is booked in the room on Wednesdays from 11 to 12. Where the class or lecture has a different timeslot, the start time and end time will be given.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes “past the hour”, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as “M. 10” will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)
- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.
- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms used by Philosophy are the Ryle Room (1st floor) and the Lecture Room (2nd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room, and Meeting Room 4 (ground floor) and the Seminar Room (3rd floor).
- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.
- “Schools” refers to the Examination Schools (75 – 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

Mathematics and Philosophy: Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic

Physics and Philosophy: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Literae Humaniores: Euthyphro and Meno, if taking this as the philosophy option for Mods

Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno*

Prof Dominic Scott – T. Th. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room *except T. week 3*: Ryle Room)

Plato's *Meno* and *Euthyphro* are usually considered to be among his earlier works. They are highly accessible and provide an excellent introduction to his philosophy, and indeed Greek philosophy in general. The *Meno* covers an extraordinarily wide range of topics, including politics, ethics, education, epistemology, philosophical method, mathematics, psychology, and religion. The *Euthyphro* discusses method as well, but is most famous for its treatment of piety and religion. Both works also convey a vivid impression of the character of Socrates. In this course I shall provide a detailed examination of the arguments of each work, as well as a consideration of their literary and dramatic features. I shall begin the course with an introduction to Plato's philosophy quite generally.

Frege: *Foundations of Arithmetic*

Dr Steven Methven – T. 12 (*weeks 1, 2, 4 to 7*), Maths Institute (L3)

Intended audience: Mathematics and Philosophy students preparing for Prelims.

These lectures will be primarily concerned with the details of Frege's logicist account of arithmetic, defended in his *Foundations of Arithmetic*. Along the way, we shall consider a number of the competitor views that Frege dismisses, and examine several puzzling questions about mathematical knowledge, mathematical truth and the applicability of number to the natural world.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Prof Simon Saunders – M. 4 – 6 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Merton College (Breakfast Room)

Audience: Physics and Philosophy students preparing for prelims.

These lectures will consist of an introduction to the philosophy of space, time and motion in the early modern period, with particular focus on the writings of Descartes and Newton, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, and Kant's writings on absolute space.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. **Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account.**

Students should also refer to the sections *Other Lectures* and *Other Events* following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but nonetheless often cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers. Those listings this term are open to all, but might particularly interest students taking 101 Early Modern Philosophy, 102 Knowledge and Reality, 103 Ethics, 108 Philosophy of Logic and Language, 114 Theory of Politics, and 124 Philosophy of Science.

102 Knowledge and Reality: revision lectures

Prof Alexander Kaiserman – W. 10 – 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These sessions will start with short lectures on particular topics in epistemology or metaphysics. We'll then consider some past exam questions on the topic and discuss what makes for good answers to these questions. There will also be opportunities to discuss exam technique, how to approach revision, and what the examiners are looking for. If you have any suggestions of topics you would like to cover, send an email to alexander.kaiserman@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.

108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language

Prof Paul Elbourne – Th. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will cover selected topics in the philosophy of language. They are designed to complement a series of lectures given in Hilary Term that concentrated on the philosophy of logic. We will concentrate on truth, meaning (the nature of propositions, internalism and externalism about meaning), and reference (the semantics of names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions).

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism

Prof James Grant – F. 2, Fitzhugh Auditorium, Cohen Quad, Walton Street)

These lectures will cover core topics on the undergraduate paper in aesthetics. Anyone interested in aesthetics, whether an undergraduate philosophy student or not, is welcome to attend. Those who would like to do preparatory reading should consult the faculty aesthetics reading list on Weblearn. Further reading will be suggested in the lectures.

Week 1: Plato's Philosophy of Art

Week 2: Aristotle's *Poetics*

Week 3: Hume and the Standard of Taste

Week 4: Kant's *Critique of Judgement*: Lecture 1

Week 5: Kant's *Critique of Judgement*: Lecture 2

Week 6: Literary Interpretation

Week 7: Musical Expression

Week 8: Defining Art

131 Plato: *Sophist*

Prof Michail Peramatzis – W. 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Worcester College (Seminar Room A)

Intended audience: those offering this option for Lit Hum Finals, and graduates, especially those contemplating offering Plato for the BPhil or the MSt in Ancient Philosophy.

The six lectures held in Trinity Term will examine the main claims and arguments developed in the *Sophist*: Plato's method of division; the impossibility of saying what is not; the ontological excursus (Giants & Friends of the Forms); the 'Late Learners' and the communion of kinds; identity and predication; the analysis of negative predication; reference, statement, and the analysis of false statement and false belief. There will be a discussion of the main interpretative and philosophical issues, as well as a presentation of the central scholarly debates.

Text

Platonis Opera, I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1995.

Translation, Commentaries, and Introductory Reading

Cornford, F.M., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist Translated with a Running Commentary*, London (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.) and New York (Harcourt, Brace, and Co.) 1935.

Hand-outs, and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

The 2017 John Locke Lectures: *A Standard of Judgement*

Prof Michael Smith (Princeton) – W. 5 – 7 (*weeks 1 to 7*), Merton College (T S Eliot Lecture Theatre)

The Faculty of Philosophy is very pleased to welcome Prof Smith as the 2017 John Locke Lecturer. The lectures will take place on Wednesdays in weeks 1 to 6 (with a film showing in week 7), and there will be a discussion session in the Faculty on Thursdays from 11 to 1 following the lectures.

Series abstract:

“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgment.” – Epictetus, *Discourses*, II:11

How much can we learn from the armchair? The answer turns out to be quite a lot. The aim is to show how it is possible for us to know, from the armchair, that we are agents in a spatio-temporal world that may well contain other agents; that there are things that we ought to do simply in virtue of being agents; that many of these things correspond to what we ordinarily take to be moral requirements; that there may well be other things we ought to do that correspond to what we ordinarily take to be requirements of love and friendship, and that these nearly always have, but are not exhausted by, a moral dimension; and that there may well be yet other things still that we ought to do that express the interests we have in art objects and aspects of nature. When we leave the armchair and remind ourselves that we are embodied human beings who live among others in a complex physical and social world, we further discover that we are typically subject to all of these requirements, and we also discover, disappointingly, that we have a limited capacity to act in accordance with them. This sets the scene for a number of practical problems. We solve some of these problems by developing and exercising our capacity for self-control, and we solve others by cooperating with other agents to develop and implement formal and informal ways of regulating our interactions with each other and with the non-agential parts of the world.

Lecture One: From the human condition to a standard of judgement

Lecture Two: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism

Lecture Three: The best form of moral rationalism

Lecture Four: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons

Lecture Five: A normative theory of blame

Lecture Six: Loose ends

The week 7 session will consist of a showing of the film *Force Majeure*.

The 2017 John Locke Lectures: discussion sessions

Prof Michael Smith – Th. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 7*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These discussion sessions are open to those who have attended the Locke Lecture given by Prof Smith the evening before. The session in week 7 will cover philosophical issues raised by the film *Force Majeure*, which will be shown in that week.

The 2017 Wilde Lectures: *The Nature of Faith*

Prof Jonathan Kvanvig (Washington) – Th. 5 (*weeks 1 to 3*) and T. 5 (*week 3*), Oriel College (Harris Lecture Theatre)

27 April Faith and Humility: Not What you Think
 Subtitle: Methodological Reflections and Their Implications

4 May Mundane Faith
 Subtitle: A Functional Account and Its Alternatives

9 May Religious Faith
 Subtitle: An Application of the Functional Account

11 May Faith, Humility, and The Complementarity Thesis
 Subtitle: Atomism and Holism in the Theory of Virtues

Directions to the Harris Lecture Theatre: enter Oriel at the main gate. Left, then right: exit Front Quad through the archway. Left, then right, continuing straight till you reach a staircase going down. Take it, going straight through the subway. When you emerge, left, then right, then right.

The 2017 Bapsybanoo Marchioness of Winchester Lecture: *After Mr Nowhere: New Proper Philosophic Selves?*

Prof Sandra Harding (UCLA) – Th. 5 (*week 2*), Schools

We in the Faculty remember our colleague Pamela Sue Anderson (1955-2017), who helped make possible this special lecture.

Contemporary analytic philosophy has modelled itself on distinctive characteristics of modern Western sciences: in its initial formulations, it was to be a 'scientific philosophy'. Its objectivity, and thus its intellectual and social value, was defined in terms of its freedom from social and political values. Yet the new social movements emerging since the 1960's, such as poor peoples' movements, civil rights, feminist, anti-colonial, and many more, have developed methods of research, including in philosophy, that claim a stronger commitment to objectivity than the conventionally objective sciences and their philosophies ever could achieve, though they refuse the value-free understanding of how best to maximize objectivity. This presentation will identify and reflect on the different conceptions of the

'proper philosophic self' created by the knowledge-production projects of these new social movements.

Sandra Harding is a Distinguished Research Professor of Education and Gender Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. She is a philosopher. She taught for two decades at the University of Delaware before moving to UCLA in 1996. She directed the UCLA Center for the Study of Women 1996- 2000, and co-edited the journal *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 2000- 2005. She was also a Distinguished Affiliate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University 2010-2014. In 2013 she was awarded the John Desmond Bernal Award by the Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S) for distinguished contributions to the field. Previous recipients include Thomas Kuhn, Robert Merton, Joseph Needham and Mary Douglas. She is the author or editor of seventeen books and special journal issues including *Objectivity and Diversity: Another Logic of Scientific Research* 2015, *Sciences From Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialisms, and Modernities* 2008, *Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues* 2006; *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge: Thinking From Women's Lives*. 1991; *The Science Question in Feminism*. 1986. She has been a Visiting Professor at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Costa Rica, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, and the Asian Institute of Technology. She has been a consultant to several United Nations organizations including the Pan American Health Organization, UNESCO, the U.N. Development Fund for Women, and the U.N. Commission on Science and Technology for Development.

Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: discussion session

Prof Sandra Harding (UCLA) – F. 4 (week 2), Harris Manchester College

This will be a discussion session with Prof Beverley Clack, Prof Liz Frazer, Dr Sabina Lovibond, and Dr Katherine Morris.

H L A Hart Memorial Lecture: *The Perils of Panglossian Constitutionalism*

Prof Frederick Schauer (Virginia) – T. 5 (*week 3*), Christ Church (Blue Boar Lecture Theatre)

I have been doing some thinking and writing about the tendency of many people, academics and policymakers and the public alike, to make things easy for themselves by assuming that rights – legal, constitutional, political, and moral – do not conflict with or infringe on other goals. People say, correctly, that there is a right not to be tortured, but also say that torture does not work. They say that there is a right to free speech that prevents restrictions on pornography or advocacy of violence, say, but also that such speech in fact causes no harm. They say that there is a right against racial profiling, but that profiling is ineffective. Drawing a bit on Nozick (side constraints) and Dworkin (trumps), but even more on legal examples and some of the psychology on cognitive dissonance and the like, I want to explore this phenomenon, think about why people are unwilling to accept the costs of rights, and talk about the implications of this tendency.

There will be a drinks reception in the Fellows' Garden after the first lecture. You must confirm attendance for this event by email to louise.wright@univ.ox.ac.uk.

Hume's Moral Philosophy

Prof Peter Kail – F. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will focus on Hume's moral philosophy, particularly its expression in his *Treatise of Human Nature*. The topics covered include, among others, Hume's conception of the moral self and its relation to responsibility, the so-called "Humean Theory of Motivation", Hume's moral sense and sympathy, natural virtues, and the artificial virtues. The text is Books II and III of Hume's *Treatise*. A useful introductory text is James Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, Routledge Guidebook, 2000.

Nietzsche and Naturalism

Mr Christopher Fowles – T. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room *except week 3: Ryle Room*)

This is a course of four lectures, primarily intended for undergraduates taking the Post-Kantian Philosophy paper. The content covered might be of particular interest to those that attended the lectures on Nietzsche earlier in the year (although familiarity with the material will not be assumed, and anyone with an interest in the topic is welcome to attend). The focus will be on the theme of naturalism in Nietzsche's work. The idea that Nietzsche is best understood as a 'naturalist' is now widely endorsed, but what exactly this is taken to mean – and thus to what it is supposed to commit Nietzsche – is still very much debated.

In the course of the lectures, I will try to say something more precise about Nietzsche's naturalism, and to look at various features of his work in light of this naturalist commitment. Topics covered will include (among other things) naturalism and genealogy, Nietzsche's psychology, and his attitude to science and its relationship to philosophy.

Hand-outs, and suggested reading will be provided in the lectures.

Themes in Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy

Mr Luke Davies – Th. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Merton College (Mure Room *except week 2*: Hawkins Room)

Much attention has been paid to Kant's central works in ethics, the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*. However, it is only in recent years that scholarly attention has also turned to his writing in political philosophy, especially the *Doctrine of Right*. In this short lecture course, we will first examine the relationship between these two branches of Kant's moral philosophy, and then address three topics that are internal to his political philosophy.

Intended audience: students reading for the following papers: 103 Ethics; 112 The Philosophy of Kant; 114 (203) Theory of Politics.

Lecture 1- Right and ethics

The first lecture examines the relationship between the two branches of Kant's moral philosophy: ethics and right. That right appears to be a distinct branch of morals causes a problem for Kant's claim that the categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality. Numerous ways to address this problem have been suggested, though all appear to fall short.

Primary reading: Introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals* 6:211-221; Introduction to the *Doctrine of Right* 6:229-33, 6:236-242; Introduction to *Doctrine of Virtue* 6:379-399; Drafts for the *Metaphysics of Morals* 23:246-250, 23:257-269, 23:374-395.

Lecture 2- The state of nature

The second lecture will discuss Kant as a social contract theorist, especially in relation to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Kant's arguments for the necessity of the state (and how those arguments differ from those of the aforementioned authors) will be examined.

Primary reading: *Doctrine of Right* §§8-9, 15, 41-42; Hobbes *Leviathan* §§13-14; Locke *Second Treatise of Government* §§2-3; Rousseau *Social Contract* §§2-6.

Lecture 3- Citizenship

The third lecture examines Kant's claims about citizenship, especially the contentious distinction he draws between active and passive citizens and his exclusion of women

from voting. I will argue that Kant's account of citizenship is much more developed than has been previously acknowledged, and that his claims about women are not a necessary consequence of his philosophical views.

Primary Reading: *Doctrine of Right* §46; 'Theory and Practice' Part II, 8:289-296.

Lecture 4- Punishment

The fourth lecture examines Kant's discussion of punishment. While Kant is most clearly seen as a pure retributivist, this lecture will also address some recent work claiming that there are elements of a deterrence theory of punishment in the *Doctrine of Right*. We will also consider whether Kant's comments on punishment are consistent with his moral theory more broadly, especially if we take the deterrence theory seriously.

Primary reading: *Doctrine of Right* General Remark E 6:331-337; Appendix §5 6:362-63.

Possible Worlds

Mr James Openshaw – W. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series will explore the motivations and metaphysical issues underlying talk of possible worlds in philosophy. Lectures will be accessible to all, but might be particularly useful for undergraduates currently reading or wishing to supplement *Knowledge and Reality*, *Philosophy of Logic and Language*, or *Philosophical Logic*.

Lecture 1: Possible Worlds: Motivations and Applications

Lecture 2: Modal Realism I

Lecture 3: Modal Realism II

Lecture 4: Modal Fictionalism and Quasi-Realism

The first lecture will introduce the foundations and applications of possible worlds semantics, touching on intensional phenomena in natural language (modality, conditionals, and content) and on the basis of quantified modal logic. Subsequent lectures will then explore the metaphysical and epistemological status of the possible worlds to which we incur a commitment. In weeks two and three we will consider *realism* about possible worlds, focusing on the dispute between *ersatz* (Plantinga, 1974) and *genuine* modal realists (Lewis, 1986). In the final lecture two metaphysically innocent, *anti-realist* accounts of possible worlds will be explored: modal fictionalism (Rosen, 1990) and quasi-realism (Blackburn, 1983).

Optional introductory readings:

Christopher Menzel, 'Possible Worlds', in the *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (2016).

David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).

David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

John Divers, *Possible Worlds* (London: Routledge, 2002).

Michael J. Loux (ed.), *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).

The non-existence of the real world

Prof Jan Westerhoff – T. 10 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a series on seminars on connected topics in metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind. It is in no way intended as an overview of these subjects, but rather is an attempt to develop and defend a particular approach to them. (The seminars will be based on early draft chapters of a book I am currently writing.) The main topic is an examination of a series of challenges to increasingly more fundamental aspects of the notion of the real world. I begin by considering the external world, move on to the internal world, consider the existence of a foundational level of reality and finish by discussing the possibility of an ultimately true theory of the world.

I provide some suggested readings for each seminar, though I won't assume that you have in fact read any of them. The readings consist of a) an extended synopsis of the chapter for that week and b) the chapter itself. All the readings can be downloaded here:

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ja6f19xwpoep4iv/AAB6zKxrcYNgJA2aekNFAkUBa?dl=0>

I will start each seminar by talking you through the main parts of the argument for each chapter, and leave the remainder of the time for discussion.

Week 1

The non-existence of the external world

The first seminar deals with various theories of perception (naive realism, disjunctivism, representationalism) and the ontologies they involve. I argue that ultimately a kind of brain-based representationalism works best but that this, somewhat surprisingly, also undermines the justification of a mind-independent world of material objects.

Week 2

The non-existence of the internal world

The second seminar investigates whether we can instead postulate a fundamental ontology of inner states, such as sense-data or other phenomenological states we have direct access to. I look at various arguments critical of introspective certainty (Dennett, Schwitzgebel, Metzinger) and conclude that the answer is negative: our introspective capacities do not give us any more of a secure grasp of the world than the theories of perception discussed in the first week.

Week 3

The non-existence of a fundamental level

Week 3 then examines the question: "Given that neither the world out there nor the world in here is fundamental, can we at least argue that *something* is fundamental?". This seminar focuses on a critique of the foundationalist assumptions in much of contemporary ontology. I argue that there aren't really any good arguments for ontological foundationalism, and that various anti-foundationalist alternatives are more attractive.

Week 4

The non-existence of ultimately true theories

The final seminar considers whether the anti-foundationalist conclusions from the third week can be taken to be what our final ontological theory should say. If there is no fundamental level, is it a fundamental truth about the world that there is no such level? I look at a variety of arguments (connected with coherence theory of truth, the denial of absolutely general quantification, and semantic contextualism) that suggest that the idea of an ultimately true theory of the world is a problematic as that of an ontological foundation. I conclude by some reflections on what the implications of this are for the ontological or philosophical enterprise more generally.

If you have any questions about these seminars please get in touch with me directly at jan.westerhoff@lmh.ox.ac.uk

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

Graduate students will need to check whether it is possible to count towards their attendance requirement any class of less than eight weeks' duration. Course handbooks or the Faculty's graduate office should be consulted for guidance.

Freedom, Determinism and Responsibility in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Prof Luca Castagnoli, Prof Ursula Coope and Prof Terence Irwin – T. 2 – 4, Oriel College (Harris Seminar Room)

We shall focus on discussions of freedom and responsibility in later ancient philosophy and in mediaeval philosophy. Though we shall be taking up some of our discussions from last term, this seminar will not presuppose knowledge of what we did last term. The first week will be a general introductory session, looking at certain strands in earlier debates about freedom and responsibility. This will serve as a reminder and summing up for those who attended last term and as a general introduction to the topics for those who did not. For the remainder of the term, the questions we shall discuss will include: how can we be morally responsible for bad action if bad action is involuntary? Does either freedom or responsibility require the ability to act otherwise? What are the relations between fate, providence, freedom and responsibility? What does it mean to say that there is such a thing as 'free will', and when did philosophers begin to have this idea?

The provisional schedule is as follows:

- 1) The story so far (UC, LC, TI)
- 2) Plato and the Middle-Platonists on Necessity and Fate (LC)
- 3) Alexander and Plotinus: two different ways of bringing together freedom and what depends on us. (UC)
- 4) Plotinus: the freedom of the One, and the possibility of freedom for things under the One. (UC)
- 5) Proclus on responsibility (UC)
- 6) Augustine on Free Will (LC)
- 7) Aquinas (TI)
- 8) Scotus (TI)

Medieval Hylomorphism

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – W. 2 – 4 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Schools (room 2) *except week 4*: All Souls College

These classes focus on two major issues in the medieval debate about hylomorphism: (1) the ontological status of prime matter; (2) the unity and plurality of substantial forms. It is in the discussions of these two issues that the most original and philosophically important medieval contributions to Aristotelian theory of substance are found. We shall examine in some detail two influential views: that of Thomas Aquinas and that of John Duns Scotus. As to the first issue, both Aquinas and Scotus believe in the existence of prime matter as an absolutely formless substrate of change, but Aquinas maintains that prime matter, being formless, is pure potentiality, whereas Scotus rejects Aquinas' view and argues that prime matter must have some actuality, although not of a formal kind. As to the second issue, Aquinas maintains that in any composite substance –from the most simple, e.g., an element, to the most complex one, e.g., a human being- there is only one substantial form, whereas Scotus attacks Aquinas' arguments for the unity and posits that in living beings there is more than one substantial form.

Suggested Reading:

- (1) Jeffrey E. Brower, 'Matter, Form, and Individuation', in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, Oxford 2012, 85-103.
- (2) Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus*, Oxford 1998, 13-93.
- (3) Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame 1987, vol. 2, 633-669.
- (4) Robert Pasnau, 'Form and Matter', in: *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 2010, vol. 2, 635-646.
- (5) Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671*, Oxford 2011, 17-95, 574-596.
- (6) John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Washington 2000, 295-375.

Programme:

Weeks 1-2: Ontological status of prime matter.

Weeks 3-4: Unity and plurality of substantial forms.

Kant

Prof Anil Gomes and Prof Colin McLear (Nebraska-Lincoln) – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Sense & Self-Awareness in Kant's Theory of Cognition

This seminar will consider a set of issues relating to Kant's views on the senses and the intellect. Questions to be considered include the relationship between cognition and knowledge, the relationship between sensibility and the intellect, the distinction between introspection and apperception, and the nature of our awareness of ourselves in inner sense and apperception.

Weeks 1 and 2 – The Critical Project

The aim of these first two weeks is to introduce those students without a background in Kant to some of the material which we'll be discussing in weeks 3-8. We'll focus on the overall shape of the Critical project, and aim to get clear on the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, and its role in Kant's Critical philosophy. The discussion in these weeks will be aimed primarily at those without a background in Kant. Those who are already familiar with the material should feel free to attend from week 3 onwards. The reading for Week 1 is listed below; we'll decide at the first meeting what material to cover in Week 2.

Core Reading

- Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface and Introductions, in both editions.

Recommended Reading

- Gardner, *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*, ch.1
- Anderson, 'The Introduction to the Critique', in Guyer (ed.) *Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*.
- Moore, 'Kant: 'The possibility, Scope, and Limits of Metaphysics'', in his *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*
- Walker, *Kant*, ch.1

Week 3 - Representation, Cognition, & Knowledge

Our discussion this week concerns the various distinctions Kant makes between kinds of representation, particularly between intuition, perception, and experience. He also has two epistemically charged notions—viz. cognition and knowledge. Here we aim to get as clear as we can concerning what all these distinctions come to.

Core Readings

- Kant: excerpts from Logic lectures; *Stufenleiter*; Canon
- Kant: *Prolegomena* §§8-10; *CPJ* §§76-7
- Watkins & Willaschek, Kant's Account of Cognition

Recommended Readings

- Chignell, *Kant's Concepts of Justification*
- Tolley, *The distinction between intuition, 'perception', and experience in Kant*
- Schafer, *Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves*
- Gomes & Stephenson, On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition

Week 4 - Conceptual Representation & Conceptual Content

Debate about whether, and to what extent, Kant's view of sensory experience construes it as depending on "higher" intellectual forms of representation, particularly *conceptual* representation, often remains somewhat unclear as to what conceptual representation *is*. This week we try to figure this out—focusing in particular on both Kant's explicit statements about conceptual representation, and their broader connection to Kant's characterization of intellectual activity. We'll then go on to look at whether it makes sense say that intuition has conceptual "content" in any relevant sense.

Core Readings

- Kant: B-Deduction; excerpts from Logic lectures; excerpts from *Anthropology*; intro to the Dialectic of *CPR*
- McLear, Kant and Perceptual Content

Recommended Readings

- McLear, Getting Acquainted with Kant
- McDowell, Introduction & Concepts and Intuitions (from *Mind and World*)
- Allais, Kant, Non-conceptual Content, and the Representation of Space
- Land, No Other Use Than in Judgment?: Kant on Concepts and Sensible Synthesis
- Ginsborg, Kant and the Problem of Experience
- Dunlop, Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts

Week 5 - The Autonomy of Sense

Kant distinguishes between two basic faculties—sensibility and the intellect (or understanding & reason). However, a significant and influential swath of Kant scholarship nevertheless construes Kant as claiming that basic sensory representations—intuitions—are in part dependent on acts of the intellect for their formation. This week we discuss whether, and to what extent, such claims of dependence could be correct.

Core Readings

- Kant: Transcendental Aesthetic; B-Deduction
- McLear, Two Kinds of Unity in the *Critique of Pure Reason*

Recommended Readings

- Messina, Kant on the Unity of Space and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception
- Onof & Schulting, Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition
- Gomes, Naive Realism in Kantian Phrase
- Longuenesse, Synthesis Speciosa and Forms of Sensibility (ch. 8 of *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*)

Week 6 - Introspection as Inner Sense

Kant famously characterizes our introspective awareness of our states as, following Locke, a kind of *sense*—viz. “inner” sense. This week we’ll look at two issues. First, the issue of whether, and to what extent, inner sense is really a form of *sense*. Second, whether, and to what extent, inner sense differs from “outer” sense in the what and how of its presentation of things.

Core Readings

- Kant: excerpts from Aesthetic, B-Deduction
- McLear, Kant on the Parity of Inner & Outer Sense

Recommended Readings

- Geach, The Notion of ‘Inner Sense’
- Valaris, Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*
- Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture I

Week 7 - Pure Apperception

Kant’s position in the “critical” period of the 1780s-1790s has it that our awareness of ourselves is bifurcated between a sensory awareness of our states (“inner sense”) and a purely intellectual awareness of ourselves as subjects of mental activity (“pure apperception”). But what *is* pure apperception? What role is it supposed to play in Kant’s overall critical conception of cognition? This week, we’ll look at some possible answers to these questions.

Core Readings

- Kant: excerpts from the Transcendental Deduction, Paralogisms
- McLear, I am the Original of All Objects—Kant on the Substantial Subject

Recommended Readings

- Engstrom, Unity of Apperception
- Kitcher, *Kant’s Thinker* (chs. 9-11)
- Wuerth, Kant’s Immediatism, Pre-Critique

Week 8 - Apperception, Reflection & Critical Reasoning

Last week we discussed how Kant construes the principle of apperception as the ground from which all other cognition is derived (B142). Moreover, Kant seems to conceive of the importance of apperception as, at least in part, stemming from the need for awareness of one's own mental activity *as one's own*. Reflection on one's own mental activity forms the basis for our capacity to act as critical *reasoners*. This week we look further at the role Kant construes self-consciousness to play in the foundations of metaphysics.

Core Readings

- Kant: excerpts from the *Lectures on Metaphysics*; excerpts from *Lectures on Logic*; "On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection" from CPR
- McLearn, Apperception and Reflection

Recommended Readings

- Merrit, Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic
- Burge, Reason and the First Person
- Moran, Self-Knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity
- Boyle, Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge
- Boyle, Transparent Self-Knowledge

Wittgenstein

Prof Stephen Mulhall – T. 11 – 12.30, New College

This class will assume no prior knowledge of Wittgenstein's writings, and it will focus primarily on his posthumously published text, the *Philosophical Investigations*. We will work through the book systematically from the beginning at least until the canonical stretches which bear on the idea of a private language (ie up to section 315); this will allow us to look at his treatments of ostensive definition, family resemblance, philosophical method, understanding and meaning, and rule-following. A particular concern throughout will be the relation between the form and the content of this work, and its bearing upon Wittgenstein's later conception of what philosophy is and how it should be done. Depending on the speed of our progress, we may have enough time towards the end of term to look at later stretches of the book, or other texts by Wittgenstein - in particular, we might examine the controversy between traditional and resolute readers of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. But we will begin with the first topic on the reading-list that that concerns the *Investigations* - the one on 'Augustine's picture of language'; so those intending to come to the first meeting should study the reading specified for that topic.

Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind: Sartre

Dr Katherine Morris and Prof Joseph Schear – T. 2 – 4, Christ Church (Lecture Room 2)

Before the 1940 publication of his large and tortuous *Being and Nothingness*, and long before his flight to literary and political fame, Sartre's first four philosophical publications were small, tightly argued pieces of work lying squarely within the phenomenological tradition. We propose to study these works closely, alongside some contemporary work in the philosophy of mind devoted to their topics (imagination, self-consciousness, emotions). No background knowledge or acquaintance with Sartre's writings is necessary to participate or audit.

Texts:

Imagination: A Psychological Critique / L'imagination (1936)

The Transcendence of the Ego / La transcendance de l'égo (1937)

Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions / Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions (1939)

The Imaginary / L'imaginaire (1940)

Rough Schedule:

Introduction (week 1)

The Imagination, The Imaginary (week 2-3)

Transcendence of the Ego (week 4-5)

Sketch of a Theory of Emotions (week 6-7)

Indian Philosophy

Dr Jessica Frazier and Prof Jan Westerhoff – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series focuses on a distinct tradition of Indian philosophical debate about metaphysical and epistemological problems that are both recognisable to Western philosophers, and innovative in their presentation of unfamiliar solutions.

Jan Westerhoff

1. Is language eternal? The Mīmāṃsā theory of an objective word-referent relation.
2. Do persons exist? The ancient Indian controversy about the existence of an ātman.
3. Is there a nature of the world? Madhyamaka's radical anti-foundationalism.
4. Does matter exist? The Yogācāra denial of the external world.
5. Are there routes to knowledge? Criticism of epistemic instruments in Jayarāśi and Nāgārjuna.

Jessica Frazier

6. Being and Fundamental Ontology (Vedānta)

7. Identity and Essential Attributes (Parināma-vāda)

8. Odd objects: abstract entities, potential entities and the problem of non-being (Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and Sāṃkhya)

Truth and Meaning

Prof Ian Rumfitt – W. 2 – 4 (*weeks 3 to 8*), All Souls College (Hovenden Room)

I shall be presenting some of my work in progress, but the readings suggested below are some useful background for each session.

Week Three (Wednesday 10 May): A neglected account of truth

Background reading: Stephen Blamey, 'Partial Logic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther, eds., *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, 2nd edition, Volume 5, pp.261-353, especially pp.261-75 and 321-49.

Week Four (Wednesday 17 May): How the account deals with the Liar Paradox

Background reading: Saul Kripke, 'Outline of a Theory of Truth', *J.Phil.* **72** (1975): 690-716, reprinted in Robert L. Martin, ed., *Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox* (Oxford: OUP, 1984), pp.53-81

Week Five (Wednesday 24 May): Comparison with other theories of truth

Background reading: Solomon Feferman, 'Toward Useful Type-Free Theories, I', *JSL* **49** (1984): 75-111, reprinted in Robert L. Martin, ed., *Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox* (Oxford: OUP, 1984), pp.237-87

Week Six (Wednesday 31 May): On an over-ambitious theory of meaning

Background reading: Hugh Mellor, 'Successful semantics', chapter 5 in his *Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in Philosophy* (Oxford: OUP, 2012)

Week Seven (Wednesday 7 June): On another over-ambitious theory of meaning

Background reading: Michael Dummett, *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics* (London: Duckworth, 1991), chapters 13-14

Week Eight (Wednesday 14 June): The relationship between truth and meaning

Background reading: TBC

Modal Logic

Prof James Studd – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Modal logic encompasses a diverse range of non-extensional systems. This graduate class aims to provide a hands-on introduction to this widely-used formal tool, with the option to progress to more advanced topics later in term. The course aims to be accessible to any graduate student in philosophy who has taken a first course in (non-modal) propositional and predicate logic (e.g. Halbach's *The Logic Manual*).

The first half of the course covers the semantics and proof theory of some of the main systems of propositional and predicate modal logic. For this part of the course, we'll use Ted Sider's textbook, *Logic for Philosophy* (OUP, 2010).

The provisional schedule is as follows:

Week 1. Modal propositional logic: semantics (LFP 6.1–6.3; review 2.1–2.4 if you need a reminder of non-modal propositional logic)

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: proof theory (2.6, 6.4)

Week 3. Quantified modal logic: constant domains (9.1–9.4, 4.4, 9.7; review 4.1–4.3 if you need a reminder of predicate logic)

Week 4. Quantified modal logic: varying domains (9.5–9.6)

I recommend that you read the indicated sections of *Logic for Philosophy* before attending that week's class.

In the second half of the course, we'll take up further topics in modal logic tailored to class interests. We could pursue either topics in the metatheory of modal logic (e.g. completeness, decidability, etc.) or extensions and variants of the usual systems of quantified modal logic (e.g. higher-order modal logic).

Authors and Papers

Prof Ofra Magidor – F. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar we will read and discuss a series papers by contemporary philosophers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. An exciting feature of this seminar, however, is that each week the author of the paper will visit the seminar to discuss their work with us. Each meeting will also be followed by a (partially subsidised, limited space) lunch with the author.

Students are expected to pre-read the paper in advance of each week's meeting, but I will also start each meeting a summary of the paper to kick-off the discussion.

Please note that the seminar is intended primarily for graduate students (Mst, BPhil, and DPhil students). Faculty members who wish to attend are welcome to do so, but should make sure to give priority to students in the discussion.

The list of papers will be circulated by e-mail but below is the schedule of the visiting authors:

- W1** Bryan Pickel, University of Edinburgh
- W2** Lee Walters, University of Southampton
- W3** Janice Dowell, Syracuse University
- W4** John Hawthorne, USC
- W5** Karen Lewis, Columbia University
- W6** Danny Fox, MIT
- W7:** Kenny Easwaran, Texas A&M
- W8:** Maria Laonen-Aarnio, University of Michigan

Epistemology

Prof Lizzie Fricker and Prof Tim Williamson – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Week 1: Jennifer Nagel, "Intuitions and experiments: a defense of the case method in epistemology", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2012.

Week 2. Lizzie Fricker, 'Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion'. Forthcoming, available in preprint form on her page on Academia.edu

Week 3 Stewart Cohen, "Justification and truth", *Philosophical Studies* 1984.

Week 4 Lizzie Fricker, 'Inference to the Best Explanation and the Receipt of Testimony' forthcoming, preprint version available on her page on Academia.edu.

Week 5 Hilary Kornblith, "Knowledge in humans and other animals", *Nous* 1999.

Week 6. Something from Ernest Sosa's recent work, precise text TBA.

Week 7 Daniel Greco, "Could KK be OK?", *Journal of Philosophy* 2014.

Week 8 Lizzie Fricker 'Stating and Insinuating' *PASSV* 2012, Vol 86, pp.61-94.

Arguments for God

Prof Brian Leftow – Th. 3 – 5 (*all weeks except week 3*), Oriel College (Harris Seminar Room)

After an initial lecture on general religious epistemology, this class will introduce the strengths and weaknesses of moral, religious experience and ontological arguments for God's existence.

Directions to the Harris Seminar Room:

enter Oriel gate. Follow the footpath to your left. Exit first quad through the arch.

Upon entering second quad, turn right, then left. Then go straight till you see a descending staircase.

Take the stairs. Once through the subway, go left, then right, then right.

Foundations of General Relativity, and Black Hole Thermodynamics

Prof Harvey Brown and Dr Christopher Timpson – M. 11 - 1, Brasenose College (Platnauer Room)

Part 1. Weeks 1-3 (HB)

The weak equivalence principle: its historical role and meaning.

The gravitational redshift and its connection with spacetime curvature.

The origin of the chronometric significance of the metric field; the role of the strong (Einstein) equivalence principle.

The status of the geodesic theorem in GR, and the role of energy conditions.

Part 2. Weeks 4-6 (CT)

Introduction to black holes; qualitative features of Schwarzschild and Kerr black holes.

The four or so laws of thermodynamics and the four or so laws of black hole mechanics; the question of their analogy (disanalogy) or identity.

Saving the Second law (the Generalised Second Law) and Beckenstein's argument. A better argument for black hole thermodynamics and for the existence of black hole entropy: a Carnot cycle for black holes.

Hawking radiation and quantum field theory on curved spacetime for platypodes.

Information in black holes and black hole evaporation.

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Prof Martin Davies and Prof Philipp Koralus – T. 3 – 5, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class is intended primarily for BPhil students, but others are welcome to attend.

Our provisional schedule is as follows:

- Week 1, 25 April Cognitive Science and Marr's levels of explanation
- Week 2, 2 May Systematicity and Cognitive Architecture
- Week 3, 9 May Reasoning
- Week 4, 16 May Judgment and Decision-making
- Week 5, 23 May Tacit knowledge
- Week 6, 30 May Personal *versus* subpersonal distinctions
- Week 7, 6 June Modularity
- Week 8, 13 June Implicit knowledge in anosognosia

Please check on WebLearn (in the Graduate Classes folder for Trinity Term 2017) for updates to the schedule and for suggested readings on each topic.

Each week, there will be opportunities for student presentations, on an issue or on a specific reading.

Philosophy of Action

Dr Dennis Buehler – Th. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room *except weeks 3, 7*: Ryle Room)

This class is on problems in current action theory and philosophy of psychology. Participants should be ready to engage with relevant psychological research. The class will have two parts, one devoted to the problem of explicating action, the other focusing on the representational contents of act-guiding psychological states. Here is a preliminary plan for the term:

1. Intentions and reasoning
2. Intentions and motor control
3. Individual-level and sub-systems
4. Executive functions and guidance
5. Act-representations Part 1
6. Act-representations Part 2
7. Seeing action
8. The interface problem

A detailed syllabus will be handed out during the first meeting. For that meeting, please read Davidson 1963, "Actions, reasons, and causes", Davidson 1970, "Agency", Frankfurt 1978, "The problem of action", and Velleman 1992, "What happens when someone acts."

Topics in Metaphysics and Epistemology

Prof John Hawthorne and Prof Timothy Williamson – T. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Week 1 (25 April)	Norms of belief: structure (Williamson)
Week 2 (2 May)	Norms of belief: strength (Williamson)
Week 3 (9 May)	Pragmatic encroachment (Hawthorne)
Week 4 (16 May)	Evidence of evidence in epistemic logic I (Williamson)
Week 5 (23 May)	Evidence of evidence in epistemic logic II (Williamson)
Week 6 (30 May)	Fine tuning (Hawthorne)
Week 7 (6 June)	Counterfactual excluded middle (Hawthorne)
Week 8 (13 June)	Temporal operators (Hawthorne)

Topics in the philosophy of punishment

Prof Cecile Fabre – T. 11 – 1, All Souls College (Wharton Room *except week 1*: Old Library)

The class is intended for all graduate students in legal, moral and political philosophy who are interested in exploring some topics in the philosophy of punishment. It will assume no prior knowledge of this specific area, though students are encouraged to read relevant entries in the SEP and the International Encyclopedia of Ethics. We will cover the following topics:

- A. What is punishment (in contrast with, for example, defense, torts)?
- B. Justifying the right and power to punish: retributivist theories, communicative theories, deterrence theories
- C. Justifying certain kinds of punishment: proportionality and punishment; capital punishment; felon disenfranchisement; the ethics of incarceration.

Students will be expected to have read two or three articles/book chapters for each class, and are welcome to offer presentations. The readings for each week will be listed at <http://oxfordpoliticalphilosophy.weebly.com/topics-in-the-philosophy-of-punishment-tt2017.html>

Applied Ethics

Dr Joshua Shepherd and Prof Guy Kahane – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Week One

DIABILITY AND WELL-BEING

Josh Shepherd and Guy Kahane

Core Reading on Disability

- Barnes, E. *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability*. OUP, 2015. Chapters 1, 3.
- G. Kahane & J. Savulescu (2016). 'Disability and Mere Difference', *Ethics* 127: 774-788.
- Campbell, Stephen M., and Joseph A. Stramondo. "The Complicated Relationship of Disability and Well-Being." Forthcoming in *The Kennedy Institute of Ethics*. On-line at academia.edu (google the title)

Additional Reading:

- Andrić, V. & Wündisch, J. (2015) 'Is It Bad to Be Disabled? Adjudicating Between the Mere-Difference and the Bad-Difference Views of Disability', *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 9 (3),1–16.
- Barnes, E. (2016) 'Reply to Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu', *Res Philosophica*, 93 (1), 295-309.
- Savulescu, J., & Kahane, G. (2009). The Welfarist Account of Disability. In A. Cureton & K. Brownlee (Eds.), *Disability and Disadvantage* (pp. 14-53). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wasserman, D. and Asch, A., 2013. Understanding the relationship between disability and well-being. *Disability and the good human life*. New York: Cambridge, pp.139-67.
- K. Brownlee and A. Cureton, *Disability and Disadvantage* (OUP, 2009)

week Two

RACIAL PROFILING

Josh Shepherd

Core Reading

- Randall Kennedy (1999) Suspect policy. *The New Republic* 221, 30-35.
<https://newrepublic.com/article/63137/suspect-policy>
- Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser (2004) Racial profiling. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 32, 131-170.
- Anabelle Lever (2005) Why racial profiling is hard to justify: a response to Risse and Zeckhauser. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33, 94-110.

Additional reading

- David Boonin (2011) *Should race matter? Unusual answers to the usual questions* (CUP) - Ch. 11.
- Benjamin Eidelson (2015) *Discrimination and disrespect* (OUP) - Ch. 6.
- Deborah Hellman (2014) Racial profiling and the meaning of racial categories. In Cohen and Wellman, eds. *Contemporary debates in applied ethics*, 2nd edn., 232-243 (Wiley- Blackwell).
- Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2006) Racial profiling versus community. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23, 191-205.
- Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2011) 'We are all different': statistical discrimination and

the right to be treated as an individual. *The Journal of Ethics* 15, 47-59.

- Paul Bou-Habib (2011) Racial profiling and background injustice. *The Journal of Ethics* 15, 33-46.
- Naomi Zack (2015) *White privilege and black rights: the injustice of U.S. police racial profiling and homicide* (Rowman & Littlefield).

Week Three

GENETIC MANIPULATION

Chris Gyngell and Tom Douglas

Core Reading

- Savulescu, J., and G. Kahane. 2009. The moral obligation to create children with the best chance of the best life. *Bioethics* 23(5): 274–290
- Elster J . 2011. Procreative beneficence—Cui bono? *Bioethics* 25:482–88.
- Sparrow, R. 2010. Should human beings have sex? Sexual dimorphism and human enhancement. *American Journal of Bioethics* 10(7): 3–12. (There are several short commentaries on Sparrow’s piece in the same issue of the *American Journal of Bioethics* for those who are interested).

Additional reading

- Gyngell, C and Douglas, T. 2016. Selecting against disability: The liberal eugenic challenge and the argument from cognitive diversity. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* DOI: 10.1111/japp.12199
- Savulescu, J., Hemsley, M., Newson, A. J., & Foddy, B. 2006. Behavioural genetics: why eugenic selection is preferable to enhancement. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 23 (2), 157 - 171
- Fowler, T. 2015. In Defence of State Directed Enhancement. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32(1): 67–81

WEEK FOUR

the NOTION OF MORAL STATUS

Josh Shepherd and Guy Kahane

Core Readings

- Harman, Elizabeth (2007). Sacred mountains and beloved fetuses: can loving or worshipping something give it moral status? *Philosophical Studies* 133 (1):55-81.
- Jaworska, Agnieszka & Tannenbaum, Julie (2014). Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status. *Ethics* 124 (2):242-271.
- DeGrazia, David (2014). On the Moral Status of Infants and the Cognitively Disabled: A Reply to Jaworska and Tannenbaum. *Ethics* 124 (3):543-556.

Further Reading

- Agar, N. (2013). Why is it possible to enhance moral status and why doing so is wrong? *Journal of Medical Ethics* 39 (2):67-74.
- DeGrazia, David (2008). Moral status as a matter of degree? *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 46 (2):181-198.
- Degrazia, David (2007). Human-animal chimeras: Human dignity, moral status, and species prejudice. *Metaphilosophy* 38 (2-3):309–329.
- Harman, Elizabeth (1999). Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of Abortion. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 28 (4):310-324.
- Kagan, Shelly (2016). What's Wrong with Speciesism? *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 33 (1):1-21.
- Liao, S. Matthew (2010). The Basis of Human Moral Status. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 7 (2):159-179.
- Lovering, Robert P. (2004). Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral Status. *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 42 (4):509-30.
- Sachs, Benjamin (2011). The status of moral status. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92 (1):87-104.
- Sebo, Jeff (2017). Agency and Moral Status. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 14 (1):1-22.
- Tannenbaum, Julie & Jaworska, Agnieszka (2013). The Grounds of Moral Status. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:0-0.
- Williams, Jeremy (2015). Public Reason and Prenatal Moral Status. *Journal of Ethics* 19 (1):23-52.

week FIVE

POVERTY

Toby Ord

Seminar Reading:

- Singer, Peter. 1972. 'Famine, Affluence and Morality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1:229–243.
- Murphy, Liam. 1993. 'The Demands of Beneficence', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22:267–92.
- Ashford, Elizabeth. 2003. 'The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism', *Ethics* 113:273–302.

Further reading:

- Unger, Peter. 1996. *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of innocence*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Pogge, Thomas. 2008. *World Poverty and Human Rights* (2nd ed.), (Cambridge: Polity).
- Miller, Richard. 2004. 'Beneficence, Duty and Distance', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 32:357–83.

Week six

NEUROINTERVENTION

Jonny Pugh and Tom Douglas

Background Reading

- Pugh, Jonathan, and Thomas Douglas. forthcoming. "Neuro-Interventions as Criminal Rehabilitation: An Ethical Review". In *Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics*, edited by Jonathan Jacobs. Routledge.

Key Readings

- Shaw, Elizabeth. 2014. 'Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement'. *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 8 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1007/s11572-012-9152-2.

- Ryberg, Jesper. 2012. 'Punishment, Pharmacological Treatment, and Early Release': Edited by Elliot D. Cohen. *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 26 (2): 231–44. doi:10.5840/ijap201226217.

Further Reading

- Bennett, Christopher. forthcoming. 'Intrusive Intervention and Opacity Respect'. In *Treatment for Crime*, edited by Thomas Douglas and David Birks. OUP.
- ———. 2014. 'Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity'. *The Journal of Ethics* 18 (2): 101–22. doi:10.1007/s10892-014-9161-6.
- (2015), 'The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement'. in J. Clausen and N. Levy, (Eds.) *Handbook of Neuroethics* (Springer) pp 1227-1249
- Harris, John. 2011. 'Moral Enhancement and Freedom'. *Bioethics* 25 (2): 102–11. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01854.x.
- McMillan, John. 2014. 'The Kindest Cut? Surgical Castration, Sex Offenders and Coercive Offers'. *Journal of Medical Ethics* 40 (9): 583–90. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101030.
- Pugh, Jonathan, and Hannah Maslen. 2015. "'Drugs That Make You Feel Bad"? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions'. *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, October, 1–24. doi:10.1007/s11572-015-9383-0.
- Ryberg, Jesper. 2013. 'Is Coercive Treatment of Offenders Morally Acceptable? On the Deficiency of the Debate'. *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 9 (4): 619–31. doi:10.1007/s11572-013-9288-8.
- Savulescu, Julian, and Ingmar Persson. 2012. 'Moral Enhancement, Freedom, And The God Machine'. *The Monist* 95 (3): 399–421. doi:10.5840/monist201295321.
- Vincent, Nicole A. 2014. 'Restoring Responsibility: Promoting Justice, Therapy and Reform Through Direct Brain Interventions'. *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 8 (1): 21–42. doi:10.1007/s11572-012-9156-y.

week SEVEN

KILLING IN WAR

Josh Shepherd and Mike Robillard

Core Reading

- Jeff McMahan (2006) On the moral equality of combatants. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14 377-393. (A revised version of McMahan's arguments can be found in his book, *Killing in War*, chapter 2.)
- Cécile Fabre (2009) Guns, food, and liability to attack in war. *Ethics* 120, 36-63.

Additional reading

- Michael Walzer (1977) *Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations* (Basic Books), Ch.3. (The text of all five editions is the same; only the preface is different.)
- Thomas Hurka (2007) Liability and just cause. *Ethics and International Affairs* 21, 199-218.
- Frances M. Kamm (2004) Failures of just war theory: terrorism, harm, and justice. *Ethics* 114, 650-92.
- Lionel K. McPherson (2007) Is terrorism distinctively wrong? *Ethics* 117, 524-546.
- Uwe Steinhoff (2008) Jeff McMahan on the moral inequality of combatants. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 16, 220-226.
- Seth Lazar (2010) The responsibility dilemma for *Killing in war*: a review essay. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38, 180-213. Watson, G. (1999). Excusing addiction. *Law and Philosophy*, 18(6), 589–619.

Week eight

Moral Status & Animal Ethics

Toby Ord and Guy Kahane

Background Reading

Singer, Peter. 2011. *Practical Ethics*. Third ed. Cambridge University Press, chs. 3-5 (available via SOLO).

Core Reading

- McMahan, Jeff. "The Meat Eaters." *The New York Times*.
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/the-meat-eaters/>.
- Matheny and Chan. Human Diets and Animal Welfare: the Illogic of the Larder. *J Agric Environ Ethics* (2005) vol. 18 (6) pp. 579-594

Further Reading

- Buchanan, Allen. 2009. "Moral Status and Human Enhancement." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37 (4): 346–381.

- Shriver, Adam. 2009. "Knocking Out Pain in Livestock: Can Technology Succeed Where Morality Has Stalled?" *Neuroethics* 2, no. 3: 115–124.
- Streiffer, Robert. 2005. "At the Edge of Humanity: Human Stem Cells, Chimeras, and Moral Status." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 15 (4): 347–370.
- Sachs, Benjamin. 2011. "The Status of Moral Status." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92 (1): 87–104.
- Vallentyne, Peter. 2005. "Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals." *The Journal of Ethics* 9 (3/4) (January 1): 403–433.
- DeGrazia, David. 2008. "Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?" *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 46: 181–198.
- DeGrazia, David. 1991. "The Moral Status of Animals and Their Use in Research: A Philosophical Review." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 1 (1): 48–70.
- Regan, Tom. 2004. *The Case for Animal Rights*. University of California Press.

Developmental Moral Psychology

Prof Ali Denham and Dr Edward Harcourt – W. 2 – 4 (*weeks 3 to 6*), St Anne's College (Seminar Room 5)

These seminars will examine issues of philosophical interest that arise in developmental moral psychology, including its bearing on the psychological pre-history of the virtues and vices and the nature of certain psychopathologies. Each seminar will begin with a topic presentation, followed by questions and discussion.

Week 3: Alison Denham, 'Early Moral Development: Attachment, Self-regulation and Prosocial Motivations'

Week 4: Marinus van IJzendoorn and MJ Bakermans-Kranenburg (Leiden), 'Emotion Regulation: A Pre-requisite for Pro-social Behaviour?'

Week 5: Edward Harcourt, 'Two Routes From Attachment to Virtue'

Week 6: Alison Denham, 'Psychopathy, Sympathy and Responsiveness to Reasons'

Some recommended reading:

J. Cassidy and P. Shaver, *Handbook of Attachment* (3rd edition, 2016)

John Bowlby, *The Making and Breaking of Affectional Bonds* (1977)

P. Fonagy, P. Luyten and E. Allison, 'Epistemic Petrification and the Restoration of Epistemic Trust: A New Conceptualization of Borderline Personality Disorder and Its Psychosocial Treatment', *Journal of Personality Disorder*, 2015 Oct ;29(5):575-609.

P. Fonagy and M. Target, 'Attachment and reflective function: their role in self-organisation', *Development and Psychopathology*, 9, 679-700 (1997)

J Belsky, MJ Bakermans-Kranenburg, MH Van IJzendoorn, 'For better and for worse: Differential susceptibility to environmental influences', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16 (6), 300-304 (1997)

Regular Faculty Seminars

The programmes of the Faculty seminars will no longer be included in this Lecture Prospectus, since running lists are often not settled by the time this Prospectus is published. Instead, students and Faculty members are referred to the weekly events digest, sent from the Faculty in each week of term, which includes details of each of the seminars (often with a linked abstract). Interested parties may also refer to seminars' individual webpages, where one exists.

The Faculty seminars listed here all take place in some weeks of each term of the year, at Radcliffe Humanities (either in the Ryle Room or the Lecture Room). The usual schedule is given as a guide, but should be checked in any term against that term's Lecture List, or the digest for the week.

- Monday* **Moral Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/moral_philosophy
- Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar**
Usual schedule: weeks vary; 4.30 to 6.30, Ryle Room
Webpage: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~philmath/pomseminar.html>
- Tuesdays* **Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: even-numbered weeks, 5 to 7, Ryle Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar
- Thursdays* **Workshop in Ancient Philosophy**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6, Ryle Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy
- Philosophy of Physics Seminar**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: <http://www.philosophy-of-physics.ox.ac.uk/tag/thursday-seminars/>
- Fridays* **Jowett Society / Philosophical Society**
Usual schedule: weekly, 3.30 to 5.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: <https://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/>

In addition to these, there are usually "work in progress" groups, or WIPs: most commonly, the Theoretical Philosophy WIP (<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/>), and in some terms a Mind WIP meets. There is also a Faculty Aesthetics seminar which meets in one term of the year.