


FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Schwarzman Centre for the Humanities, ROQ,  
Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6GG, UK

[www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

Email: [ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)



# PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS

UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES

OTHER EVENTS

GRADUATE CLASSES

TRINITY TERM 2026

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>NOTES:</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>Lectures for the First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods)</b> .....	<b>2</b>
Cicero De Finibus.....	2
Alan Turing on Computability and Intelligence .....	3
Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic .....	3
The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.....	4
<b>Lectures for the Honour Schools (Finals - FHS)</b> .....	<b>5</b>
113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Heidegger .....	5
125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science .....	5
<b>OTHER EVENTS (SUITABLE FOR ALL AUDIENCES)</b> .....	<b>12</b>
Outside In: Theorizing Pleasure .....	12
Graduate Lecture: Topics in Feminist Ethics.....	12
Graduate Lecture: Aristotle on Accidentality, Chance, and Errors in Nature.....	13
Graduate Lecture: Higher-order Metaphysics .....	14
The Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture .....	16
Inaugural Lecture .....	16
Philosophy, AI, and Innovation Grad Seminar: Autonomy in the Age of Agents .....	16
<b>GRADUATE CLASSES</b> .....	<b>18</b>
Wittgenstein on Solipsism, Subjectivity and the First Person .....	18
The Epicurean Life: For and Against .....	19
Metaphysics .....	20
A topic in the Philosophy of Mind.....	21
Philosophy of Logic.....	23
Philosophy of Statistics .....	25
Topics in Political and Moral Philosophy.....	26
The Epistemology of Aesthetic Appreciation.....	27
Social Choice Theory .....	27
Philosophy of Economics.....	29
Plato and Aristotle on Knowledge and Doxa .....	31
Mill's The Subjection of Women, Utilitarianism, and Feminism .....	32
Feminist Epistemology .....	37
The Philosophy of Mental Health and Mental Illness.....	39

# Notes:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where lecture or graduate class lasts longer than an hour, both the start and end times will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin five minutes past the hour and end five minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, lectures and graduate classes run during Weeks 1–8.
- Teaching takes place in person.

## **Undergraduate students**

- Most undergraduate lectures are recorded.
- Further information is available on the [Philosophy Undergraduate Information](#) Canvas site. *Canvas login required.*
- Enquiries about Undergraduate Information Canvas access can be made [here](#).

## **Graduate students**

- Graduate classes and other classes are not recorded.
  - Further information is available on the [Philosophy Graduate Information](#) Canvas site. *Canvas login required.*
  - Enquiries about Canvas access and class attendance can be made [here](#).
- Reading lists are often available on ORLO.
  - This Lecture Prospectus was published on **21 April 2026**. Every effort has been made to ensure the information is accurate at the start of term. However, occasional errors may occur. If you believe you have found a mistake, please contact the Education Support Officer at [ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
  - The Lecture List details for each paper in this Prospectus were correct at the time of publication. Please note that these details may be subject to change. Any late updates will be clearly marked in **red** in the **Lecture List TT26**, which is available on the Faculty of Philosophy website: [Lectures | Faculty of Philosophy](#).

# Undergraduate Lectures

## Lectures for the First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods)

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods.

### Cicero De Finibus

Prof Simon Shogry

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 11:00-12:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These lectures, intended for Classics Mods students of any stream, introduce the main philosophical issues raised by Cicero's presentation of Epicurean ethics in *De Finibus* book I. We will examine the arguments used by the Epicureans to establish their pleasure-based account of the human goal (*finis*) and scrutinise Cicero's status as a source, interpreter, and critic of the Epicurean position. Topics to be covered include: Cicero's translation project and sceptical method; the relationship between goods, the human goal, and happiness in Hellenistic philosophy; the Epicurean theory of pleasure, and their classification of desires; friendship; the virtues; the 'cradle argument'; and the physical and epistemological foundations for Epicurean ethics. For context on this last topic we will study in translation two additional texts of Epicurus: *Letter to Herodotus* and *Letter to Menoecus*.

Set Texts:

- Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, book I. Latin text: ed. L.D. Reynolds, OCT, 1998. Translation: R. Woolf, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (ed. J. Annas), 2001.
- Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus* and *Letter to Menoecus*. Translation: B. Inwood and L.P. Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*. Second Edition, Hackett. 1997.

A course description, introductory bibliography, and specimen exam can be found here:

<https://canvas.ox.ac.uk/courses/293942/pages/iv-dot-2-cicero-de-finibus-i>

This page belongs to the Faculty of Classics. For access, please contact [undergraduate@classics.ox.ac.uk](mailto:undergraduate@classics.ox.ac.uk)

## **Alan Turing on Computability and Intelligence**

Prof Peter Millican and Dr Theodor Nenu

TT26 | Weeks 2-5 | Day: Tuesdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These lectures, designed for the first year course in Computer Science and Philosophy, start with the background to Alan Turing's 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers", including Hilbert's programme, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and Cantor's results concerning the countability of infinite sets. They then work in detail through the 1936 paper, using Charles Petzold's book *The Annotated Turing* (which contains the entire paper, together with comprehensive discussion) as a basis. Finally, the last three lectures will turn to Turing's 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", discussing some of the philosophical issues arising from the Turing Test and Searle's Chinese Room thought-experiment.

## **Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic**

Prof James Studd

TT26 | Weeks 1-4 | Day: Mondays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These are the core lectures for first-year mathematics and philosophy students. We'll consider, among other things, Frege's attack on Mill's empiricism, Frege's views on number ascriptions, the 'Julius Caesar' problem, and Frege's attempt at a logicist reduction of arithmetic to Hume's Principle, and ultimately to his ill-fated theory of extensions.

Set text: Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (trans. Austin)

Lecture 1:

- Frege and the philosophy of mathematics
- *Grundlagen*, part I: Frege v Mill and Frege v Kant

Lecture 2:

- *Grundlagen*, part II: the concept of number
- *Grundlagen*, part III: ascriptions of number, object v concept

Lecture 3:

- *Grundlagen*, part IV: numbers are objects
- *Grundlagen*, part IV (cont): the Julius Caesar problem

Lecture 4:

- *Grundlagen*, part IV (cont): Frege's logicist reduction
- *Grundlagen*, part V and Fregean philosophy of mathematics post-Frege

## **The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence**

Prof Christopher Timpson

TT26 | Weeks 1-5 | Day: Fridays

Weeks 1-4 | 12:00-13:00

Week 5 | 12:00-14:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

This course will introduce the centuries-old debate about the nature of space and time. One main question will be whether space is absolute or relative, and indeed what the various meanings of these two terms are. A key text in this debate is the correspondence between Samuel Clarke—representing the ideas of Isaac Newton—and Gottfried Leibniz. We will start with the background to the debate in the works of Galileo and Descartes. We will then see how both Newton and Leibniz responded to this background, and finally contrast their arguments while investigating Leibniz's metaphysical views in more detail.

Main text: *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* ed H.G. Alexander, including introduction and extracts from Newton.

Additional Primary texts: Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* Parts 1 and 2. Newton 'De Gravitatione' in Hall and Hall (eds.) *Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton*.

The course is primarily aimed at Physics & Philosophy students, but all are welcome.

## Lectures for the Honour Schools (Finals - FHS)

Lectures listed in this section are core lectures for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section Other Lectures, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

Advanced undergraduates, especially but not only those considering graduate study of philosophy, are encouraged to consider attending relevant graduate classes as well. Permission should be sought from the class-giver(s): it is usually readily given.

### **113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Heidegger**

Lectures by: Prof Stephen Mulhall

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Tuesdays | Time: 12:00-13:00

Location: New College (Lecture Room 6)

This lecture course is primarily designed to support undergraduates studying Heidegger for the 'Post-Kantian Philosophy' paper, although anyone else is welcome to attend, and no prior knowledge of Heidegger's thinking will be assumed. During the term we will focus on 'Being and Time', and work our way through it, addressing its central themes and concerns in the order in which they emerge in the text, and leaving plenty of time at regular intervals for questions. The course reading list gives some indication of those themes, but it covers more ground than it will be possible to cover in the time available, and is intended to offer some guidance should you wish to explore further into the book yourselves after the course concludes. My hope is that we will at least engage in some detail with the material on death and guilt by the end of term. However, that may be, bringing a copy of an English translation of the primary text with you to the lectures is strongly advised; I will be using the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but the Stambaugh translation is a perfectly good alternative.

### **125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science**

Lectures by: Prof Carlotta Pavese

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 10:00-11:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

#### **Course description**

This is a course for undergraduate-level philosophy of cognitive science. The first half of the meetings we will cover some foundational topics in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as the debate between behaviorism and cognitivism, the prospects for the reductionism and different levels of explanation, the nature of representation and of intelligence; in the second half of the course, we will discuss some more specialized topics in the psychology of action, such as the psychological underpinnings of the distinction between actions and mere happenings, the role of attention, thought, and consciousness in action, the relation between

procedural and declarative memory, and the psychology of know-how, skills, and intelligent behavior.

### **Target audience**

This series of lectures is aimed at undergraduate students who have had some introduction to philosophy. Students taking this course should normally have studied paper 102 (Knowledge and Reality) or paper 104 (Philosophy of Mind) first. However, this course does not require a background in cognitive science, as the relevant concepts will be introduced in the required readings and emphasized during lectures.

### **FIRST MEETING**

**Topic:** Introduction to Cognitive Science. Behaviorism versus Cognitivism.

**Key questions:** What is cognitive science the study of? Should its subject matter be observable behavior alone or the cognitive structures underpinning it? On what basis can these foundational questions be decided? Is our knowledge of grammar partly innate or entirely acquired? What are the prospects for empiricism about linguistic competence?

### **Required Readings:**

1. Chomsky, N. (1959). "A Review of BF Skinner's Verbal Behavior." *The Language and Thought Series*, 48–62. (15 pages)
2. Cowie. F. (1999). *What's Within Nativism Reconsidered*. OUP. Chapter 8, only pp. 76–81. (16 pages)
3. Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. (2001). "The Poverty of the Stimulus Argument." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52: 217–276.

### **Background Readings:**

Bermúdez, J. L. (2014). *Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, Section 1, pp. 5–12.

### **Further Readings:**

- Putnam, H. (1967). "The 'Innateness Hypothesis' and Explanatory Models in Linguistics." In *Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1964/1966: In Memory of Norwood Russell Hanson* (pp. 91–101). Springer Netherlands.
- Cowie. F. (1999). *What's Within Nativism Reconsidered*. OUP; remainder of Chapter 8 and all of Chapter 9.
- Tomasello, M. (2009). "Universal grammar is dead." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 32(5): 470–471.
- Chater, N., McCauley, S. M., & Christiansen, M. H. (2016). "Language as skill: Intertwining comprehension and production." *Journal of Memory and Language*, 89: 244–254.

## **SECOND MEETING**

**Topic:** Reductionism and Levels of Explanation

**Key questions:** What are the main levels of explanation in cognitive science? What are the best arguments for positing different levels of explanation? Are psychology and the special sciences autonomous? How can their autonomy be decided? Does multi-realizability of a level of explanations entail its irreducibility to the more fundamental levels?

### **Required Readings:**

1. Kitcher, Patricia (1988) "Marr's Computational Theory of Vision" in *Philosophy of Science* 55(1), pp. 1–24. (24 pages)
2. Fodor, J. (1974). "Special sciences." *Synthese* 28: 97–115. (19 pages)
3. Carandini, M. (2012). "From circuits to behavior: a bridge too far?" *Nature neuroscience*, 15(4): 507–509. (2 pages)

### **Background Readings**

Bermúdez, J. L. (2014). *Cognitive science: An introduction to the science of the mind*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2, Section 3, pp. 53–65.

### **Further Readings**

- Marr, D. (1982). *Vision*, Chapter 1.
- Kim, J. (1992). "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52: 1–26.
- Peacocke, Christopher (1986) "Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level 1.5" in *Mind & Language*, 1(2): 101–123.

## **THIRD MEETING**

**Topic:** Representation, Concepts, and Language of Thought.

**Key Questions:** Are representations naturalistically acceptable entities? What are concepts? How do we acquire them? Do representations need to have a language-like structure? Do we think in a language of thought?

### **Required Readings:**

1. Fodor, J. *The Language of Thought*. Harvard University Press. Chapters 1 & 2.
2. Fodor, J. and Z. Pylyshyn (1988). 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture' in *Cognition* 28(1/2), pp. 3–71.
3. Cummins, R. (1996). "Systematicity." *The Journal of Philosophy*, 93(12): 591–614.

### **Background Readings:**

Bermúdez, J. L. (2014). *Cognitive science: An introduction to the science of the mind*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 10, Section 2 (pp. 263–266).

## Further Readings

- Smolensky, Paul (1988). 'The Constituent Structure of Connectionist Mental States: a Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn' in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* XXVI, Supplement, pp. 137–161.
- Camp, E. (2007). "Thinking with maps." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21: 145–182.
- Carey, S. (1991). "Knowledge Acquisition: Enrichment or Conceptual Change" in Carey and Gelman (eds), *The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays in Biology and Cognition*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 257-292.
- Kamp, H., and Partee, B. (1995). Prototype theory and compositionality. *Cognition*, 57(2), 129-191.

## FOURTH MEETING

**Topic:** Intelligence

**Key questions:** What does it mean for some behavior to qualify as intelligent? Is it reasonable to expect that we can come up with a criterion for intelligence that would enable us to tell apart intelligent behavior from unintelligent one? What shape should this criterion take?

### Required Readings

1. Turing, AM (1950). "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." *Mind*, 59(236): 433–460. (28 pages).
2. Block, N. (1981). "Psychologism and behaviorism." *Philosophical Review*, 90(1): 5–43.
3. Jones, C., and Bergen, B. (2023). "Does GPT-4 pass the Turing test?" *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.20216*. (11 pages)

### Background Reading:

Millican, P. (2013). "The Philosophical Significance of the Turing Machine and the Turing Test." *Alan Turing: his work and impact*. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 587–601.

### Further Readings

1. Searle, J.R. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." In: *Machine Intelligence*. Routledge (2012): 64–88.
2. French, R. M. (2000). "The Turing Test: the first 50 years." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 4(3), 115–122. (8 pages)

## FIFTH MEETING

**Topic:** The Psychology of Action.

**Key Questions:** What is the difference between actions and mere happenings? What psychological states underlie action (intentions, desires, tryings)? How is action controlled (hierarchically, motorically, cognitively)? How are we to think of the difference between bodily actions and mental actions? What is the role of attention in action? What explains failures of agency such as akrasia, slips, and habits? How are we to model unintentional mental actions such as mindwandering and daydreaming?

### Required readings

1. Davidson, D. (1971). 'Agency'. In: In Davidson, D., *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford University Press, 43–61.
2. Pacherie, E. (2008). "The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework." *Cognition*, 107(1), 179-217.
3. Wu, W. (2023) *Movements of the Mind*, Oxford University Press, Chapters 1-3.

### Background readings

Peacocke, A. (2021). "Mental action." *Philosophy Compass*, 16(6), e12741.

### Further readings

1. Wu, W. (2016). "Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentic Control." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 93(1), 101–126.
2. Wu, W. (2020). "Automaticity, Control, and Attention in Skill." In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise* (pp. 207–218). Routledge.
3. Seli, P., Risko, E. F., Smilek, D., and Schacter, D. L. (2016). "Mind-wandering with and without intention." *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 20(8), 605–617.
4. Cooper, Richard and Shallice, Tim. 2000. "Contention scheduling and the control of routine activities." *Cognitive Neuropsychology* 17:297–338.

## SIXTH MEETING

**Topic:** Know-how and Skills.

**Key Questions:** Is there a distinction between know-how and know-that? What are skills? In what ways do skills differ from other capacities such as habits, instincts, and talents? Are skills different from know-how? What is the relation between skills, know-how, and acting intentionally?

### Required readings

1. Ryle, G. 1949. *The Concept of Mind*. Chapter 2.
2. Fridland, E. (2017). "Skill and motor control: Intelligence all the way down." *Philosophical studies*, 174(6): 1539–1560.
3. Pavese, C. (2026). *The Practical Mind. Skill, Knowledge, and Intelligence*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

### Background readings

Pavese, C. (2022). "Knowledge How," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/knowledge-how/>.

### Further readings

1. Fridland, E. (2019). "Longer, smaller, faster, stronger: On skills and intelligence." *Philosophical psychology*, 32(5), 759-783.
2. Krakauer, J. W. (2019). "The intelligent reflex." *Philosophical Psychology*, 32(5), 822-830.

## SEVENTH MEETING

**Topic:** Procedural and declarative memory systems.

**Key questions:** Are there different memory, or knowledge, systems? What evidence motivates positing different memory systems? How are procedural and declarative knowledge supposed to differ, and how does the procedural and declarative distinction relate to the folk-psychological distinction between know-how and know-that?

### Required Readings

1. \*Cohen, N. J., & Squire, L. R. (1980). "Preserved Learning and Retention of Pattern-analyzing Skills in Amnesia: Dissociation of Knowing how and Knowing that." *Science*, 210(4466): 207–210. (4 pages)
2. Adams, M. P. (2009). "Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-that/Knowledge-how Distinction." *Synthese*, 170: 97–114.
3. Pavese, C. (2026) "Procedural Memory and Know-How" Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Memory, ed C. Craver and A. Sant'Anna, Oxford University Press.

### Background Readings

Michaelian, K. and J. Sutton, "Memory," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/>.

### Further Readings:

1. Fodor, J. A. (1968). "The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation." *The Journal of Philosophy*, 65(20): 627–640.
2. Krakauer, J. W. (2020). "Automatizing Knowledge: Confusion over what Cognitive Neuroscience Tells us about Intellectualism." In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise* (pp. 219–225). (7 pages)

## EIGHT MEETING

**Topic:** Representations in skilled action.

**Key Questions:** What role do representations play in skilled action? What is the relation between intentions and subpersonal representations in skilled actions? What role do conceptual representation and propositional knowledge play in skilled action? We will discuss these questions by looking closely at some pathologies of skilled actions such as ideo-motor apraxia and ideational apraxia that highlight the central contributions of conceptual representations and knowledge in skilled actions.

### Required Readings

1. Dreyfus, H. L. (2007). The Return of the Myth of the Mental. *Inquiry*, 50(4), 352-365.
2. McDowell, J. (2007). What Myth? *Inquiry*, 50(4), 338-351.
3. Montero, B. G. (2020). "Consciousness and Skill." In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise* (pp. 181–193). (13 pages)

### Further Readings

1. Goldenberg, G (2011). "The Effect of Brain Damage on Human Tool Use." in McCormack, T, C. Hoerl, and S. Butterfill (eds), *Tool Use and Causal Cognition* (Oxford, 2011): 183–201.
2. Pavese, C. (2026) *The Practical Mind. Skill, Knowledge, and Intelligence*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 8-11.
3. Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014). Intention and motor representation in purposive action. *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, 88(1), 119-145.
4. Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2017). Intentions and motor representations: The interface challenge. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, 8(2), 317-336.

# Other Events (suitable for all audiences)

## Outside In: Theorizing Pleasure

Lecture by: Prof Verity Harte

Week 1 | Day: Thursday

Time: 16:30-18:00

Location: Keble College | The H B Allen Centre | Lecture Theatre

The treatment of pleasure by philosophers of Classical Greek Antiquity has got a bad rap. Anscombe thought them “baffled by” pleasure (*Intention* §40). Platonic and Aristotelian discussions of pleasure do raise several puzzles. However, rather than being a sign of ancient confusion, these puzzles reflect the fact that Plato, Aristotle, and the hedonists with whom they engage, approach pleasure from an unexpected direction. Rather than theorize pleasure from the inside, whether as sensation, feeling, or attitude, they do so, as my title has it, from the outside in. The project of my lecture will be to explain this suggestion and their outside-in approach to pleasure, and to argue that it is worth taking seriously.

## Graduate Lecture: Topics in Feminist Ethics

Lectures by: Esther Braun and Ronya Ramrath

TT26 | Weeks 1-4 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 12:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

This lectures series introduces a set of current topics in feminist ethics. The optional preparatory readings for each class are listed below and can be found on Canvas.

### 1) 29<sup>th</sup> of April: The ethics of regulating sex work

Sex work is one of the most contentious topics within feminist theory. Many proponents of the “Nordic Model” that punishes clients regard sex work as a form of gender-based violence, and ultimately advocate for its abolition. In contrast, many sex workers’ rights organisations argue that any form of criminalisation leads to significant risks to sex workers. The lecture gives an overview of key questions and arguments in this context: Can selling sex be truly voluntary? What kinds of legal frameworks best support the rights and safety of sex workers? Whose voices are centred in this debate, and why?

Mac, Juno and Molly Smith. 2020. *Revolting Prostitutes: The Fight for Sex Workers’ Rights*. London: Verso. (Introduction)

Flanigan, Jessica and Lori Watson. 2019. *Debating Sex Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Introduction)

### 2) 6<sup>th</sup> of May: The ethics of knowing

This lecture will introduce the ethical problem of knowledge in feminist philosophy. After a brief look at feminist epistemology more broadly, we will look at different forms of epistemic injustice and how they manifest both towards women as a group and within feminism itself. What are the ethical difficulties around knowing as a woman, under conditions of oppression? How do we fight the epistemic injustices we face, and how do we avoid committing such injustices ourselves? And what are the limits of epistemic injustice as a framework?

Fricker, Miranda. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Chapters 1 and 7)<sup>[SEP]</sup>  
Dotson, Kristie. 2012. 'A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression'. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 33 (1): 24–47.

### 3) 13<sup>th</sup> of May: Reproductive justice and assisted reproductive technologies

This lecture introduces the concept of reproductive justice to explore ethical questions arising from assisted reproductive technologies. Surrogacy and egg donation open up new possibilities for reproduction, including queer family building. Yet, the emergence of transnational markets for surrogacy and egg donation poses the risk of coercion and exploitation. The lecture explores questions such as: Who benefits from these technologies, and at what cost to others? Do they enhance or diminish reproductive autonomy? How should they be regulated?

Khader, Serene J. 2013. Intersectionality and the ethics of transnational commercial surrogacy. *International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics* 6 (1): 68-90

Bailey, Alison. 2011. Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy. *Hypatia* 26 (4): 715-741

### 4) 20<sup>th</sup> of May: Feminist theory and feminist practice

Having looked at ethical questions within feminist theory and the theoretical concepts that are employed to address them, this lecture takes a step back to consider the ways in which feminist theory and practice are entangled, focussing more on the already introduced notion of intersectionality. In what ways is the history of this idea itself expressive of ethical intersectional concerns? How does the way in which some concepts are taken up risk repeating the gestures of exclusion feminism is supposed to combat? How do we make sure our feminist practice is ethical?

Hill Collins, Patricia. 2019. 'Intersectionality and Epistemic Resistance' in *Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Srinivasan, Amia. 2022. What should feminist theory be? *Radical Philosophy* 212: 48–61.  
[https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/rp212\\_srinivasan.pdf](https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/rp212_srinivasan.pdf)

## Graduate Lecture: Aristotle on Accidentality, Chance, and Errors in Nature

Lectures by: Setareh Seyedrezazad

Weeks, time, and location to be confirmed [here](#).

In these lectures we will focus on the notion of accidentality in Aristotle's philosophy and its application in his physics and biology. We will examine how Aristotle defines accidentality, what he takes to be the causes of accidental outcomes, and how chance, luck, and error fit within his broader account of the accidental.

### Lecture 1: What is Accidentality?

In this lecture, we will explore Aristotle's notion of the accidental: items that come to be 'neither always nor for the most part'. The key questions are: are there different senses of accidentality in Aristotle's philosophy? If so, can they be unified? How should the notion of 'neither always nor for the most part' be understood?

Reading: *Metaphysics E.2*, *Posterior Analytics I.4*

### **Lecture 2: Accidental and Per Se Causes**

The second lecture will focus on the causes of the accidental. Aristotle distinguishes between per se and accidental causes, stating that the cause of the accidental is itself accidental. Some questions to be addressed are: what is the distinction between per se and accidental causes? Should the latter be called causes? Further, Aristotle thinks that accidental causes, unlike per se causes, are indefinite. How should we understand this indefiniteness?

Reading: *Metaphysics* E.2, *Physics* II.3

### **Lecture 3: Chance and Luck**

In the third session we will discuss luck and chance, which in Aristotle's view are accidents that *could* come to be for the sake of something, but in fact *do not*. We will address the following questions: how are chance and luck related to teleology? What is the difference between chance and luck? Does Aristotle's philosophy allow for the existence of bad luck?

Reading: *Physics* II. 4-6

### **Lecture 4: Errors in Nature and Craft**

In our final session, we will examine how errors arise in both nature and craft, and how Aristotle understands errors within his broader account of the accidental. In particular, we will focus on errors and anomalies in natural generation.

Reading: *Physics* II.8, *Generation of Animals* IV.3

## **Graduate Lecture: Higher-order Metaphysics**

Lectures by: Pranciškus Gričius

TT26 | Weeks 5-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 12:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

Higher-order metaphysicians use higher-order languages and logics to study reality. Higher-order languages are the sort of languages that allow one to quantify into various syntactic positions, such as predicate position and sentence position. These languages prove useful in metaphysical theorising. In the last decade or so, there has been a revived interest in higher-order metaphysics. These lectures give an overview of some basic topics in higher-order metaphysics. In particular, we shall focus on elementary formal machinery and foundational philosophical issues.

Fluency in Prelims logic will be assumed. The course will benefit anyone interested in metaphysics and philosophical logic. Students studying for Philosophy of Logic and Language, Knowledge and Reality, and Philosophical Logic are particularly welcome. Readings are optional.

Background reading

Skiba, L., 2021. Higher-Order Metaphysics. *Philosophy Compass* 16 (10): 1-11.

Sider, T., 2022. *Crash Course on Higher-Order Logic*.

## Lecture 1: Higher-Order Language

Whereas first-order languages allow one to quantify only into name position, higher-order languages additionally allow one to quantify into other syntactic positions, such as predicate position and sentence position. In this lecture, we will informally discuss higher-order languages, and we shall talk about the reasons why one might go higher-order. We will then look at various interpretations of higher-order quantifiers—singularist, pluralist, and primitivist—and we shall discuss why higher-order metaphysicians opt for the primitivist interpretation.

### Reading

Fritz, P. & Jones, N. K., 2024. Higher-Order Metaphysics: An Introduction. In: P. Fritz & N. K. Jones eds. *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. **Section 1.**  
Frege, G., 1997 [1892]. Concept and Object. In: *The Frege Reader*, ed. M. Beaney, Oxford: Blackwell.

## Lecture 2: Higher-Order Logic

Type theories help us track various syntactic positions that terms occupy. We will present the main type theories that higher-order metaphysicians use and we shall talk about the relationship between types and syntactic categories in natural language. Then we will formally introduce a higher-order language and its logic. We shall spend some time examining principles which govern lambda terms. Finally, we will talk about higher-order logic as metaphysics and we shall discuss the distinction between pure and applied higher-order metaphysics.

### Reading

Fritz, P. & Jones, N. K., 2024. Higher-Order Metaphysics: An Introduction. In: P. Fritz & N. K. Jones eds. *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. **Sections 2-5.**  
Williamson, T., *forthcoming*. Is Logic about Validity? In Brendel, E., et al. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## Lecture 3: Higher-Order Reality

In this lecture, we come back to the issue of interpreting higher-order quantifiers. In particular, we shall talk about the relationship between typed languages and typed reality, the difference between ontological commitments and metaphysical commitments, and traverse other related issues.

### Reading

Prior, A. N., 1971. *Objects of Thought*. Oxford University Press. **Chapter 3.**  
Williamson, T., 2013. *Modal Logic as Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. **Chapter 5.9.**  
Stalnaker, R., 2023. *Propositions: Ontology and Logic*. Oxford University Press. **Chapter 5.**  
Jones, N. K., 2024. Quantification and Ontological Commitment. In: Anna Sofia Maurin and Anthony Fisher (eds.), *Routledge Handbook on Properties*. Oxford University Press, 2024.

#### **Lecture 4: Higher-Order Identity**

In the last lecture, we shall discuss various theories of higher-order identity, also known as theories of grain. After presenting Extensionalism and Structuralism, we shall discuss their drawbacks. Then we shall present Classicism, a theory that has recently gained a lot of attention.

#### **Reading**

Fritz, P., 2023. *The Foundations of Modality: From Propositions to Possible Worlds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. **Chapters 3-4.**

Bacon, A. & Dorr, C., 2024. Classicism. In: P. Fritz & N. K. Jones, eds, *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. **Section 1.**

Williamson, T., 2013. *Modal Logic as Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. **Methodological Afterword.**

#### **The Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture**

Prof Tania Lombrozo

TT26 | Week 3 | Day: Tuesday | Time: 17:00–18:00

Location: University College (10 Merton Street Lecture Room)

For further information: [The Gareth Evans Memorial Lectures | Faculty of Philosophy](#)

#### **Inaugural Lecture**

Lectures by: Prof David Owens

TT26 | Week 4 | Day: Wednesday | Time: 17:00-18:30

Location: Stephen A. Schwarzman Centre Theatre

Further information here:

[Inaugural Lecture by Professor David Owens, Sekyra and White's Professor of Moral Philosophy | Faculty of Philosophy](#)

#### **Philosophy, AI, and Innovation Grad Seminar: Autonomy in the Age of Agents**

Prof. Philipp Koralus and Brendan McCord

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Tuesday | Time: 16:00–18:00

Location: Mary Sunley Lecture Theatre, St Catherine's College

Plus

Wednesday 20 May (Week 4): 15:00–16:30

Location: Concert Hall, Schwarzman Centre

**Description:** The seminar will explore issues at the intersection of philosophy, AI, and technological innovation, co-taught by a philosopher and an entrepreneur. Throughout term, visiting discussants from philosophy and the technology industry will join, including:

- Jack Clark (co-founder Anthropic)
- Joe Edelman (Meaning Alignment Institute)
- Herman Cappelen [joint work with John Hawthorne] (HKU)
- Simon Cullen (UNC Chapel Hill)
- Thomas Wolf (co-founder Hugging Face)

The broad theme will be dimensions of human autonomy in the age of AI agents. The seminar is primarily aimed at philosophy graduate students and computer science graduate students, but participants from other disciplines and undergraduates are welcome.

The seminar will culminate in a clinic to facilitate grant applications for hands-on independent summer projects on the themes of the seminar (last year, participants secured over £14k in awards).

The detailed syllabus and readings will be available here:

<https://hailab.ox.ac.uk/event/philosophy-ai-and-innovation-seminar/>

**Prerequisites:** please complete this form ([HAI Lab Trinity Term Seminar 2026 – Fill in form](#)) no later than April 24<sup>th</sup> with a (very) brief explanation of your interest in the seminar to **apply for a spot**. Space is limited to maintain quality of discussion.

# Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

## **Wittgenstein on Solipsism, Subjectivity and the First Person**

Lectures by: Prof Bill Child

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Thursdays

Weeks 1-6, 8 | 11:00-13:00 | Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

Week 7 | 16:00-18:00 | Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room (30.025)

The class is intended in the first instance for Philosophy BPhil and MSt students. It is also open to 4<sup>th</sup> year undergraduates in CSP, MP and PP. PRS and DPhil students in Philosophy are welcome to attend by prior arrangement. Others may also be admitted if space permits.

**Please e-mail me ([bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk](mailto:bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk)) in advance if you would like to come to these classes.** If you are in one of the categories specified above (Philosophy BPhil and MSt students; 4<sup>th</sup> year CSP, MP and PP students; Philosophy PRS and DPhil students) you are entitled to participate; but it will help me to know likely numbers in advance. If you are not in one of those categories, please get in touch anyway; I will let you know before the first class whether I can accommodate you.

The class will deal with the treatment of questions about solipsism, subjectivity, and the self in Wittgenstein's work from the *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations*.

There is a small amount of **required reading** each week, listed below. In four weeks, the required reading is a work of Wittgenstein's. In the other four weeks, it is drawn from the secondary literature. A fuller reading list, which includes a selection of optional further readings, is available on Canvas and on ORLO (Oxford Reading Lists Online).

**Participants are strongly encouraged to e-mail me each week with one or two questions they'd like that week's class to address. All questions are very welcome; nothing is too simple or basic to ask about. I will do my best to address in the class all questions that are sent to me in good time beforehand.**

I will post a handout on Canvas in advance of each meeting (but possibly only just in advance).

Week 1                      Solipsism in the *Tractatus*: 'The world is my world'

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 5.541-5.5421, 5.6-5.641

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-16* – 23.5.15; 1.8.16 to 12.8.16; 2.9.16; 12.10.16-17.10.16

Week 2                      Sensation Language in Russell and the *Tractatus*

Cora Diamond, 'Does Bismarck Have a Beetle in his Box?', in *The New Wittgenstein*, eds. A. Crary and R. Read, London: Routledge, 2000.

Week 3      *Philosophical Remarks - 'I', the self, and immediate experience*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, part VI, pp. 88-96.

*Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann*, ed. B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979, pp. 49-50

Week 4      *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Feb-March 1933: '2 kinds of use of "I"'*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933, From the Notes of G. E. Moore* eds D. Stern, B. Rogers and G. Citron, Cambridge: CUP, 2016, pp. 266-304

Week 5      *The Blue Book I: Solipsism and the Philosophy of Mind*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* pp. 44-74

Week 6      *The Blue Book II: The use of 'I' as subject and the use of 'I' as object*

Rachael Wiseman, 'The Misidentification of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification', *Journal of Philosophy*, 2019, pp. 663-677.

Week 7      *Sensation Language and the Private Language Sections in Philosophical Investigations*

David Stern, 'Private Language', in O. Kuusela and M. McGinn, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein*.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§243-315

Week 8      *Anscombe on the First Person*

G. E. M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe, 'The First Person', in S. Guttenplan, ed., *Mind and Language*, Oxford: OUP, 1975. Reprinted in: Anscombe, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981; and in Q. Cassam, ed., *Self-Knowledge*, Oxford: OUP, 1994.

## **The Epicurean Life: For and Against**

Lectures by: Prof Luca Castagnoli and Prof Tobias Reinhardt

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Mondays | Time: 10:00-12:00

Location: Corpus Christi College (off the main quad)

This graduate class will explore all main areas of ancient Epicureanism, with emphasis on the arguments marshalled by the supporters and critics of Epicureanism for and against the central tenets of the Epicurean philosophical system.

The main sources are those collected in Long and Sedley (eds.) (1987) *Hellenistic Philosophers*. Cambridge: CUP (LS). They will be supplemented with additional texts made available for the weekly classes.

1. The aim and scope of philosophy (LS 25); atomism (LS 4-12, especially 4-6, 8 and 11)
2. Cosmology, gods, anti-teleology (LS 13 and 23)
3. Perception and knowledge (LS 15-18)
4. Happiness and pleasure (LS 21)
5. Death (LS 14 and 24)
6. Freedom and Responsibility (LS 14 and 20)

7. Justice, Law and Political Withdrawal (LS 22)
8. Love and Friendship (LS 220 and Lucretius *DRN* 4.1037-1287)

Knowledge or Ancient Greek or Latin is not required. Attendees will be offered the opportunity to give short presentations.

## Metaphysics

Lectures by: Prof Tim Williamson

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Mondays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

We'll discuss selected topics in contemporary metaphysics of a broadly structural nature. Each meeting will be based on the readings below.

### Week 1 (27 April)

Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne, 'Naturalness', *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, 8 (2013): 3-77.

### Week 2 (4 May)

Bar Luzon, 'The Euthyphro Principle', *Mind*, forthcoming,

<https://philarchive.org/archive/LUZTEP-2v1>

TW, *Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy* (OUP, 2024), section 3.6.

### Week 3 (11 May)

Kit Fine, 'Essence and modality', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 8 (1994): 1-16.

TW, 'Essences, heuristics, and metaphysical illusions', *Metaphysics*, 8, (2025): 47-60

<https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.195>.

### Week 4 (18 May)

Kit Fine, 'Reply to Timothy Williamson', *Metaphysics*, 8 (2025): 61-69.

<https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.209>

TW, 'Afterword: On Kit Fine's reply', to appear in TW, *Essays on the Philosophy of Logic* (New York: OUP,

in preparation) and will be posted on TW's Oxford webpage at

<https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/people/timothy-williamson#tab-4182171>.

### Week 5 (25 May)

TW, *Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy* (OUP, 2024), sections 3.4-3.5.

Kit Fine, 'Comments on Timothy Williamson's *Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy* (APA 2026)'.

TW, 'Response to Kit Fine's comments'.

The latter two pieces are expected to appear in *Metaphysics* and will be posted on TW's Oxford webpage at <https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/people/timothy-williamson#tab-4182171>.

### Week 6 (1 June)

Christopher Menzel, 'Pure logic and higher-order metaphysics', in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.),

*Higher-Order Metaphysics* (OUP, 2024): 421-459.

TW, 'Menzel on pure logic and higher-order metaphysics', in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.), *Higher*

*-Order Metaphysics* (OUP, 2024): 460-471.

### Week 7 (8 June)

Bryan Pickel, 'Against second-order primitivism', in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.), *Higher-Order*

*Metaphysics* (OUP, 2024): 472-503.

TW, 'Pickel against second-order primitivism', in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.), *Higher-Order*

*Metaphysics* (OUP, 2024): 504-513.

### Week 8 (15 June)

David Chalmers, 'Verbal disputes', *Philosophical Review*, 120 (2011), 515-566.

## **A topic in the Philosophy of Mind**

Lectures by: Prof Michael Martin

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Mondays | Time: 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

### *1. Our Theme*

This seminar is about the contest between representational and relational accounts of sense experience. Much of the literature assumes that the two approaches are in conflict and are competitors, although a minority of contributors suggest that we can combine them.

Are the approaches in fact inconsistent with each other? What does it take for sense experience to be representational? Why should someone who thinks of experience in relational terms take a stand on that question?

We can organize the discussion of these questions around two narrower themes. On the one hand, representational theories of perception have often been motivated by concerns with the causal argument from hallucination. Can representationalism be formulated independently of those concerns? On the other, can we give a positive account of what it would be for experience to be representational in the first place?

The seminar begins with a discussion of early statements of representationalism about sense experience in the 1980s, and their connection to earlier discussions of sense perception in the second half of the twentieth century. We'll then look at the causal argument historically, and how it constrains the options in the theory of sense perception. The question then turns to so-called new relationalism which seeks to affirm a relational conception of sense experience in a way which brackets the challenge presented by the causal argument. We'll look at a traditional form of representationalism in Byrne and Manzotti, and an amendment to his disjunctivism in John McDowell.

The second half of term is devoted to the second theme. We'll look at the form of John Foster's two-level account of experience, and the consequences of adopting it. In turn, this raises questions about the relation between endorsing relationalism about experience and rejecting representationalism. We'll consider arguments why we should think of episodic memory as both relational and representational. And we'll close by asking broader questions about the very idea of experience we need to employ.

For each topic, there will be one key reading and a selection of further readings which it would be a good idea to look at as well.

## 2. Weekly Topics & Reading

### **Week One –27 April 2026**

*Origins of Representationalism*

CAB Peacocke, *Sense & Content*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. 1

Further Reading

John Searle, *Intentionality*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), Ch 2.

Gareth Evans, 'Things without the Mind', reprinted in *Collected Papers*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985)

GEM Anscombe, 'The Intentionality of Sensation', reprinted in *Collected Philosophical Papers vol 2: Metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982)

### **Week Two – 04 May 2026**

*The Causal Argument – origins & varieties*

Gottlob Frege, 'Thoughts' translated by Peter Geach and Dugald Stoothof in *Collected Papers in Philosophy, Mathematics & Logic* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984)

Further Reading

Mark Johnston, 'The Obscure Object of Hallucination', *Philosophical Studies*, 2004

Paul Snowdon, 'Some Reflections on an Argument from Hallucination', in *Essays on Perception*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2024)

Tyler Burge, 'Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology', in *Philosophical Topics*, 2005

James Cornman, *Perception, Common Sense, & Science*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) pp. 43 – 50

### **Week Three – 11 May 2026**

*A New Approach? The New Relationalists*

Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti, 'Hallucination & its Objects', *The Philosophical Review*, 2022

Further Reading

Farid Mansour, 'On the Possibility of Hallucinations', *Mind*, 2020

Susanna Schellenberg, 'Précis of *The Unity of Experience*', *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research*, 2020

### **Week Four – 18 May 2026**

*A New Approach II? McDowell on Seeming*

John McDowell, 'Experiential Content: both Relational and Contentful', in *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2013

#### Further Reading

John McDowell, 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1982

Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press), secs. 21 – 25, 61 – 63

#### **Week Five – 25 May 2026**

*Identifying Representational Experience: Two-Level Theories I*

John Foster, *The Case for Idealism*, (Routledge: 1982), Ch. 6, particularly pp. 103 – 106

#### Further Reading

Bertrand Russell, *The Theory of Knowledge Manuscript*, (London: Routledge, 1986) Chs. III, V, VI

Robert Hopkins, 'Imagining the Past', in *Perceptual Memory and Perceptual Imagination*, edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch, pp. 46-71. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2018)

Dominic Gregory, *Showing, Sensing, & Seeming*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), Chs. 1 – 3

#### **Week Six – 01 June 2026**

*Two-Level Theories II*

John Foster, *The Nature of Perception*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) Pt. III Ch. 3

#### Further Reading

CAB Peacocke, 'Imagination, Experience, and Possibility' in Foster & Robinson, *Essays on Berkeley*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.)

#### **Week Seven – 08 June 2026**

*Embedded Information*

MGF Martin, 'Embedded Information', to be circulated

#### Further Reading

Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), Ch. 5

#### **Week Eight – 15 June 2026**

A Broader Conception of Experience

JM Hinton, *Experiences*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Part 1

#### Further Reading

Zeno Vendler, *The Matter of Minds*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) Ch. 3

James Higginbotham, 'Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person', reprinted and revised in *Tense, Aspect, and Indexicality*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

### **Philosophy of Logic**

Lectures by: Prof Ian Rumfitt and Dr Chris Scambler

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Tuesdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This seminar will address logical and metaphysical questions related to identity. A particular

focus will be the debate surrounding *Geach's Thesis*: that there is no absolute relation of identity, but only various sortal relative relations, things like 'same car as' or 'same person as'. We will also address related topics, including: the status of Leibniz's Law, the necessity of identity, the relation between identity and quantification, and that between relative identity and counting.

Week One (28 April) Putative examples of relative identity (CS)

Reading:

David Wiggins 'The Absoluteness of Identity,' in *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap 1.

Harry Deutsch 'Identity and General Similarity' *Noûs* 32 (1997): 177-199.

Week Two (5 May) Relative identity and Frege's analysis of cardinality (IR)

Reading:

John Perry 'Relative Identity and Number', *Can. J. Phil.* 8 (1978): 1-14

William Alston & Jonathan Bennett

'Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege', *Phil. Review* 93 (1984): 553-67

Patricia Blanchette 'Relative Identity and Cardinality', *Can. J. Phil.* 29 (1999): 205-24

Massimo Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi

'Cardinality and Identity', *J. Phil. Logic* 36 (2007): 539-56

Week Three (12 May) Geach's thesis examined (CS)

Reading:

P.T. Geach *Reference and Generality: An Examination of some Ancient and Modern Theories*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), chaps 2, 3, and 7.

James Cain 'Some Radical Consequences of Geach's Logical Theories' *Analysis* 45 (1985): 83-88.

Week Four (19 May) Partial syllogistic logic (IR)

Reading:

Stephen Blamey 'Partial Logic' in D.M. Gabbay & F. Guenther, eds., *Handbook of Philosophical Logic* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Kluwer 2002), vol. 5, pp.261-353 esp. §§1, 2, 6, 7

[Be sure to read the version in the *second* edition of the *Handbook*]

Ian Rumfitt 'Partial Syllogistic Logic', MS to be circulated

Week Five (26 May) Deviant treatments of absolute identity (CS)

Reading:

Andrew Bacon & J.S. Russell

'The Logic of Opacity', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 99

(2017): 81-114.

Michael Caie, Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman

'Classical Opacity', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 101

(2019): 524-566.

Catherine Diehl & B.M Mount

'The Metaphysics of Opacity', *Philosophers' Imprint* 23 (2023)

Week Six (2 June)

Identity and possibilities (IR)

Reading:

P.F. Strawson

'Names and Identity' §2.2 of his *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen, 1974), pp.51-6

John McDowell

'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', *Mind* 86 (1977): 159-85

Ian Rumfitt

*The Boundary Stones of Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015), chap.6

Week Seven (9 June)

A new theory of relative identity (CS)

Reading:

P.T Geach

'Identity', *The Review of Metaphysics* 1 (1967): 3-12

Chris Scambler

'Identity is Always Merely Relative', MS to be circulated

Week Eight (16 June)

TBC

## Philosophy of Statistics

Lectures by: Prof Sam Fletcher

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Mondays | Time: 09:00-11:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

Statistical methods form a significant part of the methodology of every scientific discipline. This graduate seminar will survey a number of central philosophical and conceptual issues in statistics, with special reference to their relations with topics in epistemology. We will consider at length both the classical and Bayesian schools of statistics: their formulations, and arguments pro and con. We will then consider a third school, likelihoodism, that is sometimes considered a compromise between classical and Bayesian methodologies and has gained favor among some philosophers of science. This leads to the likelihood principle, a natural focal point in the debate between these schools on the nature of evidence. The remainder of the seminar will be split between topics on statistical modeling (model selection), and statistical paradoxes (Simpson's paradox). Further details, including reading lists, will be posted on Canvas.

## Topics in Political and Moral Philosophy

Lectures by: Prof David Owens

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Tuesdays | Time: 16:00-18:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

We'll ask how being bound by the commands of an authority affects both the culpability of those who do comply with their commands and the authority's entitlement to coerce those who don't. Most of the time we'll focus on political and legal authority but we shall also be discussing the commands of employers and slaveholders. These familiar issues are approached from a slightly unfamiliar direction via a conventionalist theory of moral responsibility. Throughout attention will be paid to the views of the classical political philosophers, especially Hobbes, as well as to contemporaries like Rawls and Raz. Each week I will post a paper of mine – some published, some unpublished – on the course Canvas page to act as a focus for discussion, together with a handout for that session. (I shan't be providing hard copies of either so please bring these documents with you in some form.)

### Course Outline

#### **Week One: April 28<sup>th</sup> Overview**

'A Hobbesian Introduction' (Unpublished)

#### **Week Two: May 5<sup>th</sup> Directive Authority**

'Rules and Rulers' *Political Philosophy* 1(2): 463–487.

#### **Week Three: May 12<sup>th</sup> Liberty**

'Liberty, Equality, Authority' *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* (Forthcoming).

#### **Week Four: May 19<sup>th</sup> Responsibility**

'Excuse, Capacity and Convention' *Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility* Ed. M Kiener (London: Routledge 2023)

#### **Week Five: May 26<sup>th</sup> Coercion**

'Coercion as an Excuse' (Unpublished)

#### **Week Six: June 2<sup>nd</sup> Authority and Consent**

"Authority and Agreement: The Case of Employment", *Philosophers' Imprint* 26: 6. (2026).

#### **Week Seven: June 9<sup>th</sup> Slavery**

'Property, Contract and Slavery' (Unpublished)

#### **Week Eight: June 16<sup>th</sup> Justice**

'The Fragmentation of Justice and the Direction of History' (Unpublished)

## The Epistemology of Aesthetic Appreciation

Lectures by: Prof Catharine Abell and Prof James Grant

TT26 | 09:00-11:00

Wednesdays | Weeks 1-7 | Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

Monday | Week 8 | Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

Appreciation is a central concept in aesthetics. It plays a major role in theories of aesthetic judgement, definitions of art, and of the value of art and beauty. Its relation to pleasure, understanding, and knowledge is a vexed question. This class will focus on epistemological questions about appreciation. What are the epistemic resources needed to appreciate something aesthetically? Is pleasure a way of perceiving value? What is the role of perception in aesthetic appreciation? The readings are as follows.

Week 1: Malcolm Budd, [‘The Acquaintance Principle’](#), *Aesthetic Essays* (2008)

Week 2: Fabian Dorsch, [‘Non-Inferentialism about Justification: The Case of Aesthetic Judgements’](#), *Philosophical Quarterly* (2013)

Week 3: Keren Gorodeisky and Eric Marcus, [‘Aesthetic Rationality’](#), *Journal of Philosophy* (2018)

Week 4: Errol Lord, [‘Knowing What It’s Like’](#), chapter 2 of *Knowing the Normative World* (2026)

Week 5: Errol Lord, [‘Perceiving the Normative World: The Master Argument’](#), chapter 3 of *Knowing the Normative World* (2026)

Week 6: Alison Hills, [‘Aesthetic Understanding’](#), in Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), *Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding* (2017)

Week 7: Dominic McIver Lopes, [‘Aesthetic Appreciation’](#), chapter 9 of *Beyond Art* (2014)

Week 8: Servaas van der Berg, [‘The Motivational Structure of Appreciation’](#), *Philosophical Quarterly* (2019)

## Social Choice Theory

Lectures by: Prof Jean Baccelli

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This graduate class will introduce to selected topics in the axiomatic theory of collective decision-making.

### 1. Arrow

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory* (Revised Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapter 2 (“Arrow’s Impossibility Result”).

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Barbera, Hammond, and Seidl (eds.), *Handbook of Utility Theory, II*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Section 3 (“Social Choice Without Interpersonal Comparisons”).

## **2. Rights**

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory* (Revised Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapter 4 (“Individual Rights”).

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (Expanded Edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017. Selection from Chapter A5 (“The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal”, “Social Choice and Game Forms”, and “Nozick’s Conception of Liberty and Game Forms”).

Donald Saari. *Decisions and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Section 3.2 (“Sen’s Theorem”).

## **3. Interpersonal Comparisons**

John Weymark. Social Welfare Functions. In Adler and Fleurbaey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [Skip Sections 5.12-5.13.]

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Barbera, Hammond, and Seidl (eds.), *Handbook of Utility Theory, II*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Section 4.4 (“Interpersonal Comparisons of What?”).

Jacob Nebel. Recent Developments in Welfarist Social Choice. In Pivato and Guerdjikova (eds.), *Handbook of Utility Theory, III*. Berlin: Springer, forthcoming. Section 4 (“Informational Invariance”).

## **4. Bargaining**

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory* (Revised Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapter 8 (“Cooperative Bargaining”).

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (Expanded Edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017. Section 8.1 (“Bargaining Advantages and Collective Choice”).

John Roemer. *Theories of Distributive Justice*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996. Selection from Chapter 2 (“Axiomatic Bargaining Theory”; read p. 78-82, 89-93).

## **5. Risk**

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato. Social Evaluation under Risk and Uncertainty. In Adler and Fleurbaey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Section 24.3 (“The Social Aggregation Theorem”).

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018. Sections 1-4 and 7 (“Introduction”, “Harsanyi’s Theorem”, “Ex Ante Egalitarianism”, “Ex Post Egalitarianism”, and “The Separability Conundrum”).

## 6. Veil of Ignorance

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato. Social Evaluation under Risk and Uncertainty. In Adler and Fleurbaey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Section 24.2 (“The Impartial Observer Theorem”).

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, and Zvi Safra. Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem. *Econometrica*, 78 (6):1939–1971, 2010. Introduction.

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018. Section 10 (“Veil-of-ignorance Arguments”).

John Roemer. Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 99(4):167–184, 2002. Selection from the Conclusion (read p. 182-184).

## 7. Uncertainty

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato. Social Evaluation under Risk and Uncertainty. In Adler and Fleurbaey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Section 24.4 (“Subjective Probability and the Problem of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Welfare”).

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018. Section 8 (“Aggregating Beliefs and Preferences”).

Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler. Pareto Efficiency with Different Beliefs. *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 43(S2): S151–S171, 2014. (Skip S159-162, 169-170.)

## Philosophy of Economics

Lectures by: Prof Nancy Cartwright

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

In this seminar we will discuss a variety of topics in both philosophy of economics and economic methodology. Each week the topic will be introduced with a short presentation given by one of the participants, with the convenor presenting for the first week. Anyone with an interest in the topics is welcome to come. But all participants are expected to do their share in covering the topics and digging into the details.

Below are suggested topics for the term – actual readings and topics will be decided at the first meeting depending on the interests of those participating. Please come to the first meeting prepared with some ideas about subjects that you would like the seminar to cover and ones that you would be willing to introduce. Everybody attending the seminar should

be sure to have read the essential reading(s) for each session in advance as the aim is to take a critical approach to the topics raised. These seminars will be held weekly at 1400 on Wednesdays in the Ryle Room in the Philosophy Department. Please make sure that the convenor has your email address to get any updates on the programme.

#### Week 1. RCTs in development economics

- Angus Deaton & Nancy Cartwright, Deaton (2018). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *Randomized Controlled Trials and Evidence-based Policy: A Multidisciplinary Dialogue. Social Science & Medicine Special Issue*. 210: 1-90.
- Esther Duflo (2019) Field Experiments and the Practice of Policy. Nobel Prize lecture.
- Chrome-extension:
- [//efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2019/10/duflo-lecture.pdf](https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2019/10/duflo-lecture.pdf)
- 

- Suggested core readings for later weeks

-

- From *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 28:1 (2021)

- Anna Alexandrova, Robert Northcott & Jack Wright. Back to the big picture
- Don Ross. Economic methodology in 2020: looking forward, looking back
- Till Grüne-Yanoff & Philippe Verreault-Julien. How-possibly explanations in economics: anything goes?
- Francesco Guala. On letting serious crises go to waste
- Ivan Moscati. On the recent philosophy of decision theory
- Roberto Fumagalli. Theories of well-being and well-being policy: a view from methodology
- Magdalena Małecka. Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist

From Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics*

- Part 1A. Rationality: Rational choice theory, Game theory
- Chapter 8. Measurement

Other

- Mary S. Morgan and Tarja Knuuttila. Models and modelling in economics. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/teaching/Phil\_Sci\_Core/HPS\_2501\_2020/more\_pdf/Knuuttila\_Morgan\_Models\_2009.pdf
- Amartya Sen
  - a. Rational Fools. Plus: Goals, Commitment, and Identity
  - b. Commodities and Capabilities. Plus: The capabilities approach in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
- Julian Reiss and Nancy Cartwright. 2003. Uncertainty in econometrics: Evaluating policy counterfactuals. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/971/1/N\_Cartwright\_Uncertainty.pdf

## Plato and Aristotle on Knowledge and Doxa

Lectures by: Prof Michail Peramatzis

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Tuesdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Worcester College

In this graduate class we shall discuss Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of knowledge, *doxa* (belief, judgement, opinion?), and other related epistemic states, their distinctions between knowledge and *doxa*, and whether and, if so, in what measure those distinctions are grounded in different kinds of real-world object. We shall raise and seek to address both interpretative and conceptual questions. A reading list for each topic will be provided in week 1's meeting.

### Topics

Wk 1: *Meno*: Knowledge & True *Doxa*

Wk 2: *Republic* V-VII: Knowledge & *Doxa*

Wk 3: *Theaetetus*: Knowledge as True *Doxa* with an Account (*logos*)

Wk 4: *Philebus* 55-59: Types & Ranks of Knowledge; Purity & Truth

Wk 5: *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.2 & *Posterior Analytics* I.1: Intellectual Excellences & Learning

Wk 6: *Posterior Analytics* I.2 & *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.3: The Definition of Knowledge

Wk 7: *Posterior Analytics* I.33: Knowledge & True *Doxa*

Wk 8: *Metaphysics* A.1 (+*APo* II.19; *NE* VI.4 & 6-7): Craft and Wisdom

### Week 1 Reading

Charles D., 'Types of definition in the *Meno*' in Lindsay Judson & Vassilis Karasmanis, *Remembering Socrates: philosophical essays*. New York: Oxford University Press (2005).

Day, J. M. (ed.), *Plato's Meno in Focus* (Routledge 1994): translation by Day together with a collection of essays.

Fine, G., 'Inquiry in the *Meno*', in Kraut (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*.

\_\_\_\_\_, *The Possibility of Inquiry*, OUP 2014.

Nehamas, A., 'Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1985), 1-30; reprinted in Day.

Scott, D., *Plato's Meno*, CUP 2006.

Schwab, W., 'Explanation in Epistemology in the *Meno*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 48 (2015), 1-36.

Vlastos, G., 'Anamnesis in the *Meno*', *Dialogue* 4 (1965), 143-67; reprinted in Day and in

Vlastos, G., *Studies in Greek Philosophy* (ed. D.W. Graham, Princeton 1995), vol. II.

White, N. P., 'Inquiry', *Review of Metaphysics* 28 (1974-5), 289-310; reprinted in Day, and *Plato on Knowledge and Reality*, ch. 2.

## Mill's The Subjection of Women, Utilitarianism, and Feminism

Lectures by: Dr Lisa Forsberg

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Thursdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This course examines John Stuart Mill's (and Harriet Taylor Mill's) *The Subjection of Women*, influences on Mill's thinking, and the influence that *Subjection* had on moral philosophy (especially in the utilitarian tradition) after Mill. It also considers more broadly the extent to which utilitarianism offers a good foundation for feminism.

One of our classes will include a visit to the [John Stuart Mill Library at Somerville College](#).

### BACKGROUND READING

- Brink, D., *Mill's Progressive Principles* (Oxford University Press 2013)
- Crisp, R., *Mill on Utilitarianism* (Routledge 1997)
- Driver, J., 'The History of Utilitarianism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2025/entries/utilitarianism-history>

### Week 1: *The Subjection of Women*

#### CORE READING

- Mill, J. S., *The subjection of women* (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869)

#### FURTHER READING

- Morales, Maria H. (ed.) *Mill's The Subjection of Women: Critical Essays* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005)

#### QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION/TO STRUCTURE READING

- Which features of utilitarianism are most important to Mill's defence of gender equality?
- How important is Mill's conception of happiness to his argument in *Subjection*?
- Does qualitative hedonism provide a plausible account of happiness?
- What do utilitarians mean by impartiality? Is it sufficient to support Mill's arguments for extending certain rights to women?
- How does Mill accommodate rights within utilitarianism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of his approach?
- What is the role of common-sense morality in Mill's utilitarianism? Is this a plausible role for common-sense morality to play in ethical theory?
- What are some of Mill's main arguments for the equal treatment of men and women? Are they compelling?
- What is Mill's view on the respective nature of men and women and the role of societal institutions in shaping them? Is his view compelling?
- Is Mill's view of a just and equitable marriage persuasive?

- It is possible to separate Mill's arguments for equality in *Subjection* from his utilitarianism?

## Week 2: Harriet and J.S

### CORE READING

- Taylor Mill, H. (1984 [1851]) 'Enfranchisement of Women', in John Robson (ed.), *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Volume XXI: *Essays on Equality, Law, and Education*. University of Toronto Press, 393–415
- Miller, D.E. 'Harriet Taylor Mill', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (2022), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/harriet-mill/>
- Deutscher, P. (2006) 'When Feminism Is "High" and Ignorance Is "Low": Harriet Taylor Mill on the Progress of the Species', *Hypatia* 21(3): 136–150
- Philips, M. (2018) 'The "Beloved and Deplored" Memory of Harriet Taylor Mill: Rethinking Gender and Intellectual Labor in the Canon', *Hypatia* 33(4): 626–642
- 'Introduction' and 'The Co-authorship of *On Liberty*', in John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill (authors), Piers Norris Turner, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Helen McCabe, Lilly Osburg, Michael Schefczyk, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds) *On Liberty: with Related Writings* (Hackett Classics, 2026), available at: <https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Mill-On Liberty TOC and Introduction Sample.pdf>

### FURTHER READING

- Schmidt-Petri C, Schefczyk M, Osburg L. (2022) 'Who Authored *On Liberty*? Stylometric Evidence on Harriet Taylor Mill's Contribution', *Utilitas* 34(2): 120–138
- McCabe, H., *Harriet Taylor Mill* (Cambridge University Press, 2023)
- McCabe, H. (2021) "'Political ... civil and domestic slavery": Harriet Taylor Mill and Anna Doyle Wheeler on marriage, servitude, and socialism', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29(2): 226–243
- Bodkin, R. G. (1999) 'Women's Agency in Classical Economic Thought: Adam Smith, Harriet Taylor Mill, and J. S. Mill', *Feminist Economics* 5(1): 45–60
- Pöttsch, J. (2021) 'Harriet Taylor Mill: The Unitarian Background', *Women's Studies* 51(1): 32–49
- Mill, J. S. *Autobiography* (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1873)
- Le Dœuff, M., *The Sex of Knowing* (Routledge, 2003), chapter 3

### QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION/TO STRUCTURE READING

- How do HTM's and JSM's arguments and feminisms compare?
- How did HTM argue to her feminist conclusions?
- How did JSM argue for his feminist conclusions?
- Is HTM a utilitarian?
- Which influences do we see in HTM's work?

**Week 3: Influences: Bentham, Thompson & Wheeler, etc**  
(co-taught with Dr Ludmilla Lorrain, Université Côte d'Azur)

CORE READING

- Thompson, W. and Wheeler, A., *Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, To Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic, Slavery; In Reply to a Paragraph of Mr. Mill's Celebrated "Article on Government"* (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1925)
- McCabe, H. (2021) "'Political ... civil and domestic slavery': Harriet Taylor Mill and Anna Doyle Wheeler on marriage, servitude, and socialism", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29(2): 226-243
- Williford, M. (1975) 'Bentham on the Rights of Women', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36(1): 167–176
- Siméon, O. (2021) "'Goddess of reason': Anna Doyle Wheeler, Owenism and the rights of women", *History of European Ideas* 47(2): 285-298
- Wollstonecraft, M., *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (J. Johnson, 1792)
- 

FURTHER READING

- Ball, T. (1980) 'Utilitarianism, feminism, and the franchise: James Mill and his critics', *History of Political Thought*, 1(1): 91–115
- Pöttsch, J. (2021) 'Marriage, Morals, and Progress: J.S. Mill and the Early Feminists', *History of European Ideas* 48(6): 795–810
- de Champs, E. 'The Interests of Women in Bentham's Late Constitutional Thought', in Philip Schofield and Xiaobo Zhai (eds.) *Bentham on Democracy, Courts, and Codification* (Cambridge University Press, 2022)
- Lea Campos Boralevi, *Bentham and the Oppressed* (de Gruyter, 1984)
- Bentham, J., *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ed. by J. H. Burns and H.L.A Hart (Oxford University Press, 1996 [1789])
- Bentham, J., *Of Sexual Irregularities, and Other Writings on Sexual Morality*, ed. by Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin, and Michael Quinn (Oxford: Oxford: University Press, 2014 [1821]).
- Mill, J.S., 'Periodical Literature: Edinburgh Review', in *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, ed. by John M. Robson, 33 vols (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963–91)
- Ball, T., 'Was Bentham a Feminist?', *The Bentham Newsletter* May (1980), 25–32, 26–27,
- Campos Boralevi, L., 'In Defence of a Myth', *The Bentham Newsletter* May (1980), 33–38
- Hunt Botting, E. (2016) 'A Philosophical Genealogy of Women's Human Rights', in *Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Women's Human Rights* (Yale University Press, 2016): 26–69
- Hunt Botting, E. (2016) 'Foundations of Universal Human Rights: Wollstonecraft's Rational Theology and Mill's Liberal Utilitarianism', in *Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Women's Human Rights* (Yale University Press, 2016): 70–115

## Week 4: Feminism in Mill's other work

### CORE READING

- Waldron J., 'Mill on Liberty and on the Contagious Diseases Acts', in Urbinati N, Zakaras A (eds.) *J.S. Mill's Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment* (Cambridge University Press; 2007)
- Jose, J. and McLoughlin, K. (2016) 'John Stuart Mill and the Contagious Diseases Acts: Whose Law? Whose Liberty? Whose Greater Good?'. *Law and History Review* 34(2): 249–279

### FURTHER READING

- Crisp, R. (1997) *Mill on Utilitarianism*, Routledge.
- Miller, D. (2010) *J. S. Mill: Moral, Social, and Political Thought*, Polity Press.
- Skorupski, J. (ed) (1998) *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*, Cambridge University Press.
- Brink, D. (2013) *Mill's Progressive Principles*, Oxford University Press
- Mill, J. S., *Utilitarianism* (Parker, Son & Bourn, 1863)
- John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill (authors), Piers Norris Turner, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Helen McCabe, Lilly Osburg, Michael Schefczyk, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds) *On Liberty: with Related Writings* (Hackett Classics, 2026)

## Week 5: Influence on utilitarianism I: Sidgwick

### CORE READING

- Schultz B. (2000) 'Sidgwick's Feminism', *Utilitas* 12(3): 379-401
- Oppenheim, J. (1995) 'A Mother's Role, a Daughter's Duty: Lady Blanche Balfour, Eleanor Sidgwick, and Feminist Perspectives' *Journal of British Studies* 34(2): 196–232

### FURTHER READING

For discussion of Sidgwick's argument for utilitarianism

- Skelton, A. *Sidgwick's Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2025), especially section 4
- Schneewind, J. B. *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1977), 260–351

For a discussion of Sidgwick's moral epistemology

- Shaver, R. *Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 62–74
- Sverdlik, S. (1985) 'Sidgwick's Methodology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23(4): 537-553
- Skelton, A. (2010) 'Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 48 (2010), 491–519
- Phillips, D. *Sidgwickian Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 52–85

-

## Week 6: Evaluating classical utilitarian feminism

### CORE READING

- Annas, J. (1977) 'Mill and the Subjection of Women', *Philosophy* 52(200): 179–194
- Goldstein, L. F. (1980) 'Mill, Marx, and Women's Liberation', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3(18): 319–334
- Burgess-Jackson, K. (1995) 'John Stuart Mill, Radical Feminist', *Social Theory and Practice* 21(3): 369–396
- Loizides, A. (2023) 'Local and Contextual: John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*', *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 69(2): 190–209
- Smith, E. S. (2001) 'John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*: A Re-Examination', *Polity* 34(2): 181–203
- Okin, S. M., and Satz, D., 'John Stuart Mill, Liberal Feminist, in *Women in Western Political Thought* (REV-Revised, pp. 197–230) (Princeton University Press, 1979)

### FURTHER READING

- Sigot, N., Beaurain, C. (2009) 'John Stuart Mill and the Employment of Married Women: Reconciling Utility and Justice', *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 31(3): 281–304
- Ring J. (1985) 'Mill's *The Subjection of Women*: The Methodological Limits of Liberal Feminism', *The Review of Politics* 47(1): 27–44
- Knüfer, A. (2023) 'Gender and Race in John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*', *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 44(1): 53–79
- Mann, H., Spinner-Halev, J. (2010) 'John Stuart Mill's Feminism: On Progress, the State, and the Path to Justice', *Polity* 42(2): 244–270
- Ball, J. (2001) 'J. S. Mill on Wages and Women: A Feminist Critique', *Review of Social Economy* 59(4): 509–27
- Urbinati, N. (1991) 'John Stuart Mill on Androgyny and Ideal Marriage', *Political Theory* 19(4): 626–648
- Shanley, M. L. (1981) 'Marital Slavery and Friendship: John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*', *Political Theory* 9(2): 229–247
- Kha, H. (2018) 'John Stuart Mill on Matrimonial Property and Divorce Law Reform', *Fundamina* 24(2): 35–57
- Forsberg, L., and Skelton, A. 'Mill's Classical Utilitarian Feminism', in Celia Edell and Charlotte Sabourin, *Feminist Ethics: An Introduction to Fundamental Concepts and Current Issues* (Routledge, 2025)

## Week 7: Influence on moral philosophy II: post-classical utilitarianism and feminism

### CORE READING

- Driver, J. (2005) 'Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics', *Hypatia* 20(4): 183–199
- Baber, H.E. (2017) 'Is Utilitarianism Bad for Women?' *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* 3(4): 1-21
- Venkatesh, N. (2025) 'Utilitarianism Is a Form of Egalitarianism. *Ergo* 12(27): 700-725

- Berkey, B. (2018) 'The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism' *Utilitas* 30(2): 143-171
- Srinivasan, A. 'Stop the Robot Apocalypse', *London Review of Books* 37 (2015), pp. 3–6, available at: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse>

#### FURTHER READING

- Adams, Carol J., Crary, Alice, Gruen, Lori (eds.) (2023). *The Good It Promises, The Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism*. Oxford University Press
- Radcliffe-Richards, J. *The Sceptical Feminist. A Philosophical Enquiry* (Routledge 1980)
- Dung, L., Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics, online first, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*
- Purdy, L.M., *Reproducing Persons: Issues in Feminist Bioethics* (Cornell University Press, 1996)

### Week 8: The prospects of utilitarian feminism?

Reading to be assigned by Week 4.

### Feminist Epistemology

Lectures by: Dr Nick Clanchy

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Fridays | Time: 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This class will explore recent work in feminist and otherwise social justice-oriented epistemology. Questions considered will include: is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed? Under what circumstances (if any) ought members of dominant groups to defer to members of marginalized groups? Are echo chambers always pernicious? What are hermeneutical injustices, who suffers them, and what can be done to prevent them? How should we understand the epistemic dimension of political backlash? Are some groups owed epistemic reparations, and if so in what form? Might addressing epistemic injustices sometimes distract from addressing more pressing material concerns? Finally, in what ways might someone be constrained by certain things about them being rendered intelligible? The readings listed below will be compulsory; additional optional readings will be made available on Canvas.

#### Background Reading

Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. Introduction and Chs.1&7.

Aidan McGlynn, "Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories" in Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), pp.295-327.

#### Week 1: Standpoint Epistemology

Lidal Dror, "Is There an Epistemic Advantage to Being Oppressed?" in *Noûs* Vol.57 no.3 (2023), pp.618-640.

Emily Tilton, "'That's Above My Paygrade': Woke Excuses for Ignorance" in *Philosophers'*

*Imprint* Vol.24 no.8 (2024), pp.1-19.

### **Week 2: Deference and Elite Capture**

Savannah Pearlman and Elizabeth Williams, "Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience" in *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* Vol.8 no.2 (2022).

Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, *Elite Capture: How the Powerful Took Over Identity Politics (And Everything Else)* (London: Pluto Press, 2022), Introduction and Chs.1-3.

### **Week 3: Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bunkers**

C. Thi Nguyen, "Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles" in *Episteme* Vol.17 no.2 (2020), pp.141-161.

Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., "Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a "Witch Hunt"" in *Hypatia* Vol.35 no.4 (2020), pp.674-686.

Katherine Furman, "Epistemic Bunkers" in *Social Epistemology* Vol.37 no.2 (2023), pp.197-207.

### **Week 4: Recent Work on Hermeneutical Injustice**

Jonathan Ichikawa, "Consent Theory as Hermeneutical Injustice" in *The Philosophical Quarterly* Vol.75 no.4 (2025), pp.1344-1365.

Robert Herissone-Kelly, "Agency and Authority: A Differentiated Model of Hermeneutical Power" in *Philosophical Quarterly* (forthcoming).

### **Week 5: Hermeneutical Backlash**

B.R. George and Stacey Goguen, "Hermeneutical Backlash: Trans Youth Panics as Epistemic Injustice" in *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* Vol.7 no.4 (2021).

Han Edgoose, "Hermeneutical Sabotage" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* Vol.102 no.4 (2024), pp.879-895.

### **Week 6: Epistemic Reparations**

Jennifer Lackey, "Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known" in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* Vol.96 (2022), pp.54-89.

Yann Allard-Tremblay, "A Great Ox Stands in Your Mind: Decolonial Caution About Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known" in *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming).

### **Week 7: Epistemic Injustices as/and/or Material Injustices**

Thomas Spiegel, "The Epistemic Injustice of Epistemic Injustice" in *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* Vol.11 no.9 (2022), pp.75-90.

Kenneth Novis, "Epistemic Class Injustice: Class Composition and Industrial Action" in *Social Epistemology* Vol.38 no.5 (2024), pp.593-606.

David Ludwig, "It's a Shame That You Can't Afford Rent, But We Can Offer Epistemic Compensation: On Relating Epistemic and Social Justice" in *Social Epistemology* (forthcoming).

### **Week 8: Over-Intelligibility**

Maya Krishnan, "Over-Intelligibility" in *Political Philosophy* Vol.2 no.2 (2025), pp.666-695.

Nick Clanchy, "Dreaming of a World Exempt from Meaning: How Roland Barthes was Loved" (manuscript).

## **The Philosophy of Mental Health and Mental Illness**

Lectures by: Prof Edward Harcourt

TT26 | Weeks 1-8 | Day: Wednesdays | Time: 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room (10.303)

The class will introduce and evaluate key themes from the anti-psychiatry movement and its intellectual descendants, including contemporary champions of service user voice, mad pride and related tendencies. We will ask to what extent the practice of psychiatry is vitiated by asymmetries of power and prestige; to what extent such asymmetries are inescapable (for example if psychiatry's mainstream self-conception as treating diseases of the brain is correct); and to what extent they float free of any particular conception of mental illness. The starting point will thus be located more in ethics and epistemology than in the metaphysics of mind, with coverage of concepts such as epistemic injustice and expertise by experience. So certain familiar topics such as 'are delusions beliefs?' will not be dealt with, though others – e.g. are mental disorders diseases of the brain? – will be.