

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### Timothy Williamson

Positions: Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College Oxford  
A. Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor, Yale University

Born: Uppsala, Sweden, 6 August 1955

Nationality: British

Address: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, U.K.  
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#### Positions held

1980-88 Lecturer in Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin.

1988-94 Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy, University College, Oxford;  
C.U.F. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford.

1995-2000 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh.

2000- Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College Oxford

1990, 1995 Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U.

1994 Visiting Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T.

1995 Visiting Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury.

1998-99 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.

2004 Visiting scholar, Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.

2013-15 Nelson Visitor, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

2016-17 Visiting professor, Yale University.  
2018- A. Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor, Yale University

## Distinctions

Fellow of the British Academy (elected 1997)  
 Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 1997)  
 Foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (elected 2004)  
 Foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2007)  
 Member of the Academia Europaea (elected 2013)  
 Honorary Member of the Royal Irish Academy (elected 2014)  
 Member of the Institut International de Philosophie (elected 2017)  
 Honorary Fellow of Balliol College Oxford (elected 2014)  
 Doctor Honoris Causa, University of Bucharest (2015)  
 Honorary Doctorate, University of Belgrade (2018)  
 Fellow of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (2011)

Named lectures:

Henriette Hertz Lecture, British Academy, 1996  
 Weatherhead Lecture in Philosophy of Language, Tulane University, 1998  
 Jacobsen Lecture, University of London, 2001  
 Skolem Lecture, University of Oslo, 2004  
 Blackwell Brown Lectures, Brown University, 2005  
 Jack Smart Lecture, Australian National University, 2005  
 Anders Wedberg Lectures, University of Stockholm, 2006  
 Gaos Lectures, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Mexico City, 2006  
 Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton University, 2006  
 Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, Amherst College, 2009  
 Zeno Lecture, University of Utrecht, 2009  
 Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, 2010  
 Ortlieb Lecture, Claremont Colleges, 2012  
 Petrus Hispanus Lectures, University of Lisbon, 2012  
 George Myro Memorial Lecture, Berkeley, 2012  
 Hägerstrom Lectures, Uppsala University, 2013  
 Kim Young-Jung Lectures, Seoul National University, 2013  
 Nanqiang Lecture, Xiamen University, 2014  
 Annual Lecture in Memory of Ruth Manor, Tel-Aviv University, 2015  
 Bergmann Lecture, University of Iowa, 2015.  
 Beth Lecture, Amsterdam, 2015.  
 The Logic Lecture, University of Connecticut, 2016.  
 Saul Kripke Lecture, City University of New York, 2016.  
 Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, 2016.  
 Wade Memorial Lecture, St Louis University, 2016.  
 Sainsbury Lecture, King's College London, 2016.  
 Whitehead Lectures, Harvard University, 2017.  
 Casalegno Lectures, University of Milan, 2018.  
 Gottlob Frege Lectures, University of Tartu, 2018.  
 Sanders Lecture, APA Central Division, Denver, 2019.  
 Nelson Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2003  
 Townsend Visitor, University of California, Berkeley, 2006  
 José Gaos Chair, UNAM, Mexico, 2006  
 Tang Chun-I Visiting Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007  
 Nelson Visiting Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2013-15  
 Visiting Professor, Yale University, 2016-.

A.Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor, Yale University, 2018-

President of the Aristotelian Society 2004-5

President of the Mind Association 2006-7; Vice-President 2005-6

Vice-President of the British Logic Colloquium 2008-13

Senior Adviser to the Chinese Society for Epistemology 2014-18

### Research Awards

AHRC Research Leave Award 2009

Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship 2009-12

Máxima Distinción Académa a la Trayectoria Investigativa, Instituto de Investigaciones del Pensamiento Peruano y Latinoamericano, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, 2009

### Editorial boards

*Analysis* (Analysis Committee)

*Aporía: Revista Internacional de Investigaciones Filosóficas* (Scientific Committee)

*Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (revised edition, Board of Editorial Advisors)

*Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía* (Editorial Board)

*Dialectica* (Consulting Board)

*Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy* (Advisory Board)

*Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology* (Advisory Board)

*European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* (Advisory Board)

*Filozofia Nauki/The Philosophy of Science*

*International Journal of Philosophical Studies* (Editorial Board)

*Journal of Xiamen University* (Editorial Advisor)

*Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science* (Springer book series, Editorial Board)

*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* (Editorial Board)

*Organon F: International Journal of Analytic Philosophy* (Advisory Board)

*Oxford Studies in Epistemology* (Editorial Advisory Board)

*Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* (Editorial Advisory Board)

*Philosophical Studies* (Board of Consulting Editors)

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (Editorial Board)

*Polish Journal of Philosophy* (Advisory Board)

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Subject Editor in Philosophy of Language) to 2013

*Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy* (Consulting Editor)

*Thought* (Editorial Panel)

### Education

Degrees:      B.A. (Oxon.) 1976;  
                   M.A. (Oxon.) 1981;  
                   M.A. (Dubl.) *ad eundem gradum* 1986;  
                   D.Phil. (Oxon.) 1981.

- 1972-73 Computer programmer, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell.
- 1973-76 Read Mathematics and Philosophy, Balliol College, Oxford.
- 1974 Mathematics and Philosophy Honour Moderations, Class I.
- 1976 Mathematics and Philosophy Final Honours, Class I with Henry Wilde Prize.
- 1976-80 Senior Scholar, Christ Church, Oxford; research for D.Phil. thesis 'The Concept of Approximation to the Truth'.

Successful doctoral theses partly or wholly supervised by Timothy Williamson

- Maria Baghramian, *Logic, Language and Relativism* (University of Dublin, 1990)
- João Branquinho, *Direct Reference, Cognitive Significance and Fregean Sense* (University of Oxford, 1991)
- Guillermo Hurtado, *Predication, Quantification and Meaning: A Study of Russell's Philosophical Logic* (University of Oxford, 1995)
- Richard Gray, *Synaesthesia: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology* (University of Edinburgh, 2000)
- Benedict Young, *Naturalising the A Priori: Reliabilism and Experience-Independent Knowledge* (University of Edinburgh, 2000)
- Marina Rakova, *Metaphor, Theories of Concepts and Biological Reductionism* (University of Edinburgh, 2001)
- Thomas Sattig, *Predication, Ontology, and Time* (University of Oxford, 2001)
- David Efird, *Unfenced Existence: The Logic and Metaphysics of Necessary Beings* (University of Oxford, 2002)
- Kostja New, *Meaning and the Justification of Deduction* (University of Oxford, 2003)
- Nicholas Silins, *Reasons and Armchair Knowledge* (University of Oxford, 2004)
- Bruno Whittle, *Paradox and Hierarchy* (University of Oxford, 2004)
- Richard Dietz, *Being Borderline: Topics in the Semantics and Epistemology of Vague Languages* (University of Oxford, 2005)
- Corine Besson, *Language and Existence: On a New Application of Free Logic* (University of Oxford, 2006)
- Anders Nes, *Content in Thought and Perception* (University of Oxford, 2006)
- Richard Price, *The Ways Things Look* (University of Oxford, 2006)
- Michael Blome-Tillmann, *Scepticism and Contextualism* (University of Oxford, 2007)
- Wylie Breckenridge, *The Meaning of 'Look'* (University of Oxford, 2007)
- Owen Greenhall, *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction: A Defence of Grice* (University of Oxford, 2007)
- Thomas Kroedel, *A Priori Knowledge of Modal Truths* (University of Oxford, 2007)
- Ofra Magidor, *Category Mistakes* (University of Oxford, 2007)
- Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson, *Information and Logical Equivalence* (University of Oxford, 2008)
- Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, *Indefeasible Knowledge* (University of Oxford, 2009)
- Amber Riaz, *How Do We Know Particular Moral Truths?* (University of Oxford, 2010)
- David Tester, *Some Methodological Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Ethics* (University of Oxford, 2010)

- Barbara Vetter, *Potentiality and Possibility* (University of Oxford, 2010)
- Jane Friedman, *The Doxastic Attitudes and Evidential Norms* (University of Oxford, 2011)
- Daniel Morgan, *First Person Thinking* (University of Oxford, 2011)
- Katrina Przyjemska, *A Presuppositional Semantics for Referential and Anaphoric Pronouns* (University of Oxford, 2012)
- Andrew Bacon, *Indeterminacy: An Investigation into the Soritical and Semantical Paradoxes* (University of Oxford, 2012)
- Will Davies, *Essays on the Perception, Representation, and Categorisation of Colour* (University of Oxford, 2012)
- Carlotta Pavese, *The Unity and Structure of Knowledge* (Rutgers University, 2013; external member of committee)
- Andrew McCarthy, *Existence and Modality* (University of Oxford, 2013)
- Amia Srinivasan, *The Fragile Estate: Essays on luminosity, normativity and metaphilosophy* (University of Oxford, 2014)
- Gail Leckie, *The Meaning of Logical Constants: An Inferentialist Approach* (University of Oxford, 2014)
- Harvey Lederman, *Uncommon Knowledge* (University of Oxford, 2014)
- Peter Fritz, *Intensional Type Theory for Higher Order Contingentism* (University of Oxford, 2015)
- Michael Price, *The Unnameable: Limits of Language in Early Analytical Philosophy* (University of Oxford, 2016)
- Jeremy Goodman, *The Case for Necessitism* (University of Oxford, 2016)
- Lorenzo Rossi, *Truth, Paradoxes and Partiality: A Study on Semantic Theories of Truth* (University of Oxford, 2016)
- Natalia Waihts Hickman, *Practical Knowledge and Linguistic Competence* (University of Oxford, 2016)
- Andy Demfree Yu, *Fragmented Truth* (University of Oxford, 2016)
- Simona Aimar, *Modality and Efficient Causation in Aristotle* (University of Oxford, 2017)
- Beau Madison Mount, *The Kinds of Mathematical Object* (University of Oxford, 2018)
- Sara Aronowitz, *Rational Structures in Learning and Memory* (University of Michigan, 2018)
- Johanna Schnurr, *The Unruly Mind: Against Doxastic Normativism* (University of Oxford, 2018)
- Sebastian Grève, *Skill and Scepticism: An Enquiry Concerning the Nature and Epistemic Value of Intuitive Judgment* (University of Oxford, 2018)
- James Kirkpatrick, *Essays on Genericity* (University of Oxford, 2019)
- Alexander Roberts, *Investigating Necessity: Essays on the Role and Status of Metaphysical Modality* (University of Oxford, 2020)

#### Books by, co-edited by, or about Timothy Williamson

By:

*Identity and Discrimination*. Pp. ix + 173. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.  
Updated edition: Pp. xiv + 182. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

*Vagueness*. Pp. xiii + 325. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

*Knowledge and Its Limits*. Pp. xi + 340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Corrected edition 2002.

Chinese translation with interview of TW by Chen Bo, 459 pp., Beijing: People's Publishing House.

*The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Pp. xiv + 332. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

Spanish translation by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2016.

*Modal Logic as Metaphysics*. Pp. xvi + 464. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Paperback, 2015.

*Tetralogue (I'm Right, You're Wrong)*. Pp. 153. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Paperback, 2017.

Korean translation, with introduction by TW for Korean readers, Gom books, 2016, pp. 220.

*Io ho ragione e tu hai torto: Un dialogo filosofico*, Italian translation with introduction by Diego Marconi, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016.

Persian translation by Kamran Shahbazi and Saeideh Bayat, Tehran: Kargadan, 2017.

Spanish translation by Javier Suarez Diaz, Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, forthcoming.

Turkish translation, Pegasus, in preparation.

German translation by Ute Kurse-Ebeling, Stuttgart: Reclam, in preparation.

Simplified Chinese translation by Xu Zhaoqing, Shanghai: Shanghai People Publishing House.

Romanian translation by Mircea Dumitru, in preparation.

Azerbaijani translation, Parlaq Imzalar

*Doing Philosophy: From Common Sense to Logical Reasoning*. Pp. x + 154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

*Filosofar: Da Curiosidade comum ao raciocínio lógico* (Portuguese translation by Vítor Guerreiro). Lisbon: Gradiva, 2019.

Chinese translation. Beijing: United Sky New Media, 2019.

Italian translation in preparation (il Mulino).

Polish translation in preparation (PWN, Poland).

*Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

(with Paul Boghossian) *Debating the A Priori*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Co-edited book:

(edited with Delia Graff [Delia Graff Fara]), *Vagueness (The International Research Library of Philosophy 27)*. Pp. xxviii + 508. Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002.

Includes (with D. Graff) 'Introduction', *ibid.*: xi-xxviii.

About:

P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., *Williamson on Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. TW contributed 'Replies to Critics', pp. 279-384.



M. McCullagh and J. Yli-Vakkuri, ed., *Williamson on Modality*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, issues 4-5, vol. 46, and London: Routledge, 2017. TW contributed an article and ten replies.

For complete list of publications see below.

Host universities, learned societies, festivals etc. of invited talks by Timothy Williamson  
(listed by country where talk was given)

Argentina	University of Buenos Aires Society of Analytical Philosophy of Argentina
Australia	Australian National University La Trobe University Melbourne University Monash University University of New England, Armidale University of Queensland, Brisbane Wollongong University
Austria	Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society University of Innsbruck University of Salzburg University of Vienna
Belgium	University of Leuven University of Liège Belgian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Brazil	State University of Campinas Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro Latin American Association for Analytic Philosophy and Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy (Fortaleza)
Bulgaria	Institute for Philosophical Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Canada	University of Calgary McGill University Queen's University, Kingston University of Toronto University of Waterloo
Chile	Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Santiago

China	<p>Beijing Normal University  Capital Normal University, Beijing  Chinese University of Hong Kong  East China Normal University, Shanghai  Institute of Philosophy, Social Science Academy of China, Beijing  Peking University, Beijing  Renmin University of China, Beijing  Shanxi University, Taiyuan  South China Normal University, Guangzhou  South-West University, Chongqing  Sun Yat Sen University, Guangzhou  Xiamen University  Zhejiang University, Hangzhou</p>
Croatia	<p>Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb  University of Rijeka  University of Split  Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik</p>
Czech Republic	<p>Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech  Republic, Prague  Palacky University, Olomouc</p>
Denmark	<p>Aarhus University</p>
Estonia	<p>University of Tartu</p>
Finland	<p>University of Helsinki</p>
France	<p>University of Amiens  Institute of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology,  Paris  Jean Nicod Institute, Paris  University of Paris IV – Sorbonne  Collège de France</p>
Germany	<p>University of Augsburg  Humboldt University, Berlin  Free University of Berlin  University of Bielefeld  University of Bonn  University of Bochum  University of Cologne  University of Duisburg-Essen  University of Düsseldorf  University of Erfurt  University of Göttingen  University of Hamburg  University of Heidelberg  University of Konstanz</p>



	Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich University of Tübingen Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP)
Greece	University of Athens Delphi (Panhellenic Logic Symposium)
Hungary	Central European University, Budapest
Iran	Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran
Ireland	Irish Philosophical Club Irish Philosophical Society Trinity College Dublin University College Dublin
Israel	Hebrew University of Jerusalem Tel Aviv University
Italy	University of Basilicata University of Bergamo Bocconi University, Milan University of Bologna University of Eastern Piedmont, Vercelli University of Florence University of Milan University of Modena and Reggio Emilia NYU in Florence (Villa La Pietra) University of Padua University of Pavia San Raffaele University, Milan Sapienza University, Rome University of Siena University of Turin University of Urbino Italian Society of Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) Rome Science Festival
Japan	University of Tokyo
Luxembourg	University of Luxembourg
Mexico	Institute of Philosophical Research, Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City Ibero-American Philosophical Society (SOFIA)
Netherlands	Free University of Amsterdam University of Amsterdam University of Groningen University of Utrecht

	Dutch-Flemish Society for Analytic Philosophy
New Zealand	University of Canterbury, Christchurch University of Otago, Dunedin Waikato University
Norway	Centre for Advanced Studies, Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Oslo University of Bergen University of Oslo
Pakistan	Lahore University of Management Science [by video]
Palestine	Al-Quds University
Peru	National University of San Marcos, Lima
Poland	University of Szczecin John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin University of Warsaw
Portugal	Classical University, Lisbon University of Porto Portuguese Philosophical Society European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Romania	Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj University of Bucharest National Concert Hall, Bucharest (public conversation)
Russia	Moscow State University St Petersburg State University
Serbia	University of Belgrade Serbian Academy of Sciences Serbian Philosophical Society
Slovakia	University of Trnava
Slovenia	University of Ljubljana University of Maribor Austrian-Slovene Philosophical Association
South Africa	Skukuza ( <i>Episteme</i> conference)
South Korea	Seoul National University
Spain	University of Barcelona University of the Basque Country Complutense University of Madrid University of Navarre

	University of Santiago de Compostela University of Donostia – San Sebastian Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), Valencia
Sweden	University of Gothenburg University of Lund University of Stockholm University of Uppsala European Society for Analytic Philosophy Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, International Council for Science (ICSU)
Switzerland	University of Bern University of Fribourg University of Geneva University of Zurich
Taiwan	Academia Sinica, Taipei National Taiwan University
Turkey	Bilkent University, Ankara Boğazici University, Istanbul
United Kingdom	University of Aberdeen Birkbeck College London University of Birmingham University of Bradford University of Bristol University of Cambridge University of Dundee Durham University University of East Anglia University of Edinburgh Institute of Education, UCL University of Glasgow Heriot-Watt University University of Hertfordshire Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham Keele University King's College London University of Leeds University of Liverpool London School of Economics School of Advanced Study London University of Manchester University of Nottingham University of Oxford Oxford Brookes University Queen's University Belfast University of Reading Royal Institute of Philosophy, London

University of St Andrews  
 University of Sheffield  
 Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham  
 University of Stirling  
 University of Sussex  
 University College London  
 University of Warwick  
 University of York  
 Aristotelian Society and Mind Association  
 Association of Symbolic Logic  
 British Academy  
 British Logic Colloquium  
 British Society for the Philosophy of Science  
 British Undergraduate Philosophy Society  
 Scottish Philosophical Club  
 HowTheLightGetsIn Festival  
 Oxford Literary Festival

United States  
of America

Amherst College  
 University of Arizona  
 Brandeis University  
 Brown University  
 University of California, Berkeley  
 University of California, Irvine  
 University of California, Los Angeles  
 University of California, Riverside  
 University of California, Santa Barbara  
 Carnegie-Mellon University  
 Graduate School, City University of New York  
 Claremont Colleges  
 University of Colorado, Boulder  
 Columbia University  
 University of Connecticut  
 Cornell University  
 University of Delaware  
 Georgetown University  
 Harvard University  
 University of Houston  
 Indiana University  
 University of Iowa  
 University of Maryland  
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
 Memphis State University  
 University of Miami  
 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
 Michigan State University  
 University of Minnesota  
 University of Missouri  
 University of Nebraska, Lincoln  
 University of New Mexico  
 New York University

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
University of Notre Dame  
Oberlin College  
Ohio University  
Ohio State University  
University of Pittsburgh  
Princeton University  
Rice University  
University of Rochester  
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey  
University of St Louis  
University of Southern California  
Stanford University  
Syracuse University  
Texas A & M University  
University of Texas at Austin  
Tulane University  
University of Virginia  
Western Michigan University  
Williams College  
University of Wisconsin, Madison  
Yale University  
American Philosophical Association, Central Division  
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division  
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division  
New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association

Timothy Williamson: Publications in reverse chronological order

In preparation

- [a] ‘Knowledge, credence, and strength of belief’, invited for Amy Flowerree and Baron Reed (eds.), *The Epistemic*.
- [b] ‘Blackburn against moral realism’, for Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism*, Oxford University Press.
- [c] ‘Non-modal normativity and norms of belief’, for Ilkka Niiniluoto and Sami Pihlstrom (eds.), volume on normativity, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* (2020).
- [d] ‘The KK principle and rotational symmetry’, invited for *Analytic Philosophy*.
- [e] ‘Chakrabarti and the Nyāya on knowability’.

To appear

- [a] *Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- [b] (with Paul Boghossian) *Debating the A Priori*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- [c] ‘Edgington on possible knowledge of unknown truth’, in J. Hawthorne and L. Walters (eds.), *Conditionals, Probability, and Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [d] ‘Justifications, excuses, and skeptical scenarios’, in J. Dutant and F. Dorsch (eds.), *The New Evil Demon*, Oxford University Press.
- [e] ‘The counterfactual-based approach to modal epistemology’, in Otávio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Modality*, London: Routledge.
- [f] ‘More Oxonian scepticism about the a priori’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), *The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent*, Oxford University Press.
- [g] ‘Reply to Casullo’s defence of the significance of the a priori – a posteriori distinction’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), *The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent*, Oxford University Press.
- [h] ‘Introduction’ to Khaled Qutb, *Summary of The Philosophy of Philosophy* (in Arabic), Cairo: Academic Bookshop.
- [i] ‘Frank Ramsey and quantified modal logic’, in Cheryl Misak, *Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers*.

2019

- [a] ‘Evidence of evidence in epistemic logic’, in Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019: 265-297.
- [b] ‘Armchair philosophy’, *Philosophy and Epistemology of Science (Moscow)* 56, 2 (2019): 19-25.
- [c] ‘Reply to Dennett, Knobe, Kuznetsov, and Stoljar on philosophical methodology’, *Philosophy and Epistemology of Science (Moscow)* 56, 2 (2019): 46-52.
- [d] ‘Morally loaded cases in philosophy’, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 93 (2019): 159-172.
- [e] ‘In the post-truth world, we need to remember the philosophy of science’, *New Statesman*, 28 January 2019. <https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/post-truth-world-we-need-remember-philosophy-science>

2018

- [a] *Doing Philosophy: From Common Sense to Logical Reasoning*. x + 154 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
*Filosofar: Da Curiosidade comum ao raciocínio lógico* (Portuguese translation by Vítor Guerreiro). Lisbon: Gradiva.  
Chinese translation. Beijing: United Sky New Media.  
Italian translation in preparation (il Mulino).  
Polish translation in preparation (PWN: Warsaw).
- [b] ‘Alternative logics and applied mathematics’, *Philosophical Issues*, 28, 1, (2018): 399-424.
- [c] ‘Supervaluationism and good reasoning’, *Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History, and Foundations of Science*, 33, 3 (2018): 521-537.
- [d] ‘Knowledge, action, and the factive turn’, in Veli Mitova (ed.), *The Factive Turn*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018: 125-141.
- [e] ‘Counterpossibles’, *Topoi*, 37, 3 (2018): 357-368.
- [f] ‘Spaces of possibility’, *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements*, 82: Metaphysics (2018): 189-204.
- [g] ‘Gibbard on meaning and normativity’, *Inquiry*, 61, 7 (2018): 731-741.
- [h] ‘Hyman on knowledge and ability’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 97, 1 (2018): 243-248.
- [i] ‘Model-building as a philosophical method’, *Phenomenology and Mind*, 15 (2018): 16-22.



- [j] ‘The future of philosophy’, *The Philosophers’ Magazine*, 80, 1 (2018): 101-103.
- [k] Contribution to Guido Bonino and Paolo Tripodi, ‘Interviews on the history of late analytic philosophy’, *Philosophical Inquiries*, 6, 1 (2018): 17-52  
<https://www.philing.it/index.php/philing/issue/view/15>
- [l] ‘Doing philosophy’, ‘Reply to Nigel Collins’, ‘Reply to Amanda McBride’, ‘Reply to Edward Gibney’, ‘Reply to Hisham El Edrissi’, in *The Philosopher*, 106, 2 (2018): 4-6, 9-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19-20.
- 2017
- [a] (with Jason Stanley), ‘Skill’, *Noûs*, 51, 4 (2017): 713-726.
- [b] ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’, in Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), *The Relevance of the Liar*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 325-346.
- [c] ‘Acting on knowledge’, in J.A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), *Knowledge-First*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 163-181.
- [d] ‘Model-building in philosophy’, in Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick (eds.), *Philosophy’s Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress*. Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley: 159-173.
- [e] ‘Dummett on the relation between logics and metalogics’, in Michael Frauchiger (ed.), *Truth, Meaning, Justification, and Reality: Themes from Dummett* (Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy). Berlin: de Gruyter. 153-175.
- [f] ‘Ambiguous rationality’, *Episteme*, 14, 3 (2017): 263-274.
- [g] ‘Modality as a subject for science’, *Res Philosophica*, 94, 3 (2017): 415-436.
- [h] ‘Counterpossibles in semantics and metaphysics’, *Argumenta*, 2, 2 (2017): 195-226.
- [h] ‘From anti-metaphysics to metaphysics’, in Bojan Borstner and Smiljana Gartner (eds.), *Thought Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Mišćević*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 32-44.
- [i] Review of Penelope Maddy, *What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 114, 9 (2017): 492-497.
- [j] ‘Science and points of view’, *The Times Literary Supplement*, 5979 (2017): 17-18.
- [k] ‘The concept of vagueness’, *cog!to* (Munich), 9, 1 (2017): 14-17.
- [l] ‘Theoretical philosophy and practical life’, translated by Luisa Piussi as ‘Per migliorare il mondo basta un pò di logica’, *La Repubblica, Robinson*, 43: ‘Chiedilo al filosofo’ 24 September 2017.

- [m] Interview with Clifford Sosis, *What is it like to be a philosopher?*  
<http://www.whatisitliketobeaphilosopher.com/#/timothy-williamson/>
- [n] Interview with Joe Humphreys, *Irish Times*, 5 March 2017,  
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