Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 7 HT10
|Event Name||Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 7 HT10|
|Start Date||1st Mar 2010 4:30pm|
|End Date||1st Mar 2010 6:30pm|
Saul Smilansky (Haifa) 'Should We Be Sorry That We Exist?' to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Seminars in Moral Philosophy webpage
We can morally compare possible alternative states of affairs, judging that various actual historical occurrences were bad, overalló the Holocaust, World War I, and slavery, for example. We should be sorry that such events occurred. But the vast majority of people who now exist would not have existed were it not for those historical events. A "package deal" is involved here: those events, together with oneself; or, the absence of the historical calamity, and the absence of oneself. So, ought one to be sorry that one exists? There seems to be a strong case for saying that morally one must wish and prefer that certain historical events had not occurred, even if that would have meant that one would never have existed. After setting out this idea, I explore arguments against it, and possible implications if it is accepted.