Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 2 MT11
|Event Name||Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 2 MT11|
|Start Date||17th Oct 2011 4:30pm|
|End Date||17th Oct 2011 6:30pm|
Charles Pigden (Otago) 'Queerness Reconfigured' to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Seminars in Moral Philosophy webpage
I develop two distinct versions of Mackie's Argument from Queerness. The first starts from non-naturalism and explains just why non-natural properties would be too weird to be real, an argument that links Queerness with both Relativity and Explanatory Impotence. The second distinguishes between belief-internalism (the psychological claim that our moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating) and fact-internalism (the conceptual claim that the moral facts, if any, would have to be intrinsically motivating to all rational beings that became aware of them). I deny the first but defend the second as a conceptual claim. I then argue from a revised version of Hume's Slavery of Reason thesis that there are no facts that would be intrinsically motivating to all rational beings and thus that there are no moral facts.