Christ Church College
Printer Friendly Version

Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 8 HT08

Event Name Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 8 HT08
Start Date 3rd Mar 2008 4:30pm
End Date 3rd Mar 2008 6:30pm
Duration 2 hours
Description

Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Ohio State), ‘The Practical Role of Value Judgments’ to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Seminars in Moral Philosophy webpage

Abstract:

It is often claimed that value judgments are essentially practical: it is of their essence that their connection to action is somehow different from, more intimate than, that of non-evaluative judgments. An adequate account of value judgments must illuminate their distinctive practical role. Many seem to think that this is a motivational role. The practical role essential to value judgment consists in such a judgment coming with a favorable motivational orientation towards the object deemed to be of value: i.e., the one who so judges is disposed, other things equal, to pursue or at least respect the object deemed of value. On this account, the connection of value judgments to action is more intimate than that of non-evaluative judgments because unlike non-evaluative judgments, value judgments are essentially motivating, at least to some degree. I call this the motivational account of the practical role essential to value judgments. I give a competing account of the practical role essential to value judgments, which focuses not on the role of value judgments in motivation but, rather, on their role in value inquiry and, indeed, on the role of value inquiry in our lives. In value inquiry, the claim is, we work out, on our own or with others, what to value and, thereby, adjust some of the basic parameters within which our agendas are fixed. The distinctive role of value judgments, in such an inquiry, is not to carry information that may be relevant, or we may find relevant, in such a context but, rather, to press us to reconsider our values and think in a certain way, to be specified, about the thing judged to be of value when adjusting these parameters for fixing our agendas. I.e., the
one who deems something to be of value is disposed, other things equal, to exert pressure on himself and others to reconsider what they value by thinking in a certain way, to be specified, about the thing deemed to be of value. In the talk, I will give a partial presentation and defence of this account.

Tell a Friend