Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 7 HT12
|Event Name||Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 7 HT12|
|Start Date||27th Feb 2012 4:30pm|
|End Date||27th Feb 2012 6:30pm|
Talk by Debbie Roberts (York) ‘Thick Concepts and the Fact-Value Distinction’ to be held in the Lecture Room at the Philosophy Centre, 10 Merton Street.
It is widely held that a number of philosophers have attempted to use a thick evaluative concept argument, the so-called ‘disentangling argument’, to challenge the fact-value distinction. In a recent paper, Daniel Elstein and Thomas Hurka argue that this argument fails. Its key premise, they claim, can be accommodated by reductive accounts of thick concepts that are compatible with a sharp distinction between fact and value.
It is not clear, however, exactly what challenge thick concepts are supposed to pose to the fact-value distinction. In part this is because it is unclear exactly what the fact-value distinction is. I argue that once these things are made more precise we can see that the Elstein and Hurka response to the disentangling argument fails.
All philosophers are welcome to attend, and also to join the speaker for drinks after the talk, and later for dinner.