Moral Philosophy Seminar Week 1 TT12
|Event Name||Moral Philosophy Seminar Week 1 TT12|
|Start Date||23rd Apr 2012 4:30pm|
|End Date||23rd Apr 2012 6:30pm|
Guy Fletcher (Edinburgh) 'Moral Judgement Internalism Explained (Away)' to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Moral Philosophy Seminar webpage
It is commonly observed that the debate between moral judgement internalism and moral judgement externalism is a central battleground in meta-ethics. The standard story is that metaethical cognitivists, those who think that moral judgements are belief-like states, have trouble combining that view with moral judgement internalism, given a background assumption of the Humean theory of motivation. In this paper I argue that, given certain features of the way moral judgement internalism is presented and argued for, evidence that appears to support moral judgement internalism in fact supports only a much weaker thesis, one less troubling for cognitivists.