Moral Philosophy Seminar Week 2 TT12
|Event Name||Moral Philosophy Seminar Week 2 TT12|
|Start Date||30th Apr 2012 4:30pm|
|End Date||30th Apr 2012 6:30pm|
Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh) 'Should the Meta-Language of Meta-Ethics be Non-Normative?' to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Moral Philosophy Seminar webpage
Metaethical debate about the meaning of normative vocabulary is often portrayed as debate between those who favor one of two starting points: Representationalism (leading often to some form of Realism), and Expressivism (leading often to some form of Antirealism). I think this makes it hard to locate within metaethics broader Pragmatist approaches to explaining meaning, in particular approaches starting from a conception of how we use language that is richer than whatever is contained in standing for something in reality and expressing some attitude. In this paper, I seek to motivate such an alternative by considering what I take to be the main objection to it that is common to those with both Representationalist and Expressivist sympathies. Roughly speaking, this is that the Pragmatist approach only pushes all of the interesting issues back a stage where, in order to explain the meaning of normative vocabulary without using normative vocabulary, we will again have to choose between Representationalist and Expressivist options.