Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 4 MT09
|Event Name||Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 4 MT09|
|Start Date||2nd Nov 2009 4:30pm|
|End Date||2nd Nov 2009 6:30pm|
Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California) 'The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons' to be held in the Lecture Room, 10 Merton Street, Oxford - Seminars in Moral Philosophy webpage
It is a familiar observation, motivated by cases like Pascal's wager and Kavka's toxin puzzle, that not all considerations which bear on how advisable it would be to have a certain attitude - for example, a given belief or desire - also bear on the rationality of that attitude. We may call considerations which do so bear the 'right kind' of reasons, and considerations which do not the 'wrong kind'. According to one theory of the 'right kind'/'wrong kind' distinction, this is just the distinction between reasons which are 'object-given', bearing on the object of the attitude in question, as compared to reasons which are 'state-given', bearing instead on the advisability of being in the state of having that attitude. The central argument of this paper shows that this theory correctly tracks only a limited subset of right-kind reasons, by arguing that there are 'right-kind' reasons against intending and against believing that fall on the 'state-given' side of this distinction.