Personal relationships such as friendship sometimes seem to aim towards a state of togetherness. True togetherness with one’s friends and loved ones is thought by many to be highly desirable, and a central accomplishment of a good life. And yet, it is difficult to say exactly what togetherness consists in, and therefore difficult to explain why it might be valuable. In this paper I argue that togetherness (of the relevant kind) consists in sharing a sense of the meaningfulness of things. Moreover, togetherness is good because it is good to share one’s sense of the meaningfulness of things. This view offers to clarify the nature of personal relationships and to vindicate the widely held assumption that togetherness is a valuable goal of such relationships.
The first half of my paper will clarify the notion of togetherness at issue, distinguishing it from other senses of the term, and drawing out its conceptual connection to loneliness. I discuss some examples of togetherness including those that may be exemplified by band members, comrades in arms, fellow worshippers, co-parents, and infant playmates. Through this discussion I offer I a straightforward argument for my analysis of togetherness as the sharing of a sense of the meaningfulness of things.
The second half of the paper turns to the question of why togetherness is good. I offer a view about the sociality of meaningfulness in general which would explain the goodness of togetherness on my analysis, and I briefly defend this view against a natural-seeming objection.
Moral Philosophy Seminar Convenor: Jeremy Fix
