Artur Harris: 'Is Elegance a Shade of Aesthetic Value'
Format: In-person
Faculty Commentator: Umut Baysan
Chair: Nathan Elvidge
Abstract: Many different sorts of things are aesthetically valuable in many different ways. Does it follow that there are many kinds of aesthetic value? Philosophers have been quick to make that inference. This point is often articulated by comparison to colour: just as colour comes in shades, so aesthetic value comes in kinds. These kinds are usually identified with aesthetic properties such as elegance, delicacy, flamboyance, garishness etc. However, the claim that aesthetic value comes in kinds is in need of argument. The variety of aesthetically valuable things alone does not support this conclusion: aesthetic value may instead be a single multiply realisable property that does not have kinds. Relatedly, the fact that aesthetic value depends on aesthetic properties does not entail that they are kinds of aesthetic value. They may be related otherwise than in the way in which colours are to their shades: the relationship of aesthetic properties to aesthetic value need not be that of a determinate to its determinable. In this talk, I assess whether the relationship ought to be understood as determinate-determinable and raise some difficulties for supplying a definitive answer.