In the penultimate chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger gives an account of what he calls “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit), i.e. the historical character of human existence. According to this account, what makes us “historical” is that our behaviors necessarily involve an appropriation of the standards, aims, and practices which we inherit from our community or people. But why does Heidegger place emphasis on this seemingly nitpicked aspect of human existence? Heidegger’s discussion of historicality is among the most idiosyncratic and cryptic in Being and Time. Interpreters have therefore often passed over it in silence. My aim in this talk is to demystify historicality. I will do so by explicating this phenomenon in simple terms and by explaining its role in the overarching argument of the book. As I will show, historicality shares the core features of authentic or resolute selfhood, a phenomenon which Heidegger discusses extensively in earlier chapters of the book. However, the discussion of historicality proceeds in more radical terms: Heidegger does not merely repeat his earlier findings, but rather shifts focus on aspects of resolute selfhood which were not previously made explicit. In doing so, he aims to unearth a distinctive ontological dynamic which is inherent in human existence. This ontological dynamic is crucial for understanding the argumentative movement from being to time which gives the book its name. In my talk, I will do my best to explain relevant background knowledge and translate technical terms into more accessible language.
