Abstract: What is the relationship between ordinary objects (e.g. a cat called Tibbles) and the many equally viable candidate objects (e.g. multiple overlapping lumps of feline tissue Lump1, Lump2, Lump3, ... Lumpn) located in its vicinity? The relative identity theorist will say: For any two lumps Lump1 and Lump2, they are the same cat (Tibbles) while being different lumps of feline tissue.
One puzzle for the relative identity theorist is how to deal with the apparent contradiction arising from predications about Tibbles. Given the appropriate assumptions about Tibbles' hair colour, it's possible for "Lump1 is black all over" and "Lump2 is not black all over" to be both uncontroversially true. Yet this seems to entail the problematic conclusion that "Tibbles is black all over" and "Tibbles is not black all over" are both true. Is that what the relative identity theorist is committed to? If not, why not?
I explore a strategy for responding to this objection that draws on suggestions from Peter Geach's account of shared names. In particular, I explore the hypothesis that "Tibbles" is a lexically ambiguous proper name, with distinct lexical entries associated with individual lumps of feline tissue (Lump1, Lump2, Lump3, ... Lumpn), only one of which will be at play in a given token utterance of "Tibbles".
I explore the advantages and disadvantages of this hypothesis and argue that despite the costs, it's an attractive commitment for relative identity theorists to take on.
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DPhil Seminar Convenor: Óscar Monroy Perez
