Metaphysics and Epistemology Group (Tuesday - Week 5, MT22)

epistemology reading group

In this paper, I first introduce one of the most prominent objections against the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), the so-called ‘epistemic objection’, according to which GBT provides no way of knowing that our time is the objective present and, therefore, leads at best to absolute skepticism about our temporal location, at worst to the quasi-certainty that we are located in the objective past. Secondly, I express my dissatisfaction regarding the various traditional attempts to address this objection, especially Merricks (2006), Forrest (2004) and Correia & Rosenkranz (2018). Thirdly, I show that the passage of time leads to an anti-essentialist picture of natural kinds. Finally, I develop my own solution to the epistemic objection, based on the continued existence of bare particulars.

If you would like to be added to the mailing list, used to advertise upcoming sessions and other metaphysics and epistemology activities in the university, please email

Metaphysics and Epistemology Group Convenors: Nick Hughes, Nick Jones and Alex Kaiserman