Abstract: Assume that knowledge is the goal of inquiry. If you know p, the answer to a question you are inquiring into, then the goal of this inquiry has been achieved. Are you nevertheless permitted to continue inquiring, gathering more evidence bearing on whether p? There is an argument for thinking that you are not, at least if gathering more evidence could not further the goal of any other inquiry you are engaged in. After all, by gathering more evidence you risk losing knowledge, whether by defeat or by losing your belief. However, many find a prohibition to gather more evidence implausible. This is the puzzle of ex ante dogmatism.
In this talk I discuss inquiry within the context of a broad normative framework I have defended called feasibilism. I first apply feasibilism to inquiry by distinguishing between successful inquiry and inquiry that manifests the best feasible zetetic dispositions. According to the approach defended, we can assess zetetic dispositions by proxy, by assessing the doxastic dispositions rendered feasible by manifesting the zetetic dispositions. I then walk through an example involving ex ante dogmatist reasoning, showing how a feasibilist norm of inquiry permits inquiring even if one already knows and hence, even if one’s inquiry has already succeeded. Interestingly, the reasoning can be seen as an application of a well-known formal result (Good 1967/Oddie 1997), but with a novel interpretation of the formalism that diverges from that of epistemic decision theory.
Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.
Metaphysics and Epistemology Group Convenors: Nick Jones, Bernhard Salow and Alex Kaiserman
