Metaphysics and Epistemology Group (Tuesday - Week 6, MT24)

epistemology reading group

Abstract: Serena Williams might miss a serve, even though she was able to make it. I might spill my coffee, even though I was able to take a sip without spilling. These abilities are fallible, in that (roughly) possession of the ability does not guarantee successful performance. The literature on abilities has recently given greater attention to fallibility, but has not (in my view) understood its significance for the normative theory of risk. I argue that we are deeply fallible with respect to many of the actions we are able to perform: we are frequently not only fallibly able to F, but also fallibly able to decide to F, try to F, and so on. I then argue that our best developed approach to the normative theory of risk will struggle to accommodate the risks to which our deep fallibility gives rise. I close with some suggestions on how to proceed. Agents like us have no special realm of action that is immune to fallibility. Our normative theorizing must acknowledge that fact.


Metaphysics and Epistemology Group Convenors: Nick Jones, Bernhard Salow and Alex Kaiserman