Inquiry aims at knowledge (or so we're going to assume). Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence can lead to defeat, this idea threatens to recommend a novel form of dogmatism. At least in some cases, individuals who know the answer to a question appear required to avoid evidence bearing on it.
In this talk, we'll aim to do two things. First, we'll present an argument for this novel form of dogmatism and show that it presents a substantive challenge. Second, we'll consider a way those who take knowledge to be the aim of inquiry can mount a response. In the course of doing so, we'll try to get clearer on the normative connections between inquiry, knowledge and evidence gathering.
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Metaphysics and Epistemology Group Convenors: Nick Hughes, Nick Jones and Alex Kaiserman