Metaphysics Work-in-Progress Group (Tuesday - Week 4, MT20)
What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, on our view, mediate this explanation, but do not feature in it. Facts about chances do feature in some explanations: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this view and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in three metaphysical disputes concerning chance: first, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Second, it alters a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on chancy explanations of the Universe’s origin.
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