Metaphysics Work-in-Progress Group (Tuesday - Week 6, HT21)
According to Donald Baxter, one and the same thing can differ from itself by having aspects which differ, where such aspects are nevertheless numerically identical to that thing. While such a proposal is easily dismissed as unintelligible, this paper shows how the core tenets of aspect theory can be developed in a clear and consistent way. Still, I shall argue that the more comprehensive theory proposed in Baxter (2018) is descriptively inadequate and that it faces serious internal difficulties. While this leaves open the option of a modified and improved aspect theory, I’ll argue that we have no reason for favouring such a theory over two philosophically more conservative alternatives. Aspect theory may not be unintelligible. But in theorising about the target cases, we can do better.
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