Moral Philosophy Seminar (Monday - Week 4, MT21)
It is sometimes claimed that each of us has a special “first person perspective” on his or her own mind, and that understanding this perspective is crucial to understanding what a mind is. It is also sometimes claimed that each of us confronts questions about what is valuable and choiceworthy from a distinctively “agent-centered” standpoint, and that understanding this standpoint is crucial to understanding various striking features of our moral lives (e.g., our entitlement to give special weight to our own well-being and our obligation not to perform certain types of action no matter how beneficial their consequences might be). I will argue that the analogies between these two claims are not just superficial, but point to the importance, in both cases, of a certain representational structure that sets “first person” awareness apart from external or “third person” awareness. Appreciating this structure will put us in a position to understand the rationality of some forms of choice that would otherwise appear problematic.
Those who wish to attend should ask the convenor through email to add them to the mailing list if they are not already on it.
Moral Philosophy Seminar Convenor: Jeremy Fix