David Enoch (Balliol College, University of Oxford): 'Foreseeing Intended Harm: When Do Expected in-bello Violations Undermine ad-bellum Justification?'
Abstract: Suppose a decision-maker – a high-ranking officer, or perhaps a political leader – has to make a decision on resorting to war. Suppose further that they foresee that the forces under their command will commit war crimes, perhaps will intentionally harm innocents. How does this knowledge affect the moral status of the decision to resort to war?
We argue, first, that such foreseen intended harm is still – at the decision-maker’s level – foreseen, and not intended, harm; second, that such foreseen violations do not necessarily suffice to undermine the justification to resort to war; third, that nor are they morally irrelevant to the decision-maker’s decision; and fourth, that the normative significance of such foreseen violations is exhausted by the normative significance of the harm that they bring about. We also discuss a somewhat weaker claim, according to which the normative significance of such foreseen violations includes also an added premium in virtue of their wrongness.