Daniel Greco argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas. I show how his argument, and the theory of epistemic dilemmas that it depends on, goes wrong in multiple ways. I then look in detail at a would-be epistemic dilemma and argue that no non-dilemmic approach to it can be made to work. Along the way, there is discussion of octopuses, lobsters, and other ‘inscrutable cognizers’; the relationship between evaluative and prescriptive norms; a failed attempt to steal a Brueghel; epistemic and moral blame and residue; and many other exciting topics.
Oxford Epistemology Group, 14.00-15.30pm on Thursdays via Zoom. A weekly seminar of visiting speakers, work-in-progress talks, and discussion of recent work in epistemology, for faculty and graduate students. Please email Nick Hughes to be added to the mailing list.
Oxford Epistemology Group Convenor: Nick Hughes