This talk does two main things: first, it puts forth an account of the epistemic impermissibility of evidence resistance as an input-level cognitive malfunction: in resistance cases, on this view, our cognitive systems malfunction in that they fail to take up the opportunity to enhance closeness to function fulfilment - i.e. to generating knowledge - via taking up facts that one is in a position to know. Second, it defends the view against two objections. According to the first one (Williamson 2000), accounts like mine suffer from lack of extensional adequacy in that they overpredict epistemic failure. According to the second worry (Friedman 2020), accounts like mine suffer from lack of prior plausibility in that they overpredict normative conflict. I argue that my view is uniquely positioned to escape both worries.
Oxford Epistemology Group, 2:00-3:30pm on Thursdays via Zoom. A weekly seminar of visiting speakers, work-in-progress talks, and discussion of recent work in epistemology, for faculty and graduate students. Please email Nick Hughes to be added to the mailing list.
Oxford Epistemology Group Convenor: Nick Hughes