In this paper, I aim in various ways to generalise the case for the idea that to believe a proposition is to be disposed to use it as a premise in practical reasoning (i.e., to have a deliberative disposition towards it). First, I sketch three progressively more detailed pictures of the domain of cognitive attitudes, each of which implies the prevalence of deliberative dispositions. Second, I argue that the view that every doxastic attitude is some deliberative disposition is better motivated pre-theoretically than is its most prominent alternative, a credence-theoretic account of doxastic attitudes. Finally, I briefly explore the standing of a theoretically distinguished attitude of ‘outright’ belief in the context of the general picture.
Oxford Epistemology Group, a weekly seminar of visiting speakers, work-in-progress talks, and discussion of recent work in epistemology, for faculty and graduate students. Please email Nick Hughes to be added to the mailing list.
Oxford Epistemology Group Convenor: Nick Hughes