Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar (Monday - Week 8, TT26)

Abstract: There are many apparent examples of vague identity, i.e. examples where two objects appear to be neither determinately identical nor determinately different. Philosophers disagree on whether the nature of vagueness in identity is semantic or ontic/metaphysical. In this talk, I construct a novel many-valued semantic framework for vague identity. I show that this semantic framework is uniform: it works well with both a semantic and ontic conception of vague identity. I also argue that it has many other benefits and compare it with the alternatives. Finally I discuss Gareth Evans’ famous objection to vague identity in this new framework.

Registration: If you do not hold a University card which gives access to the upper floors of the Schwarzman Centre, please write to admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk copied to daniel.isaacson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.  

Please note: A notice will be sent out for each talk with the Zoom link.