Philosophy of Mind Visiting Speakers Seminar (Friday - Week 3, HT21)

Philosophy of mind


There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness---for instance, hallucinations---there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency---which we call the presentation problem---by (a) arguing that `conscious of' and related expressions are intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of `conscious of', but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.

People wishing to attend, will need to email Mike Martin, and will be sent a link for the meeting by the Thursday morning: the sessions will be secure, and each person who joins will need to be admitted to the session. So contacting Mike Martin ahead of time will be essential.


Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress convenor: Mike Martin and Dominic Alford-Duguid