Philosophy of Mind Visiting Speakers Seminar (Friday - Week 3, HT21)
There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness---for instance, hallucinations---there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency---which we call the presentation problem---by (a) arguing that `conscious of' and related expressions are intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of `conscious of', but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.
People wishing to attend, will need to email Mike Martin, and will be sent a link for the meeting by the Thursday morning: the sessions will be secure, and each person who joins will need to be admitted to the session. So contacting Mike Martin ahead of time will be essential.