Seth Grable (Oxford): The Hole Argument in Regards to the Equivalence Principle
In this paper I will present the Hole Argument as a theoretical condition on the deterministic evolution of diffeomorphically-invariant theories. It will be shown how diffeomophism-invariance arises out of Albert Einstein's Equivalence principle, a corner stone feature of General relativity. The Hole argument will then be presented in a modern context as it relates to the substantivalism debate following (Earman Norton,1987). A contemporary attempt to block the Hole Argument presented by (Weatherall, 2016) claims the Hole Argument is a product of misguided semantics derived from the formal syntax of GR, and further has no correlation to the substantivalism debate. Issue will be taken with both of Weatherall's claims by highlighting where the underpinnings of Weatherall's argument are in conflict with the Equivalence Principle, and further makes metaphysical assumptions.